McLaughlin et al v. Monaco RV LLC

Filing 78

ORDER adopting 67 Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. (1) The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is adopted, confirmed, and approved in all respects and is made a part of this Order for all purposes, including ap pellate review. (2) Defendant's Motion for Entitlement To Attorneys' Fees, Investigative Expenses and Costs 56 is GRANTED. Defendant is entitled to recover its attorneys' fees, costs and investigative expenses from Plaintiffs. (3 ) Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this Order Defendant shall file a motion and memorandum as to the amount requested, including affidavits, billing records, and/or an affidavit of a fee expert in support of the amount and reasonableness of attorneys� 39; fees sought by Defendant. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS thereafter, Plaintiffs shall file a responsive memorandum, which may include an affidavit of a fee expert. (4) The Clerk is directed to Tax Costs as set forth in Defendant's Bill of Costs, filed on September 25, 2015 (Doc. 55). Signed by Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell on 5/16/2016. (BGS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JOE MCLAUGHLIN and MARCIA
MCLAUGHLIN,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No: 8:14-cv-703-T-36TGW

MONACO RV LLC,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation filed by
Magistrate Judge Thomas G. Wilson on January 6, 2016 (Doc. 67). In the Report and
Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Wilson recommends that the Defendant be found to be
entitled to attorneys' fees, investigative expenses, and costs pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 768.89. All
parties were furnished copies of the Report and Recommendation and were afforded the
opportunity to file objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiffs filed objections (Docs.
74 and 75) and Defendant responded thereto (Doc. 77). Upon consideration of the Report and
Recommendation, and upon this Court's independent examination of the file, it is determined that
the Report and Recommendation should be adopted.
I.

Background

The claims arose from the plaintiffs' purchase of a 2013 Holiday Rambler Ambassador,
otherwise known as a recreational vehicle (“R.V.”) from R.V. World, Inc. of Nokomis, d/b/a R.V.
World of Lakeland. See Doc. 2 at p. 1. The plaintiffs purchased the R.V. for $293,675.98. Id. at p.
2. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the R.V. had various defects and that Defendant, Monaco
RV, LLC, the manufacturer of the R.V., breached an express warranty under the Magnuson Moss

Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq., after failing to repair the recreational vehicle. Id. at pp.
2-9.
In February 2014, the plaintiffs, Joe and Marcia McLaughlin, a married couple, filed this
lawsuit against the defendant in the Tenth Judicial Circuit for Polk County. Id. The plaintiffs
sought monetary damages for "the difference in value of the vehicle as promised and as actually
delivered[,]" ''special circumstantial damages in a proximate amount to be determined at or before
trial[,]" "actual, incidental, and consequential damages[,]" "costs, interest and actual attorneys’
fees[,]" as well as any other relief that the court deemed appropriate. Id. at p. 10. Thereafter, on
March 19, 2014, the defendant removed the case to this court based on diversity of citizenship and
federal question jurisdiction. See Doc. 1.
On June 12, 2014, the defendant served each plaintiff a separate proposal of settlement in
the amount of $3,483.00 to resolve the plaintiffs' claims (Doc. 56-1 at pp.1-7). 1 The plaintiffs did
not accept the defendant's offers. Thereafter, on July 25, 2014, the defendant served each plaintiff
a second proposal of settlement in the amount of $9,731.25 to resolve the plaintiffs' claims (Doc
56-1 at pp. 9-16). The plaintiffs did not accept the defendant's second offers either.
On September 14, 2015, this Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
finding the plaintiffs failed to prove a covered defect under their warranty claim. See Doc. 53 at p.
9. Defendant subsequently filed the instant Motion for Entitlement to Attorneys' Fees,
Investigative Expenses and Costs (Doc. 56).
II.

Legal Standards
a. Review of a Report and Recommendation
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), in pertinent part, provides that “a party may serve

and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations” of a magistrate
judge. When a party makes a timely and specific objection to a Report and Recommendation, the

2

district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ. of State of Georgia, 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990). The district
judge may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Report and Recommendation of the
magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The district judge may also receive further evidence
or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with further instructions. Id.
b. Attorneys’ Fees under Florida Statute § 768.79
Florida Statute §768.79 creates a substantive legal right on behalf of a defendant to recover
its attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to an unaccepted offer/proposal of settlement and states, in
pertinent part:
In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state, if a defendant
files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the plaintiff within 30 days,
the defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorneys' fees
incurred by her or him . . . from the date of filing of the offer the judgment is of
no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25% less than
such offer . . . .
Fla. Stat. §768.79(1).
The Eleventh Circuit has consistently held that Fla. Stat. §768.79 is substantive law in
diversity matters and is not preempted by Fed. Civ. P. 68. Menchise v. Akerman Senterfitt, 532
F.3d 1146, 1150-1153 (11th Cir. 2008); Horowitch v. Diamond Aircraft Industries, Inc., 645 3d
1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2011). Once a judgment of no liability is entered for an offering defendant,
even on a nominal offer, the sole basis upon which a court can disallow entitlement to an attorneys'
fee award under Section 768.79 is if the court determines that a qualifying offer was not made in
good faith. Mesa v. Ocean Enterprises, Inc., 803 So.2d 908 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Arnoul v. Busch
Entertainment Corp., 2008 WL 5341148 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (citing Vines v. Mathis, 867 So.2d 548,
550 (Fla. lst DCA 2004)) (holding that a court must award the defendant its fees and costs unless
the court determines that the offer was not made in good faith). An award of reasonable costs and

3

attorneys’ fees is mandatory unless the court makes an express finding that the offer/proposal was
not made in good faith. TGI Friday's v. Dvorak, 663 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1995).
III.

Plaintiffs’ Objections
Following a hearing on Defendant’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Magistrate

Judge Wilson issued an eighteen-page Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) analyzing the parties
arguments and concluding that Defendant’s motion should be granted. Plaintiffs’ objections make
the same arguments made in their response to Defendant’s motion – that the offers of settlement
were invalid because each offer required each Plaintiff to dismiss the other plaintiff’s claims. The
argument is nonsensical. Defendant served each Plaintiff with settlement proposals and each
proposal indicated that acceptance of the offer would require dismissal “with prejudice all elements
of the claims, causes of action, damages, costs, and attorney’s fees pled or available against this
Defendant.” Doc. 56-1 at pp. 3 and 6. The idea that this language would require either Plaintiff to
dismiss with prejudice claims made by another individual is absurd. Mr. McLaughlin would have
no standing to dismiss his wife’s claims without prejudice, and she would have no standing to
dismiss his claims without prejudice. Neither party’s acceptance of their respective offer would
have impacted the claims of the other plaintiff. Upon de novo review, this Court rejects this red
herring argument and agrees with Magistrate Judge Wilson that the settlement offers complied
with Fla. Stat. § 768.69. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under that
statute.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
(1)

The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. 67) is adopted,
confirmed, and approved in all respects and is made a part of this Order for all
purposes, including appellate review.

4

(2)

Defendant’s Motion for Entitlement To Attorneys’ Fees, Investigative Expenses
and Costs (Doc. 56) is GRANTED. Defendant is entitled to recover its attorneys’
fees, costs and investigative expenses from Plaintiffs.

(3)

Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this Order Defendant shall file a motion and
memorandum as to the amount requested, including affidavits, billing records,
and/or an affidavit of a fee expert in support of the amount and reasonableness of
attorneys' fees sought by Defendant. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS thereafter,
Plaintiffs shall file a responsive memorandum, which may include an affidavit of a
fee expert.

(4)

The Clerk is directed to Tax Costs as set forth in Defendant’s Bill of Costs, filed on
September 25, 2015 (Doc. 55).

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida on May 16, 2016.

Copies to:
The Honorable Thomas G. Wilson
Counsel of Record

5