United States of America v. Pizano

Filing 10

ORDER granting 7 Motion for summary judgment. See order for details. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. Signed by Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich on 5/21/2015. (SN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. 8:15-CV-284-T-EAK-TBM

HECTOR L. PIZANO,
Defendant.
/

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The cause is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 7). The
Court granted the Defendant up to and including May 20, 2015, to respond to the motion or the
Court would resolve the motion without a response. (Doc. 9). No timely response has been filed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This circuit clearly holds that summary judgment should only be entered when the
moving party has sustained its burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any
material fact when all the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1983). All doubt as to the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Hayden v. First
National Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 595 F.2d 994, 996-7 (5th Cir. 1979), quoting Gross v.
Southern Railroad Co., 414 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1969). Factual disputes preclude summary
judgment.
The Supreme Court of the United States held, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
91 L.Ed.2d 265, 106 S.Ct. 2548, (1986):

CASE NO. 8:05-CIV-1086-T-17-MAP
In our view the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 273.
The Court also said, "Rule 56(e) therefore requires that nonmoving party to go beyond
the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex
Corp., at p. 274. As the district court in Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F.Supp. 808 (N.D.
Tex. 1994), summarized:
Although a court must "review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the
party opposing the motion,"...the nonmovant may not rest on mere allegations or denials
in its pleadings; in short, "the adverse party's response... must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e). However, merely
colorable evidence or evidence not significantly probative will not defeat a properly
supported summary judgment...The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence will not
suffice...(cites omitted) at 810-811.
The Court must “draw inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolve all reasonable doubts in that party’s favor.” Speciality Malls of Tampa v.
The City of Tampa, 916 F.Supp 1222 (Fla. M.D. 1996). (emphasis added) A court is not
required to allow a case to go to trial “when the inferences that are drawn from the evidence, and
upon which the non-movant relies are <implausible.’” Mize v. Jefferson City Board of
Education, 93 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 1996)
A court, however, may only consider “that evidence which can be reduced to an
admissible form,” Rowell v. BellSouth Corp., 433 F.3d 794, 799 (11th Cir. 2005). The existence
of some factual disputes between the litigants will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
summary judgment motion; “the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)(emphasis in original). The
substantive law applicable to the claimed causes of action will identify which facts are material.
Id. In considering the evidence, the court resolves all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor
of the non-moving party and draws all justifiable inferences in its favor. Hickson Corp. v.
Northern Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). The court does not,
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CASE NO. 8:05-CIV-1086-T-17-MAP
however, weigh the evidence or make findings of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

DISCUSSION
The Plaintiff has established the following undisputed facts in this case, including
through the declaration of Anthony Lowery, Loan Analyst for the Department of Education. The
Plaintiff, the United States of America, moves the Court for summary judgment in this cause of
action to recover on defaulted student loans. The loans were obtained from Windsor Savings
Association, Austin, Texas, guaranteed by the Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corporation, and
then reinsured by the Department of Education under programs authorized by Title IV-B of the
Higher Education Act of 1965, as ameneded, 20 U.S.C. 1071, et seq. The Court having reviewed
the entire records finds that the motion for summary judgment is supported and is unopposed.
The Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment in this cause of action. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment be granted and that judgment is
hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff, the United States of America, and against defendant, Hector
L. Pizano, and, it is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff recovers of the defendant, Hector L.
Pizano, the sum of $14,015.56 ($2,745.85 in principal and $3,514.78 in interest at the rate of
3.35% for Account No. 2014A56043 and $2,901.97 in principal and $3,933.48 in interest at the
rate of 3.35% for Account No. 2014A56136. In accordance with the supporting documentation
attached as Exhibits “A” and “B” to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, together with
taxed costs in the amount of $1,055.00 consisting of a Fee for Service and Travel, per 28 U.S.C
§ 1921 of $75.00, plus Attorney’s Fees of $980.00. The Government is entitled to attorney’s
fees under the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §1071 et seq., (the “Act”). The Act
provides that in addition to the terms of any promissory note, “a borrower who has defaulted on
a [student] loan shall be required to pay...reasonable collection costs.” 20 U.S.C §1091a(b)(1).;
United States v. Vilus, 419 F. Supp.2d 293, 296-97(E.D.N.Y. 2005). One of the statute’s

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implementing regulations specifies that “[i]f a borrower defaults...the Secretary [i.e., the
Government] assesses collection costs on the basis of 34 C.F.R 30.60.” 34 C.F.R. § 682. In
turn, 34 C.F.R. § 3060 provides that the Government “may charge a debtor for the costs
associated with the collection of a particular debt [i.e., a defaulted student loan]. These costs
include..[c]ourt costs and attorney fees.” 34 C.F.R § 30.60(a)(8). for all of which sums let
execution issue. It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this judgment shall bear interest at the rate as
prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961, and shall be enforceable as prescribed by 28 U.S.C. §2001, et
seq., 28 U.S.C. §3001-3307, and Rule 69(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff’s address
is: Becker & Poliakoff P.A., 121 Alhambra Plaza 10th Floor, Coral Gables, FL 33134.
Defendant’s address is: Hector L. Pizano, 36615 Terry Road, Dade City , FL 33523.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 21st day of May, 2015.

Copies to:
All parties and counsel of record

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