Taylor-Williams v. Rembert

Filing 59

ORDER: Plaintiff Joyce Taylor-Williams's "Motion for Reconsideration of Defendant's Ruling/Order in Favor of Summary Judgment" (Doc. # 55 ) is DENIED. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 1/30/2017. (DRW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JOYCE TAYLOR-WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:16-cv-87-T-33MAP

RAYMOND REMBERT,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Joyce
Taylor-Williams’s “Motion for Reconsideration of Defendant’s
Ruling/Order in Favor of Summary Judgment” (Doc. # 55), which
was filed on January 25, 2017. Defendant Deputy Raymond
Rembert filed a response in opposition on January 27, 2017.
(Doc. # 56). For the reasons below, the Court denies the
Motion.
I.

Background
The Court provided an in-depth review of the facts of

this

case

in

its

January

20,

2017,

Order

and

need

not

reiterate those facts now. Suffice it to say that TaylorWilliams was arrested for trespass after warning on March 25,
2012, while she protested her excommunication from the Bible
Based Fellowship Church. Taylor-Williams subsequently brought

suit against Rembert, the arresting officer, under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for false arrest. At summary judgment, Rembert asserted
qualified

immunity.

After

the

parties

submitted

their

respective briefing, the Court found Rembert entitled to
qualified immunity on the basis that he had arguable probable
cause to arrest Taylor-Williams for trespass after warning.
The Court accordingly granted summary judgment in favor of
Rembert as to the false-arrest claim and dismissed TaylorWilliams’s related state-law claim without prejudice. TaylorWilliams now moves for reconsideration.
II.

Standard
Because Taylor-Williams does not identify the Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure under which she presently moves for
reconsideration, the Court must determine, as a preliminary
matter, what Rule governs. In determining what Rule a motion
falls under, a court looks at the relief requested, not the
labels the movant places on it. See Wright v. Preferred
Research, Inc., 891 F.2d 886, 889 (11th Cir. 1990). When a
motion for reconsideration is filed within 28 days of the
Court’s Order, Rule 59 applies. Beach Terrace Condo. Ass’n,
Inc. v. Goldring Inves., No. 8:15-cv-1117-T-33TBM, 2015 WL
4548721, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2015); Murphree v. Colvin,
No. CV–12–BE–1888–M, 2015 WL 631185, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Feb.

2 

15, 2013) (“‘Rule 59 applies to motions for reconsideration
of matters encompassed in a decision on the merits of a
dispute,’ such as orders on motions for summary judgment.”)
(citations omitted). Thus, contrary to Rembert’s position
that Rule 60(b) governs, Rule 59 governs the pending Motion
as it was filed within 28 days of the Court’s Order.
“The only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are
newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.”
Anderson v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 567 Fed. Appx. 679,
680 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335,
1343

(11th

omitted).

Cir.

2007))

Granting

extraordinary

remedy

(quotation

relief
to

under

be

marks
Rule

employed

and

alterations

59(e)

sparingly

is

“an

in

the

interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial
resources.” United States v. DeRochemont, No. 8:10-cr-287-T24MAP, 2012 WL 13510, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2012) (citation
omitted). Furthermore, “a Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used]
to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence
that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”
Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d
757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).

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III. Analysis
Without expressly saying as much, the thrust of TaylorWilliams’s Motion is the Court misapplied the controlling
standard of law by ignoring material issues of genuine fact.
The Court’s January 20, 2017, Order does provide a lengthy
discussion

of

the

general

standard

that

governs

summary

judgment. (Doc. # 53 at 6-8). The Court did not stop there,
however. In its analysis, the Court applied the specific
standard applicable to an assertion of qualified immunity in
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case. (Id. at 9-24). In particular, the
Court noted that a court “consider[s] the record in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, eliminating all issues of
fact,” which means that “[m]aterial issues of disputed fact
are not a factor in the court’s analysis of qualified immunity
and cannot foreclose the grant or denial of summary judgment
based on qualified immunity.” (Doc. # 53 at 14-15 (quoting
Wate v. Kubler, 839 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2016)).
A review of the Court’s analysis demonstrates that the
Court

analyzed

whether

qualified

immunity

applied

given

Taylor-Williams’s best case. See, e.g., (Id. at 16) (stating,
“And, as required at this stage, see, e.g., Wate, 839 F.3d at
1019, the Court must accept that Taylor-Williams was not in
fact on the Church’s property and that she had not placed any

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of her signs in the grounds on the Church’s property.). The
Court also noted that “[t]he issue at hand, however, [wa]s
not whether Taylor-Williams in fact committed the offense .
. .; rather, the issue [wa]s whether Rembert had arguable
probable cause . . . .” (Id. at 14) (citations omitted). After
providing a thorough examination of the record, the Court
concluded

Rembert

had

arguable

probable

cause

to

arrest

Taylor-Williams for trespass after warning based on several
factors: the proximity of the two properties, that Rembert
knew Taylor-Williams had been previously issued a trespass
warning, and, most importantly, Rembert testified he received
a transmission over his radio that a Church official had seen
Taylor-Williams

back

on

Church

property—something

which

Taylor-Williams failed to contradict with her own evidence.
(Id. at 13-19).
In sum, the Court finds Taylor-Williams’s argument that
the

Court

misapplied

unpersuasive.

The

the

Court

controlling

now

turns

to

standard

of

law

Taylor-Williams’s

reliance on evidence she failed to submit for consideration
when responding to Rembert’s motion for summary judgment.
When Taylor-Williams responded to Rembert’s motion for
summary

judgment,

she

attached

excerpts

of

David

Weaver

Rogers’s deposition transcript. (Doc. # 49-2). In total, only

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seven pages of Rogers’s deposition transcript were filed.
(Id.) (providing pages 1, 7, and 17-21 of Rogers’s deposition
transcript). Now, after the Court ruled on summary judgment,
Taylor-Williams attempts to rely on portions of Rogers’s
deposition that she did not cite, let alone provide to the
Court. (Doc. # 55 at 2) (quoting Rogers Depo. at 15:14-16:23);
(Id. at 5) (quoting Rogers Depo. at 13:21-14:3). But, TaylorWilliams cannot use a Rule 59(e) motion to belatedly submit
evidence for review. Michael Linet, 408 F.3d at 763.
Taylor-Williams’s

other

arguments

merely

rehash

arguments the Court addressed in its January 20, 2017, Order.
The Court found those arguments unpersuasive then and sees no
reason to readdress those arguments now or retreat from its
prior conclusion. Also, “a Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used]
to relitigate old matters . . . .” Id.
As before, Taylor-Williams failed to submit evidence
contradicting

the

fact

that

Rembert

received

a

radio

transmission informing him that Taylor-Williams was back on
Church property. Therefore, Taylor-Williams failed to carry
her burden of demonstrating a lack of arguable probable cause.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

6 

Plaintiff
Reconsideration

Joyce
of

Taylor-Williams’s

Defendant’s

Ruling/Order

“Motion
in

Favor

for
of

Summary Judgment” (Doc. # 55) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
30th day of January, 2017.

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