Shackleford v. Sailor's Wharf, Inc.

Filing 29

ORDER granting (Doc. # 23 ) Defendant Sailor's Wharf, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See Order for details. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 8/11/2016. (KAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JAMES SHACKLEFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:15-cv-407-T-33TBM

SAILOR’S WHARF, INC.
Defendant.
_______________________________/
ORDER
This

matter

comes

before

the

Court

upon

Defendant

Sailor’s Wharf, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Doc.

#

23)

filed

on

April

29,

2016.

Plaintiff

James

Shackleford filed a response in opposition to the Motion on
May 31, 2016. (Doc. # 26). For the reasons that follow, the
Court grants Sailor’s Wharf’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
I.

Background
Shackleford is the owner of Sea the World, a 1981 65’

Irwin Sailboat which was insured with Continental Casualty
Company. (Id.; Doc. # 23-2; Doc. # 23-5). On May 16, 2011,
Shackleford

and

Sailor’s

Wharf

entered

into

a

Service

Contract under which Sailor’s Wharf agreed to “haul and
[block]” the vessel, and to repair damages caused by a

lightning strike. (Doc. # 23-2). During the course of the
repairs,

Shackleford

alleges

Sailor’s

Wharf

“improperly

attempted to remove the vessel from the water using an
insufficient number of straps for a vessel of the size and
weight of 53 gross tonnage.” (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 7). This allegedly
prevented

the

weight

of

the

vessel

from

being

evenly

distributed, causing a break in the spine of the vessel. (Id.
at ¶ 8). Shackleford also alleges “repairs done by Sailor’s
Wharf have failed, were not performed, or were not performed
in a workmanlike manner” (Id. at ¶ 9) and that Sailor’s Wharf
“caused extensive damage to the decking and other areas of
[Shackleford’s] vessel.” (Id. at ¶ 10). Shackleford alleges
the damages caused to the spine, decking and other areas of
Sea the World have caused “substantial damages to the vessel,
loss of use of the vessel, loss of repairs, refurbishments,
and upgrades [Shackleford] made to the vessel.” (Id. at ¶
19). Additionally, Shackleford claims Sailor’s Wharf breached
the terms of the Service Contract by charging over $50,000
more than the amount Shackleford agreed to pay under the
contract. (Id. at ¶
Before

filing

25).
this

lawsuit

against

Sailor’s

Wharf,

Shackleford filed two claims against his insurance policy
with Continental. (Doc. # 23 at 3). The first claim sought

2 

compensation for damages caused by a lightning strike on May
14, 2011. (Id.). The second claim sought relief for damages
allegedly caused by Sailor’s Wharf while the vessel was
undergoing
Continental

repairs
paid

under

the

Shackleford

Service
a

total

Contract.
of

(Id.).

$512,811.39

in

compensation for the two claims: $236,317.27 attributable to
the

“lightning

strike”

claim;

and

$276,494.02

for

the

“Sailor’s Wharf” claim. (Id. at 4). Shackleford contends this
amount pays for “part of the damages caused by Sailor’s Wharf”
and now seeks relief from Sailor’s Wharf for the remaining
damages. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 13). In November of 2014, Continental
and

Shackleford

General

Release

entered
in

into

which

a

Settlement

Continental

Agreement

and

relinquished

its

subrogation rights to the lightning strike and Sailor’s Wharf
claims and assigned the rights to Shackleford. (Doc. # 23-7
at ¶¶ 3, 7).
Shackleford

filed

a

three-count

complaint

against

Sailor’s Wharf on February 26, 2015, alleging (1) Negligence,
(2) Breach of Contract, and (3) Subrogation. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶
18, 26, 34). Additionally, Shackleford claims he is entitled
to compensation for loss of use of the vessel under Counts I,
II, and III as well as the payment of attorney’s fees. (Id.
at ¶¶ 19, 26, 31, 35). Sailor’s Wharf argues that it is

3 

“entitled to partial summary judgment on Count I, Count III,
and Plaintiff’s claims for loss of use damages and attorney
fees.” (Doc. # 23 at 9).
II.

Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to defeat
a

properly

plead

motion

for

summary

judgment;

only

the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude
a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable

fact

finder

could

return

a

verdict

for

the

nonmoving party. Mike v. Jefferson City. Bd. of Educ., 93
F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996)(citing Hairston v. Gainesville
Sun Pub. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is
material if it may affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646
(11th Cir. 1997). The moving party bears the initial burden
of showing the court, by reference to materials on file, that
there is no genuine issues of material fact that should be
decided at trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357

4 

F.3d

1256,

60

(11th

Cir.

2004)(citing

Celotex

Corp.

v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has
discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go
‘beyond the pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by
‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file,’ designate specific facts showing there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64
F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995)(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at
324).
If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations
or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to
be true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla.,
344 F.3d 1161, 64 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact
finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one
inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a
genuine issue of material fact, the court should not grant
summary judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta,
846 F.2d 1328, 30 (11th Cir. 1988)(citing Augusta Iron & Steel
Works, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th
Cir. 1988)). However, if the non-movant’s response consists
of

nothing

“more

than

a

repetition

5 

of

his

conclusional

allegations,”

summary

judgment

is

not

only

proper,

but

required.” Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 34 (11th Cir. 1981).
III.

Analysis
Shackleford’s claims against Sailor’s Wharf arise out of

a vessel repair contract. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 15-35). As such,
general

maritime

law

governs

the

claims.

See

Diesel

“Repower,” Inc. v. Islander Invs. Ltd., 271 F.3d 1318, 13231324 (11th Cir. 2001)(“A contract to repair a vessel invokes
admiralty jurisdiction”).
A.

Attorney’s Fees

While Shackleford originally sought attorney’s fees,
(Doc. # 1 at ¶ 35), he has withdrawn his claim to attorney’s
fees. (Doc. # 26 at 8). Sailor’s Wharf’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is accordingly mooted on this point.
B.

Count I: Negligence
Shackelford alleges Sailor’s Wharf owed a duty of care

“to extract [Shackleford’s] vessel in such a manner and place
so as to not cause damage to [the] vessel.” (Doc. # 1 at ¶
16). Further, Shackleford argues Sailor’s Wharf breached this
duty by
a) failing to use a sufficient number of straps in
order to distribute the weight of the vessel
evenly [;]

6 

b) failing to use a sufficient number of straps to
accommodate
the
weight
and
size
of
the
Plaintiff’s vessel [;]
c) failing to pump out the vessel prior to
attempting to lift the Plaintiff’s vessel [;]
d) failing to adequately block and set the
Plaintiff’s vessel [; and]
e) failing to protect the flooring, decking,
woodwork, and other fixtures on the vessel which
were damaged by the Defendant’s employees or
agents acting at the direction of the Defendant.
(Id. at ¶ 17).
As

a

result,

Shackleford

alleges

he

suffered

“substantial damage to the vessel, loss of use of the vessel,
loss of repairs, refurbishments, and upgrades [Shackleford]
made to the vessel.” (Id. at ¶ 19).
Sailor’s Wharf argues the negligence count should be
dismissed because tort-based negligence claims “involving
alleged improper repairs to a vessel performed pursuant to a
written contract” are precluded by general maritime law.
(Doc. # 23 at 4). Sailor’s Wharf’s theory is grounded in the
Economic Loss Rule, “a judicially created doctrine that sets
forth

the

circumstances

under

which

a

tort

action

is

prohibited if the only damages suffered are economic losses.”
Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d
532, 536 (Fla. 2004).
Economic loss is defined as “damages for inadequate
value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective

7 

product, or consequent loss of profits – without any claim of
personal injury or damage to other property.” Tiara Condo.
Assoc., Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc., 714 F.3d 1253,
1256 (11th Cir. 2013). Economic losses, in essence, are
“disappointed economic expectations which are protected by
contract, law rather than tort law.” Id. (Internal citation
omitted).
The Economic Loss Rule originated in products liability
“to protect manufacturers from liability for economic damages
caused by a defective product beyond those damages provided
by warranty law.”

Id. at 1258. In restricting economic-loss

damages to breach of contract claims, manufacturers may limit
their own liability “by disclaiming warranties or limiting
remedies . . . [i]n exchange, the purchaser pays less for the
product.” E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,
476 U.S. 858, 873 (1986).
Since then, the Rule has been extended beyond products
liability to “maritime cases involving parties other than
manufacturers.” La. Mach. Co., LLC v. Devon Shipping, Inc.,
No. 3:09-cv-957-J-32JRK, 2010 WL 1523032, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 15, 2010). The Rule in its current form applies in two
sets of situations. First, the Rule applies where “there is
a defect in a product that causes damage to the product but

8 

causes no personal injury or damage to other property.” Indem.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 891 So. 2d at 536. Second, it applies
where “the parties are in contractual privity and one party
seeks to recover damages in tort for matters arising from the
contract.” Id. Where the parties are in privity, “a tort
action is barred where a defendant has not committed a breach
of duty apart from a breach of contract.” Id. at 537.
In the time since the Economic Loss Rule has been
extended to non-products liability disputes in maritime law,
the doctrine has been sharply receded from under Florida state
law. In 2013, the Eleventh Circuit “limit[ed] the application
of the economic loss doctrine to cases involving products
liability.” Tiara Condo. Assoc., 714 F.3d at 1263. However,
“no such limitation has been imposed in cases governed by
maritime law.” R/V Beacon, LLC v. Underwater Archeology &
Expl. Corp., No. 14-CIV-22131, 2014 WL 4930645, at *5 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 1, 2014). As such, this Court must look to the
Economic Loss Rule as applied under federal maritime law to
resolve the pending dispute.
The Economic Loss Rule at maritime law “provides that a
tort action may not lie where the basis for liability arises
from a contract.” Id. Partitioning claims in contract law

9 

from those of tort helps prevent contract law from “[drowning]
in a sea of tort.” E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 866.
Sailor’s

Wharf

argues

the

Economic

Loss

Rule,

as

recognized by general maritime law, precludes negligence
claims in this instance because “the damages complained of
relate solely to the vessel, not ‘other property’ outside the
scope of the Service Contract.” (Doc. # 23 at 5). As such,
claims pertaining to the vessel arise out of the Service
Contract and should be brought under claim for breach of
contract,

and

not

as

a

negligence

claim.

Additionally,

Sailor’s Wharf asserts Count I is merely a restatement of
Count II, and should accordingly be dismissed as a duplicative
count. (Id.).
Shackleford

counters

that

the

negligence

claim

enumerated in Count I of the Complaint alleges damages in
addition to those spawning from the breach of contract claim.
In support of this view, Shackleford contends the parts of
the vessel that were damaged, but unrelated to the parts
contracted

to

be

repaired,

constitute

“other

property”

unprotected by the Economic Loss Rule. (Doc. # 26 at 8). As
the negligence claim encompasses damages to parts of the
vessel wholly distinct from those Sailor’s Wharf was hired to

10 

repair, Shackleford argues the negligence claim is not barred
under the Economic Loss Rule.
Little precedent exists delineating the border between
“property” and “other property” under the Economic Loss Rule
in Service Contracts governed by maritime law. However, there
is

substantial

precedent

defining

“property”

and

“other

property” in a products liability context that is instructive
on this issue.
East

River

is

particularly

illuminating.

There,

plaintiffs purchased four turbines from defendant, which
contained component parts that malfunctioned, causing damage
only to the turbines themselves. E. River S.S. Corp., 476
U.S. at 859-860. Plaintiffs brought negligence and strict
liability claims seeking relief from the injury. Id. at 861.
In rejecting the plaintiffs’ negligence claim, the Court
classified

the

turbines

and

the

component

parts

as

“property,” thereby barring the claims for damages to the
turbines under the Economic Loss Rule. Id. at 867. The Court
reasoned that because each turbine was bargained for as an
“integrated package . . . each is properly regarded as a
single unit.” Id. Furthermore, a fundamental purpose of the
contract was to purchase turbines that functioned properly.
Id. at 868-69. Therefore, failure to receive functioning

11 

turbines was best brought as a breach of warranty given “the
injury suffered – the failure of the product to function
properly – is the essence of a warranty action.” Id. at 868.
As in East River, this Court must look to the object of
the

contract

as

the

starting

point

to

determine

what

constitutes “property” for the purposes of the Economic Loss
Rule. See Ice Fern Shipping Co. v. Golten Serv. Co., No. 1:04CV-20741, 2005 WL 3692840, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2005)
(“In determining whether an item constitutes other property,
one must look to the object of the bargain”)(internal citation
omitted). In East River, and other products liability cases,
the object of the bargain is normally the product contracted
for. See E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 867-869; see also
Sbarbaro v. Yacht Sales Int’l, Inc., 1996 A.M.C. 133, 141
(S.D.

Fla.

1995)(holding,

where

Sbarbaro

contracted

to

purchase a yacht, the yacht constituted property for the
purposes of the Economic Loss Rule); Sea-Land Serv. v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 134 F.3d 149, 154 (3rd Cir. 1998)(concluding, where
the parties contracted to replace engine rods that failed
causing damage to the engine, the engine rods constituted
property).
Here, Sailor’s Wharf agreed, in signing the Service
Contract, to “haul and block” the vessel Sea the World, and

12 

repair damages caused by a prior lightning strike. (Doc. #
23-3). The damage caused to the spine of the vessel occurred
as a direct result of Sailor’s Wharf improperly performing
part of the object of the contract, hauling and blocking the
vessel. Consequently, the damage to the spine of the vessel
constitutes damage to “property” within the context of the
Economic Loss Rule.
Damage to other parts of the vessel during the allegedly
faulty repairs is more difficult to classify.

The object of

this portion of the contract is to repair damages caused by
a lightning strike. (Doc. # 23-3). However, it is unclear
what specific damage the lightning caused, and what parts of
the vessel Sailor’s Wharf was hired to repair. The claim
Shackleford filed with Continental to recover damages from
the lightning strike indicates the mast of the vessel and
other

parts

lightning.

of
(Doc.

the
#

ship

may

23-5).

have

been

damaged

Additionally,

by

the

Shackleford’s

complaint seeking compensation from Continental for faulty
repairs done by Sailor’s Wharf evidences the vessel suffered
scratched floors, a cracked deck, and damage to the hull side
paint while in Sailor’s Wharf’s custody. (Id.). Therefore, it
is uncertain what specific parts of the vessel were contracted
to be repaired, and whether the damage caused by Sailor’s

13 

Wharf occurred to those parts of the vessel. Furthermore, it
is uncertain whether the damage to the vessel occurred during
the course of performing the repairs, or merely while the
vessel was within Sailor’s Wharf’s control.
Recognizing these issues, the Court nevertheless finds
that

it

is

not

obligated

to

partition

the

vessel

into

“property” and “other property” to grant summary judgment in
favor of Sailor’s Wharf on Shackleford’s negligence claim.
“When an enforceable contract exists, it is preferable to
resolve

disputes

on

the

basis

of

the

contractual

relationship.” BVI Marine Constr. Ltd. v. ECS-Fla., LLC, No.
12-80224-CIV, 2013 WL 6768646, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20,
2013).

The Economic Loss Rule, as in force under federal

maritime law, clearly bars "contract action[s] couched as
tort claim[s].” R/V Beacon, LLC, 2014 WL 4930645, at *5. As
all the damages alleged in the negligence claim are also
alleged in the breach of contract claim (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 1526),

Shackleford’s

tort

action

constitutes

a

breach

of

contract claim masquerading as negligence. See Indem. Ins.
Co. of N. Am., 891 So. 2d at 536 (citing Ginsberg v. Lennar
Fla.

Holdings,

Inc.,

645

So.

2d

490,

494

(Fla.

3d

DCA

1994)(“Where damages sought in tort are the same as those for

14 

breach

of

contract

a

plaintiff

may

not

circumvent

the

contractual relationship by bringing an action in tort”)).
For the foregoing reasons, Sailor’s Wharf is entitled to
summary judgment on Count I of Shackleford’s Complaint.
C.

Count III: Subrogation
Sailor’s Wharf contends the subrogation claim should be

dismissed as “simply a repetition of Count II with a different
label.” (Doc. # 23 at 2). Shackleford disagrees, and argues
Continental validly assigned him rights to pursue relief for
damages caused by Sailor’s Wharf. (Doc. # 26 at 9); (See also
Doc. # 23-7).
“Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the
place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or
right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights
of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights,
remedies, or securities.” Fin. Sec. Assur., Inc. v. Stephens,
Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1287 (11th Cir. 2007).
Shackleford correctly asserts there is no prohibition in
maritime law with assignments involving insurance claims in
the maritime context. See generally Caribe Carriers, Ltd. v.
C.E.

Health

&

Co.,

784

F.

Supp.

1119,

1119

(S.D.N.Y.

1992)(vessel owner assigned insurance claims for deferred
repairs to the vessel). Furthermore, injured parties that

15 

have been assigned subrogation rights may seek relief from at
fault

third

parties,

even

if

they

already

received

compensation under an insurance policy. See Despointes v.
Fla. Power Corp., 2 So. 3d 360, 361 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2008)
(holding homeowner assigned subrogation rights had standing
to bring a claim against the manufacturer of a faulty surge
protector, despite having already been compensated by her
insurance company for the property damage).
However,
claims

Shackleford

brought

under

mischaracterizes

subrogation.

A

the

nature

subrogated

of

insurer

“stands in the shoes of an insured, and has no rights greater
than the insured, for one cannot acquire by subrogation what
another, whose rights he or she claims, did not have.” Steven
Plitt et. al., Couch on Insurance 3d § 222:5 (2016). “Since
the right of subrogation is purely derivative, and the insurer
succeeds only to the rights to the insured, no new cause of
action is created.” Couch on Insurance 3d § §222.14 (2016).
Therefore,

the

assignment

of

subrogation

rights

merely

entitles Shackleford to bring claims he would have been able
to bring against Sailor’s Wharf for damages to Sea the World
had the vessel not been insured. This encompasses the breach
of contract claim Shackleford brings in Count II of the

16 

Complaint, and does not permit him to bring a separate claim
of contractual subrogation.
Accordingly, this Court finds Sailor’s Wharf is entitled
to summary judgment on Count III.
D.

Loss of Use Alleged in Counts I, II, and III
Sailor’s Wharf argues Shackleford is not entitled to

loss of use damages because Sea the World a pleasure craft
with no history business use.

Sailor’s Wharf also contends

that such damages are prohibited because the vessel is a
constructive total loss.

As explained below, the Court finds

that Shackleford is not entitled to loss of use damages
because the vessel is a private pleasure vessel.

It is not

necessary to address the disputed issue of whether the vessel
is a constructive total loss.
In The Conqueror, 166 U.S 110, 117 (1897), the Supreme
Court held that loss of use damages are generally prohibited
for pleasure vessels. See Zepsa Indus., Inc. v. Kimble, No.
3:08-civ-4,

2008

WL

4891115,

at

*3

(W.D.N.C.

Nov.

11,

2008)(“The Conqueror [stands] for the proposition that loss
of use damages for pleasure vessels is prohibited under
admiralty law”); see also Frichelle Ltd. v. Master Marine,
Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1347 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (“[t]he owner
of a purely private pleasure vessel may not recover damages

17 

for ‘loss of use’ to compensate for the deprivation of the
owner’s personal enjoyment of the vessel”). “[D]emurrage will
only be allowed when profits have actually been, or may
reasonably supposed to have been, lost, and the amount of
such

profits

is

proven

with

reasonable

certainty.”

The

Conqueror, 166 U.S at 125; see also Cent. State Transit &
Leasing Corp. v. Jones Boat Yard, Inc., 206 F.3d 1373, 1376
(11th Cir. 2000)(holding the owner of a pleasure vessel was
not entitled to damages for loss of use for failing to show
lost profits with reasonable certainty).
Shackleford

attempts

to

avoid

summary

judgment

by

asserting that the issue of whether profits were reasonably
expected is an issue of fact that should be resolved at trial.
However,

there

is

no

evidence

that

Shackleford

expected

profits with reasonable certainty. See Cent. State Transit &
Leasing Corp., 77 F.3d at 376 (granting defendant’s motion
for summary judgment as to damages for loss of use on the
grounds that the loss of use suffered “cannot be determined
with any certainty”); In re Petition of Neptune Ventures,
LLC, No. 08cv1230, 2010 WL 255581, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 15,
2010)(granting motion for summary judgment finding plaintiff
was not entitled to compensation for loss of use of a private
vessel).

18 

The

burden

is

on

the

vessel

owner

to

prove

with

reasonable certainty that profits had actually been, or may
reasonably be supposed to have been, lost. See Frichelle Ltd.,
99 F. Supp. 2d at 1347. “The owner must prove, not only the
opportunity to charter the vessel, but also that he would
have availed himself of the opportunity.” Id.
Here, Shackleford failed to meet his burden. Sea the
World is registered with the Coast Guard as a vessel for
“Recreation” (Doc. # 23-1) and has no history of commercial
use. Shackleford grounds his calculations for lost profits on
“normal charter rates in Hawaii for a similar vessel” on the
basis that he intends to make future commercial use of Sea
the World under a newly founded Hawaiian Corporation. (Doc.
# 23-9 at ¶ 11). These allegations are insufficient for
Shackleford to show with reasonable certainty profits would
have been lost. See Gladsky v. Sessa, No. CV 06-3134, 2007 WL
2769494, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2007)(“[w]here a pleasure
craft, such as defendant’s, has no history of income, the
owner is not entitled to damages for the loss of its use”).
For the preceding reasons, the Court grants Sailor’s
Wharf’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to
the damages for loss of use.
Accordingly, it is

19 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)

Shackleford’s

claims

for

attorney’s

fees

are

WITHDRAWN.
(2)
negligence

Summary Judgment is granted as to Shackleford’s
claim,

which

is

asserted

in

Count

I

of

the

Complaint. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 15-19).
(3)

Summary Judgment is granted as to Shackleford’s

subrogation claim, which is asserted in Count III of the
Complaint. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-35).
(4)

The Court finds Shackleford is not entitled to

damages for loss of use of Sea the World as alleged in Counts
I, II, and III (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 26, and 31).
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
11th day of August, 2016.

20