Whitehead v. City of Bradenton et al
Filing
37
ORDER denying 31 Defendant City of Bradenton's Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 10/14/2014. (LN)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
RANDI BRENT WHITEHEAD,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 8:13-cv-2845-T-30MAP
CITY OF BRADENTON, THE ROTARY
CLUB OF WEST BRADENTON, INC.,
WALTER SCOTT REED, MATTHEW
PALMER and BRIAN THIERS,
Defendants.
ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the Defendant City of Bradenton’s
Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11 (Dkt. #31) and Plaintiff's Response in Opposition
to the Motion (Dkt. #33). Upon review and consideration, it is the Court’s conclusion that
the Motion should be denied.
Background
Plaintiff Randi Brent Whitehead, a Florida licensed attorney, brought this complaint
alleging several violations of civil rights due to her arrest by Bradenton police officers.
Plaintiff was represented when she filed her Complaint (Dkt. #1). On January 21, 2014, the
court permitted counsel to withdraw (Dkt. #4). Plaintiff brought a claim against Defendant,
the City of Bradenton (the “City”) alleging liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to its
failure to properly train and supervise its officers to ensure that they did not violate the
constitutional rights of citizens while working in off-duty capacities. The City sent
Whitehead a letter indicating that her claim violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and requested its dismissal. Whitehead did not dismiss the claim as requested.
The City filed a Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #19) arguing that the City could not be held liable
unless such failure to train or supervise constitutes a City policy. This Court dismissed
the claim for failure to state a cause of action (Dkt. #30). Specifically, the Court noted that
Whitehead did not allege any facts indicating that the City had the requisite custom or
policy, or any facts demonstrating the City’s deliberate indifference.
Discussion
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b), any individual who files a
pleading, written motion, or other paper with the Court implicitly certifies that, to the best
of that person's knowledge after a reasonable inquiry:
(1) [the paper] is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of
information.
Rule 11's “safe harbor” provision, subsection 11(c)(2), provides as follows:
A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion and
must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b). The
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motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented
to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is
withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within
another time the court sets. If warranted, the court may award to the
prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred
for the motion.
The purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to “reduce frivolous claims, defenses, or
motions, and to deter costly meritless maneuvers.” Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A. G., 331
F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Massengale v. Ray, 267 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th
Cir. 2001)). See also Didie v. Howes, 988 F.2d 1097, 1104 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Rule 11
sanctions are designed to discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the
litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses .... They may be imposed for
the purpose of deterrence, compensation and punishment.”) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
An objective standard of reasonableness under the circumstances governs whether
a party violates Rule 11. Didie, 988 F.2d at 1104. A federal district court must evaluate
whether the motion, pleading or other paper reflected what could reasonably have been
believed by the signer at the time of signing. Id. Rule 11 sanctions are warranted in three
scenarios: (1) when a party files a pleading that has no reasonable factual basis; (2) when
the party files a pleading that is based on a legal theory that has no reasonable chance of
success and that cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to change existing law; or
(3) when the party files a pleading in bad faith for an improper purpose. See Didie, 988
F.2d at 1104 (citations omitted); Kaplan, 331 F.3d at 1255 (citations omitted).
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To allege a constitutional violation based on a failure to train, the plaintiff “must
demonstrate that the supervisor had ‘actual or constructive notice that a particular omission
in their training program causes [his or her] employees to violate citizens' constitutional
rights,’ and that armed with that knowledge the supervisor chose to retain that training
program.” Keith v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 749 F.3d 1034, 1052 (11th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 159 (2011)). To establish that a supervisor
was on actual or constructive notice of the deficiency of training, the plaintiff must
ordinarily show that a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees
existed. Id.
The City argues that Whitehead’s failure to train claim against it had no reasonable
chance of success because Florida requires law enforcement officers to comply with the
requirements of the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission and maintain
certification through ongoing training. Therefore, it could not be “deliberately indifferent”
to the training needs of a certified police officer regarding the use of force. The City states
that Officer Palmer and Officer Theirs were at all times relevant to these proceedings
Florida certified law enforcement officers. Therefore, Whitehead would not be able to
meet the stringent standard of fault required for a claim against the City on this basis.
The City has not made a sufficient showing that Plaintiff's failure to train claim was
frivolous and completely lacked a factual or legal basis, or had no reasonable chance of
success. Although a review of this case demonstrates that Plaintiff's complaint lacked
sufficient allegations to sustain this claim on a Motion to Dismiss; the claim was not
objectively frivolous and the City makes no showing of conduct by Plaintiff so egregious
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as to be tantamount to bad faith. Although “[a] municipality's culpability for a deprivation
of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train,” id. at 159.; it is
nonetheless a plausible claim under current law.
Although the City states in its safe harbor letter to Whitehead that the officers were
certified by the state, the state requirements for certification alone may not have relieved
the City of liability. Whether the officers were subject to the state requirements and
actually received the required training and certification are issues of fact which would have
been developed through discovery. The City recognized this factual issue in its safe
harbor letter where it indicated that it would set the Training and Research Manager’s
deposition and move for summary judgment, and then seek attorney’s fees if the Court
denied the Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, the Court concludes that Rule 11 sanctions are
not warranted at this time.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant City of Bradenton’s
Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11 (Dkt. #31) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 14th day of October, 2014.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record
S:\Odd\2013\13-cv-2845 osc 31 sanctions.docx
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