Ferguson v. CHC VIL, Ltd. et al
Filing
30
ORDER: Defendant CHC VII, LTD.'s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 26 is DENIED. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 11/16/2014. (AKH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
ALBERT V. FERGUSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 8:14-cv-1231-T-33TBM
CHC VII, LTD.,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant
CHC VII, LTD.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. #
26), filed on October 30, 2014. Plaintiff, Albert V. Ferguson,
did not file a response in opposition to the Motion. For the
reasons stated below, the Court denies the Motion.
I.
Background
Ferguson is a resident of the Swiss Golf & Tennis Club
Mobile Home Park. (Doc. # 1 at 2). Ferguson suffers from
several health conditions but enjoys playing golf. (Id.). He
contends that he and others similarly situated are able to
play golf “by using a golf cart over the tees, course and
greens such that they only need to park their golf carts a
short distance from their ball given their limited walking
range.” (Id.). In the Complaint, Ferguson contends that:
The Defendants provide for and allow golf cart
usage to individuals who do not have disabilities
but restrict the use of golf carts for all players,
even those with disabilities, such that golf carts
are not allowed on the tee boxes, to stop on the
fairway, or to be parked within thirty feet of the
green. The Defendants have discriminated and
continue to discriminate against individuals with
mobility disabilities by failing to provide such
individuals with any accommodations at the Lake
Henry Golf Club that they own, operate and/or
contract
for
usage,
even
though
reasonable
accommodations exist, are available on the market
or within the course itself, and are necessary to
ensure that individuals with disabilities are not
excluded, denied services, or otherwise treated
differently.
(Id.). Ferguson initiated this action against CHC VII, LTD.
on May 23, 2014 (Id.), setting forth the following counts:
Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (count
I), and Declaratory Relief (count II). (Id.). CHC VII, LTD.
filed the present Motion on October 30, 2014 (Doc. # 26). The
Court has reviewed the Motion and is otherwise fully advised
in the premises.
II.
Legal Standard
Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when “there are
no material facts in dispute, and judgment may be rendered by
considering the substance of the pleadings and any judicially
noticed facts.” Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d
1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998). A fact is “material” if it “might
affect
the
outcome
of
the
2
suit
under
the
governing
[substantive] law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247 (1986).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by
the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted. Mergens v. Druyfoos,
166 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1999). On a motion to dismiss, this
Court accepts as true all of the factual allegations in the
complaint and construes them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d
1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, this Court favors the
plaintiff with all reasonable inferences from the allegations
in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990)(“On a motion to dismiss,
the
facts
inferences
stated
in
therefrom
[the]
are
complaint
taken
as
and
all
true.”).
reasonable
However,
the
Supreme Court explains that:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal
citations omitted). Further, courts are not “bound to accept
3
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
III. Analysis
CHC VII, LTD. seeks dismissal of Ferguson’s lawsuit for
failure to state a claim for relief under Title III of the
ADA. (See Doc. # 26). In the alternative, CHC VII, LTD.
requests entry of a more definite statement as to all Counts.
(Id.). CHC VII, LTD. argues that “Ferguson has failed to
allege
what
barriers
he
encountered
on
CHC’s
property,
whether he was able to overcome them, or how they impeded his
use and enjoyment of the facility, as required to sufficiently
allege a cause of action for liability under Title III of the
ADA.” (Id. at 2).
To that end, CHC VII, LTD. argues that the “Complaint is
completely barren of facts and states nothing more than a
recitation of various ADA guidelines with general conclusory
statements unconnected to any specific allegations related to
actual barriers.” (Id.). Therefore, CHC VII, LTD. contends
that the Complaint should be dismissed because it does not
contain the requisite factual allegations to survive this
Motion for Judgment on the pleadings. (Id. at 5).
Title III of the ADA provides: “No individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full
4
and
equal
enjoyment
of
the
goods,
services,
facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of
public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases
to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(a). To prevail under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff
“generally has the burden of proving: (1) that [he] is an
individual with a disability, (2) that defendant is a place
of public accommodation, (3) that defendant denied [him] full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities or
privileges offered by defendant, (4) on the basis of [his]
disability.” Schiavo ex rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp.
2d 1161, 1165 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
After
careful
consideration,
the
Court
finds
that
Ferguson has properly pled, at this phase of the proceedings,
a Title III ADA discrimination claim. Ferguson has alleged
that he is disabled and is “only capable of walking very short
distances and is only able to ambulate about ten to fifteen
feet at a time without resting or requiring assistance.” (Doc.
# 1 at 2). The Court finds that this allegation meets the
pleading requirement of demonstrating that Plaintiff is a
disabled
individual.
(“disability
means,
See
with
29
C.F.R.
respect
to
§
an
1630.2(g)(1)(i)
individual[,]
a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
5
or more major life activities of such individual”); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)(A) (“major life activities include . . . walking
. . . .”).
Likewise, the Court finds that by pleading that CHC VII,
LTD. is the owner/operator of Lake Henry Golf Club (Doc. #
1), Ferguson has adequately alleged the second element of the
prima facie case. 42 U.S.C. 12181(7)(E) and (F); see Stevens
v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000)
(noting
that
Congress
provided
for
a
“comprehensive
definition of ‘public accommodation’ ” in Title III of the
ADA). The ADA specifically identifies golf courses as one of
the covered places of public accommodation. See § 12181(7)(L)
(“a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or
other place of exercise or recreation”); and the distinctive
“goo[d], servic[e], facilit[y], privileg [e], advantag[e], or
accommodatio[n]” identified by that provision as distinctive
to that category of place of public accommodation is “exercise
or recreation.” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 696
(2001). Next, the Court concludes that, by listing various
barriers that preclude or limit Ferguson's ability to access
the full and equal enjoyment of CHC VII, LTD.'s property
(Id.), Ferguson has alleged CHC VII, LTD. denied full and
equal enjoyment of the golf course. Finally, the Court finds
6
that Ferguson adequately alleged that the removal of the
barriers at the property is readily achievable. (Id.).
The Court disagrees with CHC VII, LTD.'s argument that
the Complaint lacks specificity regarding the barriers, or
how these barriers violate the ADA and restrict Ferguson's
access to the property. Instead, the Court finds that the
Complaint provides CHC VII, LTD. “fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Complaint alleges that the various
barriers limit Ferguson's ability to enjoy the premises fully
and equally, and prevent him from fully accessing the property
(Doc. # 1). Based on these allegations, the Court determines
that Ferguson has afforded CHC VII, LTD. ample notice of what
the case involves and, as a result, satisfies the pleading
requirements articulated in Twombly and Iqbal. See Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). To
the extent CHC VII, LTD. seeks more specific allegations of
ADA
violations,
discovery
will
provide
that
specificity.
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, CHC VII, LTD.’s
Motion is denied and the alternative relief sought is also
denied.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
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Defendant CHC VII, LTD.’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Doc. # 26) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
16th day of November, 2014.
Copies: All Counsel of Record
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