Alvey v. Gualtieri

Filing 56

ORDER: Plaintiff Amber Alvey's "Emergency Motion to Enforce Qualified Protective Order (Doc. 30) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 Filing Requirements" (Doc. # 53 ) is denied. The Clerk is directed to remove the images filed at docket entri es 51-16, 51-20, and 51-21. Exhibit A of Defendant Sheriff Bob Gualtieri's response (Doc. # 55-1), which contains the appropriate redactions, shall be deemed to replace docket entries 51-16, 51-20, and 51-21. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 8/3/2016. (DRW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
AMBER ALVEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:15-cv-1861-T-33MAP

SHERIFF BOB GUALTIERI, in his
official capacity as Sheriff
of Pinellas County,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff
Amber

Alvey’s

“Emergency

Motion

to

Enforce

Qualified

Protective Order (Doc. 30) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 Filing
Requirements” (Doc. # 53) filed on July 27, 2016. The Court
directed Defendant Sheriff Bob Gualtieri, who is being sued
in his official capacity, to file a response by 2:00PM on
July 29, 2016, if he wished to be heard on the matter. (Doc.
# 54). Gualtieri timely filed a response in opposition. (Doc.
# 55). For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants in
part and denies in part the Motion.
Discussion
Alvey

is

59

years

old

and

suffers

from

“physical

impairments that substantially limit major life activities.”

(Doc. # 1 at ¶ 8). In particular, Alvey alleges that, as a
result of “an extreme incident of domestic violence in 1981,”
she sustained “head injuries, pelvic fractures, internal
injuries to bladder and other internal organs, and spinal
fractures that could not be surgically repaired.” (Id. at ¶
9). Alvey also alleges the 1981 domestic violence incident
placed her in a coma and required hospitalization for weeks.
(Id.). As a result of the aforesaid trauma, “Alvey now has
osteoporosis/arthritis in her spine, lives with chronic pain,
and cannot walk without assistance. . . . She also has
epilepsy and other medical conditions. She has prescriptions
for medications . . .[, which include] pain mediation, muscle
relaxers, seizure medication, and sleep medication.” (Id.).
Alvey further alleges that, due to her inability to work,
she receives Social Security benefits in the amount of $721
per month. (Id. at ¶ 10). Alvey has experienced difficultly
in renting because of her fixed income. (Id. at ¶ 11). In
June of 2014, Alvey left her housing “due to serious health
and safety concerns.” (Id. at ¶ 12). Shortly thereafter, Alvey
called a community resource hotline seeking help and was
subsequently

transported

by

a

Pinellas

County

Sheriff’s

deputy to Pinellas Safe Harbor. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-16). “Pinellas
Safe Harbor is an emergency shelter designed to be a safe

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haven for those currently homeless and who require services
to help them get back on their feet.” (Id. at ¶ 17). During
her stay at Pinellas Safe Harbor, which is operated by the
Pinellas County Sheriff (Id. at ¶ 2), Alvey alleges that she
was discriminated against on the basis of her disability and,
following a slip-and-fall incident, was taken to Northside
Hospital. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-31). Once released from Northside
Hospital, Alvey attempted to regain entrance to Pinellas Safe
Harbor; however, she was denied entrance. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-48).
Alvey then returned to the location she had been formerly
residing at in June of 2014. (Id. at ¶ 49).
Alvey instituted the pending action on August 10, 2015,
by filing a one-count Complaint alleging a violation of the
American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.
(Id.). During the course of discovery, the parties jointly
moved

for

the

entry

of

a

protective

order

governing

confidential information. (Doc. # 29). The Court granted the
parties’ joint motion and entered a protective order on March
9,

2016,

which

defined

what

constituted

confidential

information and the conditions placed thereon. (Doc. # 30).
However, this Court also stated, “[w]hether documents
filed in a case may be filed under seal is a separate issue
from whether the parties may agree that produced documents

3 

are confidential. Motions to file under seal are disfavored,
and such motions will be denied unless they comply with Local
Rule

1.09.”

(Doc.

#

33

at

6).

Furthermore,

“[e]ach

confidentiality agreement or order shall provide, or shall be
deemed to provide, that ‘no party shall file a document under
seal without first having obtained an order granting leave to
file under seal on a showing of particularized need.’” (Id.
at 4); see also (Doc. # 30 at ¶ 5).
Following

discovery,

Gualtieri

filed

a

motion

for

summary judgment to which he attached several documents,
including medical records of Alvey. (Doc. ## 51-52). Alvey
now moves the Court to enter an order (1) directing the Clerk
to remove the documents filed at docket entries 51-1 through
51-8, 51-16, 51-20, 51-21, and 52-5; (2) requiring Gualtieri
to file a motion for leave to file docket entries 51-1 through
51-8, 51-16, 51-20, 51-21, and 52-5 under seal; and (3)
directing Gualtieri to redact Alvey’s full date of birth from
the documents bearing Bates numbers 000576, PSH 000001, and
PSH 000194 filed at docket entries 51-16, 51-20, and 51-21,
respectively. (Doc. # 53 at 7).
Alvey argues Gualtieri violated the Court’s protective
order by not filing her medical records under seal. In support
of her argument, Alvey cites to paragraph 5 of the protective

4 

order, which states, in part: “no party shall file a document
under seal without first having obtained an order granting
leave to file under seal on a showing of particularized need.
(Doc. 20.) The parties shall make every effort to minimize
Confidential Information filed with the Court.” (Doc. # 30 at
¶ 5). As demonstrated, though, the plain language of paragraph
5 places no obligation on a party to seek leave of Court to
file a document containing confidential information under
seal. Furthermore, to grant Alvey’s Motion on the grounds of
paragraph 5 would be to say all confidential information must
be filed under seal. But, as this Court has stated, merely
because the parties agree information may be confidential
does not automatically mean the proffering party will be
afforded leave to file under seal. (Doc. # 33 at 6).
Moreover, it was Alvey herself who put her medical
conditions at issue by filing the instant action under the
ADA.

See

Taylor

v.

Bradshaw,

No.

11-80911-CIV,

2014

WL

6459978, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2014) (“Plaintiff has put
her medical condition and/or illness at issue in this lawsuit”
brought under the ADA). And, while there is no common-law
right to discovery material, when such material is filed in
conjunction with a dispositive motion, it becomes subject to
the public right of access. Diaz-Granados v. Wright Med.

5 

Tech., Inc., No. 6:14-cv-1953-Orl-28TBS, 2016 WL 1090060, at
*3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2016) (citations omitted).
The Court is mindful that “[o]nce a matter is brought
before a court for resolution, it is no longer solely the
parties’ case, but also the public’s case.” Brown v. Advantage
Eng’g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992). “The common
law right of access may be overcome by a showing of good
cause, which requires ‘balanc[ing] the asserted right of
access against the other party’s interest in keeping the
information confidential.’” Local Access, LLC v. Peerless
Network, Inc., No: 6:14-cv-399-Orl-40TBS, 2015 WL 5897743, *1
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2015) (citation omitted). In addition,
Middle District of Florida Local Rule 1.09 sets forth the
criteria for filing a document under seal. M.D. Fla. Local R.
1.09.
In this instance, the Court is not persuaded by Alvey’s
Motion.

Again,

information

may

simply
be

because

the

confidential

parties
does

agree

that

mean

such

not

information will automatically be sealed if filed on the
record in conjunction with a dispositive motion. Furthermore,
Gualtieri

recognizes

in

his

response

that

the

documents

bearing Bates numbers 000576, PSH 000001, and PSH 000194 at
docket entries 51-16, 51-20, and 51-21, respectively, were

6 

not fully redacted and has accordingly attached redacted
copies of the same to his response. Gualtieri requests leave
to

replace

docket

entries

51-16,

51-20,

and

51-21

with

redacted copies. Without a more particularized showing, the
Court will not grant leave for the wholesale sealing of the
record

with

respect

to

Gaultieri’s

motion

for

summary

judgment. But, the Court will grant Gualtieri’s requests to
replace docket entries 51-16, 51-20, and 51-21 with redacted
copies.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)

Plaintiff Amber Alvey’s “Emergency Motion to Enforce
Qualified Protective Order (Doc. 30) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
5.2 Filing Requirements” (Doc. # 53) is DENIED.

(2)

The Clerk is directed to remove the images filed at
docket entries 51-16, 51-20, and 51-21.

(3)

Exhibit A of Defendant Sheriff Bob Gualtieri’s response
(Doc.

#

55-1),

which

contains

the

appropriate

redactions, shall be deemed to replace docket entries
51-16, 51-20, and 51-21.

7 

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 3rd
day of August, 2016.

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