MB REO-FL Church-2, LLC v. Tampa For Christ Church, Inc. et al

Filing 197

ORDER: The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff MB Reo-FL Church-2, LLC against Defendant Frank M. Bafford, in the amount of $114,448.00. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 6/15/2018. (AHG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MB REO-FL CHURCH-2, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:16-cv-276-T-33AEP

TAMPA FOR CHRIST CHURCH, INC.,
and FRANK M. BAFFORD,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This
Plaintiff

matter
MB

comes

Reo-FL

before

Church-2,

the

Court
Motion

LLC’s

pursuant
for

to

Summary

Judgment. (Doc. # 165). Although the Court granted summary
judgment in favor of MB Reo on July 31, 2017, (Doc. # 165),
Defendant Frank M. Bafford filed an interlocutory appeal
before the Court could enter an order as to damages. (Doc.
#

170).

Accordingly,

this

order

resolves

the

issue

of

damages and awards $114,448.00 to MB Reo as follows.
I.

Background
A

full

review

of

the

facts

of

this

case

is

unnecessary, as the Court has already done so in its order
granting

summary

summary

judgment,

judgment.
the

(Doc.

Court

#

165).

directed

MB

After
Reo

to

granting
file

a

supplement as to its calculation of damages by August 14,
2017. (Id. at 22). Subsequently, MB Reo filed declarations
in

support

of

damages

and

moved

for

default

judgment

against Tampa for Christ Church. (Docs. ## 167, 168).
Shortly thereafter, on August 29, 2017, Bafford filed
a third interlocutory appeal. (Doc. # 170). The case was
once

again

resolution

stayed

Circuit

of

sua

the

and

administratively

appeal.

sponte

(Doc.

dismissed

#

the

closed

pending

174).

The

Eleventh

appeal

for

lack

of

jurisdiction on October 26, 2017. (Doc. # 176). The Court
reopened the case, (Doc. # 177), and reactivated MB Reo’s
motion

for

default

judgment,

as

well

as

two

motions

to

dismiss filed by Bafford prior to appeal. (Docs. ## 166,
169). The Court denied Bafford’s motions on November 1,
2017. (Docs. ## 178, 179).
After the Court granted MB Reo’s motion for default
judgment

on

November

22,

2017,

(Doc.

#

183),

default

judgment was entered against Tampa for Christ Church. (Doc.
#

184).

Bafford

filed

his

fourth

appeal,

(Doc.

#

187),

which the Eleventh Circuit dismissed sua sponte for lack of
jurisdiction. (Doc. # 191). The Court then directed MB Reo
to file supplemental information regarding its calculation
of damages, (Doc. # 193), which MB Reo provided on June 14,

2

2018.

(Doc.

#

196).

Thus,

this

order

resolves

the

only

remaining issue in the case: damages against Bafford.
II.

Damages
Seeking

damages

against

Bafford

for

its

slander

of

title claim, MB Reo requests a total of $114,661.34. (Doc.
# 196 at ¶ 13). MB Reo does not seek monetary damages
against Tampa for Christ Church. (Doc. # 107 at 19). MB
Reo’s

requested

judgment

$37,453.26

in

carrying

$74,435.25

in

is

attorney’s

comprised

costs

related

fees;

and

of

the

to

following:

the

$2,772.83

property;
in

costs.

(Doc. # 196 at ¶ 13). The Court addresses each in turn.
a. Carrying Costs
This action focused on the commercial property located
at 9612 N. 26th Street and 9706 N. 26th Street, Tampa,
Florida 33612. (Doc. # 165 at 2). The property was listed
for sale by MB Reo on October 12, 2015, with an asking
price

of

$799,000.

(Id.).

It

is

undisputed

Bafford’s

notices prevented MB Reo from selling its property. (Doc. #
107-1 at ¶ 30). Thus, MB Reo was forced to carry the costs
of the property. In support of its alleged carrying costs,
MB

Reo

has

submitted

its

2016

income

statement,

which

includes costs related to the general operating expenses,
repairs,

maintenance,

management,

3

insurance

and

general

administration of the property. (Doc. # 196-2). The total
amount

is

$52,124.19.

(Id.).

These

costs

are

provided

through September of 2016, when MB Reo sold the property.
(Id.).

MB

Reo

has

limited

its

request

to

the

following

carrying costs: property insurance ($17,263.98); property
management

($18,967.74);

and

property

taxes

($1,248.54).

(Doc. # 196-2 at ¶ 12). Accordingly, the Court awards MB
Reo’s

requested

carrying

costs

in

the

total

amount

of

$37,453.26.
b. Attorney’s Fees
This Court is afforded broad discretion in addressing
attorney’s fees. See Villano v. City of Boynton Beach, 254
F.3d

1302,

1305

(11th

Cir.

2001)(“Ultimately,

the

computation of a fee award is necessarily an exercise of
judgment because there is no precise rule or formula for
making these determinations.” (internal citation omitted)).
In

Florida,

calculate
Rowe,

the

federal

attorney’s

472

So.

determines

the

2d

lodestar

fees.
1145,

reasonable

Fla.
1146
fee

method

Patient’s
(Fla.

by

is

used

to

Comp

Fund

v.

1985).

taking

the

The

Court

“number

of

hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
reasonable

hourly

rate.”

Hensley

424, 76 (1983).

4

v.

Eckerhart,

461

U.S.

The

fee

applicant

bears

the

burden

of

establishing

entitlement to the hours requested as well as to the hourly
rate. Webb v. Bd. of Educ. of Dyer Cty., 471 U.S. 234, 242
(1985). If an attorney fails to carry his or her burden,
the

Court

“is

itself

an

expert

on

the

question

[of

attorneys’ fees] and may consider its own knowledge and
experience concerning reasonable and proper fees.” Norman
v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th
Cir. 1988)
MB

Reo

retained

Akerman

LLP

in

this

action

and

requests attorney’s fees in the amount of $74,435.25. (Doc.
# 196 at ¶¶ 2, 9). Attorney Irene Bassel Frick explains in
her supplemental declaration the fees incurred for the work
completed are as follows:
Timekeeper

Title

Hours

Rate

Amount

Irene Bassel Frick

Partner

215.6

$400

$86,240.00

Carol S. Faber

Partner

19.2

$400

$7,680.00

Devon Galloway

Associate

22.8

$220

$5,016.00

Cynthia LaQuidera

Partner

2.2

$400

$880.00

John Dicks

Associate

1.6

$255

$408.00

Teresa Gancedo

Paralegal

.5

$210

$105.00

TOTAL $100,329.00

5

Yet, MB Reo seeks to recover only $74,435.25 in fees.
(Id.). This reduced amount reflects fees incurred in the
prosecution of MB Reo’s claims and excludes fees incurred
in its attempts to sell the property while the action was
pending. (Id.).
First, the Court must consider the reasonableness of
the hourly rate. Bassel Frick explains that she is lead
counsel

for

MB

Reo

and

has

over

18

years

of

civil

litigation experience. (Doc. # 167 at ¶ 1). She, as well as
the two other partners who worked on the matter, billed an
hourly

rate

of

$400.00.

Additionally,

two

associate

attorneys billed at hourly rates of $220.00 and $255.00.
Finally, one paralegal spent half an hour working on this
matter and billed an hourly rate of $210.00. 1
“A

reasonable

hourly

rate

is

the

prevailing

market

rate in the relevant legal community for similar services
by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and
reputation.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (citation omitted).
In the Middle District of Florida, “rates ranging up to
1

According to the United States Supreme Court, a reasonable
attorney’s fee does not include only “work performed
personally by members of the bar,” but must account for the
work of support staff that contribute to the work product
of the attorney, including that of paralegals. Mo. v.
Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989).

6

$400 per hour for senior counsel or partner level work and
$175 to $225 for junior attorneys were prevailing” in 2011.
Indyne, Inc. v. Abacus Tech. Corp., No. 6:11-cv-137-Orl22DAB, 2013 WL 11312471 at *55 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2013).
Upon

due

consideration,

the

Court

determines

that

the

requested hourly rates are reasonable. The rates for the
partners, associate Galloway and paralegal Gancedo clearly
fall within the reasonable ranges stated in Indyne, Inc.
While one associate billed at a slighter higher rate of
$255.00

an

hour,

the

Court

nonetheless

finds

the

fee

reasonable as the rate was billed in 2016 – five years
after the stated reasonable billing range in Indyne, Inc.
Next, the Court must determine the reasonableness of
the number of hours expended by MB Reo’s counsel, while
working on this case. “Fee applicants must exercise . . .
‘billing judgment,’ that means they must exclude from their
fee

applications

‘excessive,

redundant,

or

otherwise

unnecessary hours.’” ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423,
428 (11th Cir. 1999)(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).
Thus,

fee

applicants

unreasonable
adversary

to

must

bill

irrespective

experience of counsel.”

a

exclude

client
of

the

hours

and

“that

therefore

skill,

would
to

be

one’s

reputation

or

Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301 (emphasis

7

in original). Exclusions for unnecessary or excessive time
expended are left to the discretion of the Court. See Id.
at 1301.
In support of the hours spent on the case, Akerman has
submitted detailed billing invoices. (Doc. # 196-1). These
invoices include descriptions of the hours spent on legal
work such as drafting letters to Bafford, responding to the
motion to dismiss, preparing for depositions and mediation,
and drafting the motion for summary judgment. (Id. at 8,
25, 36, 52). Akerman regularly did not charge MB Reo for
time spent on activities such as follow up communication,
attending depositions, and telephone conferencing with MB
Reo. (Id. at 52-53).
Upon review of the invoices, the Court concludes that
Akerman did not bill for unnecessary or redundant work, and
the time billed was not excessive. Over the course of a
year, counsel spent 261.9 hours on this matter. The action
was lengthy and included numerous appeals. While frivolous,
each

appeal

procedural

delayed

complexity.

the

case

Further,

and

added

a

layer

of

the

Court

acknowledges

Bassel Frick’s reduction in total fees requested, as well
as Akerman’s decision not to charge MB Reo for numerous
hours spent. These are prime examples of billing judgment

8

that

attorneys

must

exercise

in

applying

for

fees.

Accordingly, the Court finds the requested fees reasonable
and awards a total of $74,435.25 in attorney’s fees.
c. Costs
Finally,

MB

Reo

requests

costs

in

the

amount

of

$2,772.83. (Id. at ¶ 10). The costs allowed by 28 U.S.C. §
1920 include: (1) fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) fees
for

printed

necessarily

or

electronically

obtained

disbursements

for

exemplification

for

use

printing

and

costs

in

and
of

recorded
the

case;

transcripts
(3)

and

(4)

fees

for

witnesses;

fees

making

copies

necessarily

obtained for use in the case; (5) docket fees; and (6)
compensation for court appointed experts and interpreters.
Certain costs requested by MB Reo are beyond those
enumerated in § 1920. The Court accordingly disallows the
following

categories

of

requested

costs

as

outside

the

scope of § 1920: postage ($4.87); telephone conferencing
($68.07); and Pacer (legal research retrieval) ($8.20). See
Gary Brown & Associates v. Ashdon, Inc., 268 F. App’x 837,
846

(11th

research).

Cir.

2008)

Furthermore,

(denying
while

costs

for

duplicating

postage

and

($132.20)

may

fall within the scope of § 1920, MB Reo has not provided
the Court with sufficient detail to determine if the copies

9

were “necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920(4). Because MB Reo does not provide any detail or
description of these duplicating fees, the Court declines
to grant such costs. See Gary Brown & Associates, 268 F.
App’x at 846 (denying costs for unspecified copying because
the

court

could

not

determine

if

the

documents

were

necessarily obtained for use in the case).
The remaining costs consist of: court reporting fees
($1,810.20); witness fees ($56.79); service of process fees
($240.00);

and

filing

and

recording

fees

($452.50).

The

Court finds that such costs were all necessarily obtained
for use in the case and well within the range 28 U.S.C. §
1920. Thus, the Court grants MB Reo costs in total amount
of $2,559.49.
III. Conclusion
The
costs:

Court

therefore

$37,453.26

in

grants

the

carrying

following

costs;

fees

and

$74,435.25

in

attorney’s fees; and $2,559.49 in costs. When added, the
total amount awarded to MB Reo is $114,448.00.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

10

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of
Plaintiff MB Reo-FL Church-2, LLC against Defendant Frank
M. Bafford, in the amount of $114,448.00.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
15th day of June, 2018.

11