Office of the Attorney General et al v. Berger Law Group, P.A. et al

Filing 132

Default Judgment and Final Judgment as to Defaulting Defendants: Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against the Defaulting Defendants in accordance with the terms and conditions contained herein. (See Order for details.) Any pending motions are denied as moot. The Clerk is directed to close this file. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 10/9/2015. (LN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
and THE STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiffs,
v.

CASE No. 8:14-cv-1825-T-30MAP

BERGER LAW GROUP, P.A., a Florida
professional association et al.,
Defendants.
/
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND FINAL JUDGMENT AS TO DEFAULTING
DEFENDANTS
Plaintiffs, the State of Florida and the State of Connecticut, commenced this action
on July 29, 2014 by filing a complaint (Doc. No. 1) pursuant to (1) Section 1055 of the
Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (“CFPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 5565; (2) Section 626
of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, as amended by Section 1097 of the CFPA,
12 U.S.C. § 5538, and the Mortgage Assistance Relief Services Rule, 12 C.F.R. Part 1015
(“Regulation O”); (3) the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act
(“FDUTPA”), Chapter 501, Part II, Florida Statutes; (4) Florida’s Civil Theft law,
Sections 812.035(5), 812.014, Florida Statutes; and (5) the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act (“CUTPA”), Chapter 735a of the Connecticut General Statutes.

On August 1, 2014, the Court entered an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order
with Asset Transfer Restrictions And Partial Asset Freeze, Appointment of Temporary
Receiver, and Other Equitable Relief and Order to Show Cause Why a Preliminary
Injunction Should Not Issue. Doc. No. 10 (“TRO”). On August 22, 2014, Plaintiffs filed
an Amended Complaint to add additional defendants. Doc. No. 41. Defendants Litigation
Law LLC, The Resolution Law Group, P.C., The Resolution Law Center, LLC, Onisak,
LLC, and Remarque Holdings, LLC (collectively the “Defaulting Defendants”) failed to
answer and the Clerk entered a default against them on October 29, 2014. Doc. No. 74.
The court may enter default judgment when a defendant fails to respond to a
complaint and court orders and fails to participate in the litigation or cooperate in good
faith with the plaintiff. Tara Prods., Inc. v. Hollywood Gadgets, Inc., 449 F. App’x 908,
910–12 (11th Cir. 2011); Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc. 561 F.3d
1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009); Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987).
Default judgment is appropriate here against Defaulting Defendants because they have
failed to file answers or otherwise appear and defend the claims brought against them.
Defaulting Defendants’ liability is well-pled in the Amended Complaint, and Defaulting
Defendants have failed to participate in the litigation in good faith. Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(b)(2), upon application by Plaintiffs, the Court now enters a default judgment
against Defaulting Defendants for violations of Regulation O, 12 C.F.R. Part 1015;
FDUTPA, Ch. Part II; Florida’s Civil Theft law, sections 812.035(5), 812.014, Florida
Statutes; CUTPA, Chapter 735a of the Connecticut General Statutes.

2

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action because it

is “brought under Federal consumer financial law,” 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a), presents a
federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and is brought by Plaintiff State Attorneys General
pursuant to their authority under 12 U.S.C. §§ 5538(b)(1) & 5552, and 12 C.F.R. §
1015.10 (2012).
2.

In addition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, this Court has supplemental

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the state law claims asserted by Plaintiffs because
those claims are so related to the claims brought under federal consumer financial law
that they form part of the same case or controversy, and because those claims arise out of
the same transactions or occurrences as the claims brought by Plaintiffs pursuant to 12
U.S.C. §§ 5538(b)(1) & 5552.
3.

This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defaulting Defendants.

4.

Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 12 U.S.C. §

5538(b)(5)(A) because a substantial part of the events or omissions and course of conduct
giving rise to the claims set forth in the Amended Complaint occurred in this district.
5.

All parties to this action were given seven days’ notice of the motion for a

default judgment, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
6.

The Amended Complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted.

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7.

Because of the Defaulting Defendants’ default, Defaulting Defendants are

deemed to have admitted the well-pled facts of the Amended Complaint and the
allegations are taken as true. Eagle Hosp., 561 F.3d at 1307; Buchanan, 820 F.2d at 361.
8.

Section 1055 of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 5565 – as well as Sections 501.207

and 812.035, Florida Statutes, and Sections 42-110m and 42-110o of the Connecticut
General Statutes, which this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367 – empower this Court to order injunctive and other relief, restitution, and
civil money penalties.
9.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an Order imposing permanent injunctive relief;

requiring Defaulting Defendants to make restitution of $1,914,669; and requiring
Defaulting Defendants to pay civil money penalties in the amount of $3,875,000.
10.

This action and the relief awarded herein are in addition to, and not in lieu

of, other remedies as may be provided by law, including both civil and criminal remedies.
Defaulting Defendants Operated as a Common Enterprise
11.

Defaulting Defendants operated as a common enterprise, and are therefore

jointly and severally liable for the misconduct alleged in the Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs alleged that “the Individual Defendants operated their scheme by using the
Defaulting Defendants as a common enterprise.” Am. Compl. ¶ 115.
12.

Each corporation existed “to participate in the same mortgage relief

operation,” with roles ranging from giving “consumers the impression of a legitimate law
firm” to “funnel[ing] revenue to non-attorneys,” to operating the “telemarketing boiler
rooms that convince[d] consumers to pay RLG/BLG’s fees.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 90, 117.
4

Defaulting Defendants commingled finances; paid each other’s rents; shared a common
address; shared employees; and operated under the common control of the same
principals, DiGirolamo, Fox, Kramer, Berger, Friedman and Kopolow. Am. Compl. ¶¶
118–120. Defaulting Defendants “all exist[ed] for the single purpose of selling consumers
mortgage assistance relief services and splitting the profits among the individual
defendants.” Am. Compl. ¶ 120. None of the companies had any other business purpose.
Id.
13.

These facts are borne out through the investigation conducted by Plaintiffs

and by the Receiver’s investigation of the Defaulting Defendants since his appointment
by the Court.
14.

Defaulting Defendants operated as a common enterprise in effectuating the

alleged mortgage relief scheme, and are therefore jointly and severally liable for all of the
violations alleged in the Amended Complaint. Where one or more corporate entities
operate in a common enterprise, each may be held liable for the deceptive acts and
practices of the other. Sunshine Art Studios, Inc. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 1171, 1175 (1st Cir.
1973); FTC v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1011 (N.D. Ind. 2000);
FTC v. Wolf, No. 94-8119-CIV-FERGUSON, 1996 WL 812940, *7–8 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31,
1996); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n. v. Int’l Berkshire Grp. Holdings, No. 0561588-CIV-ALTONAGA, 2006 WL 3716390, *7 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2006).
15.

The Court, in its discretion, enters injunctive and monetary relief, without

holding an evidentiary hearing. Tara Prods, 449 F. App’x 908 at 911–12.

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16.

Entry of this Order is in the public interest.

Defaulting Defendants Violated Regulation O
17.

The Amended Complaint contains well-pled factual allegations supporting

a finding of liability on each of these provisions of Regulation O:
a.

Defaulting Defendants offered a service, in exchange for a fee, that

purported to assist consumers to prevent the foreclosure of their home or to
obtain a loan modification on their home mortgage. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-5,
106.
b.

Defaulting Defendants charged consumers a varying upfront fee,

which typically consisted of a $6,000 initial fee and $500 per month
thereafter. Am. Compl. ¶ 9.
c.

The upfront fees were charged before the consumers had executed a

written agreement with the loan holder or servicer that incorporated the
offer obtained by the defendants. Thus, Defaulting Defendants’ upfront fees
violated 12 C.F.R. § 1015.5(a).
d.

In

numerous

instances,

Defaulting

Defendants

discouraged

consumers from communicating directly with their lenders or servicers and
claimed that they would handle all communications with consumers’
lenders and servicers. Am. Compl. ¶ 104. Defaulting Defendants’
representations to consumers about contacting their lenders violated 12
C.F.R. § 1015.3(a).

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e.

Defaulting Defendants made numerous misrepresentations to

consumers about material aspects of the defendants’ mortgage assistance
relief services. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11. Defaulting Defendants did not
disclose that if consumers “stop[ped] paying [their] mortgage, [they] could
lose [their] homes and damage [their] credit rating.” Am. Compl. ¶ 139(c).
f.

Defaulting Defendants also misrepresented their staffing and the

likelihood that their mass-joinder cases would result in the consumer
receiving a loan modification with favorable terms. Am. Compl. ¶ 80.
These and other material misrepresentations alleged in the Amended
Complaint violated 12 C.F.R. § 1015.3(b)(4).
g.

Defaulting Defendants’ solicitations to consumers failed to state

that:
i.

The consumer may stop doing business with Defaulting

Defendants or reject an offer of mortgage assistance, if one is made,
without having to pay for the services;
ii.

Defaulting

Defendants

are

not

associated

with

the

government or approved by the government or the consumer’s
lender; and
iii.

Even if the consumer uses the RLG/BLG Enterprise’s service,

the consumer’s lender may not agree to modify the loan. Am.
Compl. ¶ 101. Moreover, where any of these disclosures were made,
they were not made in a “clear and prominent manner,” they were
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“not preceded by the heading “IMPORTANT NOTICE” or made in
the font size required by law. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 101-102. Thus,
Defaulting Defendants’ failure to provide the required, “clear and
prominent” disclosures violated 12 C.F.R. § 1015.4.
18.

Given these well-pled allegations and Defaulting Defendants’ failure to

answer or defend, the Court exercises its discretion to enter a default judgment against
Defaulting Defendants for violations of Regulation O.
Defaulting Defendants Violated Florida State Laws
19.

The Amended Complaint contains well-pled factual allegations that

Defaulting Defendants violated FDUTPA.
20.

Pursuant to Section 501.204(1) of FDUTPA, “unfair or deceptive acts or

practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce” are unlawful. Florida follows the
“standards of unfairness and deception set forth and interpreted by the Federal Trade
Commission or the federal courts.” Section 501.203(3)(b), Florida Statutes. To that end,
the Florida Supreme Court has noted a deceptive practice is one that involves a
“representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting
reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.” See PNR Inc. v. Beacon
Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003).
21.

FDUTPA is liberally construed to protect the consuming public from those

who engage in deceptive or unfair acts or practices in trade or commerce. See Fla Stat.
§501.202(2).

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22.

Whether a representation or practice is deceptive is a matter of judicial

determination. Dept. of Legal Affairs v. Father and Son Moving & Storage, Inc. 643 So.
2d 22, 26 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
23.

To determine whether a representation is deceptive, courts must consider

the impression created by the representation, not its literal truth or falsity. See FTC v.
Peoples Credit First, LLC, 2005 WL 3468588 (M.D. Fla. 2005), aff’d 244 Fed. App’x
942 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Advertising claims are
deceptive if they have the capacity to convey misleading impressions to consumers even
though non-misleading interpretations may be possible.

Father and Son Moving &

Storage, 643 So. 2d at 26.
24.

Given the Amended Complaint’s well-pled allegations and Defaulting

Defendants’ failure to answer or defend, the Court exercises its discretion to enter a
default judgment against Defaulting Defendants for willful violations of FDUTPA, as
alleged in Count V by the State of Florida.
Defaulting Defendants Violated Connecticut State Laws
25.

The Amended Complaint contains well-pled factual allegations that

Defaulting Defendants violated CUTPA.
26.

Under CUTPA “[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition

and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 42-110b(a).

In construing that provision, Connecticut looks to the

“interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts to Section

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5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time
amended.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b(b).
27.

CUTPA is remedial in character and should be so construed in favor of

those whom the legislature intended to benefit. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b(d); see
also Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 656 A.2d 1009, 1017 (Conn. 1995).
28.

Connecticut courts, when determining whether a practice violates CUTPA,

will consider (1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the
common law, or otherwise whether it is within at least the penumbra of some common
law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral,
unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to
consumers. See McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 473 A.2d 1185, 1191 (Conn.
1984).
29.

A violation of CUTPA may thus be established by showing either an actual

deceptive practice or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy. See Kenney v.
Healey Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. 730 A.2d 115, 117 (Conn. App. 1999).
30.

“An act or practice is deceptive if three conditions are met. First, there must

be a representation, omission, or other practice likely to mislead consumers. Second, the
consumers must interpret the message reasonably under the circumstances. Third, the
misleading representation, omission, or practice must be material—that is, likely to affect
consumer decisions or conduct.” Southington Savings Bank v. Rodgers, 668 A.2d 733
(Conn. App. 1995), cert. denied, 670 A.2d 1307 (Conn. 1996).
10

31.

Given the Amended Complaint’s well-pled allegations and Defaulting

Defendants’ failure to answer or defend, the Court exercises its discretion to enter a
default judgment against Defaulting Defendants for willful violations of CUTPA, as
alleged in Count VI by the State of Connecticut.
DAMAGES
32.

The proper measure of consumer redress is the total amount consumers

paid to purchase goods or services, less refunds already returned. McGregor v. Chierico,
206 F.3d 1378, 1389 (11th Cir. 2000); FTC v. 1st Guar. Mortg. Corp., No. 09-61840CIV-O’SULLIVAN, 2011 WL 1233207, *22 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2011); FTC v. Wolf, No.
94-8119-CIV-FERGUSON, 1996 WL 812940, *9 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 1996).
33.

Defendants are liable for the entire amount spent by consumers, regardless

of whether consumers received anything of value; the relevant factor is the “fraud in the
selling, not the value of the thing sold.” Chierico, 206 F.3d at 1389 (quoting FTC v.
Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 606 (9th Cir. 1993)).
34.

Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving damages and may do so through

affidavits and other documentary evidence showing the amount and calculation of
damages. Tara Prods., Inc. v. Hollywood Gadgets, Inc., 449 F. App’x 908, 911–12 (11th
Cir. 2011).
35.

Plaintiffs have established, through competent evidence, that at least 775

consumers were victimized by and paid money to the Defaulting Defendants between
April 2012 and the end of the scheme. Yerkes-Ribeiro Dec. at ¶13; Featheringill Dec. at
¶7.
11

36.

Plaintiffs have further established, through competent evidence, that the

consumer victims of the Defaulting Defendants’ scheme paid at least $5,214,184 over the
lifetime of the scheme. Yerkes-Ribiero Dec. at ¶13; Featheringill Dec. at ¶7
37.

During the same period, consumers received $95,921 in refunds, returns, or

amounts for stopped payments. Yerkes-Ribeiro Dec. at ¶9 ($91521); Featheringill Dec.
at ¶9 ($4,400).
38.

The Court also notes that judgments against individual Defaulting

Defendants have previously been entered for a combined total of $3,203,594.
39.

Thus, the net amount received by the Enterprise, minus the total amount of

the previous judgments is $1,914,669, which represents a reasonable approximation of
consumer loss for which Defaulting Defendants are jointly and severally liable.
40.

As explained in the declarations of Connecticut Investigator Caylee

Yerkes-Ribiero and Florida Investigator William Featheringill attached to Plaintiffs’
Motion, these figures were derived from Defaulting Defendants’ records, including bank
records obtained pursuant to subpoenas in the underlying investigations, and document
requests to banks and other third parties pursuant to this Court’s temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction as well as document requests during discovery in this
case.
41.

Because the Defaulting Defendants operated as a common enterprise, the

Court holds the Defaulting Defendants jointly and severally liable for the consumer loss
caused by the conduct alleged in the Amended Complaint.

12

DEFINITIONS
42.

For the purposes of this Default Judgment and Final Judgment, the

following definitions shall apply:
a.

“Asset” means any legal or equitable interest in, right to, or claim to any

real, personal, or intellectual property owned or controlled by, or held, in whole or in part
for the benefit of, or subject to access by Defaulting Defendants, wherever located,
whether in the United States or abroad. This includes, but is not limited to, chattel, goods,
instruments, equipment, fixtures, general intangibles, effects, leaseholds, contracts, mail
or other deliveries, shares of stock, commodities, futures, inventory, checks, notes,
accounts, credits, receivables (as those terms are defined in the Uniform Commercial
Code), funds, cash, and trusts, including, but not limited to any trust held for the benefit
of Defaulting Defendants;
b. “Assisting others” includes, but is not limited to:
• consulting in any form whatsoever;
• performing customer service functions including, but not limited to,
receiving or responding to consumer complaints;
• formulating or providing, or arranging for the formulation or provision
of, any advertising or marketing material, including, but not limited to,
any telephone sales script, direct mail solicitation, or the text of any
Internet website, email, or other electronic communication;

13

• formulating or providing, or arranging for the formulation or provision
of, any marketing support material or service, including but not limited
to, web or Internet Protocol addresses or domain name registration for
any Internet websites, affiliate marketing services, or media placement
services;
• providing names of, or assisting the generation of, potential customers;
or
• performing marketing, billing or payment services of any kind; and
acting or serving as an employee, independent contractor, owner,
officer, director, manager, or principal;
c. “Commercial Telephone Solicitation” means: an unsolicited telephone call to
an individual for the purpose of inducing the individual to purchase or invest in
consumer goods or services; communication with an individual where (1) a
gift, award, or prize is offered or (2) a telephone call response is invited, and
(3) the salesperson intends to complete a sale or enter into an agreement to
purchase during the course of the telephone call; or any other communication
with a individual that represents a price, quality, or availability of consumer
goods or services and invites a response by telephone or which is followed by a
call to the individual by a salesperson. “Commercial Telephone Solicitation”
does not include unsolicited telephone calls to businesses;
d. “Consumer Financial Product or Service” is synonymous in meaning and equal
in scope to the definitions of the term in Section 1002(5) and (15) of the CFPA,
14

and, subject to applicable restrictions contained in the CFPA, includes but is
not limited to:
• extending credit and servicing loans, including acquiring, purchasing,
selling, brokering, or other extensions of credit (other than solely
extending commercial credit to a person who originates consumer credit
transactions);
• providing real estate settlement services or performing appraisals on real
estate or personal property;
• collecting, analyzing, maintaining, or providing consumer report
information or other account information, including information relating
to the credit history of consumers, used or expected to be used in
connection with any decision regarding the offering or provision of a
Consumer Financial Product or Service; or
• collecting debt related to any Consumer Financial Product or Service;
e. “Debt Relief Product or Service” means any product, service, plan or program
represented, expressly or by implication, to renegotiate, settle, or in any way
alter the terms of payment or other terms of the debt or obligation, including
but not limited to a tax debt or obligation, between a person and one or more
creditors or debt collectors, including but not limited to, a reduction in the
balance, interest rate, or fees owed by a person to a creditor or debt collector;
f.

“Mortgage Assistance Relief Product or Service” means any product, service,
plan, or program, offered or provided to the consumer in exchange for
15

consideration, that is represented, expressly or by implication, to assist or
attempt to assist the consumer with any of the following:
• stopping, preventing, or postponing any mortgage or deed of trust
foreclosure sale for the consumer’s dwelling, any repossession of the
consumer’s dwelling, or otherwise saving the consumer’s dwelling from
foreclosure or repossession;
• negotiating, obtaining, or arranging a modification of any term of a
dwelling loan, including a reduction in the amount of interest, principal
balance, monthly payments, or fees;
• obtaining any forbearance or modification in the timing of payments
from any dwelling loan holder or servicer on any dwelling loan;
• negotiating, obtaining, or arranging any extension of the period of time
within which the consumer may (i) cure his or her default on a dwelling
loan, (ii) reinstate his or her dwelling loan, (iii) redeem a dwelling, or
(iv) exercise any right to reinstate a dwelling loan or redeem a dwelling;
• obtaining any waiver of an acceleration clause or balloon payment
combined in any promissory note or contract secured by any dwelling;
or
• negotiating, obtaining, or arranging (i) a short sale of a dwelling, (ii) a
deed in lieu of foreclosure, (iii) or any other disposition of a dwelling

16

loan other than a sale to a third party that is not the dwelling loan
holder.
The foregoing shall include any manner of claimed assistance, including, but
not limited to, auditing or examining a consumer’s mortgage or home loan
application;
g. “Person” means an individual, partnership, company, corporation, association
(incorporated or unincorporated), trust, estate, cooperative organization, or
other entity;
h. “Receiver” means Mark Bernet, Esq.
i. “Telemarketing” means any plan, program, or campaign that is conducted to
induce the purchase of goods or services or a charitable contribution by use of
one or more telephones, whether or not covered by the Telemarketing Sales
Rule.
j. The words “and” and “or” shall be understood to have both conjunctive and
disjunctive meanings as necessary to make the applicable phrase or sentence
inclusive rather than exclusive.
FINAL ORDER AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
I.

Permanent Ban on Consumer Financial Products or Services
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defaulting Defendants, whether acting

directly or through any other Person, are hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from:

17

A. Advertising, marketing, promoting, offering for sale, or selling any Consumer
Financial Product or Service; and
B. Knowingly assisting others engaged in advertising, marketing, promoting,
offering for sale, or selling any Consumer Financial Product or Service.
II.

Permanent Ban on Mortgage Assistance Relief Products or Services
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defaulting Defendants, whether acting

directly or through any other Person, are hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from:
A. Advertising, marketing, promoting, offering for sale, or selling any Mortgage
Assistance Relief Product or Service; and
B. Knowingly assisting others engaged in advertising, marketing, promoting,
offering for sale, or selling any Mortgage Assistance Relief Product or Service.
III.

Permanent Ban on Debt Relief Products or Services
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defaulting Defendants, whether acting

directly or through any other Person, are hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from:
A. Advertising, marketing, promoting, offering for sale, or selling any Debt Relief
Product or Service; and
B. Knowingly assisting others engaged in advertising marketing, promoting,
offering for sale, or selling any Debt Relief Product or Service.

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IV.

Prohibited Practices Relating to Any Goods or Services
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defaulting Defendants, whether acting

directly or through any other Person, are hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from:
A.

Misrepresenting or knowingly assisting others in misrepresenting, directly or
indirectly, expressly or by implication, any material fact of any good or
service including, but not limited to:
1.

the total costs to purchase, receive or use the good or service;

2.

any material restriction, limitation, or condition to purchase, receive
or use the good or service;

3.

any material aspect of the nature or terms of a refund, cancellation,
exchange or repurchase policy for the good or service;

4.

the income, profits or sales likely to be achieved from the good or
service; and

5.

any material aspect of the performance, efficacy, nature or central
characteristic of the good or service.

B.

Knowingly assisting others to make any material misrepresentation in
connection with the advertising, marketing, promotion, offering for sale, or
sale of any good or service including, but not limited to, the
misrepresentations listed in Section IV. A.

C.

Using aliases, pen names, or otherwise using a false personal or corporate
identity in connection with the advertising, marketing, promotion, offering

19

for sale, or sale of any good or service including, but not limited to, the
misrepresentations listed in Section IV. A.
D.

Violating, or knowingly assisting others in violating, any federal or state
consumer protection laws, including, but not limited to, any provision of the
FDUTPA, CUTPA, and Regulation O.

V.

Permanent Ban on Telemarketing
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defaulting Defendants, whether acting

directly or through any Person, business entity, trust, corporation, partnership, limited
liability company, subsidiary, division, or other device, or any of them, are hereby
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from engaging in, participating in, or knowingly assisting
others in Telemarketing or in any other Commercial Telephone Solicitation.
VI.

Prohibition on Collecting on Accounts
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defaulting Defendants, whether acting

directly or through any other Person, are hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
attempting to collect, collecting, selling, or assigning, or otherwise transferring any right
to collect payment from any consumer who purchased or agreed to purchase Consumer
Financial Products or Services, Mortgage Assistance Relief Products or Services, or Debt
Relief Products or Services from Defaulting Defendants.

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VII.

Receivership
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the receivership imposed by this Court shall

continue as set forth in the Court’s preliminary injunction orders dated August 22, 2014
(Doc. No. 42) and September 24, 2014 (Doc. No. 51). As a result, the Receiver shall
continue to have the same duties and authorities as outlined in those orders so that he may
complete the tasks outlined in those orders as well as the Court’s August 1, 2014
Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. No. 10).
VIII. Order to Pay Redress
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a judgment for monetary relief is entered in
favor of the Plaintiffs’ and against the Defaulting Defendants, jointly and severally, in the
amount of $1,914,669, which represents the monetary value of consumer damages proven
through competent evidence ($5,118,263 subtracted by the total amount of monetary
judgments that this Court has already entered against other Defendants in this action,
$3,203,594)).
IX.

Order to Pay Civil Money Penalties
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under Section 1055(c) of the CFPA, Section

501.2075 of the Florida Statutes, and Section 42-110o(b) of the Connecticut General
Statutes and by reason of the violations of law described in the Amended Complaint,
Defaulting Defendants must pay a civil money penalty of $3,875,000 to Plaintiffs. This
penalty shall be paid as follows: $1,937,500 to the Connecticut General Fund and
$1,937,500 to the State of Florida General Revenue Fund.
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X.

Service of Default Judgment
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order may be served upon Defaulting

Defendants by certified mail or United Parcel Service, either by the United States
Marshal, the Clerk of Court, or any representative or agent of Plaintiffs.
JUDGMENT IS THEREFORE ENTERED in favor of Plaintiffs and against the
Defaulting Defendants in accordance with the terms and conditions contained above. Any
pending motions are denied as moot. The Clerk is directed to close this file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida on this 9th day of October, 2015.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record
S:\Odd\2014\14-cv-1825 Default and Final Judgment.doc

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