Blaxton v. Hillsborough County, Florida et al

Filing 2

ORDER dismissing the action as premature and directing the Clerk to CLOSE the case. Signed by Judge Steven D. Merryday on 10/27/2014. (BK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
OTIS BLAXTON,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 8:14-cv-2602-T-23MAP

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
/

ORDER
Blaxton’s civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges that the
defendants violated his rights during pre-trial, trial, and post-trial state criminal
proceedings. Blaxton sues Hillsborough County, the State of Florida, the Honorable
Chet Tharpe, and the Honorable Kimberly Fernandez. Although entitled to a
generous interpretation, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam), Blaxton is
entitled to no relief.
Blaxton paid the full $400 filing fee.1 Even though Blaxton is not proceeding
in forma pauperis, a district court is required to “review . . . a complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or

1

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), Blaxton is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis unless he is
“under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Blaxton v. Office of Att’y Gen., 8:14-cv-1832-T35TGW, lists some of Blaxton earlier cases.

employee of a governmental entity . . . [and] the court shall . . . dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A.

Habeas Corpus is Proper Remedy:
The civil rights complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal before service on the
defendants because Blaxton challenges the validity of his conviction and he
specifically requests a “re-trial.” When a state prisoner challenges the fact or
duration of his confinement, a writ of habeas corpus is his exclusive federal remedy.
Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). This long-standing principle was
affirmed in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (emphasis original).
We hold that, in order to recover damages for [an] allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state
prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if
it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff
can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already
been invalidated.
-2-

Heck requires dismissal of the civil rights complaint if a ruling in the plaintiff’s favor
questions the validity of the conviction or sentence. Blaxton has no Section 1983
claim unless he first prevails on habeas corpus. “[A] § 1983 cause of action for
damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue
until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
at 489-90.
Consequently, Blaxton fails to state a claim for relief because the complaint
fails to allege that the conviction was “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus . . . .” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 487. This dismissal is without prejudice
to Blaxton’s re-filing a Section 1983 complaint after the conviction is invalidated.2

Monetary Damages are Barred:
The Eleventh Amendment precludes Blaxton’s obtaining monetary damages
from either the State of Florida or Hillsborough County. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 345 (1979). Judicial immunity precludes Blaxton’s obtaining monetary damages
from either Judge Tharpe or Judge Fernandez for their judicial acts. Bradley v. Fisher,

2

Braxton’s earlier application for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was
denied in Braxton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 8:08-cv-1167-T-33TBM. As a consequence, under Section
2244(b)(3)(A) Braxton must obtain authorization from the circuit court to file a second or successive
application.
-3-

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 355 (1871); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281-82 (11th Cir. 1999).

No Federal Supervisory Jurisdiction:
Blaxton complains that the state circuit court judges are rejecting his recent
motions without addressing the merits of the motions. A federal district court may
not review a state court’s ruling because a federal court has no supervisory or
appellate jurisdiction over a state court.
It is well settled that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to
review, reverse, or invalidate a final state court decision. See
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1923).
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the authority to review final
decisions from the highest court of the state is reserved to the
Supreme Court of the United States. Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d
624 (11th Cir. 1997). Jones cannot utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
recast his claim and thereby obtain collateral review in federal
court of the state court decision. Berman v. Florida Bd. of Bar
Examiners, 794 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1986).

Jones v. Crosby, 137 F.3d 1279, 1280 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1041 (1998). A
federal district court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate “cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection
of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005). See also Christophe v. Morris, 198 Fed. App’x 818, 825 (11th Cir. 2006)

-4-

(construing part of a complaint as a challenge to a state court adjudication and
holding the claim barred under Rooker-Feldman).
Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED without prejudice because, under
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the complaint is premature as a
matter of law. The clerk must close this case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on October 27, 2014.

-5-