Branch Banking and Trust Company v. Crystal Centre, LLC et al

Filing 99

ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Taxable Costs 46 is granted in part and denied in part as explained herein. Plaintiff is awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $64,388.85 and costs in the amount of $ ;530.00. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a final judgment of attorney's fees and costs in the total amount of $64,918.35 in Plaintiff's favor and against Defendants Crystal Centre, LLC and Oswald P. Carrerou, jointly and severally, for all of which let execution issue forthwith. This case shall remain closed. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 9/12/2016. (LN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST
COMPANY, a North Carolina banking
corporation, as successor-in-interest to
Colonial Bank by asset acquisition
from the FDIC as Receiver for Colonial
Bank, successor by merger to Citrus and
Chemical Bank,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:15-CV-1462-T-30EAJ

CRYSTAL CENTRE, LLC, a Florida limited
liability company, OSWALD P. CARREROU,
individually, and DONALD K. STEPHENS,
individually,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/

ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees
and Taxable Costs (Dkt. 46). Upon consideration of the motion, the supporting affidavit, and
being otherwise advised in the premises, the Court grants the motion in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s complaint seeks to enforce a commercial promissory note executed by
Defendant Crystal Centre, LLC, and the related personal guaranty agreements executed by
Defendant Oswald P. Carrerou and Defendant Donald K. Stephens.

On November 12, 2015, a clerk’s default was entered against Defendant Crystal
Centre, LLC for its failure to retain counsel (Dkt. 21). Subsequently, Plaintiff moved for a
default final judgment against Crystal Centre, which this Court denied without prejudice to
renew the motion at a later date when the Court had reached the merits of the claims against
Defendants Carrerou and Stephens, who, at that time, were still defending the lawsuit (Dkt.
25). Subsequently, Stephens agreed to the entry of a final judgment against him (Dkt. 33).
Plaintiff then moved to renew its motion for default judgment against Crystal Centre
and for final summary judgment against Carrerou, who had been proceeding in this case pro
se. On August 3, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motions and judgment was entered in
its favor in the amount of $927,149.53. The Court reserved on the issue of Plaintiff’s
entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs (Dkts. 44, 45).
Plaintiff now moves for attorney’s fees in the amount of $71,610.20, and taxable costs
in the amount of $530.00. As set forth below, the Court concludes that it is necessary and
appropriate to apply an across-the-board reduction of twenty-percent to the total hours billed
by attorneys W. Glenn Jensen and Robert Malani.
DISCUSSION
I.

Attorney’s Fees
The language contained within the Promissory Note and Carrerou’s Guaranty

demonstrates Plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney’s fees against Crystal Centre and Carrerou.
In assessing the reasonableness of a request for attorney’s fees in the Eleventh Circuit, courts
use the “lodestar” method to calculate an objective estimate of the value of an attorney’s
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services. See Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988).
Under the lodestar method, the value of an attorney’s services is calculated by multiplying
the hours that the attorney reasonably worked by a reasonable rate of pay. See Loranger v.
Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299). The “‘fee
applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours
and hourly rates.’” ACLU of Georgia v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303).
Importantly, courts are not authorized “to be generous with the money of others, and
it is as much the duty of courts to see that excessive fees and expenses are not awarded as it
is to see that an adequate amount is awarded.” Id. at 428. When a request for attorney’s fees
is unreasonably high, courts may “conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the
requested hours with an across-the-board cut.” Bivins v. Wrap it Up Inc., 548 F.3d 1348,
1350 (11th Cir. 2008). Although courts may apply either method, they cannot apply both.
See id. Finally, courts need not become “green-eyeshade accountants.” Fox v. Vice, 131
S.Ct. 2205, 2216 (2011). Instead, the essential goal for the court is to “do rough justice, not
to achieve auditing perfection.” Id.
A.

Reasonable Hourly Rates

The Affidavit of Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt. 46-1) reflects that two attorneys and two
paralegals worked on the instant case. Specifically, attorney W. Glenn Jensen billed 82.3
hours at an hourly rate of $340.00, attorney Robert Malani billed 219.4 hours at an hourly
rate of $235.00, paralegal Connie Gibson billed 6.2 hours at an hourly rate of $110.00, and
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paralegal Alana Frustaci billed 1.7 hours at an hourly rate of $110.00. The Affidavit attaches
biographical summaries outlining the background and qualifications of the attorneys. The
Affidavit also states that the fees incurred in this action are consistent with rates billed and
paid in similar commercial lawsuits filed in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. The Court concludes that the hourly rates are reasonable.
B.

Reasonable Hours

The Court has carefully reviewed the billing entries in this case and concludes that a
twenty-percent across-the-board reduction of Jensen and Malani’s hours is appropriate. The
Court makes this reduction considering that the case was neither novel nor complex. The
skill required to perform the legal services properly was not great, especially considering that
Defendant Stephens stipulated to a final judgment, Defendant Crystal Centre defaulted, and
the filings necessary to obtain judgments against the three Defendants were substantively
similar. In other words, the billing entries reveal repetitive and duplicate work. These
considerations support the Court’s reduction in the number of hours found to be
compensable. Accordingly, Jensen’s 82.3 hours are reduced by twenty-percent: he will be
compensated for 65.8 hours. Malani’s 219.4 hours are also reduced by twenty-percent: he
will be compensated for 175.5 hours. The Court accepts as reasonable the hours billed by
paralegals Gibson and Frustaci.
C.

Total Amount of Reasonable Fees

After reducing the hours as reflected above, the total amount of reasonable fees is
$64,388.85.
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II.

Taxable Costs
Plaintiff also seeks taxable costs in the total amount of $530.00 associated with the

filing fee and process fees. These amounts are reasonable and appropriate under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920. Accordingly, Plaintiff is awarded costs in the amount of $530.00.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Taxable Costs (Dkt. 46) is granted
in part and denied in part as explained herein.

2.

Plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $64,388.85 and costs in
the amount of $530.00.

3.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a final judgment of attorney’s fees and
costs in the total amount of $64,918.35 in Plaintiff’s favor and against
Defendants Crystal Centre, LLC and Oswald P. Carrerou, jointly and
severally, for all of which let execution issue forthwith.

4.

This case shall remain closed.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on September 12, 2016.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record
S:\Even\2015\15-cv-1462.mt-fees-grant-in-part.wpd

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