MB REO-FL Church-2, LLC v. Tampa For Christ Church, Inc. et al

Filing 106

ORDER: Pro se Defendant Frank M. Bafford's Motions to Dismiss (Doc. ## 94 , 100 ) are denied. See Order for details. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 9/16/2016. (DRW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MB REO-FL CHURCH-2, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:16-cv-276-T-33AEP

TAMPA FOR CHRIST CHURCH, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on consideration of
pro se Defendant Frank M. Bafford’s Motions to Dismiss (Doc.
## 94, 100), filed on August 16, 2016, and August 26, 2016,
respectively. Plaintiff MB Reo-FL Church-2, LLC filed its
responses in opposition on September 8, 2016, and September
12, 2016, respectively. (Doc. ## 102, 104). For the reasons
that follow, the Motions are denied.
Discussion
Following an unsuccessful attempt at purchasing property
from MB Reo, Bafford filed two documents in the land records
of Hillsborough County, seeking to “inform[] all interested
parties

that

there’s

a

pending

housing

discrimination

complaint . . . seeking a determination of his rights” to the

1 

properties listed by MB Reo. (Doc. ## 1-14, 1-15). MB Reo
thereafter

instituted

this

action

on

February

4,

2016,

seeking to quiet title, damages for slander of title, and
declaratory judgment. (Doc. # 1).
Bafford responded by filing a motion to dismiss or,
alternatively,
investigation

to
by

stay
the

pending

Department

the
of

outcome

Housing

and

of

an

Urban

Development. (Doc. # 9). After being briefed on the motion,
the Court denied Bafford’s motion in its entirety at the Case
Management Hearing held on March 21, 2016. (Doc. # 20).
Bafford subsequently filed a handful of other motions, an
answer, and a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. ## 24, 26,
28, 30, 31, 35). Except for granting extensions of time for
Bafford and Tampa for Christ Church to retain counsel, the
Court denied each motion. (Doc. ## 25, 27, 29, 36, 49).
Thereafter, Bafford filed another motion to dismiss on
July 20, 2016. (Doc. # 80). In that motion, Bafford sought to
have the action dismissed or stayed pending the outcome of
the

administrative

proceedings

vis-à-vis

his

housing

discrimination complaint. The Court denied the motion on
August 12, 2016, noting that “[m]ost of Bafford’s arguments
are repetitive and, as to those that are new, Bafford has not
demonstrated they were unavailable at the time he originally

2 

moved the Court for the relief he again seeks.” (Doc. # 92 at
2-3) (citation omitted).
Four days later, on August 16, 2016, Bafford filed
another motion to dismiss, which was followed by still another
motion to dismiss on August 26, 2016. (Doc. ## 94, 100). These
motions, however, suffer from the same defect as Bafford’s
July 20, 2016, motion to dismiss. Namely, the arguments
asserted are either repetitive or the requisite showing for
why the argument was not advanced in Bafford’s first-filed
motion to dismiss was not made. See Continental Motors, Inc.
v. Jewell Aircraft, Inc., No. 12-0221-WS-C, 2013 WL 5530842,
at *9 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2013) (declining to revisit arguments
previously addressed and stating “insofar as [defendant] may
renew its motion . . . in the future, such a motion will be
summarily

denied

absent

an

affirmative

showing

that

the

grounds for relief specified therein were unavailable at the
time of its original motion . . .”).
Furthermore, the Court notes that Bafford has already
filed an Answer in this case (both when he was pro se and
when he was represented by counsel). (Doc. ## 30, 48).
Accordingly, to the extent Bafford’s motions are premised on
Rule 12, Fed. R. Civ. P., they are untimely. See Fed. R. Civ.

3 

P. 12(b) (“A motion asserting any of these defenses must be
made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.”).
Further, Bafford’s argument that MB Reo perpetrated a
fraud on the Court is also unpersuasive. Bafford argues
counsel

for

MB

Reo

was

aware

of

a

pending

housing

discrimination complaint at the time the Court held its Case
Management Hearing, but argued to the Court she did not know
of such complaint. Bafford, however, failed to supply the
Court with any supporting documentation or transcript that
would substantiate his claims of fraud.
In addition, Bafford’s argument as to whether MB Reo has
Article III standing is equally unpersuasive. Bafford argues
there is no longer a live controversy because “he no longer
need[s] [MB Reo’s] property and that he would dismiss his
case before HUD and [MB Reo] can dismiss this case . . . .”
(Doc. # 100 at 2). But, MB Reo indicates in its response that
it still seeks a remedy for the alleged maligning of its
reputation and still seeks a judgment in its favor. Thus, it
appears to the Court that a live controversy remains between
the parties at this juncture.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

4 

Pro se Defendant Frank M. Bafford’s Motions to Dismiss
(Doc. ## 94, 100) are DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
16th day of September, 2016.

5