Taylor-Williams v. Rembert
Filing
53
ORDER: Defendant Deputy Raymond Rembert's Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 48 ) is GRANTED insofar as Rembert is entitled to qualified immunity as to Count II. Count I is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendant Deputy Raymond Rembert's Motion in Limine (Doc. # 51 ) is DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Deputy Raymond Rembert as to Count II. Once judgment is entered, the Clerk shall CLOSE this case. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 1/20/2017. (DRW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JOYCE TAYLOR-WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 8:16-cv-87-T-33MAP
RAYMOND REMBERT,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Deputy
Raymond Rembert’s Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. # 48), filed on December 13, 2016. Plaintiff Joyce
Taylor-Williams filed a response in opposition on December
28, 2016. (Doc. # 49). Rembert filed a reply on January 11,
2017. (Doc. # 50). For the reasons that follow, the Court
grants the Motion to the extent that it finds Rembert entitled
to qualified immunity as to Count II and dismisses TaylorWilliams’ state-law claim, Count I. Without opining on the
merits of her state-law claim, the Court notes that Count I
is dismissed without prejudice and therefore Taylor-Williams
may, if she so elects, pursue the claim in state court.
I.
Background
Taylor-Williams and her daughter, a non-party to this
action, were long-time members of the Bible Based Fellowship
Church, located at 4811 Ehrlich Road, Tampa, Florida 33647.
(Doc. # 48-2, Taylor-Williams Depo. at 53:14); (Doc. # 48-3
at 2). Taylor-Williams’ daughter at some unspecified point
filed suit against a pastor of the Church, alleging sexual
assault and breach of fiduciary duty. (Doc. # 48-3 at 1). As
a
result,
both
Taylor-Williams
and
her
daughter
were
excommunicated from the Church. (Id.). And so began the
sequence of events leading up to this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 falsearrest and state-law malicious prosecution lawsuit.
On March 3, 2012, Taylor-Williams was removed from the
Church’s property, issued a verbal trespass warning by a nonparty officer, and told she was no longer welcome on the
Church’s property. (Doc. # 48-2, Taylor-Williams Depo. at
39:3-40:7, 43:11-44:13); (Doc. # 48-1 at 4). Shortly after
she was issued a trespass warning, Taylor-Williams called the
cellphone of the Church’s pastor and left a voicemail message
in which she “use[d] profanity and t[old] the victim that he
should get his grandchildren ready because they would not be
able to see him soon. The voice recording went on to call the
victim a ‘whore’ and indicated the victim would be going to
2
jail very soon.” (Doc. # 48-5 at 7). As a result, a deputy
with
the
Hillsborough
County
Sheriff
spoke
with
Taylor-
Williams on March 7, 2012, to advise her to stop calling the
pastor and to confirm that she understood the parameters of
the
previously-issued
trespass
warning;
Taylor-Williams
confirmed she understood. (Id.). In spite of the trespass
warning, Taylor-Williams returned to the Church on March 18,
2012,
whereupon
she
was
arrested
and
charged
with
trespassing. (Doc. # 48-2, Taylor-Williams Depo. at 45:1723, 49:3-4); (Doc. # 48-6). Taylor-Williams was released on
her own recognizance the same day. (Doc. # 48-2, TaylorWilliams Depo. at 49:5-9).
A week later, on March 25, 2012, Taylor-Williams drove
with her daughter to 4809 Ehrlich Road, which was the office
building of a certified public accountant, to protest against
her excommunication. (Id. at 49:10-24, 52:8-12, 53:11-13).
Taylor-Williams and her daughter parked in the accountant’s
lot, unloaded some of the homemade signs they had brought
with them, and, standing on either the accountant’s driveway
or Ehrlich road, began to protest their excommunication from
the
Church.
(Id.
at
50:12-16,
52:24-53:1,
56:18-56:24).
During the protest, Taylor-Williams and her daughter only
held the signs, they did not place any signs in the ground.
3
(Id. at 56:25-57:10). Taylor-Williams testified during her
deposition that she was not on the Church’s property at any
point on March 25, 2012. (Id. at 59:15-17). Taylor-Williams’
daughter also submitted sworn testimony via an affidavit that
her mother was not on the Church’s property that day. (Doc.
# 49-1 at ¶ 3).
Rembert and two Church officials, however, contend they
saw Taylor-Williams on the Church’s property. (Doc. # 48-8 at
12-14).
More
specifically,
Rembert
testified
during
his
deposition that he received a call over his Church-issued
radio from David Weaver Rogers, an officer with the Tampa
Police Department who provided security for inside the Church
and who was also a Church official, and Raymond Allmond, the
Church’s property manager (both non-parties to this action)
that he was needed because Taylor-Williams was back on the
Church’s property. (Doc. # 48-9, Rembert Depo. at 8:24-9:9,
10:11-25, 16:5-14, 21:4-10, 44:1-9). Rembert also testified
during his deposition that he “observed Dr. Williams on the
property with her daughter . . . setting up protests with
signs . . . [and t]he owners of the [C]hurch c[ame] out and
sa[id] she’s back on the property, she’s been trespassed, we
want her off the property.” (Id. at 15:20-16:14). Moreover,
Rembert testified he saw Taylor-Williams’ signs in the ground
4
on the Church’s property. (Id. at 12:19-21). Furthermore,
Rembert knew Taylor-Williams had been previously warned and
arrested for trespassing on the Church’s property. (Id. at
45:9-12, 46:1-8, 22-24).
Allmond’s
deposition
testimony
is
somewhat
more
equivocal as to who made the radio transmission, though.
Allmond first states it was Rogers who radioed that TaylorWilliams was back on the Church’s property but, upon further
questioning, Allmond stated he “can’t remember which one of
the guys, whether it was [the] Deputy or Weaver [who]. . .,”
made the radio transmission. (Doc. # 48-10, Allmond Depo. at
11:8-12, 16:2-21).
In any event, Rembert responded to where Taylor-Williams
was located. (Doc. # 48-9, Rembert Depo. at 10:14-16). When
Taylor-Williams insisted she was not trespassing and refused
to leave, Rembert arrested Taylor-Williams for trespass after
warning; she was arrested on March 25, 2012, and was not
released from custody for 19 days. (Doc. # 48-2, TaylorWilliams Depo. at 58:18-62:16, 63:23-25, 67:1-2); (Doc. # 488). After her release, Taylor-Williams again attempted to
return to the Church on May 6, 2013, and May 10, 2013. (Doc.
# 48-2, Taylor-Williams Depo. at 73:9-18).
5
Taylor-Williams initiated this action on January 13,
2016, by filing her Complaint while proceeding pro se. (Doc.
# 1). Taylor-Williams subsequently obtained counsel and filed
her Second Amended Complaint on May 6, 2016. (Doc. ## 12,
31). The Second Amended Complaint asserts a state-law claim
for malicious prosecution against Rembert in his individual
capacity (Count I) and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for false
arrest against Rembert in his individual capacity (Count II).
Rembert now moves for summary judgment on the basis of
qualified
immunity.
(Doc.
#
48).
Taylor-Williams
has
responded in opposition and Rembert has replied. (Doc. ## 49,
50). The Motion is ripe for review.
II.
Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to
defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude
a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
6
party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742
(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if
it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.
1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing
the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are
no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at
trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256,
1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has discharged
its burden, the non-moving party must then ‘go beyond the
pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories,
and
admissions
on
file,’
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590,
593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations
or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to
be true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla.,
344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact
finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one
7
inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a
genuine issue of material fact, the court should not grant
summary judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta,
846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Augusta Iron &
Steel Works, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856
(11th Cir. 1988)).
consists
of
conclusional
However,
nothing
if
“more
allegations,”
the
than
summary
non-movant’s
a
repetition
judgment
is
response
of
not
his
only
proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034
(11th Cir. 1981).
III. Analysis
Before continuing, the Court notes that Rembert asserts
arguments as to both his individual and official capacities
because, according to him, “it is unclear if Plaintiff had
intended to attack Deputy Rembert in his OFFICIAL CAPACITY.”
(Doc. # 48 at 15). The Court disagrees that the Second Amended
Complaint is unclear as to the capacity in which Rembert is
being sued. Count II is styled 42 U.S.C. § 1983 False Arrest
against Defendant Rembert in his own Individual & Personal
Capacity. (Doc. # 31 at 5). The substantive allegations
contained within Count II make it apparent that TaylorWilliams is seeking to impose liability against Rembert in
his individual capacity. (Id. at 6-7). Accordingly, the Court
8
only
addresses
arguments
directed
at
individual-capacity
liability.
A.
Claim Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
“A government official who is sued under § 1983 may seek
summary
judgment
on
the
ground
that
he
is
entitled
to
qualified immunity.” Crosby v. Monroe Cty., 394 F.3d 1328,
1332 (11th Cir. 2004). Rembert seeks qualified immunity in
this case.
“Qualified
immunity
affords
complete
protection
to
government officials sued individually,” Terrell v. Smith,
668 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2012), except in cases where
“the law preexisting the defendant official’s supposedly
wrongful act was already established to such a high degree
that every objectively reasonable official standing in the
defendant’s place would be on notice that what the defendant
official
was
doing
would
be
clearly
unlawful
given
the
circumstances.” Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1282 (11th
Cir. 2002). Qualified immunity “protect[s] from suit ‘all but
the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the
federal law.’” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.
2002) (quoting Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1187
(11th Cir. 2001)).
9
“[T]he
official
must
first
establish
that
he
was
performing a ‘discretionary function’ at the time the alleged
violation of federal law occurred.” Crosby, 394 F.3d at 1332
(citation omitted). “To determine whether an official was
engaged in a discretionary function, [a court] consider[s]
whether the acts the official undertook ‘are of the type that
fell
within
the
employee’s
job
responsibilities.’”
Id.
(quoting Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252,
1265 (11th Cir. 2004)). In this case, the parties do not
dispute
whether
Rembert
was
performing
a
discretionary
function at the time of the alleged violation. Further, the
Court’s
independent
research
shows
that
Rembert
was
performing a discretionary function. See, e.g., Zivojinovich
v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1071 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that
“the deputies were lawfully executing their legal duty by
informing [plaintiff] he was no longer allowed to be on the
Ritz’s property, escorting him out, and giving him a trespass
warning”).
The Court follows a two-part analysis in determining
whether qualified immunity applies. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311
F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). The first part asks “whether
[the]
plaintiff’s
allegations,
if
true,
establish
a
constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536
10
U.S. 730, 736 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alteration in original). The second part asks “whether the
right was clearly established.” Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts have discretion to decide the order in which to address
the two parts. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Nevertheless, “[b]oth elements . . . must be satisfied for an
official to lose qualified immunity.” Grider v. City of
Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010).
1.
Constitutional-Violation Analysis
Taylor-Williams “must establish qualified immunity is
not appropriate because the facts when viewed in the light
most
favorable
to
[her]
show
that
[Rembert]
violated
a
constitutional right.” Benson v. Gordon Cty., 479 Fed. Appx.
315, 317 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Mercado v. City of Orlando,
407 F.3d 1152, 1156 (11th Cir. 2005)). “At summary judgment,
[the Court] cannot simply accept the officer’s subjective
version of events, but rather must reconstruct the event in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and determine
whether the officer’s [conduct was unconstitutional] . . .
under those circumstances.” Fils v. City of Aventura, 647
F.3d 1272, 1288 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Vinyard, 311 F.3d at
1347-48 as “evaluating, at summary judgment, the allegedly
11
excessive force under the facts as described by the plaintiff,
notwithstanding the defendant-officer’s different version of
events”).
Taylor-Williams’ claim against Rembert is one for false
arrest. (Doc. # 31 at ¶¶ 17-20). A claim for false arrest may
not lie in the presence of probable cause. See Rankin v.
Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating probable
cause is “an absolute bar” to a § 1983 claim alleging false
arrest).
“Probable
cause
exists
if
‘the
facts
and
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, of which he or
she has reasonable trustworthy information, would cause a
prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown,
that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense.’” Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d
1552, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Von Stein v. Brescher,
904 F.2d 572, 578 (11th Cir. 1990)).
In conducting the qualified immunity analysis, “the
issue is not whether probable cause existed in fact, but
whether the officer had ‘arguable’ probable cause to arrest.”
Id. at 1558 (citing Moore v. Gwinnett Cty., 967 F.2d 1495,
1497 (11th Cir. 1992)). In other words, qualified immunity
applies if “a reasonable officer ‘could have believed that
probable cause existed.’” Id. (quoting Moore, 967 F.2d at
12
1497). “Arguable probable cause does not require an arresting
officer to prove every element of a crime . . ., [because to
require so] would negate the concept of probable cause and
transform arresting officers into prosecutors.” Lee, 284 F.3d
at 1195 (quoting Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1302-03
(11th Cir. 2001)). Notably, arguable probable cause for an
arrest is “a more lenient standard than probable cause.”
Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir. 2002).
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit has “recognized that an
officer should not be held personally liable where the officer
reasonably, but mistakenly, concludes that probable cause is
present.” Kinzy v. Warren, 633 Fed. Appx. 705, 707 (11th Cir.
2013) (citing Grider, 618 F.3d at 1257).
Taylor-Williams bears “the burden of demonstrating the
absence of probable cause in order to succeed in [her] § 1983
claim.” Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1436 (citing Evans v. Hightower,
117 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1997)). However, she has failed
to do so. To begin with, the Court notes any argument related
to whether the accountant asked for or wanted Taylor-Williams
removed from 4809 Ehrlich Road is not material to her arrest
for trespass after warning with respect to 4811 Ehrlich Road.
Turning to the arrest that forms the predicate for her
false-arrest claim, Taylor-Williams first relies upon the
13
affidavit of her daughter to show she was not in fact on the
property. (Doc. # 49 at ¶ 8). The affidavit does state, “[w]e
never stepped a single foot on the Church’s property.” (Doc.
49-1 at ¶ 3); see also (Doc. # Doc. # 48-2, Taylor-Williams
Depo. at 59: 15-17). The issue at hand, however, is not
whether Taylor-Williams in fact committed the offense of
trespass after warning; rather, the issue is whether Rembert
had arguable probable cause to arrest Taylor-Williams for
that offense. Post, 7 F.3d at 1558 (“the issue is not whether
probable cause existed in fact, but whether the officer had
‘arguable’ probable cause to arrest”) (citation omitted); see
also Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195 (“Arguable probable cause does not
require an arresting officer to prove every element of a crime
. . ., [because to require so] would negate the concept of
probable
cause
and
transform
arresting
officers
into
prosecutors.”). Furthermore, that the parties dispute whether
Taylor-Williams
was
on
the
Church’s
property
is
not
sufficient to preclude the grant of qualified immunity at the
summary judgment stage. Wate v. Kubler, 839 F.3d 1012, 1019
(11th Cir. 2016) (“we consider the record in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, eliminating all issues of fact.
‘“By approaching the record in this way, the court has the
plaintiff’s best case before it. . . . [M]aterial issues of
14
disputed fact are not a factor in the court’s analysis of
qualified immunity and cannot foreclose the grant or denial
of
summary
judgment
based
on
qualified
immunity[.]”’”
(quoting Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 848 (11th Cir.
2010))).
In addition, Taylor-Williams argues the Church directed
Rembert
to
arrest
Taylor-Williams
in
furtherance
of
a
“premeditated plan.” (Doc. # 49 at ¶ 10). While the portion
of Allmond’s deposition transcript cited by Taylor-Williams
supports the contention that Church officials wanted TaylorWilliams arrested if she returned to the Church, it does not
support a reasonable inference that Allmond or Rogers lied
about Taylor-Williams being on the Church’s property. (Doc.
#
48-10,
Allmond
Depo.
at
34:23-37:22).
Moreover,
even
assuming arguendo that Allmond’s testimony could support an
inference that Allmond and Rogers lied to Rembert about seeing
Taylor-Williams on the Church’s property, Allmond’s testimony
does not support an inference that Rembert knew of such
falsifications. See (Id.).
What the record does show is that 4811 Ehrlich Road and
4809 Ehrlich Road are adjacent properties separated by a line
of trees, but the space between the two properties does not
contain a visible marker identifying where one property ends
15
and the other begins. (Doc. # 48-3 at 9); (Doc. # 49-1 at 4).
And, as required at this stage, see, e.g., Wate, 839 F.3d at
1019, the Court must accept that Taylor-Williams was not in
fact on the Church’s property and that she had not placed any
of her signs in the ground on the Church’s property. (Doc. #
48-2, Taylor-Williams Depo. at 56:25-57:10, 59:15-17).
However, the record also shows that Rembert received a
call over his Church-issued radio from Rogers that he saw
Taylor-Williams once again on the Church’s property. (Doc. #
48-8 at 14); (Doc. # 48-9, Rembert Depo. at 10:8-25, 12:1921, 15:25-16:14, 44:1-9); (Doc. # 48-10, Allmond Depo. at
10:23-11:12, 16:2-21). Taylor-Williams does not cite any
evidence contradicting Rembert’s testimony that a Church
official,
who
had
seen
Taylor-Williams
on
the
Church’s
property, told him as much. The record further reflects that
Rembert knew Taylor-Williams had been previously warned and
arrested for trespassing on the Church’s property. (Doc. #
48-9, Rembert Depo. at 45:9-12, 46:1-8, 22-24).
On this record, the Court finds Joyce v. Crowder, 509
Fed. Appx. 969, 970 (11th Cir. 2013), instructive. In Joyce,
a
group
of
protestors,
and
deputies
from
the
relevant
sheriff’s office, stood along the east side of a publiclyowned canal. Joyce, 509 Fed. Appx. at 955. Eleven of the
16
protestors swam across the canal to its west side and a deputy
was dispatched to the west side of the canal to monitor the
situation. Id. at 955-56. On the west side of the canal, which
was privately-owned land, there was a grassy area with a
heavily wooded area just a few feet behind it. Id. at 956.
The privately-owned land was not demarcated by signs, posts,
or fencing that were visible by the deputies on the east side
of the canal. Id.
The eleven protestors eventually entered the brush,
which obstructed the deputies’ view of them. Id. Around the
same time, the west-side deputy began to trek through the
wooded area and had to cross over a barbed wire fence to enter
upon the privately-held land; while on the privately-held
land, the west-side deputy saw “multiple individuals walking
around.” Id. The west-side deputy then radioed to the deputies
on the east side of the canal and stated that the eleven
protestors were on the west side of the fence, i.e., on the
privately-held land. Id. When the protestors swam back to the
east side of the canal, they were arrested for trespass and,
thereafter, brought a § 1983 claim against the arresting
officers. Id.
At summary judgment, the arresting officers argued they
were entitled to qualified immunity because they had arguable
17
probable cause to arrest the protestors for trespassing. Id.
The district court denied qualified immunity on the grounds
that “regardless of what Sergeant Cunningham[, i.e., the
west-side deputy,] told them, the arresting officers lacked
arguable probable cause . . . because they did not personally
see any fence or postings from the east side of the canal .
. . . Id. at 957. The arresting officers appealed. Id. at
958.
The Eleventh Circuit noted that, “if Sergeant Cunningham
told the arresting officers that he had seen the plaintiffs
on the private property side of . . . [the] fence, the
arresting officers would not have lacked arguable probable
cause . . . simply because they could not see the fence
through the brush on the west side of the canal.” Id. at 959.
The court also went on to note that, while there was a genuine
issue of material fact about whether the eleven protestors
crossed the fence, the protestors-turned-plaintiffs had not
introduced evidence disputing that the west-side deputy told
the arresting officers he saw them on the private-property
side of the fence. Id. at 960. Because “[n]o one dispute[d]
that the arresting officers were told that,” such a fact
“establishe[d]
at
least
arguable
probable
cause
for
the
arresting officers . . . .” Id. Accordingly, the Eleventh
18
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded
with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the arresting
officers. Id.
Similarly, in this case, the record shows that the
arresting officer was told the arrestee was seen on private
property. That is, Rogers told Rembert that he saw TaylorWilliams on the Church’s property. (Doc. # 48-8 at 14); (Doc.
# 48-9, Rembert Depo. at 10:8-25, 12:19-21, 15:25-16:14,
44:1-9). Although Taylor-Williams states she was not in fact
on the property, she, like the plaintiffs in Joyce, failed to
introduce
evidence
disputing
that
Rembert
was
told
the
arrestee had been seen on Church property. Additionally,
Rembert testified he saw Taylor-Williams on what he thought
was the Church’s property. (Doc. # 48-9, Rembert Depo. at
15:20-16:14).
Accordingly,
given
the
proximity
of
the
properties, the fact that Rogers told Rembert he saw TaylorWilliams back on Church property, the fact that Rembert
himself saw Taylor-Williams standing on what he thought was
Church Property, and the fact that Rembert knew TaylorWilliams had been previously issued a trespass warning, the
Court concludes Rembert had arguable probable cause to arrest
Taylor-Williams for trespassing after warning. Therefore,
Rembert is entitled to qualified immunity.
19
2.
Clearly-Established Analysis
Assuming for the sake of argument that Taylor-Williams
established the lack of arguable probable cause, she would
still need to satisfy the clearly-established prong of the
analysis. Under this prong, Taylor-Williams “must also show
that the right involved was clearly established at the time
of the putative misconduct.” Benson, 479 Fed. Appx. at 317
(quoting Terrell, 668 F.3d at 1250) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The violation of a constitutional right is clearly
established if a reasonable official would understand that
his conduct violates that right.” Bussey-Morice v. Gomez, 587
Fed. Appx. 621, 627 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Coffin v.
Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
“‘[T]he salient question . . . is whether the state of the
law’ at the time of an incident provided ‘fair warning’ to
the
defendants
‘that
their
alleged
[conduct]
was
unconstitutional.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866
(2014)
(quoting
original).
Hope,
“[T]he
536
U.S.
touchstone
at
of
741)
(alterations
qualified
immunity
in
is
notice.” Bussey-Morice, 587 Fed. Appx. at 627 (citing Holmes
v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1078 (11th Cir. 2003)).
The
Eleventh
determining
Circuit
whether
the
has
right
20
outlined
in
two
question
methods
was
for
clearly
established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Fils, 647
F.3d at 1291. Under the first, “decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, and the highest court of the pertinent state
(here, the Supreme Court of Florida) can clearly establish
the law.” McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir.
2007) (citing Marsh v. Butler Cty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1032
n.10 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc)).
Under the first method, the Court looks at the relevant
case law at the time of the violation; the right in question
is
“clearly
established
if
‘a
concrete
factual
context
[exists] so as to make it obvious to a reasonable government
actor that his actions violate federal law.’” Fils, 647 F.3d
at 1291 (quoting Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1333
(11th Cir. 2008)) (alteration in original). The cases need
not be “materially similar” to the officer’s conduct. Id.
“But, where the law is stated in broad propositions, ‘a very
high
degree
of
prior
factual
particularity
may
be
necessary.’” Id. (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 740-41).
The second method, termed the obvious-clarity method,
“involves
evaluating
the
officer’s
conduct
and
deciding
whether the officer’s conduct lies so obviously at the very
core
of
what
the
Fourth
Amendment
21
prohibits
that
the
unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to [the
officer], notwithstanding the law of fact-specific case law
on point.” Bussey-Morice, 587 Fed. Appx. at 627 (quoting Fils,
647 F.3d at 1291) (alteration in original) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). This method “recognizes
that
although
concrete
facts
are
typically
necessary
to
provide an officer with notice of ‘the hazy border between
[constitutional and unconstitutional actions] . . .,’ when an
officer’s conduct is ‘so outrageous that it clearly goes “so
far
beyond”
these
borders,
qualified
immunity
will
not
protect him . . . .’” Id. (quoting Fils, 647 F.3d at 129192).
The obvious-clarity method “offers a narrow exception to
the general rule that only case law and specific factual
scenarios can clearly establish a constitutional violation,”
however, it “is a difficult one to meet.” Id. at 627-28.
Nevertheless,
“qualified
immunity
will
be
denied
if
the
preexisting law ‘[made] it obvious that the defendant’s acts
violated
the
plaintiff’s
rights
in
the
specific
set
of
circumstances at issue.’” Montero v. Nandlal, 597 Fed. Appx.
1021, 1026 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Youmans v. Gagnon, 626
F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010)).
22
Taylor-Williams defines the “clearly established law” as
“prohibit[ing the] . . . falsif[ication of] allegations,
evidence, witnesses and witness statements . . . to achieve
a spontaneous, considered, or pre-mediated arrest . . . .”
(Doc. # 49 at ¶ 14). And, she attempts to carry her burden
under the clearly-established prong by relying on a case from
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. That alone is sufficient
reason to find that Taylor-Williams has failed to carry her
burden because, in determining whether the law was clearly
established,
Eleventh
only
Circuit,
decisions
and
the
of
the
Supreme
Supreme
Court
of
Court,
the
Florida
are
relevant, at least for a district court sitting in the
Eleventh Circuit. McClish, 483 F.3d at 1237. Furthermore,
Taylor-Williams makes no argument under the obvious-clarity
method and the Court cannot do so for her. See Lampkin-Asam
v. Volusia Cty. Sch. Bd., 261 Fed. Appx. 274, 277 (11th Cir.
2008) (noting a district court may not “act as counsel for a
party”) (citations omitted).
But, even if the Court were to assume that preexisting
law made it obvious that Rembert’s acts violated TaylorWilliams’ rights under the specific set of circumstances in
this case, Rembert would still be entitled to qualified
immunity
because
Taylor-Williams
23
failed
to
show
a
constitutional violation, i.e., the lack of arguable probable
cause.
Grider,
618
F.3d
at
1254.
Therefore,
Rembert
is
entitled to qualified immunity as to Count II.
B.
State-Law Claim
Having
found
that
Rembert
is
entitled
to
qualified
immunity on Count II, the Court, in its discretion, declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law
claim,
Count
I.
See
28
U.S.C.
§
1367(c)(3).
Accordingly, Count I is dismissed without prejudice. See
Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246, 1255 n.8 (11th Cir. 2005)
(citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726 (1966) (stating, “[c]ertainly, if the federal claims are
dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be
dismissed as well”); Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d
1086, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating, “[t]he decision to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state claims
rests within the discretion of the district court. We have
encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state
claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed
prior to trial.”)). “Because . . . Plaintiff[’s] federal
claim[] [did not] survive summary judgment, the remaining
state law claim[] . . . will be dismissed without prejudice
so that Plaintiff[] may, if [she] choose[s], pursue [it] in
24
state court.” Borsella v. Parker, No. 6:11-cv-1249-Orl-28GJK,
2013 WL 375480, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2013).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)
Defendant Deputy Raymond Rembert’s Dispositive Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 48) is GRANTED insofar as
Rembert is entitled to qualified immunity as to Count
II.
(2)
Count I is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
(3)
Defendant Deputy Raymond Rembert’s Motion in Limine
(Doc. # 51) is DENIED AS MOOT.
(4)
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of
Defendant Deputy Raymond Rembert as to Count II.
(5)
Once judgment is entered, the Clerk shall CLOSE this
case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
20th day of January, 2017.
25
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?