Meeks v. Pasco County Sheriff

Filing 64

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 55 Motion for Attorney Fees and costs. Signed by Judge Susan C Bucklew on 1/18/2017. (JD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

SHAWN MEEKS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:15-cv-1460-T-24 AEP

CHRIS NOCCO, in his official capacity
as Pasco County Sheriff,
Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. (Doc. No.
55). Defendant opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 62). As explained below, Plaintiff’s motion is
granted in part.
I. Background
Plaintiff Shawn Meeks was a certified law enforcement officer employed by the Pasco
County Sheriff’s Office as a Road Patrol Deputy from July 11, 2011 until he resigned on March
1, 2015. On June 22, 2015, he filed this Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) lawsuit against
Defendant for failing to pay him for his drive time in his patrol vehicle between his designated
secure parking lot and his patrol area. After the close of discovery, Plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment on the issue of whether his drive time between his designated secure parking
lot and his patrol area was compensable under the FLSA. The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion
and set the issue of damages for trial. Prior to the pretrial conference, the parties stipulated to
the amount of damages to be awarded to Plaintiff—$3,507.14 in overtime damages, plus
$3,507.14 in liquidated damages, for a total of $7,014.28 in damages. After the Court entered

judgment for Plaintiff, he filed the instant motion for attorneys’ fees.
II. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiff seeks an attorneys’ fee award of $69,192.50 for the time his two attorneys spent
on this case. The parties agree that $325 per hour is a reasonable hourly billing rate in this case.
Plaintiff contends that the 212.9 hours that his attorneys spent litigating this case is reasonable,
but Defendant makes several arguments against finding that all of these hours were reasonably
expended. Therefore, the Court must determine if the amount of attorneys’ fees requested is
reasonable.
A. Lodestar
The starting point in determining reasonable attorneys’ fees is the lodestar, which is
properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
times a reasonable hourly rate. Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292,
1299 (11th Cir. 1988)(citation omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he fee applicant bears the burden of
establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and hourly rates.” Id. at 1303
(citation omitted).
As previously stated, the parties have agreed that $325 is a reasonable hourly rate in this
case. In calculating what hours were reasonably expended on the litigation, a court should
exclude excessive, unnecessary, and redundant hours, and it should also exclude any time spent
litigating discrete and unsuccessful claims. See id. at 1301, 1302 (citation omitted). Defendant
points to six areas of billing in which he contends that the number of hours billed should be
reduced. Accordingly, the Court will address each objection.

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1. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s time spent responding to Defendant’s successful motion
for a protective order should be excluded, since Plaintiff’s efforts to defeat the motion were
unsuccessful. Defendant argues that because Plaintiff chose to pursue depositions that caused
Defendant to seek and be granted a protective order, such time should not be compensable. As
such, Defendant points to specific billing entries and asks the Court to exclude 18.2 hours
relating to this issue. Upon consideration, the Court agrees that this time is not compensable and
will reduce the total amount of hours sought to be compensated by 18.2 hours.
2. Dismissal of Count II
Plaintiff initially sought to pursue his case as a collective action, but he later decided to
dismiss the collective action allegations (Count II). As such, Defendant argues that the time
Plaintiff spent in seeking dismissal of the collective action—0.4 hours—should be eliminated.
The Court agrees and will reduce the total amount of hours sought to be compensated by 0.4
hours.
3. Unrelated Matters
Next, Defendant argues that billing entries that refer to a workers’ compensation matter
and those that refer to media attention/coverage should be excluded. With regards to the 0.6
hours spent on the issue of media attention/coverage, the Court agrees that this time should be
excluded. As such, the Court will reduce the total amount of hours sought to be compensated by
0.6 hours.
With regards to the workers’ compensation matter, while it appears to be a separate claim
in a separate forum, it also appears that the workers’ compensation matter required Plaintiff’s

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counsel to review the workers’ compensation settlement and release to ensure that Plaintiff’s
FLSA claim was carved out. Plaintiff’s counsel spent 1.6 hours on that task. The Court
concludes that this time should be compensable, because it ensured that Plaintiff’s FLSA claim
in this case was not eliminated by the settlement and release language in another case.
The Court will, however, exclude the time spent looking into claim compatibility
between the FLSA claim and the workers’ compensation claim. Plaintiff spent 0.2 hours on this
task on May 25, 2015 and again on June 9, 2015. Thus, the Court will reduce the total amount of
hours sought to be compensated by 0.4 hours.
Defendant also objects to the 1.3 hours spent communicating with or about the
Department of Labor. The Court will not reduce this time, because it is not clear that such time
was not spent in relation to Plaintiff’s FLSA claim.
4. Amending the Complaint
Next, Defendant argues that the 1.1 hours that Plaintiff spent preparing and drafting the
amended complaint should be eliminated. The Court disagrees and finds that such time is
reasonable and compensable.
5. Pretrial Matters
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff should not be compensated for the 0.2 hours he
spent working on the pretrial statement in this case on September 29, 2016, because the parties
later stipulated to the amount of damages, which made the pretrial statement unnecessary. The
Court finds that this time is compensable, because the work was done before the pretrial
statement became unnecessary.

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6. Attorneys’ Fees Motion
Next, Defendant argues that the 20.6 hours that Plaintiff spent preparing the instant
attorneys’ fees motion was excessive, especially considering the fact that the parties stipulated to
the amount of the reasonable hourly rate. Instead, Defendant argues that this task should be
reduced to a total of five hours. While the Court agrees that the amount of time should be
reduced, the Court finds that a 10 hour reduction is reasonable. As such, the Court will reduce
the total amount of hours sought to be compensated by 10 hours.
7. Lodestar Amount
As explained above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 212.9 hours spent on this case should
be reduced by 29.6 hours, to a total of 183.3 compensable hours. After applying the $325
reasonable hourly rate, the lodestar amount is $59,572.50.
B. Adjustments to the Lodestar1
While the Court has calculated the lodestar amount, that does not end the Court’s inquiry.
As explained by one court:
The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end
the inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the
district court to adjust the fee upward or downward, including the
important factor of the results obtained. There is no precise rule or
formula for making these determinations. The district court may
attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may
simply reduce the award to account for the limited success. The court
necessarily has discretion in making this equitable judgment. The
most important factor to consider is the result obtained. If the
success was limited or the plaintiff's victory was limited, the lodestar
must be reduced to reflect the limited result. Fee awards, however,

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The Court has considered the 12 Johnson factors; however, the only factor the Court
addresses herein is the amount involved and results obtained. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974).
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should not simply be proportionate to the results obtained by the
Plaintiff. . . . [G]iven the nature of claims under the FLSA, it is not
uncommon that attorneys' fee requests will exceed the amount of
judgment in the case. It is against this background that the Plaintiff's
attorneys fees request must be evaluated.
James v. Wash Depot Holdings, Inc., 489 F. Supp.2d 1341, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2007)(internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s success in this case was limited, because he initially
sought overtime damages of $8,062.60, plus liquidated damages of $8,062.60, for a total of
$16,125.20 in damages. However, Plaintiff only recovered $3,507.14 in overtime damages, plus
$3,507.14 in liquidated damages, for a total of $7,014.28 in damages. Thus, Plaintiff only
recovered 43.5% of the amount he initially sought, and therefore, Defendant argues the lodestar
amount should be reduced by 50% to reflect Plaintiff’s limited success. The Court disagrees.
In this case, Plaintiff sued over the compensability of his drive time between his
designated secure parking lot and his patrol area while in his patrol vehicle. The Eleventh
Circuit had previously spoken on this issue in a very similar case and found the drive time to be
compensable. Therefore, while Plaintiff’s monetary success was less than he originally
estimated, he was successful on his theory that his drive time was compensable. As such, the
Court concludes that a reduction to the lodestar amount is not warranted.
III. Costs
The parties have stipulated to an award of $1,761.12 in costs to Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 56).
As such, the Court will include this amount in Plaintiff’s award.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’

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Fees (Doc. No. 55) is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff is awarded $$59,572.50 in
attorneys’ fees. Additionally, Plaintiff is awarded $1,761.12 in costs.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, this 18th day of January, 2017.

Copies to: Counsel of Record

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