Boyd v. Standard Fire Insurance Company et al

Filing 41

ORDER: Defendant Standard Fire Insurance Co.'s Motion to Dismiss 38 is GRANTED. This case is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff William H. Boyd's Motion to Reconsider Mediation Denial 40 is DENIED as Moot. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE THIS CASE. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 11/19/2014. (KBT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
WILLIAM H. BOYD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:14-cv-2074-T-33EAJ

STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This cause is before the Court pursuant to Defendant
Standard Fire Insurance Company’s (Standard Fire) Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint and Memorandum of Law in Support,
filed on October 29, 2014. (Doc. # 38). Pro se Plaintiff
William H. Boyd filed a response in opposition thereto on
November 11, 2014. (Doc. # 39). Upon due consideration, the
Court grants the Motion.
I.

Background
Boyd initiated this action in the County Court in and

for Hillsborough County, Florida, against Defendants Standard
Fire and Willis of Florida. (Doc. # 1). However, a Notice of
Voluntary

Dismissal

with

Prejudice

Only

As

to

Defendant

Willis of Florida was filed on August 22, 2014. (Doc. # 5 at
2). Standard Fire then removed the case to this Court on

August 25, 2014. (Doc. # 1). This Court has original exclusive
jurisdiction over the present matter, as provided under the
National Flood Insurance Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 4072.
In his initial Complaint, Boyd alleged that “Defendants
negligently underwrote my Flood Policy resulting in excess
premiums being paid.” (Doc. # 2 at 1). Standard Fire filed a
Motion to Dismiss in opposition thereto on August 29, 2014.
(Doc. # 5). This Court heard oral argument on the Motion to
Dismiss on September 30, 2014. (Doc. # 25). Based on the
arguments set forth at the hearing and an independent review
of the matter, the Court granted Standard Fire’s Motion. (Doc.
# 24). However, the Court dismissed Boyd’s Complaint without
prejudice so that he could file an amended complaint which
more fully developed the arguments he set forth at the motion
hearing. (Id. at 3).
Boyd filed an Amended Complaint on October 16, 2014,
setting forth the following claims: Breach of Duty Owed (count
I), Unjust Enrichment (count II), Failure to Perform Fiscal
Responsibility (count III), and General Change Endorsement is
Ambiguous (count IV). (Doc. # 30). In response, Standard Fire
filed the present Motion to Dismiss on October 29, 2014 (Doc.
# 38), which is now ripe for the Court’s review.
II.

Legal Standard

2

On a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true all
of the factual allegations in the complaint and construes
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v.
Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004).
Further, this Court favors the plaintiff with all reasonable
inferences from the allegations in the complaint. Stephens v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th
Cir. 1990)(“On a motion to dismiss, the facts stated in [the]
complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom are taken
as true.”). However, the Supreme Court explains that:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal
citations omitted). Further, courts are not “bound to accept
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
In

accordance

with

Twombly,

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure 8(a) calls “for sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

3

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009)(quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

A plausible claim for relief must

include “factual content [that] allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id.
III. Analysis
The

National

Flood

Insurance

Act

(NFIA)

of

1968

established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) as a
vehicle for providing property owners with affordable flood
insurance subsidized by the federal government. 42 U.S.C. §§
4001 et seq. In 1983, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) promulgated regulations enabling private insurers to
provide flood insurance under the “Write Your Own” (WYO)
Program. 44 C.F.R. § 61.13(f). WYO insurers deposit flood
insurance premiums with the United States Treasury after
deducting their fees and administrative costs and draw on
FEMA letters of credit when they lack sufficient funds to pay
claims.

Southpointe

Villas

Homeowners

Assoc.,

Inc.

v.

Scottish Ins. Agency, 213 F. Supp. 2d 586, 588 (D.S.C. 2002).
FEMA also reimburses WYO insurers for certain defense costs
related to claims handling and policy administration because
they are fiscal agents of the United States. Id. Furthermore,
the NFIA confers original, exclusive jurisdiction to the

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“United States district court for the district in which the
insured property” is located. See 42 U.S.C. § 4072.
WYO insurers issue Standard Flood Insurance Policies
(SFIPs), whose terms, rate structures and premium costs are
regulated by FEMA. Southpointe, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 588. The
SFIP provides: “This [flood] policy and all disputes arising
from the handling of any claim under the policy are governed
exclusively by the flood insurance regulations issued by
FEMA, the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended
(42 U.S.C. [§§] 4001 et seq.), and Federal common law.” 44
C.F.R. Part 61, App. A(1) art. IX (emphasis added). FEMA
regulations mandate that WYO companies – such as Standard
Fire – exclusively adhere to the National Flood Insurance
Manual when issuing flood insurance refunds “because flood
insurance premiums are funds of the Federal Government.” 44
C.F.R. Pt. 62, App. A, Art. III(E); see Southpointe, 213 F.
Supp.

2d

at

593

(federal

policy

requires

“uniform

interpretation” of the Flood Manual regarding overcharged
premiums, otherwise federal funds would be at risk without
predictability).
Here, Boyd’s claims sound in claim handling, rather than
policy procurement, because they do not involve the purchase
of a new SFIP or renewal of a lapsed SFIP. See Grissom v.

5

Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 678 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2012).
Instead, the present matter involves a policy that was not
updated to reflect the change in the applicable flood zone.
(See Doc. ## 1, 30). As previously noted, “FEMA’s regulations
are controlling regarding the application of the SFIP by WYO
Companies. 44 C.F.R. Pt. 61, App. A(1). [Furthermore, the]
FEMA Claims Manual . . . is incorporated by reference into
the FEMA regulations (44 C.F.R. § 62.23).” Suopys v. Omaha
Prop. & Cas., 404 F.3d 805, 811 (3d Cir. 2005). The relevant
provision of that manual provides:
B.

Rating Endorsements
***

4.

Map Revision
A policy may be endorsed to revise the flood
zone or change the Base Flood Elevation (BFE)
in which a building is located to provide a
more favorable rating due to a physical
revision of the FIRM, a Letter of Map Revision
(LOMR). The effective date of the endorsement
to rate a policy with the current zone must be
the effective date of the map revision.
***
•

If a map revision or amendment became
effective prior to the previous policy year,
a refund of the premium difference is granted
for the current policy year only.

Flood Manual, End 2, § II(B)(4) (emphasis added). In the
present

matter,

it

is

undisputed

6

that

Standard

Fire

reimbursed Boyd the amount owed for the current policy year.
Accordingly, Boyd is not entitled to further recovery.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)

Defendant

Standard

Fire

Insurance

Co.’s

Motion

to

Dismiss (Doc. # 38) is GRANTED.
(2)

This case is dismissed with prejudice.

(3)

Plaintiff

William

H.

Boyd’s

Motion

to

Reconsider

Mediation Denial (Doc. # 40) is DENIED as Moot.
(4)

The Clerk is directed to CLOSE THIS CASE.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

19th day of November, 2014.

Copies: All Counsel and Parties of Record

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