Jean-Louis et al v. Clear Springs Farming, LLC et al

Filing 106

ORDER: Defendants' Howard Leasing, Inc. and Howard Leasing III, Inc.'s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 82) is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter final judgment in favor of Defendants Howard Leasing, Inc. and Howard Leasing III, Inc. and against Plaintiffs. Defendants Clear Springs Farming, LLC, Florida Gold Citrus, Inc., and Jack Green, Jr.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 84) is denied. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 5/14/2015. (LN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

SHELENE JEAN-LOUIS and JUDES
PETIT-FRERE, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 8:13-cv-3084-T-30AEP

CLEAR SPRINGS FARMING, LLC,
FLORIDA GOLD CITRUS, INC., JACK
GREEN, JR., HOWARD LEASING , INC.,
and HOWARD LEASING III, INC.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/

ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendants Howard Leasing, Inc. and
Howard Leasing III, Inc.’s Renewed1 Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 82), Defendants
Clear Springs Farming, LLC, Florida Gold Citrus, Inc., and Jack Green, Jr.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. 84), Plaintiffs’ Responses in Opposition (Dkts. 93 & 94), and
Defendants’ Replies (Dkts. 103 & 104). The Court, having considered the motions,
responses, replies, record evidence, and being otherwise advised in the premises, concludes
that the motion filed by the Howard Leasing Defendants should be granted and the motion
filed by the remaining Defendants should be denied.

1

The Court denied Howard Leasing Defendants’ initial motion for summary judgment as
premature (Dkt. 60).

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Shelene Jean-Louis and Judes Petit-Frere brought the instant class action on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against Defendants for race, color, and
national origin discrimination in their employment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and the Florida Civil
Rights Act, as amended, 760.01 - 760.11, Fla. Stat. (2013). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that
they are black/Haitian/Afro-Haitian/African American. Defendants recruited them to pick
blueberries during the March 2012 season.

Plaintiffs, along with over 100 other

black/Haitian/Afro-Haitian/African American farm workers traveled to Lake Wales, Florida,
to pick blueberries for Defendants. Plaintiffs’ crew leader was Alteric Jean-Charles.
Plaintiffs reported for work from about March 19, 2012, until about March 27, 2012; they
were denied work each day. Plaintiffs were never provided any work during this period of
time and returned home without any compensation. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ failure
to provide them with any work constituted unlawful race, color, and national origin
discrimination.
On July 1, 2014, the Court certified the instant class as:
any and all black/Haitian/Afro-Haitian/African American seasonal
agricultural employees or farm-workers of Defendants who applied
to and/or were hired by Defendants on or about March 19, 2012 for
a specific crew with the group designation of C13 for a six (6) week
period during the 2012 Florida harvesting season and not provided
any work by Defendants on the basis of their race, color, and/or
national origin.
(Dkt. 49).
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Defendants Howard Leasing, Inc. and Howard Leasing III, Inc. (collectively,
“Howard Leasing Defendants”) argue that the claims against them fail as a matter of law
because they were not Plaintiffs’ “employer.” They also argue that the record is undisputed
that they did not participate in the alleged discrimination.
Defendants Clear Springs Farming, LLC, Florida Gold Citrus, Inc., and Jack Green,
Jr. (collectively, “Farm Defendants”) argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case
of discrimination as a matter of law. They also argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish pretext.
As explained below, the Court agrees that Howard Leasing Defendants are entitled
to summary judgment because the record is clear that they played no role in Green’s failure
to hire Plaintiffs and the record is bereft of any evidence that Howard Leasing Defendants
were even aware of any discriminatory act against Plaintiffs. However, there are too many
genuine and material factual disputes that preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of
Farm Defendants.
RELEVANT FACTS
Defendant Clear Springs Farming, LLC operates a blueberry farm in Homeland,
Florida. Clear Springs contracts with Defendant Florida Gold Citrus, Inc. to operate the farm
through a grower agreement. Florida Gold is responsible for the growing and harvesting
activities at the blueberry farm. Defendant Jack Green owns Florida Gold and operates the
Homeland blueberry farm.
Clear Springs contracts with Howard Leasing Defendants to provide payroll and
employment administrative services for the farm workers who harvest blueberries at the
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farm. Specifically, on January 12, 2012, Howard Leasing III and Clear Springs entered into
a “Florida Service Agreement” that set forth the parties’ respective roles; for example,
Howard Leasing III agreed to provide administrative, payroll, and other human resources
services to Clear Springs. Clear Springs also leases employees from Howard Leasing
Defendants. With respect to hiring farm labor, Howard Leasing Defendants are responsible
for accepting applications and making sure they are accurately completed.
Clear Springs’ Homeland blueberry farm is one of the largest blueberry farms in
Florida and consists of approximately 370 acres of blueberry plants. The blueberry plants
are arranged in rows. The harvest season occurs every March. Green is responsible for
operating the Homeland blueberry farm. Green has over 19 years experience managing the
harvest of blueberries in Polk County, Florida. Clear Springs depends on hand harvesting
of the blueberry crop because the blueberry plants in Florida are too delicate for mechanical
harvesting. Over the years, Green developed working relationships with local farm labor
contractors, also known as crew leaders, who hand harvest the blueberry crop. The crew
leaders operate crews of farm workers; the crews range in size from as few as 100 to several
hundred workers. Green does not interact with the farm workers directly.
Jean-Charles, Plaintiffs’ crew leader, is Haitian. He became a crew leader after
observing that it was difficult for Haitians to get work on farms. According to Jean-Charles,
farms typically hire Mexican workers. Jean-Charles visited the Homeland blueberry farm
and spoke with Green regarding labor opportunities for Jean-Charles and his crew. They
discussed how many workers Jean-Charles could provide to Green to hand pick the
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blueberries during the March 2012 season. According to Jean-Charles, Green told him that
there would be work available for Jean-Charles’ crew if Jean-Charles provided 125 farm
workers. The job was for approximately six weeks.
On March 19, 2012, Jean-Charles brought his crew to the Homeland blueberry farm.
They had traveled there from Fort Pierce, Florida. All of the farm workers were Haitian.
They arrived as a group to fill out applications. The farm workers filled out various forms;
they were issued ID badges and told that they would start work the next day.
On March 20, 2012, and every day until about March 27, 2012, Jean-Charles and his
crew arrived at the blueberry farm in the morning, ready to begin work, and were told there
was no work available for them. On or about March 27, 2012, they were told that there was
not going to be any work for them. It is undisputed that Green selected the crews that were
provided work on the Homeland blueberry farm. According to Jean-Charles, Green did not
explain or provide a reason to him as to why there was no work for Jean-Charles’ Haitian
farm workers.
According to Green, he gave priority to the crews he had worked with in the past.
Green preferred to use crew leaders with whom he had the longest working relationship
because he could depend on these crew leaders to arrive to the farm when he called them and
to provide a sufficient number of productive farm workers. Green had not previously worked
with Jean-Charles or Salvador Grajeda, another crew leader who was not given work.2 As

2

Grajeda’s crew was comprised of approximately sixty percent Hispanic/Mexican workers
and forty percent Haitian workers.
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such, Jean-Charles and Grajeda’s crews were not selected over crews that Green had a
previous working relationship.
According to Green, once the blueberry season begins, he is faced with a constant
gauging and analysis of the amount of blueberries that appear to be ready for harvest against
the available farm labor. This includes daily visits to the fields themselves to inspect the
plants. Additionally, because the amount of production during the harvest starts low and then
increases, Green cannot flood the field with workers at the beginning of the harvest. During
the first days of the harvest, Green will utilize only a portion of one or two crews.
As the March 2012 blueberry harvest progressed, Green became more and more
certain that he would not need either Jean-Charles or Grajeda’s crews. According to Green,
production was about half of what he projected. Rather than producing the estimated 2.34
million pounds of blueberries, the actual 2012 harvest was approximately 1.5 million pounds.
Consequently, Green required much less labor for the 2012 harvest than anticipated at the
time he had initial communications with Jean-Charles and Grajeda.
As stated in more detail below, there are disputed facts in the record related to the
reason Green provided for failing to hire Jean-Charles’ crew, who are the class members in
this case. There are also disputed facts on the issue of whether Green continued to hire
Hispanic/Mexican farm workers after he told Jean-Charles and Grajeda that he did not need
any additional farm labor. For example, according to Jean-Charles, he observed Defendants
accepting more applications after he and his crew were told that there was no work available
for them. Grajeda, also after being informed that there was no work for his crew, observed
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Green hire the Hispanic/Mexican workers from Grajeda’s crew. Green did not hire any of
the Haitian workers from Grajeda’s crew.
The record is undisputed that Green was solely responsible for selecting the farm crew
for the March 2012 blueberry season. Green testified as follows during his November 3,
2014 deposition:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Who made the decision as to which crews worked and which
crews did not?
I did.
Anyone else?
No.

(Dkt. 82-4 at 79:17-21).
Green testified that he utilized a seniority system in deciding which crew to hire for
the blueberry season.

Green based his decision on “[e]xperience, seniority, past

relationships.” Id. at 79:14.
With respect to Howard Leasing Defendants, Green testified that they were not
involved in the hiring decision:
Q.

A.

Just to be clear. The question was: Was anyone at Howard
Leasing involved with your decision as to which workers or
crews to hire to work on that farm?
No.

Id. at 111:14-18.
Amy Pomeroy, Clear Springs’ Vice President of Finance also testified during her
December 4, 2014 deposition that Green made the decision as to which individuals were
going to be hired to pick blueberries during the 2012 blueberry season. Charles Perry

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Howard, Howard Leasing Defendants’ corporate representative similarly testified during his
December 9, 2014 deposition that Howard Leasing Defendants had no role in selecting who
was going to pick the blueberries.
Plaintiffs’ discrimination claim in this class action is that they were not selected to
pick blueberries during the 2012 blueberry season because of their race, color, or national
origin (Haitian) - there are no other discriminatory acts alleged in the complaint.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Motions for summary judgment should be granted only when the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). The existence of some factual disputes between the litigants will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported summary judgment motion; “the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986) (emphasis in original). The substantive law applicable to the claimed causes of action
will identify which facts are material. Id. Throughout this analysis, the court must examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences
in its favor. Id. at 255.
Once a party properly makes a summary judgment motion by demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, the
nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings through the use of affidavits, depositions,
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answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, and designate specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The evidence must be
significantly probative to support the claims. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49 (1986).
This Court may not decide a genuine factual dispute at the summary judgment stage.
Fernandez v. Bankers Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 564 (11th Cir. 1990). “[I]f factual
issues are present, the Court must deny the motion and proceed to trial.” Warrior Tombigbee
Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 1983). A dispute about a
material fact is genuine and summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;
Hoffman v. Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1990). However, there must exist a
conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question. Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 1989).
DISCUSSION
I.

Howard Leasing Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Howard Leasing Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment

because they were not Plaintiffs’ employer or potential employer within the meaning of Title
VII, FCRA, and Section 1981. Howard Leasing Defendants point out that the record is
undisputed that they had nothing to do with the alleged discrimination, i.e., Green’s failure
to provide Plaintiffs with any work picking blueberries during the March 2012 blueberry
season. The Court agrees that the record is clear that Howard Leasing Defendants did not
participate in the discrimination; it is also clear that they were not even aware of the
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discrimination. Having resolved this issue, the Court need not determine whether Howard
Leasing Defendants were Plaintiffs’ joint employer.
A joint employer relationship does not automatically expose an employer to liability
for actions taken by its co-employer. See, e.g., Brown v. Cook Cnty., No. 10 C 2689, 2012
WL 6055318, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec.6, 2012) (stating in an FMLA case that “[n]owhere in the
statue [sic] or regulations ... is it suggested that one employer can or should be held liable for
the other employer’s adverse employment actions solely because of their joint employer
relationship .... even if there is a joint employer relationship, each of the defendant employers
must have its own relevant contacts with the plaintiff employee for the purposes of FMLA
liability”); Neal v. Manpower Intern., Inc., No. 3:00-CV-277/LAC, 2001 WL 1923127, at
*9 (N.D. Fla. Sept.17, 2001) (defendant employment agency would not be liable even if the
court were to assume for the sake of argument that it was the plaintiff’s joint-employer
because the employment agency did not have control over the other employer’s supervisors
who engaged in the harassing conduct and thus had no “opportunity to guard against their
misconduct,” nor to “screen them, train them, and monitor their performance.”) (quoting
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)).
Courts addressing the liability of temporary employment agencies have held that a
staffing or employment agency found to be a joint employer may be held liable under Title
VII if the agency knew or should have known of the discriminatory conduct and failed to
take prompt corrective measures within its control. See, e.g., Lima v. Adecco, 634 F. Supp.
2d 394, 400-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d 375 Fed. Appx. 54 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We also agree
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with the District Court that even if [the defendants] could be considered a ‘joint employer,’
[the temporary employment agency] could not be held liable to plaintiff based on that legal
theory because there is no evidence that [the agency] either knew or should have known
about any of the alleged discrimination.”) (citation omitted); Watson v. Adecco Employment
Servs., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1355-57 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that even if defendant
employment agency is a joint employer, it cannot be held liable for the discriminatory
conduct because plaintiff cannot show that it “knew or should have known of the conduct
and failed to take corrective measures within its control.”); see also Medina v. Adecco, 561
F. Supp. 2d 162, 178 (D.P.R. 2008).
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not spoken definitively on this issue, it has noted
that when discrimination is based on an adverse employment decision, the joint employer
theory “concentrate[s] on the degree of control an entity has over the adverse employment
decision on which the Title VII suit is based.” Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163
F.3d 1236, 1244-45 (11th Cir.1998) (emphasis added).
There is simply no evidence in the record suggesting that Howard Leasing Defendants
had any control over Green’s decision related to the crews he chose to hire. Green clearly
testified that Howard Leasing Defendants had nothing to do with his decision as to which
crews he selected to pick blueberries during the March 2012 season. Pomeroy and Howard
similarly testified that Howard Leasing Defendants played no role in the selection of crew
leaders and farm workers. As such, there is no basis in the record to hold Howard Leasing

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Defendants liable for the discriminatory acts and summary judgment will be entered in their
favor.
II.

Farm Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Farm Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish as a matter of law that

Defendants’ failure to hire them was discriminatory on the basis of their race, color and/or
national origin in violation of Title VII, the FCRA, and section 1981. Notably, the essential
elements of a section 1981 employment discrimination claim are the same as a Title VII
employment discrimination claim. See Bass v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Orange Cnty., Fla.,
256 F.3d 1095, 1109 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting same). Moreover, because the FCRA was
patterned after Title VII, decisions construing Title VII are applicable when considering
FCRA claims. See Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir.
1998).
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination through direct or
circumstantial evidence. See Jackson v. Rooms To Go, Inc., No. 8:06-cv-01596-T-24EAJ,
2008 WL 2824814, at *5 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2008) (citing Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc.,
161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998)). The record is clear that there is no direct evidence
of discrimination; therefore, Plaintiffs must prove their claims through the familiar
McDonnell Douglas circumstantial evidence framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
“In a traditional failure-to-hire case, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by
demonstrating that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she applied and was
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qualified for a position for which the employer was accepting applications; (3) despite her
qualifications, she was not hired; and (4) the position remained open or was filled by another
person outside of her protected class.” E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, 296 F.3d 1265, 1273
(11th Cir. 2002). If Plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination,
“[t]he burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason” for the employment action. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. If Farm
Defendants meet this burden of production, the presumption of discrimination raised by
Plaintiffs’ prima facie case is rebutted. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 254-56 (1981). Plaintiffs must then show that Farm Defendants’ proffered legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason is pretextual. See id.
To prove pretext, a plaintiff has to show that his “employer’s explanation is unworthy
of credence.” Jackson v. Ala. State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005)
(citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. at 256). This requires showing “both that the
reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason” for the adverse action. St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 512 n. 4 (1993). A plaintiff may show pretext by
pointing to “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions”
in the proffered reason. Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160,
1163 (11th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff may also produce other evidence “which permits the jury
to reasonably disbelieve the employer’s proffered reason.” Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318
F.3d 1066, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003).

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Farm Defendants argue in a conclusory fashion that Plaintiffs cannot present any
competent evidence to dispute the summary judgment record showing that there were no
other crews or farm workers who applied for work after Plaintiffs. Farm Defendants also
argue that even if Plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, they cannot establish pretext because
Green testified to logical and non-discriminatory reasons for not hiring Plaintiffs - that he had
prioritized crew leaders with whom he already had confidence in and experience with, that
the actual production of blueberries at the Homeland farm fell far below expectations, and
that Green’s labor needs therefore were decreased.
The record, reviewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the non-movants, reflects
genuine and material disputed facts on these issues.

The record reflects that Farm

Defendants continued to process applications after Jean-Charles was told there would be no
work for his crew. According to Jean-Charles, Green promised Jean-Charles work and then
provided Jean-Charles with no reason for his failure to hire Jean-Charles’ crew. According
to Grajeda’s Declaration, after being told by Green that there was no work for his crew,
Green hired Grajeda’s Hispanic and Mexican workers “behind [his] back and allowed them
to start working in the blueberry fields.” Grajeda states: “Mr. Green only hired the Mexican
workers from my crew and did not hire any of the Black Haitian workers from my crew.”
(Dkt. 94-1).3

3

Farm Defendants’ brief argument in their reply that Grajeda’s Declaration lacks foundation
and should be disregarded is without merit.
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This evidence establishes a triable issue on whether Plaintiffs established a prima facie
case. This evidence also presents a genuine dispute and triable issue with respect to the
credibility of Green’s proffered reasons for not hiring Plaintiffs. A jury could find that the
real reason behind Green’s failure to hire Plaintiffs was discriminatory. A jury could
construe the evidence in favor of Plaintiffs and find that Green hired additional farm workers
after he told Jean-Charles that there was no work. The record suggests that these farm
workers were not Haitian. And some of them came from Grajeda’s crew, a crew in which
Green did not have a prior working relationship. For these reasons, Farm Defendants’
motion for summary judgment must be denied.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
1.

Defendants’ Howard Leasing, Inc. and Howard Leasing III, Inc.’s Renewed
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 82) is granted.

2.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter final judgment in favor of Defendants
Howard Leasing, Inc. and Howard Leasing III, Inc. and against Plaintiffs.

3.

Defendants Clear Springs Farming, LLC, Florida Gold Citrus, Inc., and Jack
Green, Jr.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 84) is denied.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on May 14, 2015.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record
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