Lempicki v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER. The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED AND REMANDED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment consistent with this opinion and, thereafter, to close the file. Signed by Magistrate Judge Douglas N. Frazier on 2/21/2017. (CAS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
EILEEN LEMPICKI,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 8:15-cv-1991-T-DNF

CAROLYN COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_____________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Eileen Lempicki, seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her claim for a period of disability,
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).

The

Commissioner filed the Transcript of the proceedings (hereinafter referred to as “Tr.” followed by
the appropriate page number), and the parties filed legal memoranda in support of their positions.
For the reasons set out herein, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED AND
REMANDED pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.

Social Security Act Eligibility, Standard of Review, Procedural History, and the
ALJ’s Decision

A. Social Security Act Eligibility
The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A), 1382(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905. The

impairment must be severe, making the claimant unable to do her previous work, or any other
substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2),
1382(a)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505-404.1511, 416.905-416.911.
B. Standard of Review
The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable person would accept as adequate support to a conclusion. Even if the evidence
preponderated against the Commissioner’s findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is
supported by substantial evidence.” Crawford v. Comm’r, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citing Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997)); Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d
1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). In conducting this review, this Court may not reweigh the evidence
or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, but must consider the evidence as a whole, taking
into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Martin v. Sullivan, 894
F.2d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002); Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). However,
the District Court will reverse the Commissioner’s decision on plenary review if the decision
applied incorrect law, or if the decision fails to provide sufficient reasoning to determine that the
Commissioner properly applied the law. Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064,
1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

The Court reviews de novo the conclusions of law made by the

Commissioner of Social Security in a disability benefits case. Social Security Act, § 205(g), 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
The ALJ must follow five steps in evaluating a claim of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,
416.920. At step one, the claimant must prove that she is not undertaking substantial gainful
employment.

Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001), see 20 C.F.R. §

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404.1520(a)(4)(i). If a claimant is engaging in any substantial gainful activity, she will be found
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).
At step two, the claimant must prove that she is suffering from a severe impairment or
combination of impairments. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278, 20 C.F.R. § 1520(a)(4)(ii). If the
claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not significantly limit her physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities, the ALJ will find that the impairment is not severe, and
the claimant will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 1520(c).
At step three, the claimant must prove that her impairment meets or equals one of
impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P. App. 1; Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278; 20 C.F.R. §
1520(a)(4)(iii). If she meets this burden, she will be considered disabled without consideration of
age, education and work experience. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278.
At step four, if the claimant cannot prove that her impairment meets or equals one of the
impairments listed in Appendix 1, she must prove that her impairment prevents her from
performing her past relevant work. Id. At this step, the ALJ will consider the claimant’s RFC and
compare it with the physical and mental demands of her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §
1520(a)(4)(iv), 20 C.F.R. § 1520(f). If the claimant can still perform her past relevant work, then
she will not be found disabled. Id.
At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant is capable of
performing other work available in the national economy, considering the claimant’s RFC, age,
education, and past work experience. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278; 20 C.F.R. § 1520(a)(4)(v). If
the claimant is capable of performing other work, she will be found not disabled. Id.

In

determining whether the Commissioner has met this burden, the ALJ must develop a full and fair
record regarding the vocational opportunities available to the claimant. Allen v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d

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1200, 1201 (11th Cir. 1989). There are two ways in which the ALJ may make this determination.
The first is by applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines (“the Grids”), and the second is by the
use of a vocational expert (“VE”). Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004).
Only after the Commissioner meets this burden does the burden shift back to the claimant to show
that she is not capable of performing the “other work” as set forth by the Commissioner. Doughty
v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 n.2 (11th Cir. 2001).
C. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB and SSI in November 2012,
alleging disability beginning April 16, 2011. (Tr. 225-40). Plaintiff’s applications were denied.
(Tr. 101-43). At Plaintiff’s request, an administrative hearing was held before Administrative Law
Judge Lawrence J. Neary (“the ALJ”) on July 7, 2014. (Tr. 35-64). On November 5, 2014, the
ALJ entered a decision finding Plaintiff had not been under a disability from April 16, 2011,
through the date of the decision. (Tr. 13-34). Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision and
the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request on July 28, 2015. (Tr. 1-5). Plaintiff initiated the
instant action by Complaint (Doc. 1) on August 26, 2015. The parties having filed memoranda
setting forth their respective positions, this case is ripe for review.
D. Summary of the ALJ’s Decision
At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since April 16, 2011, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 15). At step two, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease with back
pain; seizure disorder; hypoglycemia; major depressive disorder; anxiety disorder, NOS; mood
disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder; personality disorder; and history of opiate dependence, in
remission. (Tr. 15). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or

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combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of any of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 16).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)
except she is limited to no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and all
other postural activities are limited to occasional; is limited to no exposure
to hazards such as machinery and heights; and is further limited to simple,
routine, repetitive tasks, with only occasional changes in the works setting
and only occasional interaction with the public and co-workers.
(Tr. 19). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not capable of returning to her past relevant
work as a fast food manager, nursing home cook, and cashier at a truck stop. (Tr. 25).
At step five, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience,
and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff
could perform. (Tr. 25-26). In reaching this decision, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a
vocational expert who stated that an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform the jobs of
bakery worker conveyor line, cleaner/housekeeper, and produce weigher. (Tr. 26). The ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from
April 16, 2011, through the date of the decision, November 5, 2014. (Tr. 27).
II.

Analysis
Plaintiff raises a single issue on appeal: whether the ALJ properly evaluated the opinions

of the treating and consulting physicians in this case. (Doc. 17 p. 19-25). Specifically, Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Paul
Doghramji, M.D., and one-time consultative evaluator, Gregory Coleman, Psy.D.
The Court begins by reviewing the record as it pertains to Dr. Doghramji. The record
shows that Plaintiff started seeing Dr. Paul Doghramji at Collegeville Family Practice on August
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31, 2010. (Tr. 715). Dr. Doghramji noted Plaintiff’s history of vulvar cancer, obstructive sleep
apnea, and depression. (Tr. 715). Plaintiff presented with complaints of back pain. (Tr. 714).
Plaintiff reported that she had had intermittent problems with her back over the years, but now the
pain was severe. Any movement hurt, but lying down produced the least pain. (Tr. 715). On
examination, her lumbar spine was tender on palpation with spasms of the paraspinal muscles.
Bending especially elicited pain. Straight leg raising test was positive on the right leg at 30
degrees, and positive on the left at 90 degrees. (Tr. 716). Dr. Doghramji diagnosed lower back
pain, insomnia, hypertension, sciatica, depression, obstructive sleep apnea, and vulvar neoplasm.
(Tr. 716). He sent her for lumbar x-rays and MRI and prescribed hydrocodone-ibuprofen for the
pain. (Tr. 717). Dr. Doghramji recorded that Plaintiff would likely need physical therapy. (Tr.
717). On September 9, 2010, Plaintiff underwent an MRI of her lumbar spine on orders from Dr.
Doghramji. (Tr. 474). The MRI showed minimal disc desiccation at L3-L4. (Tr. 474).
On September 14, 2010, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Doghramji with complaints of her hands
going numb. (Tr. 712). Plaintiff had just had the MRI, and said that since then, her right leg would
go numb.

(Tr. 712).

On physical examination, Phalen’s maneuver on her hands caused

numbness/tingling in the median nerve distribution of both wrists. (Tr. 713). Dr. Doghramji added
carpal tunnel syndrome to her diagnosis. He also changed her medication from hydrocodone to
fentanyl patch and oxycodone. He referred her to physical therapy. (Tr. 713). He ordered rigid
wrist splints for nighttime use. (Tr. 714).
On October 6, 2010, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Doghramji and complained that the fentanyl
patch was not helping with her pain. (Tr. 709). She also complained of chest pain while walking.
(Tr. 709). Dr. Doghramji sent her for a cardiology referral. (Tr. 711).

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On November 9, 2010, Plaintiff stated to Dr. Doghramji that her medications were not
helpful regarding her low back pain. (Tr. 706). She was going to see a weight doctor the next day.
(Tr. 706). Dr. Doghramji stopped the oxycodone and wanted to try embeda, a “good morphine
product” for which he had a coupon. Dr. Doghramji referred Plaintiff to an orthopedic doctor.
(Tr. 708).
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Doghramji again on January 17, 2011. Dr. Doghramji stated that
her medications had been working but seemed to be losing their potency. (Tr. 703). He increased
her dose of Embeda from 30 mg to 60 mg daily. She was also taking Nucynta3 for her back pain.
(Tr. 705). On February 10, 2011, Plaintiff complained of drowsiness despite using CPAP machine
for her obstructive sleep apnea. She was taking her medications but her back was more bothersome
lately. (Tr. 700). On March 16, 2011, Plaintiff called Dr. Doghramji’s office stating that she had
a burning sensation and numbness in her left leg, which was getting worse. (Tr. 1305). Dr.
Doghramji ordered prednisone, and indicated that he would refer her back to a specialist if the
prednisone did not help. (Tr. 1306). Again, on April 6, 2011, Plaintiff complained that her pain
medications were not working as well. (Tr. 697).
Plaintiff contacted Dr. Doghramji’s office on January 2, 2012 to state that she was having
a flare of her radicular pain in her legs. Dr. Doghramji added a NSAID to her pain regimen. (Tr.
302). She called again on January 4, 2012 about the numbness in her left leg. (Tr. 1300). Dr.
Doghramji added gabapentin. (Tr. 1301).
On February 2, 2012, Plaintiff called Dr. Doghramji’s office indicating that she was having
a panic attack and her medications were not working. (Tr. 1294). Dr. Doghramji changed her
medication for anxiety from alprazolam to clorazepate. (Tr. 1295). On March 12, 2012, she told
him that her anxieties were no better. (Tr. 1292). Dr. Doghramji renewed the alprazolam and

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added citalopram. (Tr. 1293). On April 16, 2012, she reported that her anxieties were still very
high. (Tr. 1288). He temporarily increased her alprazolam. (Tr. 1289). Plaintiff called again on
May 21, 2012. She was having panic attacks and crying again. (Tr. 1286). She was also having
sleep problems. (Tr. 1286). Dr. Doghramji added abilify to her medications. (Tr. 1287). On May
28, 2012, she complained that the sleep medications made her sleep 15 hours. (Tr. 1284). He
changed the sleep medication. (Tr. 1285). On June 19, 2012, she called again indicating her
anxiety attacks were much worse and the medications were not helpful. (Tr. 1278). He increased
the alprazolam. (Tr. 1279). She called again on June 26, 2012 complaining of being shaky and her
blood sugar being too low. (Tr. 1276). She wanted a glucose meter and was advised that the
insurance company would send one to her. (Tr. 1277).
On June 29, 2012, Plaintiff called Dr. Doghramji the next day stating that she had gone to
the emergency room due to walking poorly the day before. She was told that it was a side effect
of the nucynta. She had gotten a fentanyl patch at the hospital, but felt no better. (Tr. 1274). Dr.
Doghramji advised her to stay off the nucynta until she could be seen. (Tr. 1275). Plaintiff called
again on July 16, 2012 about her medications. She was having insomnia despite the medications.
(Tr. 1272). She called on July 27, 2012 to say that the Opana was not helping her pain. (Tr. 1270).
On August 13, 2012, Plaintiff’s sister called Dr. Doghramji about Plaintiff’s medications.
She said that Plaintiff seemed out of it, and was tired lately. (Tr. 1266). Dr. Doghramji suggested
cutting back on the alprazolam and coming in for a medication review. (Tr. 1267).
On September 15, 2012, Plaintiff’s sister called Dr. Doghramji to tell him that Plaintiff has
suffered seizures that day. (Tr. 1260). On September 17, 2012, Plaintiff talked to Dr. Doghramji
and told him that the hospital indicated that the seizure was from not eating properly and
hypoglycemia. (Tr. 1258). He ordered her not to drive, and referred her to a neurologist. (Tr.

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1259). He was still prescribing her pain and sleep medications, including nucynta, opana, and
temazepan. He was tapering her down on the clonazapam. (Tr. 1258).
On December 12, 2012, Dr. Doghramji filled out a physical residual functional capacity
questionnaire concerning Plaintiff’s chronic back pain. (Tr. 1101). He noted that she had chronic
back pain since 2009, and had 2 herniated lumbar discs, and siatica. Her prognosis was poor. (Tr.
1101). He stated that the findings supporting this were tender low back, decreased sensation in
lumbar spine, DTR’s unequal, and positive straight leg raising at 45 degrees on the left. (Tr. 1101).
He stated that she used gabapentin for relieving symptoms, and also needed opana and nucynta.
(Tr. 1101). He stated emotional factors also affected her functioning, including depression and
anxiety, and psychological factors affecting physical condition. (Tr. 1102). He stated that her pain
would constantly interfere with her ability to perform even simple tasks, and she was incapable of
even a low stress job. (Tr. 1102). He stated she could sit, and stand/walk for less than two hours
each. (Tr. 1103). She could not lift even ten pounds. (Tr. 1103). She would miss at least 4 days
of work per month. (Tr. 1104).
On the same day, Dr. Doghramji also filled out a medical source statement concerning
Plaintiff’s mental problems. (Tr. 1107). He stated that Plaintiff suffered from generalized anxiety
disorder, depression, and possible bipolar. He said that her treatment for those problems was
celexa, seroquel, and abilify. He indicated that she had had a modest response to those medications.
(Tr. 1107). He stated that the clinical findings backing up his opinion were her depressed mood,
decreased (not readable), insomnia, mood swings, short temper, tearfulness, lack of energy, and
trouble thinking. Her prognosis was fair to poor. (Tr. 1107). He said that she would be unable to
remember work like procedures, complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions
from psychologically based symptoms, perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable

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number and length of rest periods, ask simple questions or request assistance, deal with normal
work stress, be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions, set realistic goals, and
use public transportation. (R.pp. 1109-1110). He opined that she had marked limitations in
activities of daily living, maintaining social functioning, and maintaining concentration,
persistence or pace. (Tr. 1111).
On December 12, 2012, Dr. Doghramji filled out a form concerning Plaintiff’s sleep
problems. (Tr. 1117). She was diagnosed with sleep apnea, and her prognosis was good. (Tr.
1117). She was also taking morphine in the form of opana and nucynta which caused drowsiness
and sedation. (Tr. 1118). She was unable to drive due to excessive daytime sleepiness and loss of
consciousness. (Tr. 1120).
Plaintiff called Dr. Doghramji on December 21, 2012 concerning medications that he had
given her for asthma that were not working. (Tr. 1221). Plaintiff saw Dr. Doghramji again on
May 29, 2013, complaining of severe hip pain and sleep problems. (Tr. 1364). She was taking
methadone for her pain, but had run out the week before and it didn’t make a difference. (Tr.
1364). He added lyrica and nuvigil to her medications. (Tr. 1367).
In his decision, after reviewing the medical evidence of record, the ALJ addressed the
opinions offered by Dr. Doghramji as follows:
The undersigned has further considered the multiple opinions of Dr.
Doghramji, who provided the opinion that the claimant is unable to lift
and carry; could sit, stand and/or walk for less than two hours; could never
perform postural maneuvers; and was unable to perform or has marked
limitations in her ability to perform mental work-related activities
(Exhibits B32F, B33F and B35F). These opinions are inconsistent with
the objective medical findings, as discussed above, including Dr.
Doghramji’s own examinations (Exhibit B17F and B37F).
(Tr. 24).

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating Dr. Doghramji’s opinions because the
reasons the ALJ gave for rejecting the opinions was not clear. (Doc. 17 p. 20). Plaintiff notes
that the ALJ never stated the weight he gave Dr. Doghramji’s opinions nor identified what
evidence, in the record as a whole or in Dr. Doghramji’s records, is inconsistent with the opinions
proffered by Dr. Doghramji. (Doc. 17 p. 20-21). Plaintiff contends that contrary to the ALJ’s
finding, Dr. Doghramji’s opinions as to Plaintiff’s physical and mental limitations are consistent
with and supported by his own records as well as the record as a whole. (Doc. 17 p. 21-24). In
response, Defendant contends that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Dr.
Doghramji’s opinions regarding Plaintiff’s physical and mental limitations were inconsistent
with both the objective evidence and Dr. Doghramji’s own examinations of Plaintiff. (Doc. 18
p. 7-18).
“The Secretary must specify what weight is given to a treating physician’s opinion and
any reason for giving it no weight, and failure to do so is reversible error.” MacGregor v. Bowen,
786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has held that
whenever a physician offers a statement reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of a
claimant’s impairments, including symptoms, diagnosis, and prognosis, what the claimant can
still do despite his or her impairments, and the claimant’s physical and mental restrictions, the
statement is an opinion requiring the ALJ to state with particularity the weight given to it and the
reasons therefor. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178-79 (11th Cir. 2011).
Without such a statement, “it is impossible for a reviewing court to determine whether the
ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is rational and supported by substantial evidence.”
Id. (citing Cowart v. Shweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981)). The opinions of treating
physicians are entitled to substantial or considerable weight unless good cause is shown to the

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contrary. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004). The Eleventh Circuit has
concluded that good cause exists when the: “treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by
the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was
conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records. Id.
In this case, the Court begins by rejecting the argument that remand is necessary due to
the ALJ’s failure to specify the “weight” given to Dr. Doghramji’s opinions. An ALJ is not
required to use particular phrases or formulations as long as the court can determine what
statutory and regulatory requirements the ALJ applied. See Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585,
588-89 (11th Cir. 1987). Although the ALJ did not state that he gave “little” or “no” weight to
Dr. Doghramji’s opinions, given the ALJ’s finding that the opinions were inconsistent with the
record, it is clear from the ALJ’s decision that the opinions were discounted, at least to the extent
that they are in disagreement with the ALJ’s RFC finding. For this reason, the Court finds that
any error the ALJ may have committed in failing to specifically state the weight given to Dr.
Dogramhji’s opinions was harmless. See Caldwell v. Barnhart, 261 F. App’x 188, 190 (11th Cir.
2008) (“When, however, an incorrect application of the regulations results in harmless error
because the correct application would not contradict the ALJ’s ultimate findings, the ALJ’s
decision will stand.”); Wright v. Barnhart, 153 F. App’x 678, 684 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Although
the ALJ did not explicitly state what weight he afforded the opinions of [several physicians],
none of their opinions directly contradicted the ALJ’s findings, and, therefore, any error
regarding their opinions is harmless.”).
While it was harmless error for the ALJ to not specifically state the “weight” accorded
Dr. Doghramji’s opinion, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ’s explanation for his
rejection of Dr. Doghramji’s opinion was impermissibly vague. In rejecting Dr. Doghramji’s

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opinions, the ALJ did not identify how the medical evidence of record or Dr. Doghramji’s
treatment notes were inconsistent with his opinions. Defendant contends that the ALJ’s finding
is supported by his statement that Dr. Doghramji’s opinion was inconsistent with the evidence
“discussed above,” i.e., the ALJ’s summarization of the medical evidence in the preceding
section. (Doc. 18 p. 6; Tr. 24). This vague statement, without specific references to the evidence
that is inconsistent, frustrates review and runs afoul of Winschel’s directive for the ALJ to state
with particularity his reasons for assigning whatever weight he deems appropriate to the opinions
of record. See Moliere v. Colvin, 2016 WL 5110507 at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2016) (collecting
cases). Reviewing the ALJ’s summarization of the medical evidence and Dr. Doghramji’s
opinion, it is not obviously clear to the Court how this evidence is inconsistent with Dr.
Doghramji’s opinions. This ambiguity is not made any clearer, as Defendant claims, by the ALJ
citing to two exhibits (i.e., “B17F” and “B37F”) as examples of the record undermining Dr.
Doghramji’s opinion. Exhibit B17F and B37F are treatment notes from Dr. Doghramji’s office
and are over 100 pages and 200 pages in length, respectively. Citing generally to these lengthy
exhibits does not make the ALJ’s decision any clearer.
In her brief, Defendant reviews the evidence attempting to demonstrate that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Doghramji’s opinion was inconsistent with the
medical record and his own treatment notes. The Court, however, will not engage in such a post
hoc analysis. The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “a court may not accept appellate counsel’s
post hoc rationalizations for agency actions,” and “[i]f an action is to be upheld, it must be upheld
on the same bases articulated in the agency’s order.” Baker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 384 F. App’x
893, 896 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 397, 94 S.Ct. 2315, 2326,

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41 L.Ed. 141 (1974)). On remand, the ALJ shall state the weight he accorded the opinions of Dr.
Doghramji and explain with particularity his reasons therefor.
As Dr. Coleman’s opinion, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s decision to accord it little
weight. As a one-time examining physician, Dr. Coleman’s opinion was entitled to no deference.
See McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987). Unlike in his analysis of Dr.
Doghramji’s opinion, the ALJ stated that he was according little weight to Dr. Coleman’s
opinion. The ALJ explained his reasoning with specific citations to the record to show that Dr.
Coleman’s opinion was inconsistent with the record. The Court therefore affirms the ALJ’s
treatment of Dr. Coleman’s opinion.
III.

Conclusion

The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED AND REMANDED. The Clerk of the
Court is directed to enter judgment consistent with this opinion and, thereafter, to close the file.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on February 21, 2017.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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