Veltheim v. International Bodytalk Association, Inc. et al

Filing 64

ORDER: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 51 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is dismissed because the claims he asserts are barred by the Release Agreement dated May 20, 2015. The Clerk is directed to issue a Judgment in favor of Defendants John Veltheim, Esther Veltheim, and International BodyTalk Association, Inc. reflecting that Plaintiff Christopher Veltheim's claims asserted in the Second Amended Complaint are barred by the Release Agreement dated May 20, 2015. The Clerk shall close the case. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 1/5/2017. (KAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER VELTHEIM,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:16-cv-298-T-33JSS

INTERNATIONAL BODYTALK ASSOCIATION,
INC., JOHN VELTHEIM, and ESTHER
VELTHEIM,
Defendants.
________________________________/
ORDER
For the second time, a son has sued his father, his
former stepmother, and the family company in the context of
corporate litigation regarding a family business.

The first

lawsuit, in which the son challenged his dismissal from
employment

from

the

family

business,

was

resolved

in

a

settlement agreement with the son signing a broad release.

A

Motion for Summary Judgment now before the Court asks the
single question of whether the son’s claims in the present
lawsuit are barred by the release agreement the son signed to
resolve the first lawsuit.

The Court answers the question in

the affirmative, and, as explained below, grants the Motion
for Summary Judgment.
I.

Background
International Bodytalk Association, Inc. is “a domestic

profit corporation chartered in the State of Florida on June

23, 2003, with a principal address . . . [in] Sarasota,
Florida.”

(Doc.

#

42

at

¶

4).

International

Bodytalk

Association, Inc. (hereafter “the Company”) is “a wellness and
life sciences educational organization . . . with branches in
Australia and Europe, offering training and education to more
than 40,000 people worldwide.” (Id. at ¶ 18).
John

Veltheim

is

the

President

of

the

Company

and

Christopher Veltheim is his son.1 (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 19). Esther
Veltheim is the Treasurer of the Company. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 19).
She was previously married to John, but Esther and John have
divorced. (Id. at ¶ 19).

Esther is Christopher’s former

stepmother. (Id.).
Christopher submits that he was issued ten shares in the
Company on June 19, 2003. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 9). Thereafter, on
December 21, 2012, Christopher claims that ten additional
shares were transferred to him, increasing his total ownership
in the Company to 20 shares. (Id. at ¶ 11).

His counsel

contends that Christopher has a 20% ownership interest in the
Company. (Doc. # 60-1 at 10).
Christopher, John, and Esther have been embroiled in
litigation concerning the Company in the United States and in

1

Because the parties share the same last name, the Court
will refer to them by their first names.
2

Australia.

Christopher explains that “beginning in 2014, the

parties’ relationship suffered from increased tensions between
them.” (Id. at ¶ 27).
Company

since

Christopher had been working for the

November

30,

2007,

but

John

and

Esther

terminated Christopher from the Company. (Id., Doc. # 51-4 at
2). On April 17, 2015, Christopher filed an unfair dismissal
claim with the Fair Work Commission in Australia against the
Company

as

well

termination.
20,

2015,

in

as

John

and

Esther,

challenging

his

The employment litigation was resolved on May
a

settlement.

(Id.).

In

the

settlement,

Christopher received:
(i) Payment of 20.37 weeks of accrued and unused
annual leave entitlements, amounting to a total of
$32,026.73; (ii) Payment of 4 weeks’ pay in lieu of
notice, amounting to a total of $6,289 plus $597.46
superannuation . . . ; (iii) An ex-gratia payment
equal to 16 weeks’ base salary, amounting to
$25,156; (iv) 6.4278 weeks’ long service leave,
amounting to $10,106.11, (v) Less the amount of
$34,659 AUD . . . to be deducted in full and final
satisfaction of the car loan amount that was
provided by IBA Australasia’s U.S. parent company.
(Doc. # 51-4 at 3-4)(emphasis in original).
In exchange for monetary payment and to effectuate the
settlement of the lawsuit regarding the termination of his
employment, Christopher signed a lengthy Release Agreement.
Among other key terms, the Release Agreement provides:
2.3 Release
3

(a)

(b)

Mr Veltheim understands and acknowledges that
this release agreement constitutes full and
final settlement of all monies that are owing
to him in respect to his Employment2 and the
termination of the employment relationship and
any and all Claims which may arise out of his
Employment
or
the
termination
of
the
employment relationship with IBA Australasia
and/or International BodyTalk Association,
Inc. This includes, but is not limited to,
payment for all services performed by Mr
Veltheim on behalf of IBA Australasia in
Australia, the United States or any other
location during the entire period of his
employment.
Mr Veltheim releases and absolutely and
forever discharges IBA Australasia, its
parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors
and assigns in the IBA Group, and any and all
of their current, former or future directors,
office holders, agents or employees from all
Claims3 whatsoever (whether at common law, in
equity or under any statute which may be
legally waived by Mr Veltheim), past present
and future and howsoever arising, known or
unknown to Mr Veltheim, which he may have had,
may now have or but for this release agreement
may have had at any future time against IBA
Australasia,
International
BodyTalk
Association Inc. or any other company within
the IBA Group, arising out of or in relation
to the Employment or termination of the
employment
relationship.
Mr
Veltheim

2

The Release Agreement defines “Employment” as “the
employment of Mr Veltheim by IBA Australasia and/or
International BodyTalk Association, Inc.” (Doc. # 51-4 at 3).
3

The Release Agreement defines “Claims” as “all actions,
suits,
applications,
arbitrations,
causes
of
action,
complaints,
costs,
damages,
debts
due,
demands,
determinations, enquiries, judgements, liabilities, sums of
money and verdicts whatsoever and however arising whether at
law or in equity under any statute.” (Doc. # 51-4 at 2).
4

(c)

understands and agrees that his release of
Claims also applies to Claims by any person
by, through or under Mr Veltheim, such as Mr
Veltheim’s heirs, executors, administrators or
assigns.
Further, Mr Veltheim understands,
acknowledges and agrees that he is releasing
the releasees from any and all Claims which
may include, but are not limited to, Claims in
Australia and the United States for breach of
contract, personal injury
(except for any
claims Mr Veltheim may be entitled to make
under applicable Workers’ compensation laws in
Australia),
wages,
benefits,
defamation,
unfair
dismissal,
breach
of
general
protections, wrongful discharge, bullying,
retaliation, claims for discrimination or
harassment in employment under the applicable
laws of the United States or Australia, and
any and all rights and claims Mr Veltheim may
have arising under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in
Employment
Act
of
1967,
the
Genetic
Information Non-Discrimination Act, and the
Equal Pay Act, all as amended, and any and all
Claims based on any oral or written agreements
or promises, whether arising
under statute
(including, but not limited to, claims arising
under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, the Family and Medical Leave Act
and the Fair Work Act of 2009 (Cth) and any
other federal, state, local, or foreign laws
or
regulations),
contract
(express
or
implied), tort, constitutional provision,
common law, public policy or otherwise, from
the beginning of time through the date Mr
Veltheim signs this release agreement.
Mr Veltheim promises not to bring or commence
or seek to enforce any Claims in any court,
commission,
tribunal,
or
body
in
any
jurisdiction within or outside of Australia,
the United States or any other jurisdiction,
against
IBA
Australasia,
International
5

BodyTalk Association Inc. or any other company
within IBA Group, or any current or former
directors, office holders, agents or employees
of IBA Australasia, International BodyTalk
Association Inc.
or the IBA Group, arising
out of or in relation to the Employment or
termination of the employment relationship.
This includes any demand for arbitration
against releasees.
(Doc. # 51-4 at 6-7)(emphasis added).
On February 8, 2016, approximately nine months after
signing the Release Agreement, Christopher initiated this
action against John, Esther, and the Company seeking, among
other things, an accounting, damages, corporate dissolution
and liquidation, the appointment of a receiver, and the
imposition of a constructive trust. (Doc. # 1). Among other
contentions, Christopher claims that in 2003, John and Esther
purported to transfer Christopher’s “original ten shares in
[the Company] to Defendants John Veltheim and Esther Veltheim,
without [Christopher’s] knowledge, authority, or consent.”
(Doc. # 42 at ¶ 13). Along with seeking dissolution of the
Company and payment for his shares from the proceeds of the
dissolution,

Christopher

complains

about

his

forced

“termination from the corporation and/or partnership through
deceit and fraud.” (Id. at ¶ 35).

Christopher also claims

that John and Esther have wasted corporate assets (alleging
excessive compensation in 2013, and unauthorized royalties in
6

2014, as examples of such corporate waste).

Christopher also

describes alleged sexual misconduct by John against a student
in 2014, in the Second Amended Complaint. (Id. at ¶ 39).
The Second Amended Complaint contains the following
specific

counts:

action

for

involuntary

dissolution,

liquidation, purchase of shares, or other equitable relief
(count

one);

International

equitable
Bodytalk

accounting
Association,

and
Inc.

dissolution
(count

of

two);

declaratory relief (count three); and libel, slander, and
slander per se (count four). On September 2, 2016, Defendants
filed an Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and the following
Counterclaims:

breach

of

fiduciary

duty

(count

one);

conversion (count two); breach of contract (count three);
breach of implied in fact contract (count four); unjust
enrichment (count five); and money lent (count five). (Doc. #
47).

Christopher failed to respond to the counterclaims, and

the deadline for him to do so has passed. John, Esther, the
Company failed to apply to the Clerk for Entry of a Default
pursuant to Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court dismisses the Counterclaims without prejudice based
on the finding that John, Esther, the Company have failed to
prosecute the counterclaims. See Local Rule 1.07(b), M.D. Fla.
On October 20, 2016, John, Esther, and the Company filed
7

a Motion for Summary Judgment and Notice of Intent to Rely on
Foreign Law (Doc. # 51).

Christopher filed a Response in

Opposition to the Motion (Doc. # 55) on November 28, 2016, to
which John, Esther, and the Company replied (Doc. # 60) on
December 27, 2016.
II.

Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).

Fed. R.

A factual dispute alone is not enough to

defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude a
grant of summary judgment.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.

Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742

(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)).

A fact is material if

it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.
Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.
1997).

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing

8

the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are
no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at
trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256,
1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).

“When a moving party has discharged

its burden, the non-moving party must then ‘go beyond the
pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.”

Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590,

593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations
or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to be
true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the nonmoving party’s favor.

Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344

F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact finder
evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference
from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine
issue of material fact, the court should not grant summary
judgment.

Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846

F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Augusta Iron & Steel
Works, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th
Cir. 1988)).

However, if the non-movant’s response consists
9

of

nothing

“more

allegations,”
required.

than

summary

a

repetition

judgment

is

of

not

his
only

conclusional
proper,

but

Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir.

1981).
III. Analysis
A.
The

Application of Foreign Law
sole

task

at

hand

is

determining

whether

Christopher’s claims asserted in the Second Amended Complaint
are barred by the Release Agreement.

The Release Agreement

states that it “is governed by and construed in accordance
with the laws applicable in the State of Queensland.” (Doc. #
51-4 at 10).

Rule 44.1, Fed. R. Civ. P., states:

A party who intends to raise an issue about a
foreign country’s law must give notice by a
pleading or other writing. In determining foreign
law, the court may consider any relevant material
or source, including testimony, whether or not
submitted by a party or admissible under the
Federal
Rules
of
Evidence.
The
court’s
determination must be treated as a question of law.
See

Trinidad

Foundry

&

Fabricating,

Ltd.

v.

M/V

K.A.S.

Camilla, 966 F.2d 613, 616 (11th Cir. 1992)(affirming district
court’s utilization of affidavits from a solicitor of the
Supreme Court of England and Wales to determine the laws of
England in the context of a maritime dispute).
This Court was provided with adequate notice that foreign

10

law applies.

In addition, Christopher, John, Esther, and the

Company agree that the law of Queensland, Australia governs
this matter.

For his part, Christopher has provided the

affidavit of Andrew Herbert, Barrister at Law (Doc. # 55-2).
And Defendants -- John, Esther, and the Company -- submit the
sworn declarations of Cameron Kenneth Dean, Solicitor. (Doc.
# 51-5; Doc. # 60-2).
B.

The Release Agreement Bars Christopher’s Claims

The Court credits the affidavit of Barrister Herbert,
stating that “[t]he fundamental rule of interpretation of
agreements under Australian law, is that the agreement must be
read as a whole, in context, and by ascertaining the plain
English meaning of the words the parties used.” (Doc. # 55-2
at 5).
The Court agrees with Christopher’s argument that the
Release Agreement was executed in the context of resolving
Christopher’s unfair dismissal lawsuit.

The Court, however,

rejects Christopher’s assertion that the Release Agreement
should be interpreted narrowly and such that Christopher
should be able to bring myriad claims against John, Esther,
and

the

Company,

dating

back

to

2003,

when

Christopher

specifically released these parties from these claims in the

11

Release Agreement in 2015. The Court disagrees with Barrister
Herbert’s contention that “the Release Agreement, by its
express

terms,

is

dedicated

only

to

the

employment

relationship and its termination.” (Doc. # 55-2).

A plain

reading of the Release Agreement shows that the parties
intended to effect a global settlement of all pending matters.
The Court starts with an analysis of the “recitals” of
the

Release

Agreement.

The

recitals

explain

(1)

that

Christopher was employed from November 30, 2007, until April
of

2015,

when

he

was

dismissed

from

the

Company;

(2)

Christopher filed an Unfair Dismissal Claim in Australia; and
(3) “without any admission of liability, the parties have
agreed to enter into this release agreement to finalise all
matters between them and any Claims that Mr Veltheim may now
have or which may arise as a result of the Employment or the
end of the employment relationship between the parties.” (Doc.
# 51-4 at 2)(emphasis added).
The purpose of the Release Agreement was not just to end
the disagreement regarding Christopher’s termination from the
Company, but also to “finalise all matters” between the
parties and the resolve any and all “Claims.”

As noted, the

parties did not limit the definition of “Claims” to labor and

12

employment matters.

Instead, the parties’ broadly defined

“Claims” as “all actions, suits, applications, arbitrations,
causes of action, complaints, costs, damages, debts due,
demands, determinations, enquiries, judgements, liabilities,
sums of money and verdicts whatsoever and however arising
whether at law or in equity or under any statute.” (Doc. # 514 at 2).

In addition, had the parties sought to restrict the

claims to the finite period of Christopher’s employment, they
could have established that limited period for claims, instead
of setting the inception of the release period as “the
beginning of time.” (Doc. # 51-4 at 7). The four causes of
action that Christopher asserts against John, Esther, and the
Company fall within the broad definition and sweeping time
period for “Claims” contained in the Release Agreement.
Christopher points out that certain portions of the
Release Agreement contain limiting language, specifically
“arising

out

of

or

in

relation

to

the

Employment

or

termination of the employment relationship.” That language
does

indeed

Agreement.

appear

in

several

sentences

of

the

Release

However, paragraph 2.3(b) is not limited to the

employment context and contains no limiting language:
Further, Mr Veltheim understands, acknowledges and
agrees that he is releasing the releasees from any
and all Claims which may include, but are not
limited to, Claims in Australia and the United
13

States for breach of contract, personal injury
(except for any claims Mr Veltheim may be entitled
to make under applicable Workers’ compensation laws
in Australia), wages, benefits, defamation, unfair
dismissal, breach of general protections, wrongful
discharge, bullying, retaliation, claims for
discrimination or harassment in employment under
the applicable laws of the United States or
Australia, and any and all rights and claims Mr
Veltheim may have arising under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, the Genetic Information
Non-Discrimination Act, and the Equal Pay Act, all
as amended, and any and all Claims based on any
oral or written agreements or promises, whether
arising under statute (including, but not limited
to, claims arising under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, the Family and Medical
Leave Act and the Fair Work Act of 2009 (Cth) and
any other federal, state, local, or foreign laws or
regulations), contract (express or implied), tort,
constitutional provision, common law, public policy
or otherwise, from the beginning of time through
the date Mr Veltheim signs this release agreement.
(Doc. # 51-4 at 6).
This separate and specific release is not limited to
releasing claims specifically in relation to Christopher’s
employment or termination from employment. This broad release
language directly bars Christopher from bringing the current
lawsuit against John, Esther, and the Company -- the parties
specifically intended to be released from such Claims.
Release Agreement is dated May 20, 2015.

The

Yet, the Second

Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants (1) effected an
unauthorized transfer of Christopher’s shares in 2003; (2)
14

wasted assets in 2013; and (3) made unauthorized royalty
payments in 2014, among many other contentions predating the
Release Agreement.

Christopher released the Defendants of

these claims in the Release Agreement.
The Court takes note of Barrister Herbert’s description
of a prior hearing held in Australia on January 13, 2016, in
which

“Daubney

J.,

in

the

Supreme

Court

of

Queensland,

dismissed an application in IBA Australasia Pty Ltd and
Another and Christopher Veltheim, No 9996 of 2015, which
application relied upon the . . . argument . . . that the
Release Agreement barred Mr Veltheim from seeking to enforce
rights

in

relation

to

the

transfer

allegedly owned by him.” (Doc. # 55-2).

of

shares

owned

or

Apparently, during

that hearing, in which injunctive relief was requested by
John, Esther, and the Company and denied by the court, the
Australian Justice asked: “he stopped being an employee, but
he’s still a shareholder, isn’t he?” (Id.). Barrister Herbert
maintains that because Justice Daubney denied a petition for
injunctive relief, that this Court should deny the Motion for
Summary Judgment.

This position is flawed.

The question of

whether John, Esther, and the Company were entitled to an
injunction in Australia is not the same issue before this
Court,

and,

as

explained

in
15

Defendants’

reply,

“Justice

Daubney did not consider Section 2.3(b) [of the Release
Agreement], or crucially, any argument which went to the
merits of the claims which Plaintiff has brought in this
lawsuit.” (Doc. # 60 at 6).

A written opinion reflecting the

denial of injunctive relief was not issued by the Australian
tribunal.

In addition, Christopher has not filed a complete

transcript of the hearing held in Australia on January 13,
2016.

Instead, Christopher filed a two-page excerpt. (Doc. #

55-1).

This document does not reflect the Australian Court’s

ruling.

Instead, it reflects some of the questions asked at

the hearing.

The Court would be embarking on an reckless

course if it were to ascribe precedential value to the
preliminary questions considered by a Court during a hearing.
The Court roundly rejects Barrister Herbert’s proposition that
Justice Daubney’s questions and impressions in the excerpt
from the transcript represent the law of Australia.
Furthermore, the Court takes note of the undisputed fact
that Christopher signed the Release Agreement in the presence
of his attorney and with the benefit of legal representation.
Other

sections

of

the

Release

Agreement

reflect

that

Christopher (1) carefully read and understood the Release
Agreement; (2) was given sufficient time to consider his
rights

and

obligations

under
16

the

Release

Agreement;

(3)

enjoyed the benefit of legal counsel; (4) understood that in
signing the Release Agreement he was giving up certain legal
rights; (5) voluntarily chose to enter into the Release
Agreement and was not forced, coerced, or pressured to enter
into the Release Agreement; and (6) did not rely on any
representation or statements not contained in the Release
Agreement. (Doc. # 51-4 at 9).
Christopher

also

agreed

in

the

Release

Agreement:

“Further, by signing this release agreement, Mr Veltheim
agrees that he is not entitled to any payments and/or benefits
that are not specifically listed in this release agreement
including, but not limited to, any benefits of International
BodyTalk Association Inc. under either Australian or United
States Law.” (Id. at 4).
Solicitor

Dean

summarizes

the

law

Australia in his Declaration. (Doc. # 51-5).

of

Queensland,

“In order for a

binding agreement to be formed, there needs to be: (a) offer
and acceptance of terms; (b) valuable consideration provided;
and (c) an intention to be legally bound. There must also be
certainty as to the terms agreed.” (Id. at 12). Solicitor Dean
argues that offer and acceptance, valuable consideration, and
an intent to be bound are present here, and the Court agrees
with his analysis. “The Release Agreement sets out the terms
17

of the agreement reached and has been signed by all parties.”
(Id.).

It cannot be disputed that Christopher received

valuable consideration, the payment of thousands of Australian
dollars,

in

Agreement.

exchange

for

his

signature

on

the

Release

And, “each of the beneficiaries (relevantly for

the US Proceeding being International BodyTalk Association,
Inc., John Veltheim, and Esther Veltheim) have signified their
acceptance of the benefits offered to them by Christopher
Veltheim by signing the Release Agreement.” (Id. at 14).

In

addition, “[t]he language and terms of the Release Agreement
make it clear that the parties intended to be bound by it.”
(Id.).
With respect to “certainty of terms” Solicitor Dean
remarks:
The terms of the releases in the Release Agreement
are drafted to have broad coverage.
The terms
evince an intention to settle not only the unfair
dismissal claim, but also all other “Claims” that
arise out of or are in relation to the “Employment”
and termination of the employment relationship . .
. . Clause 2.3(b) of the Release Agreement goes
even further and, relevantly, from the sentence
commencing
with
the
word
“Further”
onwards
describes releases not limited to the Employment or
the employment relationship,
but describes
releases from “any and all Claims,” which is then
followed by a non-exhaustive list of Claims in
Australia and the United States in favour of the
“releasees.” While the term “releasees” is not
defined in the Release Agreement, it is clear from
the terms of the Release Agreement that the persons
to benefit from the release offered include
18

International BodyTalk Association, Inc., John
Veltheim and Esther Veltheim as being parties to
the Release Agreement. Relevant to the US
Proceeding, the list of Claims to be released
include
Claims
in
the
United
States
for
“defamation” and “any and all Claims based on any
oral or written agreements or promises” including
those that may arise “under statute” from “ . . .
the beginning of time through the date that Mr
[Christopher]
Veltheim
signs
this
release
agreement.”
The terms of the release in clause
2.3(b) of the Release Agreement described above
uses the words “including but not limited to” when
describing the list of Claims released. The use of
these words means that the rule of construction
known as “ejusdem generis” will not apply so as to
limit the operation of the releases to only Claims
that arise out of or in relation to the
“Employment” and the termination of the employment
relationship.
The term “ejusdem generis” comes
from Latin and means “of the same kind.”
The
“ejusdem generis” rule of construction is that
where general words follow specific words, the
general words may be limited to the same kind as
the specific words. Before the rule can apply, it
must be shown that the specific words make up a
common class or genus. However, because there are
specific words included in clause 2.3(b) of the
Release Agreement that make it clear that the class
of matters to be released is not limited by the
list of terms used, the rule cannot apply.
(Id. at 14-15). Solicitor Dean also declares that the Release
Agreement does not violate public policy (Id. at 20) and that
in his opinion, “based on the law that applies in the State of
Queensland, Australia, the claims made in the US Proceedings,
as set out [in the Second Amended Complaint], would each be
the subject of the releases contained in clause 2.3(b) of the
Release Agreement.” (Id.).
19

The Court adopts the reasoning of Solicitor Dean and
independently finds that the causes of action brought in the
Second Amended Complaint by Christopher against John, Esther,
and the Company are barred by the Release Agreement.

The

Motion for Summary Judgment is accordingly granted.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)

Defendants’ Motion
GRANTED.

for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 51) is

Plaintiff’s

Second

Amended

Complaint

is

dismissed because the claims he asserts are barred by the
Release Agreement dated May 20, 2015.
(2)

The Clerk is directed to issue a Judgment in favor of
Defendants

John

Veltheim,

Esther

Veltheim,

and

International BodyTalk Association, Inc. reflecting that
Plaintiff Christopher Veltheim’s claims asserted in the
Second

Amended

Complaint

are

barred

by

the

Release

Agreement dated May 20, 2015.
(3)

The Clerk shall close the case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 5th

day of January, 2017.

20