Langa v. Secretary, Department of Corrections et al
Filing
44
OPINION AND ORDER. Langa's petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment against Langa and to close this case. It is further ORDERED that Langa is not entitled to a certificate of appealability and he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis. Signed by Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell on 2/14/2017. (BGS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
STEPHEN C. LANGA,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 8:13-cv-2569-T-36AEP
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
______________________________/
ORDER
Petitioner Stephen C. Langa, an inmate in the Florida Department of Corrections
proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt.
1). He challenges his convictions entered by the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit,
Pasco County, Florida. Respondent filed a response (Dkt. 22), and Langa filed a reply
(Dkt. 33). Upon review, the petition must be denied.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Langa pleaded no contest to four counts of robbery and two counts of trafficking in
illegal drugs. (Dkt. 24, Ex. 2, p. 96.) He received concurrent sentences of 15 years in
prison on all counts. (Id., pp. 100-02.) The sentences on the trafficking charges were
minimum mandatory terms. (Id., p. 100.) Langa did not file a direct appeal. Langa’s
motions for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and
motions to correct illegal sentence under Rule 3.800(a) were rejected by the state court.
(Dkt. 1-1, pp. 25-28; Dkt. 24, Exs. 5, 5A, 11, 12, 18; Dkt. 40, Exs. 25, 26.)
Page 1 of 22
TIMELINESS OF LANGA’S FEDERAL HABEAS PETITION
Respondent contends that Langa’s federal habeas petition is untimely. The AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides a one-year period
of limitation for filing a § 2254 federal habeas petition. This period runs from the later of
“the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The limitation
period is tolled for “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending. . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
The state court judgment was entered on August 29, 2008. It became final upon
expiration of the 30-day period to file a direct appeal. See Booth v. State, 14 So.3d 291,
292 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Gust v. State, 535 So.2d 642, 643 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
Accordingly, after his judgment became final, Langa’s AEDPA limitation period began
running on September 29, 2008.
Langa apparently filed a motion to correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) in April 2009. Specifically, the date stamp on the motion
reflects Langa provided it to prison officials for mailing on April 20, 2009, after 204 days of
untolled time passed. (Dkt. 1-1, p. 25.) The state court record does not reflect any docket
entry showing this motion was received and docketed by the Clerk of the State Circuit Court
in April 2009. (Dkt. 24, Exs. 3, 3A.) In 2013, however, it appears that Langa filed a motion
to hear and rule. (Dkt 1-1, p. 27.) As a result, the state court dismissed Langa’s underlying
Rule 3.800(a) motion, noting that it was “filed in April of 2009.” (Dkt. 1-1, p. 27.) It is clear
that the state court accepted the motion as having been filed in April 2009. Accordingly,
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this Court considers the April 20, 2009 Rule 3.800(a) motion as a tolling application for
determining timeliness under § 2244(d). The state court’s order of dismissal was filed on
April 12, 2013. (Id., pp. 27-28.) Langa did not file an appeal. At this time, however, his
appeal of the state court’s order denying a May 1, 2012 Rule 3.800(a) motion was already
pending. The state court’s order was affirmed on June 19, 2013, and the appellate court’s
mandate issued on August 20, 2013. (Dkt. 24, Exs. 20, 23.) Another 44 days, for a total
of 248 days of untolled time, passed before Langa filed his federal habeas petition on
October 3, 2013. Therefore, the habeas petition is timely under § 2244(d).
EXHAUSTION OF STATE COURT REMEDIES; PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
Before a district court can grant habeas relief to a state prisoner under § 2254, the
petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging his
conviction, either on direct appeal or in a state postconviction motion.
28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (“[T]he state prisoner
must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those
claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.”). See also Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d
880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief cannot raise a
federal constitutional claim in federal court unless he first properly raised the issue in the
state courts.”) (citations omitted). A state prisoner “‘must give the state courts one full
opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the
State’s established appellate review process,’ including review by the state’s court of last
resort, even if review in that court is discretionary.” Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1358-59
(11th Cir. 2003) (quoting O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845).
To exhaust a claim, a petitioner must make the state court aware of both the legal
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and factual bases for his claim. See Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir.
1998) (“Exhaustion of state remedies requires that the state prisoner ‘fairly presen[t] federal
claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass on and correct
alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’”) (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,
365 (1995)). A federal habeas petitioner “shall not be deemed to have exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State . . . if he has the right under the law of the
State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” Pruitt, 348 F.3d at
1358. The prohibition against raising an unexhausted claim in federal court extends to both
the broad legal theory of relief and the specific factual contention that supports relief.
Kelley v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1344 (11th Cir. 2004). The requirement of
exhausting state remedies as a prerequisite to federal review is satisfied if the petitioner
“fairly presents” his claim in each appropriate state court and alerts that court to the federal
nature of the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76
(1971).
The doctrine of procedural default provides that “[i]f the petitioner has failed to
exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default
which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is established.” Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d
1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). To establish cause for a procedural default, a petitioner “must
demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise
the claim properly in state court.” Wright v. Hopper, 169 F. 3d 695, 703 (11th Cir. 1999).
See also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986). To show prejudice, a petitioner must
demonstrate not only that the errors at his trial created the possibility of prejudice but that
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they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage and infected the entire trial with
error of constitutional dimensions. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). The
petitioner must show at least a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Henderson,
353 F.3d at 892; Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2002).
Alternatively, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally
defaulted claim if review is necessary to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96.
A
fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs in an extraordinary case where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent.
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. This exception
requires a petitioner’s “actual” innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th
Cir. 2001). To meet this standard, a petitioner must show a reasonable likelihood of
acquittal absent the constitutional error. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
DISCUSSION
Langa raises nine claims for relief in his federal habeas petition. The record reflects
that Langa’s four robbery charges resulted from his taking oxycontin from pharmacies. His
trafficking charges were based on the amount of oxycontin that he took on two of these
occasions. In Ground One, Langa argues that his plea to the trafficking charges was
involuntary due to an insufficient factual basis. In Ground Two, Langa alleges that his
minimum mandatory sentences are illegal. In Ground Three, he alleges (A) that his plea
was involuntary because the trial court failed to have him evaluated for competency and
(B) that he was incompetent to enter his plea. In Ground Four, he argues that counsel was
ineffective for failing to secure a written order that he undergo a competency evaluation and
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for failing to determine whether he could make a knowing, intelligent decision to enter a
plea. In Ground Five, Langa asserts that his plea was involuntary because counsel failed
to advise him of his “alternative choices.” In Ground Six, Langa argues that counsel was
ineffective for not deposing Trisha Glenn, the victim of two of the robberies. In Ground
Seven, he contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and
prepare a defense given the alleged lack of factual support for the charges. In Ground
Eight, Langa argues that counsel was ineffective for not addressing the elements of the
crimes with him and not ensuring that he understood the nature of the charges to which he
pleaded. In Ground Nine, he alleges that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence
and that counsel was ineffective for allowing an allegedly erroneous statement by Glenn
to go uncorrected.
Voluntariness Of Langa’s Plea
The record reflects that Langa’s plea was voluntary. The standard for determining
the validity of a guilty plea is “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). “A reviewing federal court may set aside a state court guilty plea
only for failure to satisfy due process: ‘If a defendant understands the charges against him,
understands the consequences of a guilty plea, and voluntarily chooses to plead guilty,
without being coerced to do so, the guilty plea . . . will be upheld on federal review.’” Stano
v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1141 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d
873, 882 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Although a defendant’s statements during a plea colloquy are not insurmountable,
“the representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at [a plea hearing],
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as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable
barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry
a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). “[W]hen
a defendant makes statements under oath at a plea colloquy, he bears a heavy burden to
show his statements were false.” United States v. Rogers, 848 F.2d 166, 168 (11th Cir.
1988).
The change of plea hearing transcript reflects the following exchanges during the
plea colloquy:
THE COURT: And you read over this three-page plea form with your
attorney?
DEFENDANT LANGA: Yes, I did.
THE COURT: And today it’s my understanding that you’re entering a plea of
no contest to four counts of robbery, second-degree felonies, each carrying
15 years in prison maximum possible.
And on the trafficking illegal drugs, they’re still first-degree felonies,
they carry up to 30 years in prison, and the State has amended them such
that they would reflect a 15-year minimum mandatory,[1] and $100,000 fine on
each of those counts. Are you aware of that, sir?
DEFENDANT LANGA: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand by entering this plea to these charges,
you’re waiving your constitutional rights?
DEFENDANT LANGA: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You’re waiving your right to a trial by jury, and because of your
plea, there will not be a trial; the right to require the State to prove the
charges beyond a reasonable doubt; the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses; the right to testify; also the right not to be a witness against
1
The record reflects that the trafficking charges carried 25-year minimum mandatory terms but that
the State amended them to carry 15-year minimum mandatory terms in accordance with the plea agreement.
(Dkt. 24, Ex. 2, pp. 93-95.)
Page 7 of 22
yourself; the right to call witnesses on your behalf; the right to present any
defenses that might apply; and also the right to appeal all matters related to
the judgment, including guilt or innocence except for post-conviction matters.
Sir, do you understand all those rights you’re waiving by entering this
plea?
DEFENDANT LANGA: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you entering this plea freely and voluntarily?
DEFENDANT LANGA: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you, promised you anything, or
coerced you into entering this plea?
DEFENDANT LANGA: No, sir.
THE COURT: Are you entering this plea because it’s in your own best
interest to do so?
DEFENDANT LANGA: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Are you under the influence of drugs or alcohol today?
DEFENDANT LANGA: No, sir.
THE COURT: Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental or emotional
illness?
DEFENDANT LANGA: Yes.
THE COURT: What is that, sir?
DEFENDANT LANGA: Major depression. General anxiety.
THE COURT: Is that in any way affecting the decision you’re reached to
enter this plea today?
DEFENDANT LANGA: No, sir.
THE COURT: And are you taking medication for that at this time?
DEFENDANT LANGA: Yes.
THE COURT: Is the medication in any way clouding your judgment today as
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to entering this plea?
DEFENDANT LANGA: No, sir.
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the help and advice your attorney has
given you?
DEFENDANT LANGA: Yes.
THE COURT: Has she reviewed with you what in the way of evidence would
be required by the State to prove these charges and discussed with you all
possible defenses?
DEFENDANT LANGA: Yes, sir.
...
THE COURT: For purposes of the plea, [counsel], do you stipulate to the
affidavits and approve?
[COUNSEL]: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: I find there’s sufficient factual basis, a prima facie showing as
to each of the counts in each of the files.
Sir, I accept your plea. I find you to be alert and intelligent, you freely
and voluntarily have entered your plea, you understand your rights and have
waived your rights upon the advice of competent counsel with whom you’ve
expressed satisfaction.
(Dkt. 24, Ex. 2, pp. 96-100.) The record reflects that Langa understood the charges to
which he pleaded, the maximum penalties he faced, and the rights he waived by electing
not to proceed to trial. It also shows that Langa was not forced, coerced, or threatened into
entering his plea. Accordingly, the record demonstrates that Langa’s plea was voluntary.
Waiver Of Nonjurisdictional Claims Not Challenging Voluntariness Of The Plea
Langa’s plea of nolo contendere waives all nonjurisdictional claims that do not
concern the plea’s voluntariness. Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir.
1992) (“A defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional challenges to
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the constitutionality of the conviction, and only an attack on the voluntary and knowing
nature of the plea can be sustained.”).2 See also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267
(1973) (“[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in
the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that
he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise
independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to
the entry of the guilty plea.”). Grounds Six, Seven, and Nine are waived because they raise
nonjurisdictional claims involving matters prior to the plea but do not challenge the
voluntariness of the plea.
Procedurally Defaulted Claims
Langa may challenge the voluntariness of his plea. See Wilson, 962 F.2d at 997.
See also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989) (“[W]hen the judgment of
conviction upon a guilty plea has become final and the offender seeks to reopen the
proceeding, the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both
counseled and voluntary.”); Duhart v. United States, 556 Fed. App’x 897, 898 (11th Cir.
2014) (Although “a defendant’s knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives all
nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings . . . a defendant can still maintain an attack on
the voluntary and knowing nature of the guilty plea itself.”). To the extent Langa’s
remaining claims challenge the voluntariness of the plea or concern the sentence imposed
after the plea, however, they are procedurally defaulted.
2
Langa’s nolo contendere plea is subject to the same analysis as a guilty plea. Wallace v. Turner,
695 F.2d 545, 548 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The fundamental constitutional consideration when a petitioner
challenges his plea is whether it was voluntary. The rule is the same for pleas of guilty or nolo contendere.”).
See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 495 n.5 (1983) (stating that “[u]nder Florida law, a plea of nolo
contendere is equivalent to a plea of guilty.”).
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Procedural Default Due To Failure To Exhaust Federal Claim In State Court
First, the federal claims raised in Grounds One, Three(A), Four, Five, and Eight,
which directly or implicitly challenge the voluntariness of Langa’s plea, are unexhausted
due to Langa’s failure to expressly raise the federal components of these claims in state
court. (Dkt. 24, Ex. 11.) Langa cannot return to state court to file an untimely, successive
postconviction motion. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b), (h). Accordingly, any unexhausted
federal claims raised in the habeas petition are procedurally defaulted. See Smith, 256
F.3d at 1138.3
Procedural Default Due To State Court’s Resolution Of Claims On An Independent And
Adequate State Procedural Basis
Furthermore, even assuming the state court may have considered these allegations
of involuntary plea and ineffective assistance as federal claims, they are still procedurally
defaulted. Ground Two, which contains an exhausted federal claim, is also procedurally
defaulted.
This is because the state court resolved Langa’s federal claims on an
3
The response does not address Langa’s failure to raise a federal claim with respect to Grounds One,
Four, Five, and Eight. Notwithstanding the default of these grounds on this basis, however, the claims are
without merit. In Ground One Langa claims that no factual basis existed for the trafficking charges. He claims
that Glenn, the pharmacist listed as the victim of both charges, untruthfully told law enforcement that she
provided him with oxycontin. He asserts that Glenn’s statements are false because after he ingested the pills
on one of these occasions and was taken to the hospital, his blood tests showed no presence of oxycontin.
Langa admitted the facts against him. United States v. Brown, 752 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2014) (a guilty
plea admits all the elements of a formal criminal charge). Moreover, he has not offered any evidence in
support of his factual assertion that Glenn lied about the substance she provided him, rendering his claim
speculative and unsubstantiated. Finally, the results of his blood tests fail to prove that he did not at some
point possess the oxycontin, as he admitted. In Ground Four, Langa alleges counsel was ineffective for not
having his competency evaluated and determining whether he could knowingly enter a plea. This claim is
without merit because, as discussed in Ground Three(B), infra, Langa does not show that he was incompetent
to proceed with the plea. The record refutes Ground Five, in which Langa asserts that his plea was
involuntary because he did not understand his alternatives. Langa understood that he gave up his right to a
trial, and counsel told the court that he was not interested in a trial. (Dkt. 24, Ex. 2, pp. 89, 97.) Ground Eight,
in which Langa asserts that counsel did not review with him the elements of the crimes and ensure he
understood the nature of the offense, is also refuted by the record. Langa told the court that counsel
addressed with him what evidence the State would need to present to prove the charges against him. (Id., pp.
98-99.) None of these grounds warrants relief.
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independent and adequate state procedural basis.
The argument raised in Ground Two of the federal habeas petition was presented
in Langa’s May 1, 2012 Rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. In denying the
motion, the state court found that Langa’s assertion was not cognizable in a Rule 3.800(a)
motion because it involved a factual issue that could not be determined from the face of the
record. (Dkt. 24, Ex. 18, p. 57.)4 The state court further found that Langa’s claim could not
be considered under Rule 3.850 because it would be untimely under that rule. (Id.)5 A
motion must be filed under Rule 3.850 no later than two years after the judgment and
sentence became final, unless an exception to this time limitation applies. Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.850.
The remaining arguments presented in Langa’s federal habeas petition were raised
in his April 12, 2011 Rule 3.850 postconviction motion. The state court found the motion
untimely under Rule 3.850 because more than two years had passed since Langa’s
conviction and sentence became final and he did not establish the applicability of any
exception to the time limitation. (Dkt. 24, Ex. 12.) Therefore, although its orders reflect the
claims were cognizable under Rule 3.850, the state court did not consider the claims on
their merits because they were not raised before the two-year filing deadline expired.
A federal habeas petitioner’s failure to present a claim in accordance with state
procedural rules generally precludes federal habeas review of the claim. Coleman v.
4
See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a) (“A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it . . .
when it is affirmatively alleged that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to that
relief . . .”).
5
Unlike Rule 3.800(a), Rule 3.850 provides for evidentiary hearings, thus allowing for findings of fact
by the court. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(8).
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Thompson, 501 U.S. 722(1991); Caniff v. Moore, 269 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir.2001)
(“[C]laims that have been held to be procedurally defaulted under state law cannot be
addressed by federal courts.”).
“However, a state court's rejection of a federal
constitutional claim on procedural grounds will only preclude federal review if the state
procedural ruling rests upon [an] ‘independent and adequate’ state ground.” Judd v. Haley,
250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir.2001). A state court’s procedural ruling constitutes an
independent and adequate state rule of decision if (1) the last state court rendering a
judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that it is relying upon a state procedural
rule to resolve the federal claim without reaching the merits of the claim, (2) the state
court’s decision rests solidly on state law grounds and is not intertwined with an
interpretation of federal law, and (3) the state procedural rule is not applied in an “arbitrary
or unprecedented fashion,” or in a “manifestly unfair manner.” Id. (citing Card v. Dugger,
911 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir.1990)).
The state court applied a state procedural rule setting forth a time limit to bring
postconviction claims. Rule 3.850 clearly provides that, absent specific exceptions, claims
must be raised under that Rule within two years of the date the judgment and sentence
become final. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b). Langa makes no allegation or showing that this
subsection of the Rule is not firmly established and regularly followed.6 The state appellate
court approved the postconviction court’s application of this procedural rule when it affirmed
the orders rejecting both Langa’s third Rule 3.850 motion and his Rule 3.800(a) motion.
(Dkt. 24, Exs. 15, 20.) Accordingly, Langa’s arguments are procedurally defaulted because
6
See Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011) (to be considered adequate, a state procedural bar
must be firmly established and regularly followed).
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they were rejected on an independent and adequate state procedural ground. See Harris
v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989) (independent and adequate state procedural default
bars review of a federal claim unless petitioner meets cause and prejudice or fundamental
miscarriage of justice exception).
Langa Does Not Overcome The Procedural Default Of Any Claims
Apparently recognizing the procedural default of his claims, Langa asserts that he
meets the cause and prejudice exception to overcome the default. He alleges that four
factors impeded his ability to properly raise his claims to the state postconviction court: his
mental health status; the Clerk of the state Circuit Court’s refusal to provide him with
documentation necessary to bring his claims; his lack of legal education; and the state
court’s refusal to accept the claims as timely. However, none of these reasons is sufficient
to establish cause.
Mental Health
First, Langa argues that “his severe mental illness pre-arrest, pre-trial and postconviction is an ‘extraordinary circumstance which was beyond his control’ and said illness
completely precluded him from being able to timely file his constitutional claims to the State
within the two-year time limitation.” (Dkt. 1, p. 32.) In his reply, Langa explains that he was
“in a continual mental state of hopelessness, suicidal ideation, experienced debilitating
fatigue (physical and mental), had virtually no present ability to concentrate on or
comprehend complex written or oral subject matter and concepts; was under extreme
stress (which further aggravated underlying mental instability) and could only perform the
most basic of functions.” (Dkt. 33, p. 15.) Langa asserts that, at some point, he was found
to be disabled by the federal government due to psychiatric conditions, and that he was
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committed to a psychiatric hospital under the Baker Act7 following an attempted suicide.
(Id.)
Langa states that he took a large amount of pills in a suicide attempt following one
of the robberies. He attaches to his federal habeas petition documentation from behavioral
health centers and the Department of Corrections.
A psychiatric evaluation and
comprehensive mental status examination report dated July, 14, 2007,8 reflects Langa’s
suicidal ideations and diagnoses of major depressive disorder and opiate withdrawal. (Dkt.
1-1, p. 62.) A risk assessment also dated July 14, 2007, provides that Langa experienced
depression, a drug problem, psychosocial stressors, and suicidality, and was a danger to
himself. (Dkt. 1-1, pp. 64-65.)
A May 12, 2011 Department of Corrections’ Summary of Outpatient Mental Health
Care provides that Langa’s treatment focused on major depression and anxiety. It noted
that Langa complied with mental health treatment and illustrated progress from month to
month. The initial diagnoses of “major depres. unspecified,” “alcohol dependence,” and
“plysubstance [sic] dependence” were not listed under the “ending diagnosis” section. (Id.,
p. 67.) The report recommended “after-care follow-up,” particularly for substance abuse
and polysubstance abuse. (Id., p. 68.)
“Cause exists if there was ‘some objective factor external to the defense [that]
impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule.’” Mize v. Hall, 532
F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).
7
§§ 394.451-.47891, Fla. Stat. The Baker Act is also referred to as “The Florida Mental Health Act.”
8
It appears Langa was arrested on July 13, 2007. (Dkt. 24, Ex. 11, Offense Incident Report.)
Page 15 of 22
Courts have determined that a petitioner’s mental health concerns must actually cause a
procedural default of his claim to excuse the default. See Smith v. Newsome, 876 F.2d
1461, 1465-66 (11th Cir. 1989) (petitioner’s “general mental condition is not legal cause for
his default” when he acted in a rational manner in state proceedings); Farabee v. Johnson,
129 Fed. App’x 799, 804 (4th Cir. 2005) (“It is not enough for a petitioner to show that there
existed at the time of his procedural defaults certain conditions external to the defense; the
petitioner must show that those external conditions actually ‘impeded [his] efforts to comply’
with procedural requirements and thus caused his default.”); Ervin v. Delo, 194 F.3d 908,
916 (8th Cir. 1999) (because petitioner’s “alleged depression did not hinder his ability to file
a pro se postconviction motion,” his depression “could not amount to cause excusing
Ervin’s procedural default”); Holt v. Bowersox, 191 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir. 1999) (for mental
illness to constitute cause, “there must be a conclusive showing that mental illness
interfered with a petitioner’s ability to appreciate his or her position and make rational
decisions regarding his or her case at the time during which he or she should have pursued
post-conviction relief.”).
Langa’s allegation of cause is conclusory, and he has not demonstrated that his
failure to timely bring his postconviction claims was caused by his mental health diagnoses
or issues. His first postconviction motion was timely filed under Rule 3.850. (Dkt. 40, Ex.
25.) His sole ground for relief in that motion is raised in an intelligible and coherent
manner. The state court readily discerned his allegation in its order denying the motion.
(Dkt. 40, Ex. 26.) Similarly, Langa’s April 2009 jail credit motion is easily comprehensible
and the state court’s order reflects that it had no difficulty recognizing his claim. Langa’s
behavior at the change of plea hearing also indicates that he acted rationally, participated
Page 16 of 22
in the proceedings, and gave appropriate answers to the court’s questions. (Dkt. 24, Ex.
2.)
Langa does not establish that his mental health prevented him from prosecuting his
postconviction claims or complying with state procedural requirements. The only record
documentation he submits that involves his mental state at and after the time of his
conviction is the Department of Corrections’ report. This report provides no indication that
during the two years to file a timely Rule. 3.850 motion,9 Langa’s mental health condition
affected him such that he could not prepare and file a motion raising his federal claims.
Langa has not demonstrated that his mental health condition caused the default of his
claims.
Clerk Of The State Circuit Court’s Refusal To Provide Documents
Langa asserts that the Clerk of the state Circuit Court’s “consistent non-compliance
with numerous Public Record requests for pertinent files, reports and other sources of
information relevant to his case as well as misleading, erroneous presentations as to
availability and associated costs of these records . . . only served to delay Petitioner[’]s
timely access to the necessary information to cogently assess, and present his valid
constitutional claim.” (Dkt. 1, p. 32.) Specifically, he contends that the Clerk inaccurately
informed his sister that a copy of the change of plea hearing transcript would cost
$1,200.00 because it was 1,200 pages long. (Id., p. 33.) He claims the Clerk’s actions
“lulled Petitioner into a futile expiration of his 2 year postconviction relief filing time.” (Id.)
In determining cause, “[a]n external impediment includes ‘interference by state
9
The state court determined that Langa’s deadline to file a timely Rule 3.850 motion expired on
September 30, 2010. (Dkt. 24, Ex. 12.)
Page 17 of 22
officials’ that prevented a petitioner from raising a claim.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144,
1176 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mize, 532 F.3d at 1190). Langa fails to establish that the
Clerk’s alleged non-compliance with public records requests constitutes cause to excuse
the procedural default of his claims. Langa’s claim is too vague to warrant relief because
it does not clarify or explain how any specific record documents were necessary to timely
bring his claims.
Langa presented the claims raised in his federal habeas petition in an untimely
manner in his April 12, 2011 postconviction motion and his May 1, 2012 motion to correct
illegal sentence. He did so with a limited number of supporting documents.10 Langa does
not show that he could not have presented the claims timely without any documentation,
because he fails to allege or demonstrate that a certain document contained information
that enabled him to discern and bring a claim for relief. Langa has not established that a
lack of documentation constituted an external factor that impeded his ability to comply with
state procedural rules and timely raise his federal claims in state court. Therefore, he fails
to show that the Clerk of the Circuit Court’s alleged non-compliance with his records
requests constitutes cause to overcome the default of his claims.
Pro Se Status And Lack of Legal Knowledge
Langa asserts that cause is established because he is a pro se litigant with no legal
education or experience attempting to bring complex issues before the courts. This
10
Langa attached medical records and police reports to his motions. He does not state when he
obtained these reports and whether they were items he sought from the Clerk. However, there is no indication
that he received documentation from the Clerk or the state court when he filed these untimely claims. Langa’s
requests seeking documentation from the state court were denied after he raised his claims in his April 12,
2011 Rule 3.850 motion and his May 1, 2012 Rule 3.800(a) motion. (Dkt. 24, Ex. 18, pp. 73-86; Dkt. 33-3,
p. 4.) Additionally, the change of plea hearing transcript was prepared and filed after he submitted these
motions. (Dkt. 24, Ex. 2.)
Page 18 of 22
allegation is insufficient to establish cause to overcome the procedural default of Langa’s
federal claims. See McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992) (petitioner’s
lack of legal education did not constitute cause to overcome procedural default of untimely
claims); Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1275 (11th Cir. 1990) (pro se status does not
suffice to establish cause); Smith, 876 F.2d at 1465 (11th Cir. 1989) (illiteracy, lack of
education, and failure to act or think like an attorney do not amount to cause).
State Court’s Refusal To Accept Claims As Timely
The state court denied Langa’s claims as untimely filed under Rule 3.850. Langa
asserted in bringing his third Rule 3.850 motion that his claims should be considered due
to his mental health issues, lack of documents from the Clerk, and lack of legal knowledge.
(Dkt. 24, Ex. 11, pp. 1-6.)
However, it was not the state court’s rejection of his
postconviction claims as untimely that prevented Langa from bringing his federal claims
within the time permitted by Rule 3.850. Therefore, he fails to show that the state court’s
adherence to the time limitation of Rule 3.850 amounts to cause to excuse his procedural
default.
Accordingly, Langa has not established cause and prejudice to overcome the
procedural default of the claims presented in his federal habeas petition. He does not
argue or demonstrate that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies.
Consequently, his procedurally defaulted claims are barred from federal habeas review.
Allegation Of Substantive Due Process Violation Based on Langa’s Alleged Incompetency
To Enter A Plea
In Ground Three(B), Langa asserts that he raises a “substantial” competency
challenge and claims that his federal due process rights have been violated because “his
Page 19 of 22
competency was in doubt” when he was prosecuted. (Dkt. 1, p. 16.) The Court interprets
Langa’s argument as raising a substantive due process claim that he was incompetent to
proceed when he entered his plea. This claim is not considered procedurally defaulted.
See Wright v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The district
court’s ruling that Wright had procedurally defaulted his substantive due process mental
competency claim is contrary to the law of this circuit that such claims generally cannot be
defaulted.”). Langa makes similar allegations to those offered in support of his cause
allegation discussed above, emphasizing that he was involuntarily hospitalized under the
Baker Act. However, Langa has not established that he was incompetent to proceed when
he entered his plea.
The conviction of a mentally incompetent defendant violates due process. Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). The federal standard for competency to stand trial is
whether the defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding–and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402, 402 (1960). See also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“It has long been
accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel,
and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”). The standard
governing competency to enter a valid guilty plea is the same as that for competency to
stand trial. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398-99 (1993). “[A] petitioner raising a
substantive claim of incompetency is entitled to no presumption of incompetency and must
demonstrate his or her incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence.” James v.
Page 20 of 22
Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1571 (11th Cir. 1992).
Langa has not shown that he was incompetent to enter his plea. The record reflects
that he acted rationally and responded appropriately to the court’s questions during the
change of plea hearing. Furthermore, he told the court that his diagnoses for depression
and anxiety had no effect on his decision to enter a plea, and that his judgment was not
clouded by his medication. Thus, there is no indication from the record of this proceeding
that he was incompetent to proceed under the Dusky standard.
The reports about his mental health following his arrest were made one year before
his July 28, 2008 change of plea and therefore do not address his mental state when he
pleaded to the charges. A history of mental instability does not demonstrate incompetency
without a specific showing of how such issues generated a substantial doubt of a
petitioner’s competency at the time. Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1107 (11th Cir.
1995) (“[N]ot every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand
trial; rather, the evidence must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand
the charges.”) (quoting Card v. Singletary, 981 F.2d 481, 487-88 (11th Cir. 1992)).
Furthermore, a defendant’s use of psychiatric drugs is relevant but not determinative to
establishing incompetency. Sheley v. Singletary, 955 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir. 1992). Because
Langa has not demonstrated that he was incompetent to enter his plea, he is not entitled
to relief on this portion of Ground Three.
Any claims not specifically addressed herein have been deemed to be without merit.
It is therefore
ORDERED that Langa’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Clerk is
directed to enter judgment against Langa and to close this case.
Page 21 of 22
It is further ORDERED that Langa is not entitled to a certificate of appealability
(“COA”). A petitioner does not have absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial
of his habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). A district court must first issue a certificate
of appealability (COA). Id. “A [COA] may issue ... only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. at § 2253(c)(2). To make
such a showing, Langa “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district
court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke,
542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that
“the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 893 n. 4 (1983)). Langa has not made this showing. Finally, because Langa is not
entitled to a COA, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on February 14, 2017.
Copy to:
Stephen C. Langa
Counsel of Record
Page 22 of 22
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