Castillo et al v. Groundlevel, Inc.
Filing
14
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 7 motion to dismiss and/or Motion for More Definite Statement. Signed by Judge James D. Whittemore on 10/1/2013. (KE)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
EUSEBIO CASTILLO et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case No.: 8:13-cv-01585-T-27TGW
vs.
GROUNDLEVEL, INC.,
Defendant.
--------------------------------------------------~'
ORDER
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for a More
Definite Statement (Dkt. 7), to which Plaintiffs have responded in opposition (Dkt. 8). Upon
consideration, the motion (Dkt. 7) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This case concerns Groundlevel's alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act. Plaintiffs were employed full-time by
Groundlevel to perform "restoration activities, including reforestation, wetland restoration and land
management activities in central Florida" (Dkt. 1 ~ 10). They were paid on a "piece-rate" based on
the number of trees or plants they planted during working hours. The piece rates allegedly failed to
equal the minimum wage and Groundlevel allegedly failed to pay time-and-a-half to Plaintiffs when
they exceeded 40 hours worked in a week. Groundlevel also allegedly failed to compensate Plaintiffs
for "offthe clock" work such as loading and unloading plants. 1
1Guadalupe
Cantoran and Julian Cantoran worked as chemical sprayers, rather than planters, and were paid at
a rate of$8.00 per hour. Plaintiffs allege that Guadalupe and Julian were not paid overtime wages.
1
In December 2012, Plaintiffs were recruited by Groundlevel to plant trees for one month near
Pensacola, Florida. Plaintiffs allege that Groundlevel "knowingly provided Plaintiffs with false and
misleading information" about the employment and failed to provide a written statement of the terms
and conditions of the employment, as required by the A WP A (Dkt. 1 ~~ 13, 14). Contrary to the
working arrangement under which Plaintiffs allege they were hired, Plaintiffs were allegedly paid
only minimum wage, rather than on a piece-rate basis, for their work in Pensacola, and Groundlevel
allegedly failed to pay overtime.
Groundlevel moves to dismiss the Complaint on several bases. Groundlevel argues that
Plaintiffs are exempt from the FLSA as agricultural workers, and that Plaintiffs have failed to
sufficiently plead a violation of the FLSA because the allegations, taken as true, do not permit the
justifiable inference that Groundlevel violated the FLSA. Groundlevel also argues that Plaintiffs
have failed to state a claim for a violation of the A WP A because the allegations do not establish that
Plaintiffs are "migrant agricultural workers," as defined in the A WPA, 29 U.S.C. § 1802(8)(A).
II.
STANDARD
A complaint should contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This Rule does not require detailed factual
allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, conclusory accusation of harm. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint must "plead all facts establishing an entitlement to
relief with more than 'labels and conclusions' or a 'formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action."' Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012)(quoting Bell At/. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
"The complaint must contain enough facts to make a claim for relief plausible on its face."
2
Resnick, 693 F.3d at 1324-25. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This plausibility
standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely
consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility
of entitlement to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "Determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
672 (2009)).
Although it is axiomatic that the Court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in the complaint, this tenet is "inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "While
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiffs favor.
St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Count I - Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
1.
Plaintiffs Adequately Allege a Prima Facie FLSA Violation.
Groundlevel argues that the Complaint does not contain "a factual basis on which the Court
can make a 'just and reasonable inference' as to the amount or extent of hours worked that is not
consistent with Plaintiffs' pay." This argument misconstrues the applicable pleading standard and
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the requirements of Twombly and Iqbal.
"To state a claim for failure to pay minimum (or overtime) wages under the FLSA, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that (1) he is employed by the defendant, (2) the defendant engaged in interstate
commerce, and (3) the defendant failed to pay him minimum or overtime wages." Freeman v. Key
Largo Volunteer Fire & Rescue Dep't, Inc., 494 Fed. Appx. 940, 942 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing
Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1277 n.68 (11th Cir. 2008)). The Complaint
alleges all three prongs. Nevertheless, Groundlevel contends that the allegations are "threadbare" and
are "more consistent with compliance, than violations" because they do not allow an inference "as
to the amount or extent of hours worked."
Although a "complaint must contain enough facts to make a claim for relief plausible on its
face," Resnick, 693 F.3d at 1324-25, Twombly and Iqbal do not demand "detailed factual
allegations." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Allegations of fact allowing the "reasonable inference" that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged are sufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Here, that reasonable inference is easily drawn from the Complaint. A
claim under the FLSA is not a complicated cause of action, and requiring detailed allegations of the
time worked would contravene principles of notice pleading and work against Rule 8(a)'s directive
that complaints contain only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see U.S. SecyofLaborv. Labbe, 319 Fed. Appx. 761,763
(11th Cir. 2008) ("Unlike the complex antitrust scheme at issue in Twombly that required allegations
of an agreement suggesting conspiracy, the requirements to state a claim of a FLSA violation are
quite straightforward."); Burton v. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla., 181 Fed. Appx. 829, 840 (11th Cir.
2006) ("Neither the FLSA nor the relevant case law contemplate, let alone require, such a heightened
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pleading standard for overtime wage claims.").
2.
The Complaint Is Not Due to Be Dismissed under the Agricultural
Employee Exemption.
Groundlevel contends that the FLSA claim must be dismissed because the Complaint
establishes that Plaintiffs are agricultural workers exempt from the overtime provisions of the
FLSA. 2 Plaintiffs respond that the claim survives because Groundlevel has not shown "plainly and
unmistakably" that the exemption applies.
Section 213 (b)( 12) exempts from the overtime provisions of§ 207 "any employee employed
in agriculture." Under the FLSA,
"Agriculture" includes fanning in all its branches and among other things
includes the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production,
cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural
commodities (including commodities defined as agricultural commodities
in section 1141j(g) of Title 12), the raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing
animals, or poultry, and any practice (including any forestry or lumbering
operations) performed by a fanner or on a farm as an incident to or in
conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation for
market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to
market.
29 U.S.C. § 203(f). The Secretary of Labor clarified that the § 203(f) definition of "agriculture"
contains two distinct meanings. 29 C.F.R. § 780.105(a). 3 The primary meaning of "agriculture"
includes "farming in all its branches." /d. § 780.105(b). The secondary meaning includes "any
practices, whether or not they are themselves farming practices, which are performed either by a
farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with 'such' farming operations." /d. §
780.105(c). Finally, "employees not employed in farming or by a farmer or on a farm are not
2 Groundlevel does not argue that the agricultural employee exemption found at § 213(b)(12) applies to
Plaintiffs' minimum wage claims.
3Appropriate deference must be accorded to the Secretary ofLabor's interpretations ofthe statutes he is charged
with enforcing. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984).
5
employed in agriculture." !d. § 780.105(d).
Without addressing the clarifying definitions propounded by the Secretary of Labor,
Groundlevel argues that Plaintiffs' work in "restoration and reforestation," including planting trees,
establishes that Plaintiffs were employed in agriculture. The Complaint does not, however, contain
any allegations that Plaintiffs worked in farming or for a farmer. Rather, drawing all inferences in
favor of Plaintiffs, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs were hired to reforest and restore nonfarming land by planting trees. This activity is not "agriculture," as defined by the FLSA and the
Secretary of Labor, and the overtime claim will not be dismissed on the basis of the agriculture
exemption. Accord 29 C.F.R. § 780.115 ("Trees grown in forests ... are not 'agricultural or
horticultural commodities.' ... It follows that employment in the production, cultivation, growing,
and harvesting of such trees ... is not sufficient to bring an employee within[§ 203(t)] unless the
operation is performed ... as an incident to or in conjunction with ... farming operations."). See
generally Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co., 349 U.S. 254, 260 (1955) (briefly examining the
evolution and scope of the agricultural exemption).
3.
Plaintiffs Fail to Allege that Groundlevel Is Engaged in Interstate
Commerce.
Although the FLSA claim survives both of Groundlevel's arguments, it fails in a more
fundamental manner arising upon a sua sponte review of the allegations. Sections 206 and 207 of
the FLSA apply only to employees "engaged in commerce," engaged "in the production of goods for
commerce," or employed "in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce."4 29 U.S.C. § 206(a); 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(l); see Freeman, 494 Fed. Appx. at 942.
4An "[e]nterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" is an enterprise that "has
employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or that has employees handling, selling,
or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person," and
6
"Commerce" is defined in § 203 as "trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the
several States or between any State and any place outside thereof." § 203(b) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, for employees to invoke the FLSA, their work, or that of the enterprise for which they
work, must touch interstate commerce in some way. See Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448
F .3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006)("[F]or an employee to be 'engaged in commerce' under the FLSA,
he must be directly participating in the actual movement of persons or things in interstate commerce
.... ").s
In the Complaint, Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts allowing a reasonable inference that
Groundlevel is involved in interstate commerce or the work Plaintiffs performed for Groundlevel
touched on interstate commerce. Paragraph 9 alleges that Groundlevel is "an enterprise ... engaged
in commerce, within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act," but such legal conclusions are
disregarded for the purpose of determining whether a cause of action is adequately pleaded. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations."). Absent other factual allegations supporting the legal
conclusion that Groundlevel is an "enterprise" engaged in "commerce" within the meaning of the
FLSA, Count I must be dismissed. Cf Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d
"whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000." 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(l)(A).
5The question of whether Groundlevel is an enterprise engaged in "commerce" is jurisdictional. See Johnston
v. Spacefone Corp., 706 F.2d 1178, 1180 (lith Cir. 1983) (specifying the issue on appeal as "whether Johnston meets
the FLSA' s jurisdictional requirements because he was either 'engaged in production ofgoods or commerce' or 'engaged
in commerce' while employed by Spacefone."). But cj Turcios v. Delicias Hispanas Corp., 275 Fed. Appx. 879, 882
(11th Cir. 2008) (refusing to address whether enterprise coverage is a ''jurisdictional prerequisite," and holding that the
question of enterprise coverage is "intertwined with the merits of an FLSA claim"); Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d
26, 33 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that the annual dollar value element of enterprise coverage is not jurisdictional);
Navegar, Inc. v. U.S., 192 F.3d 1050, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("[C]ongressional fmdings in the original FLSA that subpart labor conditions in manufacture carried on in one state could cause interstate commerce to be used to spread poor
labor conditions . . ., burden the flow of commerce, and constitute an unfair method of competition in interstate
commerce served to adequately explain the connection between the labor conditions of the newly-protected employees
and interstate commerce.").
7
1292, 1317 (lith Cir. 20li) (granting summary judgment on FLSA claim where evidence
demonstrated, among other things, that none of defendant's employees utilized goods or materials
that had previously moved in interstate commerce); Navarro v. Broeny Automotive Repairs, Inc., 314
Fed. Appx. 179, 180 (lith Cir. 2008) (affirming summary judgment on FLSA claim in favor of
defendant where plaintiff collected automobile parts that were previously in the stream of interstate
commerce and used them to repair foreign and domestic vehicles. These responsibilities "merely
affected and did not implicate interstate commerce." (internal quotations omitted)); Sandoval v. Fla.
Paradise Lawn Maintenance, Inc., No. 07-22298-CIV, 2008 WL 1777392 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2008)
(granting summary judgment on FLSA claim because plaintiff failed to meet the interstate commerce
requirement where the defendant lawn company did not conduct business outside Florida, rely on
trade or commerce from outside Florida, or purchase products, plants, or trees from outside Florida).
B.
Count II - Violation of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers
Protection Act
The AWPA is designed to "remove the restraints on commerce caused by activities
detrimental to migrant and seasonal agricultural workers." 29 U.S.C. § 1801. It is a "remedial statute
and should be construed broadly to effect its humanitarian purpose." Caro-Ga/van v. Curtis
Richardson, Inc., 993 F.2d 1500, 1505 (lith Cir. 1993)(citing Bracamontes v. Weyerhaeuser Co.,
840 F.2d 271,276 (5th Cir. 1988)).
Groundlevel argues that Count II must be dismissed because Plaintiffs have not alleged they
are "migrant agricultural workers" within the meaning of the AWP A. 6 To qualify as a "migrant
agricultural worker," one "must be 'employed in agricultural employment of a seasonal or other
6The Complaint does not allege, nor do Plaintiffs argue, that they fall within the definition of seasonal
agricultural workers.
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temporary nature,' and must be 'required to be absent overnight from his [or her] permanent place
of residence."' Caro-Ga/van, 993 F.2d at 1504 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1802(8)(A)).
There is no dispute that Plaintiffs were required to be absent overnight from their places of
residence. Rather, Groundlevel contests the first requirement, arguing that Plaintiffs do not allege
facts establishing their employment was "of a seasonal or other temporary nature. " 7 Labor is
performed on a seasonal basis "where, ordinarily, the employment pertains to or is of the kind
exclusively performed at certain seasons or periods of the year and which, from its nature, may not
be continuous or carried on throughout the year." 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(s)(l). Ultimately, the
''touchstone for seasonality is whether the employee is involved in field work." Caro-Ga/van, 993
F.2d at 1508. "Field work" includes ''planting, cultivating or harvesting operations." 29 C.F.R. §
500.20(r)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).
The dispositive question, therefore, is whether Plaintiffs' alleged employment in
"reforestation" while in Pensacola, Florida constitutes "field work" withing the meaning of §
500.20(r)(2)(ii). Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, it unquestionably does. Reforestation
involves the planting of seeds and young trees, and "planting" falls squarely within the definition of
field work. 8
The fact that Plaintiffs work full-time for Groundlevel at another location on another task
does not obviate the reasonable inference that Plaintiffs are seasonal workers. The AWPA was
intended to cover "some persons working year-round for the same agricultural employer" and ''yearround employment may qualify as seasonal within the meaning of the AWPA." Caro-Ga/van, 993
7Groundlevel
does not argue that Plaintiffs are not "employed in agricultural employment."
8Merriam-Webster defines "reforestation" as ''the action of renewing forest cover (as by natural seeding or by .
the artificial planting ofseeds or young trees." Reforestation, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reforestation
(last visited Aug. 17, 2013) (emphasis added).
9
F.2d at 1507, 1508; see 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(s)(1)("A worker who moves from one seasonal activity
to another, while employed in agriculture or performing agricultural labor, is employed on a seasonal
basis even though he may continue to be employed during a major portion of the year."). This
conclusion is consistent with the remedial nature of the A WP A and Congressional intent that the
AWPA be construed broadly. See Caro-Ga/van, 993 F.2d at 1505.
Accordingly,
1) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for a More Definite Statement (Dkt. 7) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
2) Count I is DISMISSED without prejudice.
3) Plaintiffs are GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint within fourteen days of the
date ofthis Order.
I$~
DONE AND ORDERED this ___l___:_ day of October, 2013.
Copies to: Counsel of Record
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