Sheets et al v. Sorrento Villas, Section 5, Association, Inc. et al
Filing
137
ORDER: Defendant Linda Benford's Motion for Summary Judgment 109 is granted to the extent stated herein. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a final judgment in favor of Defendant Linda Benford and against Plaintiffs. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 10/19/2016. (LN)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
KIRSTEN SHEETS, JASON KALAGHER
and JANSON MURPHY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No: 8:15-cv-1674-T-30JSS
SORRENTO VILLAS, SECTION 5,
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant Linda Benford’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 109), Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition (Dkt. 121), and
Defendant Linda Benford’s Reply (Dkt. 128). The Court, having reviewed the motion,
response, reply, record evidence, and being otherwise advised in the premises, concludes
that the motion should be granted and final judgment entered in Benford’s favor.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Kirsten Sheets, Jason Kalagher, and Janson Murphy allege that
Defendants violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (“FHA”). Sheets and
Kalagher are married and Murphy is Sheets’ minor son.
Plaintiffs reside in a
condominium unit that Sheets owns. Defendants are the condominium association of
which Plaintiffs are members (“Association”); the Association’s individual officers and
directors; Argus Property Management, Inc., the Association’s property management
company; and Linda Benford, Argus’ employee who was the Association’s property
manager during the relevant time.
Sheets alleges that she suffers a handicap within the scope of the FHA and has an
emotional support animal to assist her. Sheets’ handicap often makes it difficult for her to
walk. Sheets installed an underground invisible fence within the common elements of the
condominium to dispense with the need to walk or constrain her emotional support dog
while it was outside her home. Sheets alleges that, after she installed the invisible fence,
Defendants took actions in violation of the FHA. Specifically, Sheets contends that
Defendants violated the FHA by (1) failing to reasonably accommodate her need for an
invisible fence to constrain her emotional support dog (Dkt. 32 Counts I and V) and (2)
failing to make modifications to the condominium property to accommodate her need for
an invisible fence (Dkt. 32 Counts II and VI).
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants also violated the FHA by (1) retaliating against
Plaintiffs for exercising their rights under the FHA (Dkt. 32 Counts III and VII) and (2)
discriminating against Plaintiffs based on their familial status (Dkt. 32 Counts IV and
VIII).
With respect to the retaliation claim, Plaintiffs allege that, on or about May 5,
2014, Sheets and Kalagher filed a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”) against the Association, Argus, and individual Defendant James
Tompkins, alleging discrimination and other violations of the FHA.
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According to
Plaintiffs, after they filed the HUD complaint, the Association initiated an arbitration
proceeding against Sheets, seeking an order requiring her removal of the invisible fence,
and retaliated against Plaintiffs by, among other things, selectively enforcing the
Association rules against Plaintiffs.
The FHA discrimination claim alleges that Defendants notified Plaintiffs that
Murphy and his friends could not play on the common elements, specifically, an empty
lot that was located near Sheets’ home.
Plaintiffs allege that this amounted to
discrimination based on familial status.
Benford moves for summary judgment on all of the claims alleged against her
(Counts V-VIII). Benford argues that the record evidence is undisputed that she cannot
be held personally liable for any FHA violations. She also argues that the record reflects
that Plaintiffs cannot prove their claims against her as a matter of law. The Court agrees.
As explained below, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the nonmovants, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Benford assisted or contributed to
any FHA violations. Accordingly, judgment should be entered in Benford’s favor.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Motions for summary judgment should be granted only when the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
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477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The existence of some factual disputes between the litigants
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported summary judgment motion; “the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (emphasis in original). The substantive law
applicable to the claimed causes of action will identify which facts are material. Id.
Throughout this analysis, the court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255.
Once a party properly makes a summary judgment motion by demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, the
nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings through the use of affidavits, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, and designate specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The evidence must be
significantly probative to support the claims. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49 (1986).
This Court may not decide a genuine factual dispute at the summary judgment
stage. Fernandez v. Bankers Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 564 (11th Cir. 1990). “[I]f
factual issues are present, the Court must deny the motion and proceed to trial.” Warrior
Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 1983). A
dispute about a material fact is genuine and summary judgment is inappropriate if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Hoffman v. Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1990).
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However, there must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a jury question.
Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 1989).
DISCUSSION
I.
The FHA
The FHA forbids discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin.”
42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
Such discrimination includes “a refusal to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)). “To prevail on a [§] 3604(f)(3)(B)
claim”—that is, a claim that a housing provider refused to reasonably accommodate a
disability—“a plaintiff must establish that (1) he is disabled or handicapped within the
meaning of the FHA, (2) he requested a reasonable accommodation, (3) such
accommodation was necessary to afford him an opportunity to use and enjoy his
dwelling, and (4) the defendants refused to make the requested accommodation.” Hawn
v. Shoreline Towers Phase 1 Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 347 Fed.Appx. 464, 467 (11th Cir.
2009).
Discrimination under § 3604 includes “a refusal to permit, at the expense of the
handicapped person, reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied or to be
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occupied by such person if such modifications may be necessary to afford such person
full enjoyment of the premises.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A).
Finally, the FHA also prohibits retaliation to the extent that “[i]t shall be unlawful
to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment
of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed” any right granted or protected under
the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617; Sofarelli v. Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718, 722 (11th
Cir. 1991) (finding that a note threatening “to break [the plaintiff] in half,” hitting his
truck, shouting obscenities and spitting at him constituted coercion and intimidation under
§ 3617 when there was also an indication that there was a discriminatory motivation
behind that conduct).
II.
Personal Liability under the FHA
Benford’s motion for summary judgment argues that Plaintiffs have not
established, as a matter of law, her personal liability for any purported FHA violations. A
plaintiff who has allegedly suffered FHA violations may seek damages, including
punitive damages, from individual defendants who have personally committed or
contributed to the FHA violation. See Fair Hous. Ctr. of the Greater Palm Beaches, Inc.
v. Sonoma Bay Cmty. Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1325-1326 (S.D.
Fla. 2015); Sabal Palm Condos of Pine Island Ridge Ass’n, Inc. v. Fischer, 6 F. Supp. 3d
1272, 1293 (S.D. Fla. 2014); Copeman v. Briel, No. 1:11-cv-75-SPM-GRJ, 2011 WL
2292113, at *5 (N.D. Fla. May 6, 2011); see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003)
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(discussing vicarious liability for FHA violations); Andujar v. Hewitt, No. 02 CIV. 2223,
2002 WL 1792065, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2002) (“Aggrieved persons have long been
permitted to assert Fair Housing Act claims against individual defendants who engaged in
affirmative acts of discrimination or enforced a corporation’s discriminatory rules or
policies.”).
III.
The Alleged Refusal to Accommodate the Invisible Fence
Benford argues that the record is undisputed that she did not have any personal
involvement with the Association’s refusal to accommodate Sheets’ invisible fence. The
Court agrees based on the record evidence. The record reflects that the Association,
through its board members, concluded that Sheets’ invisible fence was in violation of its
rules. The Association directed Benford to send violation letters to Sheets, requesting
that Sheets remove the invisible fence. Benford sent two violation letters to Sheets
related to this issue. The Association’s board voted to refer the matter to its attorney after
Sheets failed to comply with the two violation letters.
On February 12, 2014, the Association’s lawyer, Robert Moore, sent Sheets a letter
directing her to remove the invisible fence. The letter stated, in relevant part, that the
invisible fence was on the common elements of the condominium and that “[n]o unit
owner may appropriate the common elements for their own use.” The letter further stated
that if Sheets did not remove the fence within thirty days, the Association would pursue
all legal remedies including mandatory non-binding arbitration. These facts make clear
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that Benford, as the Association’s property manager, exhibited no control over the
Association’s actions related to the invisible fence and the Association’s alleged refusal to
reasonably accommodate Sheets’ request. Notably, the record is undisputed that Benford
had no authority to vote at the board meetings.
Importantly, although Benford sent two violation letters to Sheets on behalf of the
Association related to the invisible fence, under the particular facts here she cannot be
personally liable for “ministerial” functions she performed as the Association’s property
manager. See Fair Hous. Ctr. of the Greater Palm Beaches, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d at
1326-27.
In Fair Housing Center of the Greater Palm Beaches, the condominium
required rental applications to include report cards of any minor residents under the age of
eighteen; an application that did not include the report card would be denied. The
plaintiff alleged that the report card requirement violated the FHA because it amounted to
a refusal to rent based on familial status. The plaintiff included the association’s property
management company and property manager in the lawsuit. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the property manager. The court concluded that, although the
property manager was involved in the screening of rental applicants, including informing
the applicant of the report card requirement, the property manager’s involvement was
“purely ministerial.” The record was undisputed that the property manager was not
involved in the condominium’s decision to reject an application based on the applicant’s
failure to provide a report card. See id.
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Similarly, in Sabal Palm, although the court found that the board member of the
association was liable for the association’s FHA violation (a failure to accommodate the
plaintiff’s disability) because he “personally contributed” to the violation by voting
against accommodating the disability, the association’s attorney could not be liable
because he had no authority to vote and did not in fact vote on Sabal Palm’s decision to
sue the plaintiff instead of simply granting her requested accommodation. See Sabal
Palm Condos of Pine Island Ridge Ass’n, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1294.
The court
concluded that even if the attorney had advised the association that the plaintiff was not
entitled to the accommodation, advice is not tantamount to unlawful discrimination. See
id. (noting that the FHA violation occurred when the association acted on the lawyer’s
advice “and voted to not grant [the plaintiff’s] accommodation request.”).1
In their response, Plaintiffs rely on several cases that they argue stand for the
proposition that a purely ministerial act is sufficient to establish liability under the FHA.
As Benford points out in her reply, these cases dealt with motions to dismiss, not motions
for summary judgment. While such allegations may be sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss under the “plausibility standard” applied at the dismissal stage, the Court
concludes that Benford’s minimal, ministerial involvement with the invisible fence issue
1
This is relevant to Plaintiffs’ argument that Benford advised the Association that Sheets’
invisible fence was in violation of the rules because it was located on the condominium’s common
elements. Regardless of any advice on the issue, the Association, not Benford, concluded that
violation notices and, ultimately, arbitration, were necessary actions to enforce the Association’s
rules. Moreover, there is no record evidence establishing that Benford had any authority to grant
any purported accommodation request related to the invisible fence.
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is insufficient to establish liability at the summary judgment stage. Accordingly, the
Court grants summary judgment to Benford on Sheets’ failure to accommodate claims
(Counts V and VI).
IV.
Plaintiffs’ Retaliation Claim
Plaintiffs allege that, after they filed a complaint with HUD, Defendants, including
Benford, retaliated against Plaintiffs by initiating the arbitration and selectively enforcing
the Association’s rules against Plaintiffs and their relatives. Benford argues that there is
no record evidence demonstrating retaliation on her part. The Court agrees. As stated
above, the Association, not Benford, determined that arbitration of the invisible fence
dispute was necessary.
And Benford had no authority to vote on issues that were
discussed at the board meetings.
Moreover, there is simply no evidence that Benford took any adverse actions
against any of the Plaintiffs based on the HUD complaint; in other words, there is no
causal link between the filing of the HUD complaint (or any other purported protective
activity) and any adverse action on Benford’s part. There is also no evidence that
Benford intimidated or threatened Plaintiffs based on their alleged protective activity.
See Wood v. Briarwinds Condo. Ass’n Bd. of Directors, 369 Fed.Appx. 1, 3 (11th Cir.
2010) (“As for [the plaintiff’s] FHA retaliation claim, he failed to allege conduct that
rises to the level of coercion or intimidation under the FHA; he alleges only that he was
retaliated against when his van, which was leaking oil, was towed, a board member
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complained that he was violating the pool rules by using a mask and snorkel in the pool,
and the same board member assessed fines against Wood for the oil leak and took
photographs of him. That conduct does not rise to the level of intimidation or threats, nor
did Wood demonstrate any nexus between the complained about conduct and his FHA
protected activity.”). Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to Benford on
Sheets’ retaliation claim (Count VII).
V.
Plaintiffs’ Discrimination Claim
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, including Benford, discriminated against them
based on their familial status in violation of the FHA because, on several occasions,
Plaintiffs were told that Murphy and his friends were prohibited from playing on the
common elements. Like the other claims against Benford, the record contains no genuine
issue of fact for trial establishing Benford’s personal liability for any purported
discrimination. Indeed, the record does not reflect any action Benford personally took
against Plaintiffs with respect to any alleged trespassing issue on the common elements.
Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to Benford on Plaintiffs’ discrimination
claim (Count VIII).
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Benford is entitled to summary judgment on the FHA
claims asserted against her because the record does not establish a genuine issue for trial
related to Benford’s personal involvement with any purported FHA violations. It is worth
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noting that Plaintiffs’ response largely attempts to cloud and confuse the record by
pointing to discrepancies in the record that are immaterial and unrelated to the substantive
law applicable to the claimed causes of action. This tactic is unavailing.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1.
Defendant Linda Benford’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 109) is
granted to the extent stated herein.
2.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a final judgment in favor of
Defendant Linda Benford and against Plaintiffs.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on October 19, 2016.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record
S:\Even\2015\15-cv-1674.msj 109 Benford grant.wpd
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