Jean-Louis et al v. Clear Springs Farming, LLC et al

Filing 60

ORDER: Defendants Howard Leasing, Inc. and Howard Leasing III, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 55) is DENIED without prejudice as premature. Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief Under 56(d) (Dkt. 56) is DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 11/18/2014. (LN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

SHELENE JEAN-LOUIS and
JUDES PETIT-FRERE,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No: 8:13-cv-3084-T-30AEP

CLEAR SPRINGS FARMING, LLC,
FLORIDA GOLD CITRUS, INC., JACK
GREEN, JR. , HOWARD LEASING,
INC. and HOWARD LEASING III, INC.,
Defendants.

ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendants Howard Leasing, Inc. and
Howard Leasing III, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum
of Law (Dkt. 55) and Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment and Motion for Relief Under 56(d) (Dkt. 56). Upon review and
consideration, it is the Court’s conclusion that the motion should be denied as premature.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and the Florida Civil Rights Act, alleging
Defendants’ unlawful employment practices including discrimination on the basis of race,
color, and national origin. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants Howard Leasing, Inc. and

Howard Leasing III, Inc.’s (the “Howard Defendants”) motion for summary judgment
should be denied as premature because many of the issues raised will require Plaintiffs to
depose witnesses and conduct discovery in order to respond fully. Plaintiffs also move
for relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).
The Court agrees that the Howard Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
should be denied as premature. As stated in Blumel v. Mylander, 919 F.Supp. 423, 428
(M.D.Fla.1996), Rule 56 “implies [that] district courts should not grant summary judgment
until the non-movant has had an adequate opportunity for discovery.” Furthermore, the
Eleventh Circuit has decisively determined that “summary judgment may only be decided
upon an adequate record.” Snook v. Trust Co. of Ga. Bank, 859 F.2d 865, 870 (11th
Cir.1988). The Eleventh Circuit expounded:
[S]ummary judgment should not be granted until the party opposing the
motion has had an adequate opportunity for discovery. The party opposing a
motion for summary judgment has a right to challenge the affidavits and
other factual materials submitted in support of the motion by conducting
sufficient discovery so as to enable him to determine whether he can furnish
opposing affidavits. If the documents or other discovery sought would be
relevant to the issues presented by the motion for summary judgment, the
opposing party should be allowed the opportunity to utilize the discovery
process to gain access to the requested materials. Generally summary
judgment is inappropriate when the party opposing the motion has been
unable to obtain responses to his discovery requests.
Id. at 870 (internal citations omitted).
At this stage in the litigation, without adequate discovery, Plaintiffs are unable to
respond to the affidavits relied upon in support of the Howard Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.

Accordingly, the Howard Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is premature and is denied without prejudice. The Howard Defendants may

2

reassert the arguments contained in their motion for summary judgment upon the
conclusion of discovery.
It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. Defendants Howard Leasing, Inc. and Howard Leasing III, Inc.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Dkt. 55) is
DENIED without prejudice as premature.
2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief Under 56(d) (Dkt. 56) is DENIED as moot.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 18th day of November, 2014.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record
S:\Even\2013\13-cv-3084 deny sj premature.docx

3