Hernandez et al v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.

Filing 30

ORDER: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint 12 is DENIED. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 10/14/2014. (AKH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JOSE HERNANDEZ and WILLIE
HILL, on their own behalf and
others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 8:14-cv-1902-T-33AEP

CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY
STORE, INC.,
Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER
This cause is before the Court pursuant to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Doc. # 12), filed on
August 29, 2014.

Plaintiffs, Jose Hernandez and Willie Hill,

filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
# 29) on October 9, 2014.

For the reasons that follow, the

Court denies the Motion to Dismiss.
I.

Background
Hernandez and Hill worked for Cracker Barrel at multiple

locations in Hillsborough and Hernando County, Florida, in a
position entitled “Associate Manager.” (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 4).
Their position involved primary job duties that were nonexempt in nature. (Id.).
On August 7, 2014, Hernandez and Hill filed this putative
Collective Action Complaint against Cracker Barrel alleging a

violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207,
for Recovery of Overtime Compensation. (See Id.). Cracker
Barrel seeks dismissal of this action pursuant to Middle
District of Florida Local Rule 3.01(a)1 as “the instant action
raises the same claims and issues which are currently pending
against Defendant Cracker Barrel in the Northern District of
New York.” (Doc. # 12).
II.

Analysis
Cracker Barrel seeks dismissal of the case before this

Court as “the exact same claim has been brought against
Cracker Barrel by another Associate Manager in the Northern
District of New York.” (Id.). It is Cracker Barrel’s position
that the “first-filed rule” requires that this Court defer to
the action pending in the Northern District of New York.
(Id.). However, Hernandez and Hill contend that dismissal is
improper as it is not the decision of this Court, but the

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The Court notes that although Cracker Barrel cited to
Local Rule 3.01(a), Local Rule 1.04 is more appropriate. Rule
1.04 states in relevant part that “if cases assigned to a
judge are related because of either a common question of law
or fact or any other prospective duplication in the
prosecution or resolution of the cases, a party may move to
consolidate the cases for any or all purposes in accord with
Rule 42, Fed. R. Civ. P., or Rule 13, Fed. R. Civ. P. The
moving party shall file a notice of filing the motion to
consolidate, including a copy of the motion to consolidate, in
each related case.”
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Court in the Northern District of New York that should make
the determination of whether to apply the “first-filed rule.”
(Doc. # 29).
The “first to file” rule states that “where two actions
involving overlapping issues and parties are pending in two
federal courts, there is a strong presumption across the
federal circuits that favors the forum of the first-filed suit
under the first-filed rule.” Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430
F.3d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., United States
Fire Ins. Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 920 F.2d 487, 488
(8th Cir. 1990)(describing the first-filed rule as “wellestablished”); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States
Dep't of Defense, 611 F.2d 738, 750 (9th Cir. 1979)(noting
that

the

first-filed

rule

“should

not

be

disregarded

lightly”). The case pending before the Northern District of
New York, styled Proper et al. v. Cracker Barrel Old Country
Store, Inc., Case No. 3:14-CV-413, was filed on April 11,
2014. The case before this Court was filed on August 7, 2014,
118 days after the Proper action. (Doc. # 12).
“[T]he ‘first to file rule’ not only determines which
court may decide the merits of substantially similar issues,
but also establishes which court may decide whether the second
suit filed must be dismissed, stayed or transferred and
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consolidated.“ Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174
F.3d 599,606 (5th Cir. 1999);(quoting Sutter Corp. v. P & P
Indus., Inc., 125 F.3d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1997)). Courts
applying this rule generally agree “that the court in which an
action is first filed is the appropriate court to determine
whether

subsequently

filed

cases

involving

substantially

similar issues should proceed.” (Id.) (quotations omitted);
e.g., Perkins v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1353
(M.D. Ga. 2006) (“[U]nder the ‘first-filed rule,’ the court
where the subsequently filed action has been filed should
defer to the court where the first action was filed to allow
that court to decide whether it should exercise jurisdiction
over both cases in a consolidated action.”); Street v. Smith,
456 F. Supp. 2d 761, 768 (S.D. Miss. 2006); Kate Aspen, Inc.
v. Fashioncraft-Excello, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1338
(N.D. Ga. 2005) (“[T]he first-filed rule generally requires
the first court to decide whether the first-filed rule should
apply, or whether a narrow exception to the rule that only
applies in ‘compelling circumstances,’ favors transfer of the
first-filed case to the second court for consolidation.”).
This Court notes that the application of the first-filed
rule is not mandatory, but rather committed soundly to the
district court’s discretion. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Clohessy, 9
4

F. 3d 1314, 1316 (M.D. Fla. 1998)(see White v. Microsoft
Corp., No. 1:05-CV-00731, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77010, at * 9,
(“The most basic aspect of the first-to-file rule is that it
is discretionary; an ample degree of discretion, appropriate
for disciplined and experienced judges, must be left to the
lower

courts.”)).

Furthermore,

“district

courts

have

the

discretion to dispense with the first-to-file rule where
equity so demands.” Barnett v. Ala., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1292,
1296 (S.D. Ala. 2001).
Here, Cracker Barrel has not provided this Court with any
indication in its Motion to Dismiss or by way of notice that
a request for consolidation or transfer has been made in the
Northern District of New York. In addition, it appears that
the Court in the Proper case has endorsed a 180-day stay,
during which time the parties were to conduct discovery. (Doc.
# 29 at 8-9). As Plaintiffs correctly point out, the Proper
case is at an entirely different procedural posture than the
action pending before this Court and dismissing this action
would prejudice Plaintiffs in this case. The case before this
Court did not enter into an “expedited discovery and mediation
process,” as is the course for the Proper case. (Doc. # 12,
Proper). As the “first-to-file rule” is the sole basis of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 12), this Court finds
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that dismissal of this action would not be in the interests of
justice, and therefore, the Motion is denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint(Doc.
# 12) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this
14th day of October, 2014.

Copies: All Counsel of Record

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