Camacho v. Warden et al

Filing 8

ORDER denying without prejudice 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying without prejudice 2 Motion for temporary restraining order. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 5/30/2014. (LN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

STEVEN CAMACHO,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:14-CV-1019-T-30MAP

JOHN DOE, WARDEN,
ZEPHYRHILLS CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTION, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Plaintiff’s “Motion for Injunction [sic] a
Temporary Restraining Order Under American With Disabilities Act 'ADA-Standard”
(“motion”) (Dkt. 2). In the motion, Plaintiff alleges that he is in "imminent danger of serious
physical and mental injury" because: 1) although he has a history of mental illness and
cutting himself with sharp objects, he is not receiving "proper" mental health treatment or
medication for his suicidal thoughts; 2) the warden and correctional officers at Hardee
Correctional Institution ("HCI"), Plaintiff's current institution of incarceration, constantly tell
Plaintiff that "he is lucky to still be alive," and that he "won't live too long" if he continues

to file grievances against staff;1 and 3) he is being denied toilet paper and his Bible, law
books, and legal papers (Dkt. 2 at pp. 1-2).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has not served a copy of his motion on Defendants. Consequently, the Court
construes the motion as seeking a temporary restraining order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
Plaintiff, however, has failed to comply with the strictures of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 and Local
Rules 4.05 and 4.06. He has not certified to the Court the efforts, if any, which have been
made “to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(b)(1)(B).
Moreover, under Local Rule 4.05(a), “[s]uch orders will be entered only in emergency
cases to maintain the status quo until the requisite notice may be given and an opportunity
is afforded to opposing parties to respond to the application for a preliminary injunction."
Plaintiff has not provided “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly
show[ing] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant
before the adverse party can be heard in opposition[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A); Local
Rule 4.05(b). Plaintiff's allegation that he was assaulted by officers at ZCI in 2013 is
insufficient to warrant a restraining order. See Helton v. Burks, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
154366, at * 28-29 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 3, 2011) ("[P]reliminary injunctive relief will not be
granted because of a past injury or a mere perceived or suspected threat of harm; [Plaintiff]
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Plaintiff alleges that in 2013, the warden at Zephyrhills Correctional Institution ("ZCI"), an institution in
which Plaintiff was incarcerated at some time prior to his transfer to HCI, told officers to assault Plaintiff (Dkt. 2 at
p. 3). Plaintiff also alleges that on April 3, 2014, the warden at HCI ordered Captain Hess to threaten to assault
Plaintiff (Id.).

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must show that irreparable injury will be suffered unless an injunction issues.") (citing
Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1128 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
547 U.S. 1192 (2006)). Moreover, although the Court takes Plaintiff's allegations seriously,
Plaintiff offers only conclusory assertions about his fear of a future assault by officers at
HCI. Finally, with regard to Plaintiff's assertion that he is not receiving "proper" mental
health care at HCI, Plaintiff does not identify his mental health condition, state what
treatment or medication he requires, or assert that there is a reasonable likelihood that he will
harm himself without the unspecified mental health care he seeks.
In sum, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he is in danger of an immediate risk of
substantial or irreparable harm, and that an emergency situation exists which requires
immediate intervention by the Court. Therefore, the Court will not grant ex parte relief
without Defendants being afforded notice and an opportunity to respond to Plaintiff’s motion.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction, he must demonstrate that: (1)
he has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered
unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to him outweighs whatever damage the
proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would
not be adverse to the public interest. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "'A preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly
establishes the burden of persuasion as to the four requisites.'" Id. (quoting All Care Nursing
Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989)). At this
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time, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits, and that he will suffer irreparable injury without the injunction he seeks.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. 2) is DENIED
without prejudice.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on May 30, 2014.

SA:sfc
Copy to: Pro se Plaintiff

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