Espinoza v. Leo's Construction Group, Inc.
Filing
38
ORDER granting 37 Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Final Judgment against Defendant. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $15,750.00. If Plaintiff intends to file a motion for attorney fees in this matter, Plaintiff is directed to do so on or before February 11, 2014. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 2/3/2014. (CH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
GUSTAVO ESPINOZA,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 8:13-cv-1094-T-33EAJ
LEO’S CONSTRUCTION GROUP, INC.,
Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court in consideration of
Plaintiff Gustavo Espinoza’s Motion for Entry of Default
Final Judgment against Defendant, Leo’s Construction Group,
Inc. (Doc. # 37), filed on January 8, 2014.
For the reasons
that follow, the Court grants the Motion.
I.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) provides: “When a
party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought
has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is
shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the
party’s default.”
A district court may enter a default
judgment against a properly served defendant who fails to
defend or otherwise appear pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55(b)(2). DirecTV, Inc. v. Griffin, 290 F. Supp. 2d
1340, 1343 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
The mere entry of a default by the Clerk does not, in
itself, warrant the Court entering a default judgment.
See
Tyco Fire & Sec. LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App’x 860, 863 (11th
Cir. 2007) (citing Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank,
515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)).
Rather, a Court must
ensure that there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for
the judgment to be entered.
Id.
A default judgment has the
effect of establishing as fact the plaintiff’s well-pled
allegations of fact and bars the defendant from contesting
those facts on appeal.
II.
Id.
Discussion
On
April
24,
2013,
Espinoza
initiated
this
action
against Leo’s Construction Group for recovery of overtime
compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §
201, et seq.
(Doc. # 1-2).
Within the Complaint, Espinoza
alleges that Leo’s Construction Group hired him in May of
2011 to work as a “laborer” in the Sarasota Memorial Hospital
construction site.
(Id. at ¶¶ 13-14).
Espinoza further
alleges that, “[f]rom at least May [of] 2011, and continuing
through October 31, 2012, Defendant failed to compensate
Plaintiff at a rate of one and one-half times Plaintiff’s
2
regular rate for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in
a single workweek.”
(Id. at ¶ 16).
More specifically, in
his answers to the Court’s interrogatories, Espinoza claims
that he “usually worked from Monday through Friday (7:00 a.m.
to 5:30 p.m.) and Saturday (7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.) . . .
doing
drywall,
framing,
similar tasks.”
Espinoza
fire-taping,
stencils,
and
other
on
Leo’s
(Doc. # 24-1 at 1).
effected
service
of
Construction Group on May 17, 2013.
process
(Doc. # 7 at 1).
In
June of 2013, the owner of Leo’s Construction Group sent a
letter
to
Espinoza’s
counsel
designated
as
an
“official
Answer and Response to the complaint filed in the [U.S.]
District Court.”
(Doc. # 10-2 at 2).
On June 14, 2013, the
Court entered an Order explaining that such correspondence
must be filed with the Court, and additionally explaining
that the Court could not accept the letter as an Answer on
behalf of Leo’s Construction Group because, in accordance
with Local Rule 2.03(e), a corporation may appear and be heard
only through counsel admitted to practice before this Court.
(Doc. # 11 at 2-3).
Leo’s Construction Group subsequently
retained counsel in this matter who filed an Answer and
Affirmative Defenses on behalf of the corporation (Doc. #
13), but the Court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw on
3
August 13, 2013 (Doc. # 22).
Despite the Court’s warning
regarding the possibility of default (see Doc. # 25), Leo’s
Construction Group has failed to appear in this action since
the withdrawal of counsel in August of 2013.
On October 9, 2013, the Court entered an Order granting
Espinoza’s motion to strike Leo’s Construction Group’s Answer
(Doc. # 30), and the Clerk filed an entry of default as to
Leo’s Construction Group on the same day (Doc. # 31).
On
January 8, 2014, after two deadline extensions granted by the
Court (Doc. ## 33, 35), Espinoza filed the instant Motion for
Entry of Default Final Judgment (Doc. # 37).
Based upon the Clerk’s entry of default, the wellpleaded
factual
Answers
to
allegations
Court
in
the
Interrogatories
Complaint,
filed
in
the
sworn
support
of
Espinoza’s Motion (Doc. # 37-1), and the Motion itself, the
Court determines that the Motion is due to be granted and
further determines that a hearing on this matter is not
needed.
Espinoza
is
entitled
to
an
award
of
overtime
compensation in the amount of $7,875.00, based on Espinoza’s
“conservative estimate” of 14 overtime hours per week for 75
weeks, for which he was paid his regular hourly rate of $15.00
4
rather than the appropriate overtime rate of $22.50. 1
amount
is
capable
of
accurate
and
ready
This
mathematical
computation and ascertainment from Espinoza’s sworn Answers
to Court Interrogatories.
Additionally, by statute, “[a]ny employer who violates
the provisions of [the FLSA] shall be liable to the employee
. . . affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages,
or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be,
and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29
U.S.C. § 216(b); see Davila v. Menendez, No. 12-11049, 2013
WL 2460199, at *6 (11th Cir. June 10, 2013) (“An employee
ordinarily is entitled to liquidated damages if her employer
violated the minimum wage laws.”). Espinoza claims that “[a]n
employer who seeks to avoid liquidated damages as a result of
violating the provisions of the FLSA bears the burden of
proving
that
its
violation
was
both
in
good
faith
and
predicated upon reasonable grounds.” (Doc. # 37 at 3) (citing
Joiner v. City of Macon, 814 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Espinoza further argues that Leo’s Construction Group “failed
to meet its burden to oppose the imposition of liquidated
1
Based on a regular hourly rate of $15.00, Espinoza is owed
$7.50 for each overtime hour worked. $7.50 X 14 (overtime
hours per week) = $105.00 per week. $105.00 per week X 75
weeks = $7,875.00 in overtime wages owed.
5
damages,
and
awarded.”
therefore
liquidated
damages
must
also
be
(Id.).
The Court agrees that liquidated damages are appropriate
in this case.
“When, as here, the defendant[ ] ha[s] not
presented a defense that the failure to pay . . . overtime
compensation was in good faith, the Court must also require
the employer to pay liquidated damages in an additional amount
equal
to
‘the
amount
compensation . . . .’”
of
their
unpaid
.
.
.
overtime
Fernandez v. Belly, Inc., No. 6:05-
cv-1074-Orl-31KRS, 2006 WL 5159188, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 23,
2006).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Espinoza is entitled
to a judgment against Leo’s Construction Group in the amount
of $15,750.00, representing his unpaid overtime wages of
$7,875.00 and an award of liquidated damages in the amount of
$7,875.00.
The Court thus directs the Clerk to enter a final
default judgment against Leo’s Construction Group and in
favor of Espinoza in the amount of $15,750.00.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)
Plaintiff Gustavo Espinoza’s Motion for Entry of Default
Final Judgment against Defendant, Leo’s Construction
Group, Inc. (Doc. # 37) is GRANTED.
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(2)
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of
Plaintiff
and
against
Defendant
in
the
amount
of
$15,750.00.
(3)
If Plaintiff intends to file a motion for attorney
fees in this matter, Plaintiff is directed to do so on
or before February 11, 2014.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 3rd
day of February, 2014.
Copies: All Counsel of Record
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