MB REO-FL Church-2, LLC v. Tampa For Christ Church, Inc. et al

Filing 165

ORDER: Plaintiff MB Reo-FL Church-2, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment and Declaratory Relief (Doc. # 107 ) GRANTED. MB Reo is directed to file a supplement, supported by competent evidence, by August 14, 2017, wherein MB Reo calculates its current damages and costs. MB Reo is further directed to move without delay in filing a motion for default judgment against Tampa for Christ Church. The motion should be filed no later than August 14, 2017. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 7/31/2017. (DRW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MB REO-FL CHURCH-2, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:16-cv-276-T-33MAP

TAMPA FOR CHRIST CHURCH, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court in consideration of
Plaintiff
Judgment
September

MB
and

Reo-FL

Church-2,

Declaratory

16,

2016.

Relief

After

two

LLC’s
(Doc.

Motion
#

for

107),

interlocutory

Summary
filed

on

appeals

by

Defendant Frank M. Bafford and several extensions of time,
Bafford’s response in opposition was due by May 29, 2017.
(Doc. # 150). Bafford did not file a response in opposition.
For the reasons below, MB Reo’s Motion is granted.
I.

Background
As noted on the undersigned’s website, “[i]n deciding a

motion for summary judgment, the Court will deem admitted any
fact in the statement of material facts that the opposing
party does not specifically controvert, provided the moving

party’s statement is supported by evidence in the record.”
U.S. Dist. Ct., M.D. Fla., Judicial Info, Tampa Division,
Virginia

M.

Hernandez

Covington,

Civil

Motions,

http://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/judicialInfo/Tampa/JgCovington
.htm. Because Bafford failed to file a response and thereby
failed to specifically controvert the statement of material
facts provided by MB Reo, the Court deems the facts as laid
out in the Motion (Doc. # 107 at 2-10) admitted.
MB Reo owns the commercial property located at 9612 N.
26th Street and 9706 N. 26th Street, Tampa, Florida 33612.
(Doc. # 107-1 at ¶¶ 5, 6). The property was listed for sale
by MB Reo on October 12, 2015, with an asking price of
$799,000. (Id. at ¶ 7).
Over a span of five days, Bafford, on behalf of Defendant
Tampa for Christ Church, Inc., submitted three offers. (Id.
at ¶ 9). The first offer, in the amount of $675,000, was
submitted on October 14, 2015. (Id.). The second and third
offers followed in quick succession, the former for $799,000
on October 19 and the latter for the same amount but deleting
a condition for rezoning. (Id.). All the offers were based on
98%-100% financing. (Id. at ¶ 10). All the offers also
included a pre-approval form from Complex Capital Mortgage &
Finance, Inc., a non-party to this action. (Id.).

2 

MB Reo responded to these offers on November 2, 2015,
and indicated it could not accept an offer based on 98%
financing. (Id. at ¶ 11). Furthermore, MB Reo requested Tampa
for Christ Church provide certain financial information to
enable MB Reo to sufficiently evaluate the third offer. (Id.).
It is the regular practice of MB Reo’s servicer to request
information to prove ability to close a transaction when the
buyer is unknown. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 12). The servicer for MB Reo
requested additional financial information from prospective
buyers 29 times in 2016. (Id. at ¶ 12). Rather than providing
the requested financial information, Defendants told MB Reo
to contact their proposed lender. (Id. at ¶ 13). Because it
normally does not communicate with lenders, MB Reo did not
follow up with the proposed lender. (Id. at ¶ 14).
Then, on November 13, 2015, Bafford submitted a fourth
offer for $803,000. (Id. ¶ 15). At the same time, Bafford
accused MB Reo of racially discriminating against him. (Id.).
MB Reo retained counsel to respond to Bafford’s charge of
racial discrimination. (Id. at ¶ 16). In a letter dated
November 16, 2015, MB Reo’s counsel set forth the reasons
Bafford’s

offers

were

rejected,

as

well

procedures MB Reo followed. (Doc. # 107-5).

3 

as

the

normal

Nevertheless, MB Reo deviated from its usual practice
after it became clear Tampa for Christ Church would not
provide the requested financial information. (Doc. # 107 at
¶ 17). On November 20, 2015, MB Reo indicated it would
consider

selling

the

property

for,

among

other

terms,

$803,000, a due diligence period of 20 days, and no financing
contingency. (Doc. # 107-6). Bafford neither accepted nor
rejected the November 20, 2015, terms. Instead, on November
30, 2015, Bafford sent a series of emails that (1) reiterated
his

charge

of

discrimination,

(2)

asked

for

a

copy

of

contracts from “the other buyers,” and (3) indicated an
attorney representing Bafford would be contacting MB Reo.
(Doc. # 107-7). MB Reo followed up with a letter on December
1,

2015,

which

“emphatically

den[ied]

any

claims

of

discrimination.” (Doc. # 107-8 at 4-6). Counsel for MB Reo
also sent an email on December 2, 2015, stating if MB Reo did
not receive confirmation by December 4, 2015, that Tampa for
Christ Church wished to proceed with the purchase, then MB
Reo would consider Tampa for Christ Church to have withdrawn
its interest in purchasing the property. (Id. at 1).
On December 3, 2015, Bafford responded that Tampa for
Christ Church “unequivocal[ly] . . . wish[ed] to proceed.”
(Doc. # 107-9). The next day, MB Reo sent Bafford a draft

4 

purchase and sale agreement; Bafford had until December 8,
2015, to execute and return the agreement. (Doc. # 107-10).
But, Bafford did not execute the agreement. Rather, Bafford
sent a series of emails between December 7 and December 8,
2015, wherein he made nonspecific objections to the terms of
the

agreement

and

reiterated

his

accusation

of

discrimination. (Doc. # 107-11). MB Reo responded by denying
the charges of racial discrimination again and asking Tampa
for Christ Church to provide its specific objections to the
terms of the agreement by December 11, 2015. (Doc. # 107-12).
Having

received

no

specific

objections,

MB

Reo

ceased

negotiations by letter dated December 11, 2015. (Doc. # 10713).  
Three days later, on December 14, 2015, Bafford filed a
notice titled “Pending Housing Discrimination Complaint with
Ownership Interests” in the Official Records of Hillsborough
County, Florida. (Doc. # 107-14). This notice stated: Bafford
“informs

all

interested

parties

that

there’s

a

pending

housing discrimination complaint concerning the [property] .
. . seeking a determination concerning his rights” thereto.
(Id.). On December 28, 2015, Bafford filed a second document
in the Official Records of Hillsborough County, Florida;
namely, his “Amended Pending Housing Discrimination Complaint

5 

with Ownership Interests.” (Doc. # 107-15). Again, Bafford
sought to “inform[] all interested parties that there[] [was]
a pending housing discrimination complaint concerning the
[property] . . . seeking a determination concerning his
rights” thereto. (Id.). The amended document further stated
that the complaint sought specific performance “of a contract
illegally denied by discrimination.” (Id.). “As a result of
Bafford’s recordings of Notices purporting to encumber the
Property, MB REO has . . . been unable to sell the Property.”
(Doc. # 107-1 at ¶ 30).
On February 4, 2016, MB Reo instituted the pending action
in this Court seeking to quiet title, damages for slander of
title, and a declaratory judgment. (Doc. # 1). Bafford and
Tampa for Christ Church were served on February 11, 2016.
(Doc. ## 5, 6). About a month and a half later, on March 30,
2016, Bafford filed the administrative housing discrimination
complaint he had been alluding to for several months. (Doc.
# 107-17). This litigation proceeded and, upon MB Reo’s
motion, the Court dissolved the lis pendens Bafford had filed
in the Official Records of Hillsborough County, Florida.
(Doc. # 65).
And although counsel filed a notice of appearance on
behalf of Bafford and Tampa for Christ Church, defense counsel

6 

withdrew. (Doc. ## 38, 76). Because Tampa for Christ Church
is a corporation and, per Local Rule 2.03(e), a corporation
may only be heard in this Court through counsel, the Court
directed Tampa for Christ Church to retain counsel. (Doc. #
87). When Tampa for Christ Church failed to retain counsel,
the Court struck its pleadings. (Doc. # 97). Thereafter,
because Tampa for Christ Church was technically in default,
MB Reo applied for entry of Clerk’s default, which was entered
on August 26, 2016. (Doc. ## 98, 99).
MB Reo filed its pending Motion on September 16, 2016.
(Doc. # 107). Much delay then ensued because of Bafford’s
filing of interlocutory appeals and repeated requests for
extensions of time. (Doc. ## 108, 111-113, 115-117, 119, 130,
133, 136, 141, 142, 149, 150). The deadline for Bafford to
file a response in opposition to the Motion was May 29, 2017.
(Doc. # 150).
On May 22, 2017, Bafford filed a motion seeking an
extension of the discovery deadline, which the Court denied
on May 25, 2017. (Doc. ## 149, 150). The Court’s May 25, 2017,
Order reminded Bafford of the due date for his response. (Doc.
# 150). But Bafford failed to timely file a response. Instead,
after the deadline for responding to the motion for summary
judgment had passed, Bafford filed a motion on June 8, 2017,

7 

seeking reconsideration of the Court’s Order that denied his
requested extension of the discovery deadline. (Doc. # 152).
The next day, on June 9, 2017, the Court directed MB Reo
to file a jurisdictional supplement. (Doc. # 151). MB Reo
requested and received an extension of time. (Doc. ## 153,
154).

Before

the

jurisdictional

supplement

became

due,

Bafford filed another interlocutory appeal on June 19, 2017.
(Doc. # 155). The Court therefore deferred ruling on MB Reo’s
motion

for

summary

judgment

and

Bafford’s

motion

for

reconsideration. (Doc. # 158). The Court also stayed and
administratively closed the case pending resolution of the
appeal. (Id.).
The Eleventh Circuit sua sponte dismissed the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction on July 24, 2017. (Doc. # 162). Because
the time for Bafford to respond to the motion for summary
judgment has already passed and Bafford has not filed a
response, nor sought an extension of time do so, the Court
proceeds to disposition.
II.

Legal Standard

The Court “cannot base the entry of summary judgment on
the mere fact that the motion was unopposed, but, rather,
must consider the merits of the motion.” United States v.
5800 SW 74th Avenue, Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th

8 

Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). Further, the Court
“need not sua sponte review all of the evidentiary materials
on file at the time the motion is granted, but [it] must
ensure that the motion itself is supported by evidentiary
materials.” Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to
defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude
a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742
(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if
it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.
1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing
the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are
no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

9 

trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256,
1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has discharged
its burden, the non-moving party must then ‘go beyond the
pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions,
answers

to

interrogatories,

and

admissions

on

file,’

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590,
593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations
or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to
be true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla.,
344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact
finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one
inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a
genuine issue of material fact, the court should not grant
summary judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta,
846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Augusta Iron &
Steel Works, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856
(11th Cir. 1988)).
consists

of

conclusional

However,

nothing

if

“more

allegations,”

than

summary

10 

the

non-movant’s
a

repetition

judgment

is

response
of
not

his
only

proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034
(11th Cir. 1981).
III. Jurisdiction
“Federal courts operate under a continuing obligation to
inquire into the existence of subject matter jurisdiction
whenever it may be lacking.” RES-GA Cobblestone, LLC v. Blake
Const. & Dev., LLC, 718 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2013)
(citing Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1468
(11th Cir. 1997)). “That obligation continues through every
stage of a case, even if no party raises the issue.” Id.
(citing Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726
(2013)).
In reviewing the pending Motion, a question arose as to
the existence of jurisdiction because MB Reo’s jurisdictional
statement — “[t]his Court has both diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and federal question jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331, 12 U.S.C. § 1819 and 28 U.S.C. § 22012202,” (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 2) — suggested MB Reo was basing “the
independent source of jurisdiction,” Goodin v. Fidelity Nat’l
Title Ins. Co., 491 Fed. Appx. 139, 143 (11th Cir. 2012), for
a declaratory judgment action on § 1819. And, as the Court
explained in its June 9, 2017, Order, § 1819 does not provide
a basis for exercising jurisdiction because the FDIC is not

11 

a party in any capacity to this action. (Doc. # 151 at 3).
The Court also found the allegations relating to diversity
jurisdiction insufficient. (Id. at 3-6). Thus, the Court
directed MB Reo to file a jurisdictional supplement. (Id. at
6).
MB Reo timely filed its jurisdictional supplement. (Doc.
# 164). In its supplement, MB Reo states that it “declines to
identify the partners of the limited partnerships in [its]
ownership chain” and MB Reo elected not to substantiate the
claim that the limited liability companies in its chain of
ownership are diverse from Defendants. (Id. at ¶ 1). Given MB
Reo’s refusal to establish diversity of citizenship, the
Court will not base the exercise of jurisdiction upon § 1332.
Further, this Court’s “virtually unflagging obligation
. . . to exercise the jurisdiction given [it],” Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976), and its “obligation to inquire into the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction whenever it may be lacking,” RESGA Cobblestone, 718 F.3d at 1313, do not combine to create a
duty to ferret out the jurisdictional bases for a plaintiff
where the plaintiff’s jurisdictional statement is ambiguous.
Indeed, it is “the party seeking a federal venue [that] must
establish the venue’s jurisdictional requirements,” Lowery v.

12 

Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1207 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis
added), and the Court may not act as counsel for a party, see
Lampkin-Asam v. Volusia Cty. Sch. Bd., 261 Fed. Appx. 274,
277 (11th Cir. 2008).
Although
established,

diversity
MB

Reo

jurisdiction

clarifies

via

has
its

not

been

jurisdictional

supplement that the independent jurisdictional basis for its
declaratory judgment count was asserted under the analytical
framework of Hudson Insurance Company v. American Electric
Corp., 957 F.2d 826, 828 (11th Cir. 1992). (Doc. # 164 at 24). Hudson presents an exception to the well-pled complaint
rule and directs a court to “determine whether or not the
cause

of

action

anticipated

by

the

declaratory

judgment

plaintiff arises under federal law.” Id. at 828. Here, as now
demonstrated by MB Reo, there is sufficient record material
to show the anticipated coercive action by Bafford arises
under federal law. (Doc. # 107-4) (showing that Bafford
accused MB Reo of racial discrimination); (Doc. # 1-6 at 4)
(showing

that

Bafford

asserted

his

belief

he

was

being

discriminated against); (Doc. ## 1-14, 1-15) (showing that
Bafford alleged to have instituted a complaint for housing
discrimination)). Jurisdiction therefore exists under § 1331
and §§ 2201-2202, as interpreted in Hudson. The Court also

13 

has supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. 28
U.S.C. § 1367.
IV.

Analysis
A.

Motion to Reconsider

Before taking his third interlocutory appeal, Bafford
filed a motion requesting that the Court reconsider its May
25,

2017,

Order.

(Doc.

#

152).

Because

the

motion

to

reconsider was filed within 28 days of the Court’s May 25,
2017, Order, Rule 59(e) governs. Beach Terrace Condo. Ass’n,
Inc. v. Goldring Inves., No. 8:15-cv-1117-T-33TBM, 2015 WL
4548721, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2015).
“The only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are
newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.”
Anderson v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 567 Fed. Appx. 679,
680 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335,
1343 (11th Cir. 2007)) (quotation marks omitted). Granting
relief under Rule 59(e) is “an extraordinary remedy to be
employed

sparingly

in

the

interests

of

finality

and

conservation of scarce judicial resources.” United States v.
DeRochemont, No. 8:10-cr-287-T-24MAP, 2012 WL 13510, at *2
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2012) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “a
Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used] to relitigate old matters,
raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised

14 

prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill.
of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
The

parties

had

more

than

enough

time

to

conduct

discovery in this case. And, Bafford was granted not one or
two or three, but four extensions of time to respond to the
pending Motion for summary judgment. (Doc. ## 113, 117, 131,
142). Despite all this time, Bafford did not file the motion
for extension of time to conduct discovery (Doc. # 149) until
well after the expiration of the discovery deadline. As noted
by the Court’s Case Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. #
146 at 3), the Court may deny discovery-related motions as
untimely, if they are filed after the discovery deadline.
Such is the case here. And, rather than pointing to newly
discovered evidence or a manifest error of law or fact,
Bafford

simply

previously

attempts

advanced.

to

reassert

Bafford

has

the

failed

argument
to

show

he
the

extraordinary relief provided by Rule 59(e) is warranted. The
motion for reconsideration is denied.
B.

Quiet Title

“To

state

a

cause

of

action

to

quiet

title,

the

[plaintiff] need[s] to allege [and prove] that (1) they had
title to the subject property; (2) a cloud on the title

15 

existed; and (3) that the cloud was invalid.” D’Alessandro v.
Fid. Fed. Bank & Tr., 154 So. 3d 498, 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
The undisputed facts show MB Reo owns the property (Doc.
# 107-1 at ¶¶ 5, 6). In addition, it is undisputed a cloud on
the title existed due to Bafford’s notices in the Official
Records of Hillsborough County, Florida, which indicated a
housing discrimination complaint that sought a determination
of Bafford’s rights to the properties was pending (Id. at ¶¶
25, 26; Doc. ## 107-14, 107-15); Phillips v. Epic Aviation,
LLC, No. 2:13-cv-410-FtM-29MRM, 2017 WL 202541, at *31 (M.D.
Fla. Jan. 18, 2017) (“A lis pendens . . . operates as a cloud
on the title . . . .”). As alleged by MB Reo, “[a]s a result
of Bafford’s recordings of Notices purporting to encumber the
Property, MB REO has . . . been unable to sell the Property.”
(Doc. # 107-1 at ¶ 30). It is also undisputed the cloud
created by Bafford’s notices was invalid because the notices
were defective (Doc. # 65) and a written contract for the
sale of the property never existed (Doc. # 107 at ¶¶ 19, 22).
MB Reo is entitled summary judgment on its quiet title claim.
C.

Slander of Title

“To establish the elements of slander of title, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant has communicated to
a third party a false statement disparaging title which has

16 

caused the plaintiff actual damage.” Residential Cmtys. of
Am. v. Escondido Cmty. Ass’n, 645 So. 2d 149, 150 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1994). Further, there is a distinction between presumed
and actual malice. Phillips, 2017 WL 202541, at *28.
In an action for slander of title, “malice” merely
means a lack of legal justification and is said to
be ‘presumed’ if the disparagement is false, if it
caused damage, and if it is not privileged. [W]hen
the defendant disparages plaintiff’s title under
circumstances
supporting
a
privilege,
the
presumption of malice is rebutted and, as in a case
of defamation, the plaintiff must then prove actual
or genuine malice in order to recover. This means
that malice, in the ordinary sense of the term, is
not important at all except to defeat the defense
of privilege or to enhance damages.
Id. (citation omitted).
The filing of a document in a county’s official records
satisfies the publication requirement. Id. at *30. Here, it
is undisputed Bafford filed his notices in the Official
Records of Hillsborough County, Florida. (Doc. ## 107-14,
107-15). Thus, the publication element is met.
Bafford’s notices state that, as of December of 2015, a
housing discrimination complaint was pending. (Doc. ## 10714,

107-15).

However,

Bafford

did

not

file

his

housing

discrimination complaint until March 30, 2016. (Doc. # 10717). Thus, the notices contained a material false statement.
Phillips, 2017 WL 202541, at *32 (finding falsity requirement

17 

met where lis pendens falsely indicated defendant initiated
an action).
Moreover, it is undisputed Bafford’s notices prevented
MB Reo from selling its property. (Doc. # 107-1 at ¶ 30). As
a result, MB Reo has been forced to carry the costs of the
property, e.g., taxes, property management, and insurance.
(Id.). Therefore, MB Reo is entitled to summary judgment on
its slander of title claim.
D.

Declaratory Judgment

Under § 2201, “any court of the United States . . . may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief
is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Although Bafford
filed an administrative housing complaint and there is no
evidence as to the complaint’s status, the Court may still
proceed with this action because an action under 42 U.S.C. §
3613 may be commenced “whether or not a complaint has been
filed under section 3610(a) of this title and without regard
to the status of any such complaint.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(2).
MB Reo seeks a declaratory judgment against Tampa for
Christ Church and Bafford “finding that no contract has ever
existed between the Parties and that Defendants have no claims
against Plaintiff or the Property, together with an award of

18 

costs and such other and further relief as the Court deems
just and proper.” (Doc. # 1 at 12). But, in its Motion, MB
Reo states it “does not seek any monetary relief against
[Tampa for Christ Church], only a declaration that MB REO did
not discriminate against it and that [Tampa for Christ Church]
has no interest in the Property.” (Doc. # 107 at ¶ 25).
Given

that

Bafford

filed

a

housing

discrimination

complaint under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3600-3620,
and filed two lis pendens, the issues before the Court are
whether MB Reo racially discriminated against Bafford and
whether a contract existed between Tampa for Christ Church
and MB Reo. With respect to the discrimination charge,
to prevail on a claim under the FHA, a plaintiff
must demonstrate unequal treatment on the basis of
race that affects the availability of housing. . .
. A plaintiff can establish a violation under the
FHA by proving (1) intentional discrimination, (2)
discriminatory impact, or (3) a refusal to make a
reasonable accommodation.
Bonasera v. City of Norcross, 342 Fed. Appx. 581, 584 (11th
Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
While the FHA does not apply to commercial property like that
at issue here, see, e.g., Telesca v. Vill. of Kings Creek
Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 390 Fed. Appx. 877, 881 (11th Cir. 2010)
(defining what a dwelling is for purposes of the FHA), even
if the FHA did apply, there is still no evidence showing MB

19 

Reo treated Bafford unequally on the basis of race. The
undisputed facts show MB Reo requested additional financial
information in 29 other situations and, as a general matter,
did not contact proposed lenders. (Doc. # 107-1 at ¶¶ 3, 12,
14). Bafford produced no evidence disputing those facts or
otherwise suggesting that MB Reo only requested additional
information from members of a protected class.
As to whether a contract existed between Tampa for Christ
Church and MB Reo, Florida law has three elements for breach
of contract claim: a valid contract, a material breach, and
damages. Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital, 765 So. 2d
737, 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). To have a valid contract,
Florida law requires an offer, acceptance, and consideration.
Med-Star Cent., Inc. v. Psychiatric Hosps. of Hernando Cty.,
Inc., 639 So. 2d 636, 637 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Furthermore,
Florida’s Statute of Frauds requires contracts for the sale
of land to be in writing. Fla. Stat. § 725.01. Although
several offers and counter-offers were volleyed back and
forth,

no

single

consideration

given.

offer
In

was

ever

addition,

accepted,

the

evidence

nor

was

shows

a

written agreement for the sale of the property was never
executed. Thus, neither Tampa for Christ Church, nor its

20 

representative (Bafford) has a claim to or interest in the
property.
E.

Damages

MB Reo seeks a judgment against Bafford in the amount of
$128,560.94, but it does not seek a money judgment against
Tampa for Christ Church. (Doc. # 1; Doc. # 107 at ¶ 25). While
MB Reo may recover damages and attorney’s fees for slander of
title, Atkinson v. Fundaro, 400 So. 2d 1324, 1326 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1981), it may not do so for its quiet title claim, Price
v. Tyler, 890 So. 2d 246, 252 (Fla. 2004) (statute governing
actions to quiet title “does not authorize the award of
damages and attorney’s fees”). MB Reo is also entitled to its
costs pursuant to Rule 54(d).
MB Reo’s requested judgment is comprised of $51,372.70
in carrying costs related to the property, $74,435.25 in
attorney’s fees to have the notices of lis pendens removed,
and $2,752.99 in costs to have the notices of lis pendens
removed. (Doc. # 107-1 at ¶¶ 30, 31). However, the damages in
the form of carrying costs were only calculated through
September of 2016, and it is now July of 2017. In addition,
although MB Reo asserts Atkinson, 400 So. 2d at 1326, supports
its claim to costs as damages, Atkinson speaks only to
attorney’s fees as damages. But, MB Reo may recover costs

21 

under Rule 54(d). To do so though, MB Reo must support its
claim to costs with documentation showing its costs are
recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. MB Reo is therefore
directed

to

file

a

supplement,

supported

by

competent

evidence, by August 14, 2017, wherein MB Reo calculates its
current damages and costs. Once that supplement is filed and
reviewed, the Court will enter a single judgment consistent
herewith.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)

Plaintiff MB Reo-FL Church-2, LLC’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and Declaratory Relief (Doc. # 107) GRANTED.

(2)

MB Reo is directed to file a supplement, supported by
competent evidence, by August 14, 2017, wherein MB Reo
calculates its current damages and costs.

(3)

MB Reo is further directed to move without delay in
filing a motion for default judgment against Tampa for
Christ Church. The motion should be filed no later than
August 14, 2017.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

31st day of July, 2017.

22