Caporicci v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.

Filing 24

ORDER denying 12 motion to dismiss. Defendant is directed to file an answer to the Amended Complaint 7 in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's Local Rules. Signed by Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell on 4/9/2015. (AEB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
LISA CAPORICCI,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 8:14-cv-2131-T-36EAJ

CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC.,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Family Medical Leave Act Claims Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Motion to Stay
Remaining Claims (Doc. 12), and the Plaintiff’s response thereto (Doc. 14). The Court, having
considered the motion and being fully advised in the premises, will deny Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Family Medical Leave Act Claims Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and
Motion to Stay Remaining Claims.
I.

Factual Allegations 1
Plaintiff Lisa Caporicci worked for Defendant Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. as a

Crewmember at its South Tampa location for approximately eleven months. Doc. 7 at ¶¶ 20-21.
While employed by Defendant, Plaintiff satisfactorily performed the job requirements of her
position. Id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff had satisfactory attendance while employed by Defendant and never
received any warnings, write-ups, or other documentation in regards to her attendance. Id. at ¶ 23.

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In ruling on Defendant’s motion, the Court must accept as true the allegations of the Complaint
(Doc. 7). See Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 334 (11th Cir. 1992); Quality Foods de
Centro Am., S.A. v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp. S.A. 711 F.2d 989, 994 (11th Cir. 1983).

Plaintiff suffers from a disability requiring her to be under the care of a psychiatrist and
take daily medications. Id. at ¶ 24. Plaintiff informed her General Manager, Jared Miesel, around
April 2013, of her disability and the necessity of her medications and potential side effects and
provided documentation. Id. at ¶ 25. Prior to the beginning of Plaintiff’s shift on June 6, 2013,
Plaintiff and her doctor submitted all required documentation requesting upcoming medical leave
pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Id. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff would have been
eligible for FMLA leave in the coming month. Id. at ¶ 27.
In addition, on June 6, 2013, Plaintiff took her daily medication, which caused her to have
a medical reaction. Id. at ¶ 29. Thereafter, Plaintiff explained to her General Manager, Jared Miesel
(“Miesel”), that she was experiencing a reaction to the medication. Id. at ¶ 30. Thereafter, Miesel
told Plaintiff “it was fine” and that she could just “go home.” Id. at ¶ 31. Plaintiff then left
Defendant’s South Tampa location and returned home. Id. at ¶ 32.
Plaintiff then had her doctor fax a note to Miesel, stating that Plaintiff was suffering from
a reaction to her medication. Id. at ¶ 33. Two hours later, Miesel phoned Plaintiff and terminated
her because she looked like “she was under the influence” of illegal drugs. Id. at ¶ 34.
Plaintiff explained that she had her doctor fax medical documentation regarding the
reaction to Miesel’s attention to prove that she was using prescription medicines – not illegal drugs.
Id. at ¶ 35. A drug test was never administered to Plaintiff establishing she was using anything but
her prescribed medication; therefore, Defendant had no basis for accusing Plaintiff of using illegal
drugs. Id. at ¶ 36. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a claim with Defendant’s Human Resources. Id. at ¶
37. Plaintiff was informed by David Gottlieb with Human Resources that Defendant stood by
Miesel’s decision to terminate her employment. Id. at ¶ 38.

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On or about June 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (hereinafter “EEOC”) based on disability discrimination and harassment. Id. at ¶ 11.
On or about June 12, 2014, the EEOC issued to Plaintiff a Letter of Determination establishing
that there is reasonable cause to believe that Defendant terminated Plaintiff due to her disability in
violation of the ADAAA. Id. at ¶ 13. On or about July 27, 2014, Plaintiff was notified that the
EEOC’s attempts to conciliate Plaintiff’s charge were unsuccessful and Plaintiff was given a
Notice of Right to Sue (Conciliation Failure). Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff filed this action on August 29,
2014.
II.

Standard of Review
To survive a motion to dismiss, a pleading must include a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Labels, conclusions and formulaic recitations of the elements of
a cause of action are not sufficient. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). Furthermore, mere naked assertions are not sufficient. Id. A complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, which, if accepted as true, would “state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The court, however, is not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion stated as a “factual allegation” in the complaint. Id.
III.

Discussion
The FMLA provides “eligible employees”, among other rights, with up to twelve weeks of

unpaid leave if a serious medical condition makes the employee unable to perform the functions
of his or her position as an employee. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). An eligible employee is

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defined under 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) as an employee who has been employed for at least twelve
months by the employer and has completed at least 1,250 “hours of service” with that employer
during the previous twelve month period. The FMLA creates a private right of action against
employers who “interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise or the attempt to exercise” FMLA
rights. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1), 2617. Plaintiff has alleged claims of interference and retaliation
under the FMLA.
In an FMLA retaliation claim, an employee asserts that her employer discriminated against
her because she engaged in activity protected by the Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(2). To succeed
on a claim of retaliation, an employee must demonstrate that her employer intentionally
discriminated against her in the form of an adverse employment action for having exercised an
FMLA right. Strickland v. Waterworks and Sewer Bd. of the City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199,
1207 (11th Cir. 2001).
To state a claim that Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s substantive FMLA rights,
Plaintiff must allege that she was entitled to, but denied an FMLA right. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1);
Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1207; Martin v. Brevard County Public Schools, 543 F.3d 1261, 1353-54
(11th Cir. 2008). An employee need not allege that her employer intended to deny the right—the
employer’s motives are irrelevant. Martin, 543 F.3d at 1267.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s FMLA claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff was
not yet eligible for FMLA leave on the date she was terminated. This argument fails in light of
Pereda v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., Inc., 666 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012), a case nearly
identical to this one in which an employee was terminated in her eleventh month of employment
following a notification to her employer that she was pregnant and would be seeking FMLA leave
post-eligibility. The Eleventh Circuit reversed an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s FMLA interference

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and retaliation claims, allowing both to go forward. Pereda is controlling here as there is no
material distinction between the facts alleged here and those alleged in Pereda.
Defendant has also requested that a stay be imposed during the pendency of its motion to
dismiss so that Defendant does not have to answer the remaining claims until after the instant
motion is decided. This request is obviously moot at this point and will be denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Family Medical Leave Act Claims

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Motion to Stay Remaining Claims (Doc. 12) is DENIED.
2.

Defendant is directed to file an answer to the Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) in

compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on April 9, 2015.

Copies to:
Counsel of Record and Unrepresented Parties, if any

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