Potter v. Pinellas Park Water Management District

Filing 15

ORDER denying 5 motion to dismiss. The Defendant has ten days from this date to provide a response to Plaintiff's Complaint. Signed by Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich on 11/3/2014. (SN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

ROBERT POTTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CASE NO. 8:14-cv-02130-EAK-MAP
PINELLAS PARK WATER
MANAGEMENT DISTRICT
Defendant.
/

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED
COMPLAINT OR FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint or for a More Definite Statement (hereinafter “Motion to Dismiss”)
(Doc. 5) and Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss (hereinafter “Response”) (Doc. 9). After careful consideration of the parties’
submissions, this Court concludes that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 6, 2013, Plaintiff Robert Potter (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) filed his initial
complaint in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit In and For Pinellas County,
Florida, alleging a retaliatory employment action by Defendant Pinellas Park Water
Management District (hereinafter “Defendant”). On August 7, 2014, Plaintiff amended
his complaint to include a federal claim for retaliation under the Civil Rights Acts of
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1866 and 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1981(a)(b) and (c). Defendant thereafter removed
the action to this Court.
On August 29, 2014, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 2) was filed with this
Court. On September 5, 2014, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss, alleging that
Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to set forth sufficient facts in order to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. (Doc. 5). Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss asks that in the
alternative, Plaintiff should be required to submit a more definite statement because
Plaintiff’s Complaint is too vague and ambiguous and Defendant cannot reasonably
frame a responsive pleading. Id. Because Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges facts sufficient to
support a claim for retaliation under § 1981 and a claim for the deprivation of rights
under § 1983, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss must be DENIED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not
required, but the Rule does call for sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility
when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The Supreme Court has
identified two working principles that underlie its decision in Twombly. “First, the tenant
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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662, 678 (2009). “Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief
survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim
. . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
When considering a motion to dismiss, a court may begin its analysis “by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to
the assumption of truth.” Id. The Supreme Court has explained that “[w]hile legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”
Id.
DISCUSSION
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that while employed by Defendant as a
Maintenance Supervisor, Plaintiff complained to Defendant’s Executive Director, Janet
Rogers, that a white employee of the Defendant had harassed a black employee of the
Defendant because of the black employee’s race. (Doc. 2). Plaintiff further alleges that
Defendant thereafter terminated Plaintiff’s employment because Plaintiff had complained
about race discrimination in Defendant’s workplace. Id.
Plaintiff asserts that the retaliatory employment action taken against him was in
violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.01, et seq., and under the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1981(a)(b) and (c). (Doc. 2).
Plaintiff finally asserts that this Court has jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 2). Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss claims that Plaintiff has

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failed to allege sufficient facts to sustain a claim for retaliation under § 1981 and failed to
allege a cause of action under § 1983.
42 U.S.C. § 1981
Defendant claims that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to sustain a
claim for retaliation under § 1981 because “the plaintiff must show that he was racially
discriminated against.” (Doc. 5). This is not the case.
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that § 1981 “is directed exclusively toward racial
discrimination.” Tucker v. Talladega City Schools, 171 Fed. Appx. 289, 295 (11th Cir.
2006). However, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[r]uling out a § 1981 retaliation
claim unless it was coupled with a non-retaliation race claim would go a long way toward
eviscerating [the court’s] holding in Andrews which recognizes a separate and distinct
cause of action for retaliation under § 1981.” Id. (referencing Andrews v. Lakeshore
Rehabilitation Hosp., 140 F.3d 1405 (11th Cir. 1998)). Thus, a § 1981 cause of action
“includes retaliation for a plaintiff’s opposition to race discrimination, whether or not he
personally is the victim of that race discrimination.” Id.
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s employment by the Defendant was
terminated as the result of Plaintiff’s complaint about race discrimination in the
Defendant’s workplace. (Doc. 2). Because the Eleventh Circuit has clearly stated that a §
1981 cause of action includes retaliation for a plaintiff’s opposition to race
discrimination, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges facts sufficient to support a claim for
retaliation under § 1981.

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42 U.S.C § 1983
Plaintiff’s Complaint states that this Court has jurisdiction over the § 1981 claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 2). Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s “naked references to
[§ 1983] to support jurisdiction, [leaves Defendant] to speculate that Plaintiff may be
attempting to state a constitutional claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Doc. 5).
While in reality 28 U.S.C. 1331 grants this Court jurisdiction over this action, it is
clear from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff is bringing a claim against Defendant
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the deprivation of
federally protected rights, privileges, and immunities by state actors. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In order to establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) “the defendant
deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,” and
(2) “that the defendant acted under color of law.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 151 (1970).
In order to survive a Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 at 570. In his Complaint, Plaintiff has alleged that his
employment by the Defendant was terminated because he complained about race
discrimination in the Defendant’s workplace. (Doc. 2). It would appear then, that
Plaintiff is alleging that Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment for expressing his
opposition to race discrimination. Because the First Amendment grants individuals the
freedom of expression, it would appear that the Plaintiff is claiming he was deprived of
his First Amendment rights.

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Motions for more definite statements are disfavored and “should only be granted
where the pleading is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required
to frame a responsive pleading. Royal Shell Vacations, Inc. v. Scheyndel, 233 F.R.D. 629,
630 (M.D. Fla. 2005). Because the Complaint is not so vague that Defendant cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, and because accepting as true all
of the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff has provided “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 at 555, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint or for a
More Definite Statement must be DENIED. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. The Defendant has
ten days from this date to provide a response to Plaintiff’s Complaint.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 3rd day of
November, 2014.

Copies to: All Parties and Counsel of Record

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