Case et al v. Cullum & Maxey Camping Center Inc.
Filing
36
ORDER granting 7 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to close the case and terminate all pending motions. Signed by Judge Susan C Bucklew on 8/18/2015. (ALK)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
HAROLD CASE and
DEBRA CASE,
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO.: 8:15-cv-588-T-24TBM
vs.
CULLUM & MAXEY CAMPING
CENTER INC.,
Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and/or
Motion to Transfer Venue. Dkt. 7. Plaintiffs sought leave to conduct limited jurisdictional
discovery regarding Defendant’s contacts with Florida before filing their response to the Motion
to Dismiss. Dkt. 8. The Court granted the motion for limited jurisdictional discovery (Dkt. 9) and,
after conducting jurisdictional discovery (see Dkts. 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27)1, Plaintiffs filed
a response to the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 28). With leave of Court, Defendant filed a reply. Dkt.
31. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
1
The parties engaged in written discovery and Plaintiffs took the video deposition of Defendant’s corporate
representative, Bud Maxey. Despite the fact that the discovery permitted by the Court was limited to
jurisdictional facts regarding Defendant’s contacts with Florida, the parties were unable to resolve various
discovery disputes on their own and the Court was required to intervene. The Court entered orders granting
Defendant’s motion for protective order to the extent that the deposition of Mr. Maxey was to be taken by
video conference (Dkt. 22), denying Plaintiffs’ motion to compel better answers to interrogatories (Dkt.
25), and denying Plaintiffs’ emergency motion to compel answers to deposition questions (Dkt. 27).
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed their complaint in state court on February 18, 2015 and Defendant removed
the case to this Court on March 17, 2015. Dkts. 1, 2. Plaintiffs are Harold Case and Debra Case,
individuals that reside in Hillsborough County, Florida. Dkt. 2, ¶¶ 1, 2. Defendant Cullum &
Maxey Camping Center, Inc. (“Cullum & Maxey”), is a Tennessee Corporation located in
Nashville, Tennessee that sells luxury motor coaches and campers. On May 29, 2012, Plaintiffs
purchased a luxury motor coach from Defendant for $120,156.70. Id., ¶¶ 5, 7. As part of the
transaction, Plaintiffs traded in a 5th wheel trailer for $34,000. Id., ¶ 9. In January 2015, Plaintiffs
received a call from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) notifying them that the motor
coach was a stolen vehicle. Id., ¶ 13. The FBI subsequently seized the motor coach, including the
upgrades made to the vehicle by Plaintiffs. Id., ¶ 15. Plaintiffs allege that the motor coach did not
have clear title, that Defendant knew or should have known that the vehicle was stolen, and that
Defendant knowingly sold Plaintiffs a stolen luxury motor coach. Plaintiffs bring claims against
Defendant for breach of contract, civil theft, conversion, negligence, gross negligence, violation
of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Dkt. 2.
In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant
and venue is proper in this matter because the sale of the motor coach was finalized in Hillsborough
County, Florida and because the tag, title, registration and financing were obtained in Hillsborough
County, Florida. Id., ¶ 6. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and/or motion to
transfer venue and asserted that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant and,
if it does have jurisdiction over Defendant, that the action should be transferred to the Middle
District of Tennessee as the more convenient forum. Dkt. 7.
2
II.
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Defendant argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it and seeks to dismiss the
Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).
The determination of whether the court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is
governed by a two-part analysis. First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged
facts sufficient to subject the defendant to Florida’s long-arm statute. Smith v. Trans-Siberian
Orchestra, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (citations omitted). Second, if the court
determines that the long-arm statute is satisfied, the court must inquire as to: (1) whether defendant
has established sufficient “minimum contacts” with the state of Florida; and (2) whether the
exercise of this jurisdiction over defendant would offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.
Smith, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1312. If the plaintiff meets this burden by alleging sufficient facts in the
complaint to initially support jurisdiction, the burden then shifts to the defendant to make a prima
facie showing of the inapplicability of the statute providing the basis for jurisdiction. Future Tech.,
218 F.3d at 1249 (quotation omitted). If the defendant sustains the burden, the plaintiff must
substantiate the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint “by affidavits or other competent proof,
and not merely reiterate the factual allegations in the complaint.” Id. Where the plaintiff’s
complaint and supporting affidavits and documents conflict with the defendant’s affidavits, the
court construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau
Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006).
3
Florida’s long-arm statute provides for both general and specific personal jurisdiction. See
Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)-(2). General personal jurisdiction exists when a defendant “is engaged in
substantial and not isolated activity within this state . . . whether or not the claim arises from that
activity.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2). General personal jurisdiction is based on a defendant’s substantial
activity in Florida without regard to where the cause of action arose. See Oldfield v. Pueblo De
Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1220 n. 27 (11th Cir. 2009).
On the other hand, specific personal jurisdiction authorizes jurisdiction over causes of
action arising from or related to the defendant’s actions within Florida and concerns a nonresident
defendant’s contacts with Florida only as those contacts relate to the plaintiff’s cause of action.
See id.
A.
Jurisdictional Allegations
According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Court has jurisdiction over Defendant
because the sale of the motor coach was finalized in Hillsborough County, Florida and because the
tag, title, registration and financing were obtained in Hillsborough County, Florida. Dkt 2, ¶ 6.
Plaintiffs also allege that the motor coach they purchased from Defendant was delivered to
Plaintiffs’ home in Hillsborough County, Florida.2 Id., ¶ 5. Plaintiffs also generally allege that
Defendant, which is a Tennessee corporation that sells luxury motor coaches and campers to
customers all over the country including Florida, “does business in Florida directly and through its
internet related activities.” Id., ¶ 4. The Complaint does not contain any additional allegations
regarding jurisdiction.
2
The affidavit of Plaintiff Harold Case submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss contradicts this
allegation and states that he “took delivery of the motor coach in Tennessee and drove it to [his] home in
Florida.” Dkt. 28 at pg. 20, ¶ 11.
4
Defendant contests personal jurisdiction in the motion to dismiss by asserting that Cullum
& Maxey does not operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business in Florida such as to bring
this claim within Florida’s long arm statute. In addition, Defendant states that Cullum & Maxey
does not maintain the minimum contacts with the state of Florida to satisfy due process afforded
to non-residents. Dkt. 7 at 7. Defendant supports these contentions with the March 31, 2015
affidavit of Cullum & Maxey’s general manager, Bud Maxey. Maxey states that Cullum & Maxey
is located in Nashville, Tennessee and has no operations, including employees, agents, a facility,
branch, office, or other place of business, in Florida. Dkt. 7-1, ¶¶ 3, 4. Cullum & Maxey has not
sought to be qualified to do business in Florida, pays no taxes in Florida, does not have a Florida
bank account, address, or telephone listing. Id., ¶¶ 5, 6, 7. Maxey states that although Cullum &
Maxey advertises on the internet via a company website and postings on Craigslist for the
Tennessee region, Cullum & Maxey does not advertise in Florida, nor is its advertising directed at
Florida or “contained in publications directed primarily toward Florida residents.” Id., ¶ 8. Maxey
states that “over the years,3 less than 10% of Cullum & Maxey’s sales involve purchases outside
of Tennessee and only 1-3 of its total sales are to residents from Florida [i]n any given year.” Id.,
¶ 14.
As for Plaintiffs’ purchase of the motor coach, Maxey states that the sale occurred in person
at Cullum & Maxey’s dealership in Nashville, Tennessee on May 29, 2012. Id., ¶ 9. No
negotiations were conducted via Cullum & Maxey’s website. Instead, Maxey states that Plaintiffs
initiated contact with Cullum & Maxey’s sales representative at the dealership. Id. The contract
for the motor coach was executed at the Cullum & Maxey dealership. Id., ¶ 10. Plaintiffs obtained
financing for the motor coach while at Cullum & Maxey. Id. In fact, all documents concerning
3
Maxey does not state the number of years he is referring to.
5
the transfer of title for the motor coach were “prepared, finalized, and executed in Nashville,
Tennessee” and “[a]ny such relevant documents remain in the possession, custody and control of
Cullum & Maxey in Nashville, Tennessee.” Id., ¶ 15. Plaintiffs took delivery and possession of
the motor coach at Cullum & Maxey’s dealership in Tennessee and drove it out of the facility. Id.,
¶ 11. Cullum & Maxey took possession of the fifth wheel that Plaintiffs traded in for the motor
coach at the Tennessee dealership. Id.
After the filing of the April 1, 2015 motion to dismiss, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ request
to engage in limited jurisdictional discovery before Plaintiffs filed their response to the motion.
On June 29, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their response to the motion to dismiss (Dkt. 28) and in support
submit the June 26, 2015 affidavit of Harold Case (Id. at 19-20), the June 19, 2015 deposition of
Bud Maxey (Id. at 21-69), and Defendant’s answers and supplemental answers to jurisdictional
interrogatories (Id. at 70-85).
As for the sale of the motor coach that is at issue in this case, Plaintiff Harold Case found
the motor coach advertised on the Craigslist website for the Tennessee region. Dkt. 28 at pg. 20,
¶ 6. Mr. Case then visited Cullum & Maxey’s website and found the motor coach listed for sale
there as well. Id., ¶ 7. After calling Cullum & Maxey and expressing interest in purchasing the
motor coach, Plaintiffs drove to Tennessee, purchased the motor coach from Cullum & Maxey in
Nashville, Tennessee, traded in a fifth wheel trailer, took delivery of the motor coach at Cullum &
Maxey’s dealership, and drove the motor coach home to Florida. Id., ¶¶ 8, 9, 11. Plaintiffs
obtained financing through Cullum & Maxey and filed the financing statement (lien) in Florida.
Id., ¶ 10. The vehicle’s tag and title are registered in Florida. Id., ¶ 12. In January 2015, law
enforcement seized the motor coach from Plaintiffs in Florida because it had been reported as a
stolen vehicle. Id. at pg. 19, ¶ 3.
6
Defendant’s website lists vehicles for sale and it is updated on a regular basis. Dkt. 28 at
57; Depo. of Maxey pg. 36, lines 18-21. Since June of 2012, Defendant’s website has also included
a parts store where parts and supplies may be purchased directly through the website. Since its
inception, no sales of parts and supplies have been made to individuals or entities in Florida. Dkt.
28 at 79 (interrogatory no. 17).
Cullum & Maxey’s website is maintained by Ultimate Video Showcase (“UVS”), which is
located in Orlando, Florida. Dkt. 28 at 80 (interrogatory nos. 22, 23). Defendant has used UVS
as its website provider for four or five years, may or may not have a contract with UVS,4 and pays
UVS on an annual basis. Dkt. 28 at 27, 28; Depo. of Maxey pg. 7 lines 19-21, pg. 7 lines 22-24.
Visitors to the website may enter their phone number, address, and e-mail address via a “Let us
know how we can help” or “contact us” links. If a visitor utilizes the “Let us know how we can
help” or “contact us” links and enters their information when prompted, UVS forwards that
information to Cullum & Maxey in an e-mail. Id. at 29; Depo of Maxey pg. 8 lines 20-25. Maxey
emphasized that Cullum & Maxey has “very little contact with [UVS].” Dkt. 28 at 29; Depo. of
Maxey pg. 8, lines 12-19. Instead, UVS monitors the website, provides leads to Defendant
obtained through the “let us know how we can help” and “contact us” links, and includes the parts
store. Id.
Plaintiffs do not address the frequency with which Defendant contracts with or makes sales
to Florida residents.
The Court permitted Defendant to file a reply to Plaintiffs’ response to the motion to
dismiss in order to address any new jurisdictional allegations contained therein.
4
Dkt. 30.
Although Maxey testified that Cullum & Maxey does not have a contract with UVS, Defendant’s
interrogatory responses, signed by Maxey, refer to a “service agreement” with UVS. Dkt. 31-2 at 2 (supp.
interrogatory no. 23).
7
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs inaccurately characterized Cullum & Maxey as a large-scale
company that actively engages in business within the state of Florida. In support of this argument,
Defendant submits its answers to Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional interrogatories (Dkt. 31-1), its
supplemental answers to Plaintiffs’ interrogatories (Dkt. 31-2), the deposition of Bud Maxey (Dkt.
31-3),5 the March 31, 2015 affidavit of Bud Maxey (Dkt. 31-4), and the June 26, 2015 affidavit of
Harold Case (Dkt. 31-5).
Defendant points out that from 2010 to 2014, Cullum & Maxey sold 1,419 units (motor
coaches/vehicles). Dkt. 31-1 at 2 (interrogatory no. 1). Of those 1,419 units, Cullum & Maxey
sold ten to individuals who provided Florida as their primary address. Id. at 2-3 (interrogatory no.
2). Thus, .7% of Case & Cullum’s sales over the past five years were to Florida residents. Over
that same period of time, two entities or individuals located within Florida have applied for
financing with Cullum & Maxey. Dkt. 31-2 (supp. interrogatory no. 16). All aspects of the sales
transactions including financing, contracts, and trade-ins take place at Cullum & Maxey’s
dealership in Nashville, Tennessee. Dkt. 31-1 at 5 (interrogatory no. 6). Direct contact with
individuals located in Florida is limited to responding via e-mail or telephone to those individuals
who have utilized the “let us know how we can help” or “contact us” links on Defendant’s website.
Id. at 4-5 (interrogatory nos. 4, 5). Since December 2014, no one using a computer in Florida has
utilized the “let us know how we can help” or “contact us” links. Id. Defendant does not direct
advertising toward Florida nor does it advertise in Florida. Dkt. 31-4 at 2, ¶ 8. Although the
website has also included a parts store since 2012, no sales have been made to individuals or
entities in Florida. Dkt. 31-1 at 10 (interrogatory no. 17). Maxey testified that most of the out of
state customers come from the 800 campsites surrounding Cullum & Maxey’s Nashville,
5
Plaintiffs also submitted the deposition of Maxey, but not the errata sheet.
8
Tennessee dealership rather than from its website. Dkt. 31-3 at 10; Depo. of Maxey pg. 34 lines
7-18).
III.
DISCUSSION
As discussed above, in order to establish personal jurisdiction over Defendant, Plaintiffs
must satisfy both Florida’s long-arm jurisdictional statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193, and constitutional
notions of due process.
A.
Specific Jurisdiction
Section 48.193(1) addresses specific jurisdiction, permitting jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants who engage in certain enumerated acts. In this case, Plaintiffs rely on the tortious act
provision in § 48.193(1)(a)(2) of Florida’s long-arm statute. Dkt. 28 at 6. That section provides:
A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who
personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in
this subsection thereby submits himself or herself . . . to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising
from any of the following acts: committing a tortious act within this
state.
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat.
“Under Florida law, a nonresident defendant commits a tortious act within Florida when
he commits an act outside the state that causes injury within Florida.” Mighty Men of God, Inc. v.
World Outreach Church of Murfreesboro Tenn., Inc., No. 6:14-CV-947-ORL-41, 2015 WL
1534446, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2015). The alleged tortfeasor’s physical presence in Florida is
not required. Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162, 1168 (11th
Cir. 2005) (citing Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1260 (Fla. 2002)). “For example,
allegations about an out-of-state defendant’s telephonic, electronic, or written communications
into Florida are sufficient to trigger jurisdiction under the long arm statute provided, however, that
the cause of action arises from those communications.” Id. (quotation omitted). In Acquadro v.
9
Bergeron, 851 So. 2d 665, 671 (Fla. 2003), the Florida Supreme Court found that there was
personal jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2)6 where an out of state defendant allegedly
defamed a Florida resident during a phone call made into Florida. This “connexity” must be
present for courts to assert personal jurisdiction over an out of state defendant under Fla. Stat. §
48.193(1)(a)(2). Estate of Scutieri v. Chambers, 386 F. App’x 951, 954-55 (11th Cir. 2010). If
the “connexity” requirement is not met, i.e., the alleged causes of action did not arise out of the
communications into the state by the non-resident defendant, and personal jurisdiction does not
exist over the non-resident defendant. Walack v. Worldwide Mach. Sales, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d
1358, 1367 (M.D. Fla. 2003). One Florida appellate court has noted that:
If the Legislature intended for [Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2)] to
encompass all tortious acts which were complete outside Florida but
ultimately have consequences here only because a Florida resident
suffers damages, we believe it would be incumbent on the
Legislature to make that statutory purpose clear in the plainest of
language. Because we do not yet discern such a purpose, we limit
the statutory provision to its plain and obvious meaning, [which is
the commission of a tortious act within Florida].
Korman v. Kent, 821 So. 2d 408, 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
Plaintiffs argue that section 48.193(1)(a)(2) is satisfied because Plaintiffs were harmed
when the motor coach was seized by law enforcement at their home in Florida and thus the injury
occurred in Florida. However, the alleged out of state torts are in no way connected to Florida. It
cannot be said, nor can Plaintiffs allege, that Defendant’s sale of a stolen vehicle in Tennessee was
expressly aimed at Florida, even though Plaintiffs allege that the resulting injury occurred in
Florida. The causes of action alleged in this case are (1) breach of contract, (2) civil theft, (3)
conversion, (4) negligence, (5) gross negligence, (6) violation of FDUPTA, and (7) negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs must show that the alleged torts (civil theft, conversion,
6
Formerly Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b).
10
etc.) were committed by Defendant and directed at Florida. They do not. Plaintiffs point to no
case law and the Court is not aware of any that would allow for it to assert personal jurisdiction
over Defendant under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2).
Having found that Plaintiffs do not and cannot allege sufficient facts to satisfy the Florida
long-arm statute for specific jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2), the Court next looks to
whether it has general jurisdiction over Defendant under the long-arm statute.
B.
General Jurisdiction
Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, addresses the court’s ability to exercise general
jurisdictional over a non-resident defendant. It provides that “[a] defendant who is engaged in
substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate,
intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the
claim arises from that activity.” § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. Thus, general personal jurisdiction arises
from a party’s contacts with the forum state that are unrelated to the litigation. Walack, 278 F.
Supp. 2d. at 1366.
Because general personal jurisdiction is based on contacts unrelated to the cause of action
being litigated, the due process requirements for general jurisdiction must be assessed under a
“stricter standard” than those for specific jurisdiction. Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216
F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2000). Under this stricter standard, a defendant’s contacts with the
forum state “must be so extensive to be tantamount to a defendant being constructively present in
the state to such a degree that it would be fundamentally fair to require it to answer in the forum
state’s courts in any litigation arising out of any transaction or occurrence taking place anywhere
in the world.” Aronson v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 1379, 1386 (S.D. Fla. 2014)
(quotation omitted). Put another way, a defendant’s activities must be “so continuous and
11
systematic as to render [the defendant] essentially at home in the forum state.” Daimier AG v.
Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 749 (2014) (quotation omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that the Court has general personal jurisdiction over Defendant because
Defendant has engaged in substantial activity within Florida through its relationship with its
website provider, UVS, which is located in Orlando, Florida. Dkt. 28 at 7. In support of this
argument, Plaintiffs state that Defendant has had an ongoing relationship with UVS for four or
five years and pays UVS to maintain its website. UVS sends Defendant one to two internet leads
(received when a visitor to the website provides their contact information through the “Let us know
how we can help” or “contact us” links) by e-mail on a daily basis. UVS also manages the online
parts store. Any orders placed online go through UVS which then e-mails the purchase information
to Defendant. Plaintiffs argue that these activities establish a pattern of continuous and substantial
activity within Florida over the past four or five years. According to Plaintiffs, the fact that
Defendant has chosen to use a website provider in Florida, rather than in Tennessee, shows that
Defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business within Florida.
In response, Defendant points out that Cullum & Maxey pays UVS on an annual basis,
rather than on a monthly basis, thus limiting the frequency of its contacts with UVS. Defendant
argues that “one isolated service agreement with one entity in Florida is not sufficient to bring
Defendant under Florida’s long-arm statute.” Dkt. 31 at 6. Defendant states that the internet leads
and online orders are forwarded from UVS to Defendant via an automated process and does not
support a finding that this creates substantial activity within Florida. Id. Defendant argues that
while it advertises on the internet, its website is passive and insufficient to confer jurisdiction.
A passive web site only makes information available to those interested in viewing the web
site in foreign jurisdictions, whereas an active web site allows for those interested in foreign
12
jurisdictions to enter into contracts over the Internet with the defendant. The middle ground is
occupied by interactive websites where a user can exchange information with the host computer.
In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and
commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the site. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo
Dot Com. Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
Defendant is correct in its argument that the fact a foreign defendant contracts with a
Florida resident is not enough to establish general personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Walack, 278 F. Supp. 2d. at 1366 (citing Washington Capital Corp. v. Milandco, Ltd., Inc., 695
So. 2d 838, 841 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). Moreover, “a website is not well-suited to serve as a basis
for general jurisdiction.” Rexam Airspray, Inc. v. Arminak, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
Under the Zippo test, it is possible for a Web site to be very
interactive, but to have no quantity of contacts. In other words, the
contacts would be continuous, but not substantial. This is untenable
in a general jurisdiction analysis. As one court has noted, the Zippo
test ‘is not well adapted to the general jurisdiction inquiry, because
even repeated contacts with the forum residents by a foreign
defendant may not constitute the requisite substantial, continuous
and systematic contacts required for a finding of general
jurisdiction.’
Rexam Airspray, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1301(quoting Lakin v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 348 F.3d 704,
712 (8th Cir. 2003)) (emphasis in original).
The evidence submitted by the parties in this case relates to the sections of the website that
list available vehicles for sale, the “Let us know how we can help” and “contact us” links, and the
online parts store. The inventory section of the website that lists available vehicles is the section
of the website visited by Plaintiff Harold Case where he saw the motor coach listed for sale.
Plaintiff subsequently called Defendant and inquired about the motor coach. A visitor to the
website cannot contract directly through the website for the purchase of the vehicles listed for sale
13
on the website, so this portion of the website is passive because it is limited to a listing of inventory
rather than permitting a user to exchange information and enter into contracts online.
In the event a visitor to the website utilizes the “Let us know how we can help” and “contact
us” links regarding the inventory listed on the website, such activity falls into the middle ground
between an active and passive website because the user is able to exchange information with the
host computer. Thus, the Court will look to the “level of interactivity and commercial nature of
the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site” to determine jurisdiction. Zippo, 952
F.Supp. at 1124. UVS receives one to two leads a day from the “contact us” and “let us know how
we can help” links, which UVS then forwards to Defendant on a daily basis via an automated
process. That information includes a customer’s contact information and the type of vehicle they
may be interested in learning more about.
Since December 2014, no one using a computer in
Florida has utilized the “Let us know how we can help” or “contact us” links. As for these
functions of the website, although some of the contacts between UVS and Defendant may be
continuous by virtue of UVS forwarding leads to Defendant, they are not the substantial,
continuous, and systematic contacts required for a finding of general jurisdiction. The “level of
interactivity” and “commercial nature of the exchange of information” is restricted to the exchange
of a limited amount of information regarding a customer’s contact information and interest in a
vehicle.
With regard to the evidence submitted concerning the parts store, customers can contract
with Defendant via its website, which is indicative of an active website
However, no Florida
residents or entities have made any online purchases from the parts store since its inception in
2012. Based on the evidence submitted by the parties regarding Defendant’s website, the website,
viewed as a whole, is not active for purposes of the Court’s jurisdictional analysis.
14
Here, Plaintiffs have not established sufficient contacts between Defendant and the state of
Florida in order to satisfy Florida’s long-arm statute. Because general jurisdiction allows a court
to exercise jurisdiction over any type of suit whatsoever, Florida requires that the contacts must be
especially pervasive and substantial to satisfy Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2). Accordingly, Fla. Stat. §
48.193(2) provides courts with general jurisdiction only over a defendant who has “substantial and
not isolated” contacts with Florida. Plaintiffs have not come forward with evidence to satisfy this
standard.
Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not satisfied the Florida long-arm statute, it is
not necessary to consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with federal
due process. The Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
IV.
MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF VENUE
Defendant asks that to the extent the Court does not dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
that the Court transfer this action to the Middle District of Tennessee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a). Because the Court has found that it does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant,
the Court need not address this request.
V.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not sustained their burden in establishing that this Court
has personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
the case. The Clerk is directed to close the case and terminate all pending motions.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, this 18th day of August, 2015.
Copies Furnished to: Counsel of Record
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?