Taylor-Williams v. Rembert
Filing
30
ORDER: Defendant Raymond Rembert's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 10 ) is granted to the extent provided herein. Plaintiff Joyce Taylor-Williams may file a second amended complaint by May 9, 2016. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 4/7/2016. (DRW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JOYCE TAYLOR-WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 8:16-cv-87-T-33MAP
RAYMOND REMBERT,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of
Defendant Deputy Raymond Rembert’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #
10), filed on February 18, 2016. Plaintiff Joyce TaylorWilliams filed a response on March 11, 2016. (Doc. # 24). For
the reasons that follow, the Court grants the Motion.
I.
Background
Taylor-Williams
was
once
a
member
of
Bible
Based
Fellowship Church, which is located at 4811 Ehrlich Road,
Tampa, Florida 33647. (Doc. # 6 at ¶ 2). On an unspecified
date, Taylor-Williams was excommunicated from the Church.
(Id. at ¶ 3). On March 25, 2012, Taylor-Williams went with
her daughter to protest the Church’s leadership, as well as
her excommunication from the Church. (Id.). Taylor-Williams
parked her car at an adjacent property. (Id.). During her
1
protest, Taylor-Williams “marched around in front of” the
Church and “then took the those [sic] signs to a Hillsborough
County owned sidewalk, street, and/or bike lane.” (Id.).
The Church employs Rembert, a Hillsborough County Deputy
Sheriff, on Sundays to provide security. (Id. at ¶ 4). Other
than alleging Rembert’s rate of pay, the Amended Complaint
does not allege the specifics of the employment relationship
between the Church and Rembert. The Church allegedly directed
Rembert to end Taylor-Williams’ protest and to arrest TaylorWilliams. (Id. at ¶ 5).
Rembert allegedly claimed Taylor-Williams’ protest was
unlawful because she was on the Church’s property. (Id.).
Rembert also allegedly “created an additional false basis for
trespassing” her from the adjacent property. (Id.). According
to the Amended Complaint, Rembert stated the owner of the
adjacent property wanted Taylor-Williams trespassed because
she was screaming, yelling, and interrupting his business.
(Id. at ¶ 12). The Amended Complaint further alleges the
adjacent
property
owner
“never
made
any
such
assertions
against” Taylor-Williams and that a prior trespass warning
had not been issued vis-à-vis the adjacent property. (Id.).
Rembert
“incarcerated
arrested
for
19
Taylor-Williams
days.”
2
(Id.
at
and
¶
6).
she
was
“Criminal
proceedings were . . . brought against [Taylor-Williams] but
. . . were terminated in her favor.” (Id. at ¶ 13). The date
on which the criminal proceedings terminated is not alleged.
Taylor-Williams
subsequently
brought
suit
against
Rembert by filing a pro se complaint on January 13, 2016.
(Doc. # 1). An Amended Complaint was filed on January 29,
2016. (Doc. # 6). After Rembert filed the pending Motion,
counsel filed a notice of appearance on behalf of TaylorWilliams. Taylor-Williams filed a response in opposition to
Rembert’s Motion on March 11, 2016. The Motion is now ripe
for review.
II.
Legal Standard
On a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true all
the allegations in the complaint and construes them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth
Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further,
this
Court
favors
the
plaintiff
with
all
reasonable
inferences from the allegations in the complaint. Stephens v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th
Cir. 1990) (stating “[o]n a motion to dismiss, the facts
stated
in
[the]
complaint
and
all
reasonable
therefrom are taken as true”). However:
3
inferences
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.
Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Furthermore, “[t]he scope
of
review
must
be
limited
to
the
four
corners
of
the
complaint.” St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337
(11th Cir. 2002).
III. Discussion
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Rembert’s
argument
regarding
service
of
process
raised
under
Rule
12(b)(5), Fed. R. Civ. P., has been mooted. See (Doc. # 23)
(showing service of process effected on February 29, 2016, by
non-party
process
server).
And,
although
Taylor-Williams
attached the affidavit of Cliffany Williams to her response
in opposition (Doc. # 24-1), the Court declines to review
that affidavit, as the Court limits its review to the four
corners of the Amended Complaint. See St. George, 285 F.3d at
1337.
4
Count
I
of
the
Amended
Complaint
alleges
malicious
prosecution under Florida law. (Doc. # 6 at 3-5). The elements
of a malicious prosecution claim are
(1) a criminal proceeding was instituted or
continued against the plaintiff, (2) the present
defendant commenced or caused the commencement of
such proceeding, (3) the criminal proceeding had a
bona fide termination in the plaintiff's favor, (4)
there was no probable cause for initiating the
proceeding, (5) the present defendant acted
maliciously, and (6) the plaintiff suffered damages
as a result.
Abdullah v. Osceola Cty. Sheriff, No. 6:14-cv-629-Orl-40TBS,
2015 WL 5915818, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2015) (citing Alamo
Rent–A–Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1355 (Fla.
1994)). Count II of the Amended Complaint alleges false arrest
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. # 6 at 5-6). “A warrantless
arrest without probable cause . . . forms a basis for a
section 1983 claim.” Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525
(11th Cir. 1996).
Upon review, the Court determines that dismissal of the
Amended Complaint is appropriate. The Amended Complaint is a
shotgun pleading. “When faced with a shotgun pleading, the
trial court, whether or not requested to do so by a party’s
adversary, ought to require the party to file a repleader.”
United States ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1354
n.6 (11th Cir. 2006).
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The Amended Complaint does not indicate if Rembert is
being sued in his individual or official capacity, or both.
(Doc. # 6). “The distinction between an individual capacity
suit . . . and an official capacity suit is a significant
one.” Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007),
abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S.
277,
287
(2011).
To
be
sure,
a
defendant
sued
in
its
individual capacity “may . . . be able to assert . . .
qualified immunity,” whereas a defendant sued in its official
capacity may only claim “forms of sovereign immunity that the
entity,
qua
entity,
may
possess,
such
as
the
Eleventh
Amendment.” Smith, 502 F.3d at 1271-72 (citations omitted).
This distinction in capacity also has an effect under Florida
law. See Fla. Stat. §§ 768.28(6)(a), (9)(a) (listing pre-suit
requirements for an action brought against the state and
prerequisite for holding employee of governmental entity
personally liable).
The Amended Complaint is a shotgun pleadings because it
fails to allege the capacity in which Rembert is being sued.
See
Thorn
v.
Randall,
No.
8:14-cv-862-T-36MAP,
2014
WL
5094134, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2014) (finding complaint
“a deficient shotgun pleading” because plaintiff “fail[ed] to
specify
whether
he
[was]
suing
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[defendants]
in
their
individual capacities and/or official capacities”). While
Rembert construes the Amended Complaint as asserting counts
against him in both his official and individual capacities,
the Amended Complaint makes no mention as to capacity. Without
knowing the capacity in which Rembert is being sued, the Court
is
unable
to
determine
the
appropriateness
of
Rembert’s
immunity defenses. Thus, dismissal is appropriate. Holder v.
Gualtieri, No. 8:14-cv-3052-T-33TWG, 2015 WL 370048, at *4
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2015) (dismissing complaint with leave to
amend partly because it failed to indicate capacity in which
defendant was sued).
The Amended Complaint is also a shotgun pleading because
Paragraph 16 reincorporates every preceding Paragraph into
Count II, as well as two succeeding Paragraphs that are
themselves included within Count II. (Doc. # 6 at ¶ 16). See
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313,
1321 (11th Cir. 2015) (characterizing the most common type of
shotgun pleading as “a complaint containing multiple counts
where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding
counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came
before and the last count to be a combination of the entire
complaint”).
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In addition, the Amended Complaint contains ambiguous
and long-winded factual allegations. The Amended Complaint is
also unclear as to basis of the alleged false arrest. Compare
(Doc. # 6 at ¶ 5) (alleging arrest based on two reasons),
with (Id. at ¶ 12) (alleging arrest based on one reason).
Furthermore, the Court is not bound to accept the Amended
Complaint’s conclusory allegation that “[p]robable cause for
the criminal proceeding against the Plaintiff was absent, as
per Johnson v. City of Pompano Beach, 406 So. 2d 1257 (Fla.
4th DCA 1981).” (Doc. # 6 at ¶ 14) (underlining added).
Although
detailed
Taylor-Williams
factual
must
allegations
allege
sufficient
are
not
facts,
required,
not
mere
conclusionary allegations, in a manner that comports with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds dismissal
appropriate. As such, the Amended Complaint is dismissed
without prejudice and with leave to amend. In so doing, the
Court directs Taylor-Williams’ attention to Rules 8(a) and
10(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., in particular. Taylor-Williams may
file a second amended complaint by May 9, 2016.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
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(1)
Defendant Raymond Rembert’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #
10) is GRANTED to the extent provided herein.
(2)
Plaintiff
Joyce
Taylor-Williams
may
file
a
second
amended complaint by May 9, 2016.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 7th
day of April, 2016.
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