Gonzalez et al v. GEICO General Insurance Company

Filing 185

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 163 GEICO's Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 12/8/2016. (LN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

MANUEL A. GONZALEZ,
ISHMAEL RAMJOHN, and
ALELI GONZALEZ,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 8:15-cv-240-T-30TBM

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/

ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant GEICO General Insurance
Company’s Motion in Limine (Dkt. 163) and Plaintiffs’ Response (Dkt. 171). The Court,
having reviewed the motion, response, and being otherwise advised in the premises,
concludes that Defendant’s motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
DISCUSSION
I.

Brief Background
This is a third-party insurance bad faith action that stems from an automobile accident

that occurred on February 23, 2009, between Plaintiff Ishmael Ramjohn and Lisa Anderson.
At that time, Ramjohn was insured by Defendant GEICO General Insurance Company, under
an automobile policy providing bodily injury (“BI”) coverage in the amount of $100,000 per

person, and $300,000 per occurrence.1 It is undisputed that Ramjohn was at fault for the
accident and that the accident injured Anderson.
Anderson initially offered to settle her claim for the $100,000 policy limits but
GEICO rejected her initial offer. By the time that GEICO offered Anderson the full
$100,000 policy limit, she was unwilling to settle for that amount. Subsequently, following
a jury trial, a verdict was returned in favor of Anderson and a Final Judgment was entered
in her favor in the amount of $398,097.82. On February 4, 2015, the insureds filed this bad
faith lawsuit against GEICO.
This case is set for trial on the Court’s February 2017 trial calendar. GEICO has filed
a motion in limine to exclude certain evidence from being admitted during the trial.
II.

GEICO’s Motion in Limine
A.

Personal Opinions of Insurance Companies

GEICO requests the Court prohibit Plaintiffs “from presenting evidence, testimony,
or argument involving personal opinions of insurance companies in general and GEICO
specifically.” (Dkt. 163). Plaintiffs counter that this request is so broad that it would
seemingly preclude any expert testimony regarding the handling of insurance claims. The
Court agrees that this is an overly broad request. Indeed, if the Court were to grant such a
broad exclusion, Plaintiffs would be unfairly limited in their ability to compare GEICO’s
conduct with industry standards so that the jury can evaluate the reasonableness of GEICO’s

1

Ramjohn was seventeen at the time of the accident. His grandfather, Manuel Gonzalez, and
mother, Aleli Gonzalez (formerly Ruiz), were also insureds under the policy.
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conduct. See Altheim v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., No. 8:10-CV-156, 2011 WL 1429734, at *3
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2011) (denying a similar motion in limine filed by GEICO in a bad faith
action because it sought to unfairly limit the plaintiff’s ability to compare GEICO’s conduct
with industry standards). Accordingly, the Court denies GEICO’s motion on this issue
without prejudice to GEICO raising an appropriate and specific objection during trial.
B.

GEICO’s Advertising Campaigns

GEICO argues that any reference, argument, or testimony regarding GEICO’s
advertising campaigns is not relevant to the issue of whether GEICO acted in bad faith in
handling Anderson’s bodily injury claim. Plaintiffs respond that there is relevant evidence
from which the jury could conclude that GEICO’s decision to reject Anderson’s $100,000
settlement offer was influenced or driven by GEICO’s Average Loss Payments (“ALP”)
performance metric. This Court noted in its Order denying GEICO’s motion for summary
judgment that a jury could find that GEICO’s main concern was to avoid raising its ALP.
Thus, GEICO’s motion is denied with respect to GEICO’s ALP performance metric.
However, evidence regarding GEICO’s advertising materials and campaigns in general that
purport to tout the low cost of GEICO’s insurance may be irrelevant and cumulative.
Accordingly, the Court will address any specific objections with respect to evidence related
to GEICO’s general advertising materials and campaigns at trial, if and when the need arises.
C.

The Payment of Premiums and Length of Time that Plaintiffs Were
GEICO Policyholders

Plaintiffs’ response indicates that they do not oppose the portion of GEICO’s motion
seeking to preclude discussion of the length of time that Plaintiffs were GEICO
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policyholders. However, they believe the fact that Plaintiffs paid premiums to GEICO is
integral to the jury’s understanding of the insurer-insured relationship. Plaintiffs contend that
GEICO will not be prejudiced if the jury is simply informed that the insureds paid premiums.
The Court concludes that any evidence regarding whether Plaintiffs paid their premiums is
irrelevant because the validity of the insurance contract in this case is not at issue.
Accordingly, the Court grants GEICO’s motion on this issue. See Altheim, 2011 WL
1429734, at *4 (holding that evidence of the plaintiff’s payment of her premiums was
irrelevant to the issues in the case).
D.

Testimony from Lay Witnesses about the Standards for Bad Faith

GEICO asks the Court to prohibit Plaintiffs from eliciting opinions from lay witnesses
regarding “the standards for bad faith under Florida law.” Plaintiffs respond that they do not
intend to elicit any such testimony. Accordingly, GEICO’s motion is granted on this issue.2
E.

GEICO’s Claims and Training Materials

GEICO has asked the Court to preclude the use of GEICO’s claim handling manual
and training materials. Plaintiffs argue that this request is overly broad and that GEICO files
this “boilerplate motion . . . in nearly every bad faith case.” (Dkt. 171). Plaintiffs also point
out that the majority of district courts deny this request without prejudice to GEICO to make
any relevance objections at trial. See e.g. Altheim, 2011 WL 1429734, at *5 (denying the
2

Of course, as Plaintiffs point out in their response, this ruling does not preclude Plaintiffs
from eliciting testimony from the adjusters about their understanding of how they are supposed to
handle claims and act toward their insureds. However, Plaintiffs cannot ask the adjusters about their
understanding of the standard for bad faith in Florida. See Hines v. GEICO Indemnity Co., Case No.
8:14-CV-1062, 2016 WL 688050, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2016) (noting that “such questioning
is better asked of the experts, who would be better equipped to answer such questions.”).
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request without prejudice and noting that if the company’s policies, manuals, and training
materials contain guidelines that are consistent with industry standards, then non-compliance
may be evidence of bad faith); see also Hayas v. GEICO Gen. Ins., Co., No. 8:13-CV-1432T-33AEP, 2014 WL 5590808, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2014) (same). The Court agrees with
this approach and denies GEICO’s motion on this issue without prejudice to GEICO raising
specific objections at trial.
F.

References to “Broken Promises”

GEICO argues that Plaintiffs should be precluded from presenting any evidence,
testimony, or argument that characterizes this action as involving a “broken promise.”
GEICO argues that references to “broken promises” will encourage the jury to make an
emotional decision based on sympathy. The Court agrees and grants GEICO’s motion on
this issue.
G.

The Extent of Anderson’s Injuries and Their Impact on Her Life

GEICO moves to preclude evidence of Anderson’s current condition and the impact
any injuries have had on her life. Plaintiffs do not oppose this request to the extent that
Plaintiffs agree that Anderson’s current medical condition and any ongoing medical
treatment are irrelevant to this case. However, Plaintiffs argue that Anderson’s medical
condition, from the date GEICO was placed on notice of the claim through the conclusion
of the underlying litigation is relevant to assess whether GEICO properly evaluated
Anderson’s claim. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs and it does not appear that GEICO
disputes this point: GEICO referenced in footnote 1 of its motion that it “recognizes that

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certain evidence or testimony, including portions of Anderson’s medical records may be
admissible as they pertain to the presentation of Anderson’s bodily injury claim to GEICO.”
(Dkt. 163 at n.1). Accordingly, GEICO’s motion is granted to the extent that it relates to
Anderson’s current medical condition and any ongoing medical treatment (and the impact
said treatment has had on her life).
H.

GEICO’s Business Plans, Patterns, Practice, and Financial Status

GEICO makes a vague request to exclude evidence related to its business plans,
patterns, practice, and financial status. As Plaintiffs contend, this request is unclear.
Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent that this request relates to GEICO’s Average Loss
Payments, GEICO’s practice of forcing claims to litigation, and GEICO’s incentivizing of
claim handling employees, through its performance reviews and performance-based
compensation to undervalue bodily injury liability claims, the request should be denied.
Plaintiffs state that this broad request essentially seeks to preclude Plaintiffs from presenting
their theory of this case that GEICO systemically placed its own interests ahead of its
insureds when handling liability claims during the relevant time.
The Court denies this overly broad request. Importantly, this Court noted on summary
judgment that a jury could find that GEICO’s main concern was to avoid raising its average
loss payments. Evidence of GEICO’s business practices is also relevant under the totality
of the circumstances. See Hines, 2016 WL 688050, at *3-*4 (denying a nearly identical
request and noting that: “While the Court acknowledges that evidence regarding GEICO’s

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use of ALP could be damaging to GEICO’s defense, such evidence would be damaging
because it is highly relevant to GEICO’s motive in how it values claims.”).
I.

Personnel Files of GEICO’s Employees

GEICO requests that the Court exclude the introduction of any “personnel materials
pertaining to GEICO employees.” The Court denies this request for the reasons already
stated, i.e., these records are the primary source of the evidence regarding Average Loss
Payments and GEICO’s incentive practices. In Hines, the court denied a nearly identical
request, concluding that the personnel files were “relevant to show the criteria upon which
GEICO’s employees are evaluated and rewarded.” 2016 WL 688050, at *4. Of course, as
the court in Hines noted, the entire personnel files cannot come into evidence because they
also contain irrelevant and personal employee information that would be irrelevant to claims
handling.
J.

Doug McIntosh’s Pending Bad Faith Action with Plaintiffs’ Counsel

GEICO’s expert witness, Dough McIntosh, is a practicing attorney and is currently
defending two cases initiated by Plaintiffs’ counsel. GEICO moves to exclude Plaintiffs
from presenting any evidence, testimony, or argument regarding the pending bad faith
actions between Plaintiffs’ counsel and McIntosh. Plaintiffs counter that this evidence is
relevant to McIntosh’s bias and credibility. The Court reserves ruling on this issue.
Plaintiffs’ counsel shall approach the bench prior to introducing any evidence, testimony, or
argument related to McIntosh’s involvement with those other cases.

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K.

The Disclosure of Aleli Gonzalez’s Policy

GEICO argues that the Court should preclude Plaintiffs from asserting that GEICO
should have disclosed Aleli Gonzalez’s policy to Anderson and her counsel. GEICO states
that it was not required, under Florida law, to disclose the subject policy. And that the
existence of the policy was not known to GEICO at the time that it received Anderson’s
request for statutory disclosures. GEICO also contends that, once it learned of the policy and
investigated any coverage under that policy, GEICO concluded that the policy was not
applicable to the subject claim.
Plaintiffs counter that GEICO did in fact provide coverage under Gonzalez’s policy
and that the jury could conclude, under the totality of the circumstances, that GEICO’s twoand-a-half year concealment of the additional GEICO policy supports Plaintiffs’ claim that
GEICO failed to settle Anderson’s claim in good faith.
The Court does not find this evidence to be particularly relevant. Accordingly,
GEICO’s motion on this issue is granted without prejudice to Plaintiffs to approach the bench
during trial if Plaintiffs can provide the Court with a more persuasive argument as to how this
evidence is relevant.
L.

GEICO’s Behavior in this Action

GEICO believes that Plaintiffs may attempt to offer evidence that GEICO acted in bad
faith in the present action, specifically in the handling of discovery. GEICO argues that the
contentious discovery disputes in this case are irrelevant to a determination of whether

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GEICO acted in bad faith in the handling of Anderson’s claim. The Court agrees and grants
GEICO’s motion on this issue.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant GEICO General
Insurance Company’s Motion in Limine (Dkt. 163) is granted in part and denied in part as
explained herein.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on December 8, 2016.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record

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