Boyd v. Standard Fire Insurance Company et al

Filing 24

ORDER Plaintiff William H. Boyd's Motion for Reconsideration 21 is DENIED. Defendant Standard Fire Insurance Co.'s Motion to Dismiss 5 is GRANTED. Plaintiff William H. Boyd may file an amended complaint on or before October 20, 2014. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 10/2/2014. (KBT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
WILLIAM H. BOYD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:14-cv-2074-T-33EAJ

STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court pursuant to a motion
hearing held on September 30, 2014, at which the Court heard
oral argument on Defendant Standard Fire Insurance Co.’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 5) and pro se Plaintiff William H.
Boyd’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. # 21) of this Court’s
denial of his Motion to Deny Transfer of Case to Federal
District Court and Remand Same to Hillsborough County Court
(Doc. # 16). For the reasons set forth at the hearing and
described below, the Court grants Standard Fire’s Motion to
Dismiss and denies Boyd’s Motion for Reconsideration.
In regard to Boyd’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. #
21),

this

Court

finds

that

it

has

federal

question

jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, as the present
claim

relates

to

the

National

Flood

Insurance

Program,

created pursuant to the National Flood Insurance Act, 42
U.S.C. § 4001 et seq. Furthermore, as provided under the Act,
this

Court

has

original

exclusive

jurisdiction

over

the

present matter. See 42 U.S.C. § 4072. Accordingly, Boyd’s
Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. # 21) is denied.
As to Standard Fire’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court notes,
as an initial matter, that it would have been appropriate to
grant the Motion to Dismiss as unopposed, as Boyd failed to
timely

file

a

response

in

opposition

to

the

Motion.

Nevertheless, at the motion hearing, the Court allowed both
parties to address their respective positions as they relate
to the Motion to Dismiss. At that time, Standard Fire pointed
the Court to two provisions, which govern the present matter.
In particular, 44 C.F.R. § 62 app. A, Article III, of the
National Flood Insurance Program provides:
E. Premium refunds to applicants and policyholders
required pursuant to rules contained in the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) “Flood
Insurance Manual” shall be made by the Company from
Federal flood insurance funds referred to in
Article II, Section E, and, if such funds are
depleted, from funds derived by drawing against the
Letter of Credit established pursuant to Article
IV. As fiscal agent, the Company shall not refund
any premium to applicants or policyholders in any
manner other than as specified in the NFIP's “Flood
Insurance Manual” since flood insurance premiums
are funds of the Federal Government.

2

(See Court’s Ex. 2) (emphasis added). Standard Fire, in turn,
pointed the Court to the language of the NFIP Flood Insurance
Manual, which limits Boyd’s recovery to the current policy
year. (See Court’s Ex. 1). Further, Standard Fire argues that
it is mandated to follow the guidance of the NFIP’s Flood
Insurance Manual. (Doc. # 5 at 3) (citing Suopys v. Omaha
Prop. & Cas., 404 F.3d 805, 811 (3d Cir. 2005)).
It is undisputed that Standard Fire reimbursed Boyd the
amount owed for the current policy year. Therefore, it is
Standard Fire’s position that Boyd is not entitled to further
recovery. (See Doc. # 5). Looking to the four corners of the
Complaint and having considered the arguments presented at
the hearing, the Court finds that Boyd has not demonstrated
his entitlement to additional funds and, therefore, has not
stated a cause of action. Accordingly, the Court grants
Standard Fire’s Motion to Dismiss. However, Boyd’s Complaint
is dismissed without prejudice so that he may file an amended
complaint which more fully develops the arguments set forth
at the motion hearing.
The Court instructs Boyd that, in order to sufficiently
state a cause of action in federal court, Boyd must meet the
pleading

standards

required

by

the

rules

and

case

law

governing this Court. Specifically, in accordance with Bell

3

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a) calls “for sufficient factual matter,
accepted

as

true,

to

‘state

a

claim

to

relief

that

is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A plausible claim
for relief must include “factual content [that] allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Furthermore, on a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts
as true all the allegations in the complaint and construes
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v.
Bellsouth

Telecomms.,

372

F.3d

1250,

1262

(11th

Cir.

2004). Further, this Court favors the plaintiff with all
reasonable
complaint.

inferences

from

the

allegations

in

the

Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901

F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990) (“On a motion to dismiss,
the

facts

inferences

stated

in

therefrom

[the]
are

complaint

taken

as

and

all

true.”).

reasonable

However,

Supreme Court explains that:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action

4

the

will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.
Twombly,

550

U.S.

at

555

(2007)(internal

citations

omitted). Further, courts are not “bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
Therefore, Boyd has until and including October 20,
2014, to file an amended complaint to state a valid cause of
action to the extent possible in compliance with the federal
rules as outlined above.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)

Plaintiff William H. Boyd’s Motion for Reconsideration
(Doc. # 21) is DENIED.

(2)

Defendant

Standard

Fire

Insurance

Co.’s

Motion

to

Dismiss (Doc. # 5) is GRANTED.
(3)

Plaintiff William H. Boyd may file an amended complaint
on or before October 20, 2014.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 2nd

day of October, 2014.

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Copies: All Counsel and Parties of Record

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