Meth Lab Cleanup, LLC v. Spaulding Decon, LLC et al

Filing 40

ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendants' Amended Counterclaims, Third Party Complaint and Affirmative Defenses 36 is DENIED. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 7/23/2015. (LN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

METH LAB CLEANUP, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 8:14-cv-3129-T-30TBM

SPAULDING DECON, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendants’ Amended Counterclaims, Third Party Complaint and Affirmative Defenses
(Dkt. #36) and Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to the
Motion (Dkt. #38). Upon review and consideration, it is the Court’s conclusion that the
Motion should be denied.
Background
The Court discussed the background of this case extensively in its Order on
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See Dkt. #39. Plaintiff and Third Party
Defendants Joseph Mazzuca and Julie Mazzuca (the “Mazzucas”) now move to dismiss
the Defendants’ Amended Counterclaims and Third Party Complaint arguing that it is a
shotgun pleading and that the Defendants fail to state a cause of action in Counts I - III.
Plaintiff also moves to strike the Defendants’ affirmative defenses.

The Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs (hereinafter “Defendants”) filed their
Amended Counterclaims and Third Party Complaint against Meth Lab Cleanup, LLC
(“MLC”) and its owners, the Mazzucas, alleging several causes of action. Count I seeks a
declaration from the Court that the Defendants’ use of the phrase “meth lab services” does
not: (1) infringe on any of Plaintiff’s trademarks, (2) violate the Lanham Act, (3) constitute
unfair competition, or (4) infringe on MLC’s common law rights. In Count II, they allege
unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act § 43 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), based on
MLC’s assertion of contractual and exclusive intellectual property rights in the phrase
“meth lab services” and the Mazzucas’ false and derogatory statements. In Count III,
Defendants allege a violation of the Lanham Act § 43 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) based on
false and misleading advertising on the website “floridamethlabcleanup.com” and MLC
and the Mazzucas’ use of the company name “Florida Meth Lab Cleanup.” In Count IV,
V, and VI Defendants allege that MLC and the Mazzucas breached various provisions of
the Confidential Settlement Agreement by violating the confidentiality clause and filing
this lawsuit against Laura Spaulding and Spaulding Decon.
Discussion
I.

Motion to Dismiss Standard

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations
contained in the complaint as true, and view the facts in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). However, unlike factual
allegations, conclusions in a pleading “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). On the contrary, legal conclusions “must be

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supported by factual allegations.”

Id.

Indeed, “conclusory allegations, unwarranted

factual deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.”
Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).

While a

“heightened fact pleading of specifics” is not required, “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face” is necessary. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007).
II.

MLC and the Mazzucas’ Motion to Dismiss

MLC and the Mazzucas move to dismiss the Amended Counterclaims and Third
Party Complaint arguing that it is a shotgun pleading. In addition, they move to dismiss
Count I arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the Defendants
have not established a case or controversy as they have not pled any damages. Assuming a
case or controversy exists, they further argue that the Court should decline to exercise its
discretionary power to hear a cause of action for declaratory judgment because all issues
and all parties are involved in the Plaintiff’s complaint. Additionally, they move to
dismiss Counts II and III for failure to state a cause of action.
a. Shotgun Pleading
One form of a “shotgun pleading,” which may apply in this case, is when a party
asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without identifying which specific
party is responsible for the alleged acts or omissions. See Weiland v. Palm Beach County
Sheriff's Office, No.:13-14396, 2015 WL 4098270, at *5 (11th Cir. Jul. 8, 2015). “The
unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or

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another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims
against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id.
In this case MLC and the Mazzucas argue that Defendants inappropriately “lump”
MLC and the Mazzucas together in their allegations without identifying which party
committed which act. As an example, Plaintiff points out that “Defendants allege that …
Joseph and Julie Mazzuca have both made a false statement concerning the Defendants,
but do not state which [one] made the statement nor to whom and when.” Since the
Mazzucas are the owners and operators of MLC, the Defendants’ allegations, although not
the model of clarity, are sufficient to put MLC and the Mazzucas on notice as to the claims
against them. Therefore, the Motion is denied as to this basis.
b. Declaratory Judgment
“The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that a court may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party, not that it must do so.” MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 S.Ct. 764, 776, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007); see also
Ameritas Variable Life Ins. Co. v. Roach, 411 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005) ([“The
Declaratory Judgment Act] only gives the federal courts competence to make a declaration
of rights; it does not impose a duty to do so.”). The Court's discretion over whether to
sustain a claim for declaratory judgment extends to cases where a direct action involving
the same parties and the same issues has already been filed. Knights Armament Co. v.
Optical Sys. Tech., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1374-75 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges trademark infringement claims regarding the use of the
URL “www.methlabservices.com.” The Court disagrees with MLC that the count for

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declaratory relief is redundant with MLC’s claims. MLC’s complaint specifically
addresses the Defendants’ use of the URL, but Defendants seek a declaration that any use
of the phrase “meth lab services” to describe their services does not violate the law or
otherwise infringe on MLC’s intellectual property rights. Therefore, the Court denies
dismissal on this basis.
c. Unfair Competition and False Advertising Under the Lanham Act
Title 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) provides that:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person's goods, services, or commercial
activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
To state a claim for unfair competition and false designation of origin, “a plaintiff
must show (1) that the plaintiff had enforceable trademark rights in the mark or name, and
(2) that the defendant made unauthorized use of it such that consumers were likely to

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confuse the two.” Custom Mfg. & Eng'g, Inc. v. Midway Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647–
48 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
In Count II the Defendants allege that MLC and the Mazzucas have engaged in
unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) based on Plaintiff’s
assertion of contractual rights and property rights to the phrase “meth lab services.”
Defendants allege that they have continuing rights to use the term “meth lab services” and
that MLC and the Mazzucas made derogatory statements about Laura Spaulding and
Spaulding Decon to other members of the meth lab decontamination industry. Although
the Defendants do not state the specific false or derogatory statements, they allege that the
statements have interfered with their ability to do business. Defendants’ allegations are
sufficient to sustain this claim, and the Court denies dismissal on this basis.
To prevail on a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must
establish that: 1) the advertisements were false or misleading; 2) the advertisements
deceived, or had the capacity to deceive, consumers; 3) the deception has a material effect
on purchasing decisions; 4) the misrepresented product or service affects interstate
commerce; and 5) the plaintiff has been injured as a result of the false advertising. N. Am.
Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1224 (11th Cir. 2008)).
In Count III Defendants allege that MLC and the Mazzucas made false advertising
statements that “have the capacity to deceive consumers and will have a material effect on
purchasing decisions.” (Emphasis added). MLC and the Mazzucas argue that alleging that
the false statements “will have” a material effect on purchasing decisions, as opposed to a
past or present effect, is insufficient as a matter of law. The Court disagrees and concludes

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that the Defendants have sufficiently alleged a cause of action and denies Plaintiff’s motion
to dismiss this claim.
III.

Affirmative Defenses

MLC and the Mazzucas also move to strike the Defendants’ affirmative defenses on
the basis that they are conclusory with no supporting facts and are therefore insufficient as
a matter of law. The following affirmative defenses survived Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment: unclean hands, laches, waiver, consent, acquiescence, estoppel, and
failure to mitigate damages.

Defendants further assert that Spaulding Decon has

contractual rights to use the phrase “meth lab services” and that MLC has no intellectual
property rights to the phrase.
Motions to strike are generally disfavored and will usually be denied unless it is
clear the pleading sought to be stricken is insufficient as a matter of law. Guididas v. Cmty.
Nat. Bank Corp., 8:11-CV-2545-T-30TBM, 2013 WL 230243, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22,
2013). “A court will not exercise its discretion under the rule to strike a pleading unless
the matter sought to be omitted has no possible relationship to the controversy, may confuse
the issues, or otherwise prejudice a party.” Id. A court will only strike a defense as
insufficient as a matter of law if: (1) it is patently frivolous on its face, or (2) it is clearly
invalid as a matter of law. Id. at *2. Furthermore, an affirmative defense is sufficient when
it raises substantive factual or legal questions and there is no showing of prejudice to the
movant. Id.
The Court concludes that given the facts alleged within the Defendants’ Amended
Counterclaims and Third Party Complaint, MLC and the Mazzucas have sufficient notice

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of the basis for the defenses. Therefore, the request to strike the affirmative defenses is
denied.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Amended Counterclaims, Third

Party Complaint and Affirmative Defenses (Dkt. #36) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 23rd day of July, 2015.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record
S:\Odd\2014\14-cv-3129 mtd 36.docx

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