Shew et al v. Horvath
Filing
40
ORDER: Defendant William Horvath's Motion to Stay, or Alternatively Deny as Premature, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 28 ) is granted to the extent that the Court denies the Shews' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as prematurely asserted. Plaintiffs Ricky and Frances Shew's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 26 ) is denied. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 11/10/2016. (DMD)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
RICKY SHEW
and FRANCES SHEW,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CASE NO:
8:16-cv-766-T-33JSS
WILLIAM HORVATH,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This
Plaintiffs
matter
Ricky
comes
and
before
Frances
the
Shew’s
Court
pursuant
Motion
for
to
Partial
Summary Judgment, filed on September 8, 2016. (Doc. # 26).
Defendant
William
Alternatively
Deny
Horvath
as
filed
Premature,
a
Motion
to
Plaintiff’s
Stay,
Motion
or
for
Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 28), on September 13, 2016,
which the Shews opposed (Doc. # 29). Subsequently, Horvath
filed a response in opposition to the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on October 6, 2016, (Doc. # 33), to which
the Shews replied on October 17, 2016 (Doc. # 39). As set
forth below, the Court denies the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment as premature.
1
I.
Background
In June of 2015, Ricky and Frances Shew were living in
Hernando
County,
Florida,
when
William
Horvath
began
investigating them for mortgage fraud in his capacity as a
law enforcement officer with the Hernando County Sheriff’s
Office. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 2, 5-6). In the course of the
investigation, Horvath executed a probable cause affidavit to
obtain an arrest warrant for the Shews. (Id. at ¶ 7). Despite
the purported defects with the probable cause affidavit, of
which the Shews allege Horvath knew or should have known,
Horvath did obtain a warrant and arrested the Shews. (Id. at
¶¶ 8-10). However, the State Attorney decided not to prosecute
the case and filed a no information on December 8, 2015. (Id.
at ¶ 11).
In the Complaint, filed on March 30, 2016, the Shews
allege that Horvath violated their Fourth Amendment rights to
be free of unreasonable searches and seizures by arresting
them on the basis of a faulty probable cause affidavit. (Id.
at ¶¶ 1, 12). As a result of their arrest, the Shews incurred
damages in the form of attorney’s fees, and “monies expended
in posting a bond for their release from jail, as well as
damage to their reputation,
embarrassment, and emotional
distress.” (Id. at ¶ 13).
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Horvath denies that he lacked probable cause to arrest
the Shews and filed his Answer containing twelve defenses on
May 10, 2016. (Doc. # 5). Subsequently, on June 15, 2016, the
Court
entered
setting
its
February
establishing
Case
1,
March
Management
2017,
1,
as
2017,
as
and
the
the
Scheduling
discovery
Order
deadline,
dispositive
motions
deadline, scheduling the pretrial conference for August 17,
2017, and slating the case for the September of 2017 trial
term. (Doc. # 19).
On September 8, 2016, the Shews filed their Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 26). The Shews assert in
their
Motion
appropriate
that
summary
because
the
judgment
probable
as
to
cause
liability
affidavit
is
and
Horvath’s deposition “establish[] that [his] investigation at
the time of the issuance of the warrant was at best incomplete
and that he did not have probable cause to believe that [the
Shews] had committed the crime of mortgage fraud.” (Id. at ¶
3). The Shews conclude that “[b]ecause the warrant was issued
upon an affidavit which failed to establish probable cause,
and that no reasonable officer would have believed probable
cause existed, [the Shews’] Fourth Amendment rights were
violated
and
[Horvath]
is
not
immunity.” (Id. at ¶ 5).
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entitled
to
qualified
Horvath
moved
the
Court
to
stay
the
Motion,
or
alternatively deny it as premature, arguing that partial
summary
judgment
is
inappropriate
as
he
has
not
yet
significantly engaged in discovery. (Doc. # 28). Horvath
emphasizes that at the time the Shews filed their Motion and
Horvath responded, he had not yet deposed Ricky Shew and
“requests that the Court defer ruling on the Motion until
after” Horvath may engage in such discovery. (Id. at 3; Doc.
# 33 at 7). As explained below, Horvath has persuaded the
Court that the Shews’ request for partial summary judgment is
prematurely asserted.
II.
Analysis
Summary
judgment
is
appropriate
if
the
pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). As stated in Blumel v. Mylander, 919 F. Supp.
423, 428 (M.D. Fla. 1996), Rule 56 “implies [that] district
courts should not grant summary judgment until the non-movant
has had an adequate opportunity for discovery.”
Furthermore,
the Eleventh Circuit has determined that “summary judgment may
4
only be decided upon an adequate record.” Snook v. Trust Co.
of Ga. Bank, 859 F.2d 865, 870 (11th Cir. 1988).
The Eleventh Circuit expounded:
[S]ummary judgment should not be granted until the
party opposing the motion has had an adequate
opportunity for discovery.
The party opposing a
motion for summary judgment has a right to
challenge
the
affidavits
and
other
factual
materials submitted in support of the motion by
conducting sufficient discovery so as to enable him
to determine whether he can furnish opposing
affidavits.
If the documents or other discovery
sought would be relevant to the issues presented by
the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party
should be allowed the opportunity to utilize the
discovery process to gain access to the requested
materials.
Generally
summary
judgment
is
inappropriate when the party opposing the motion
has been unable to obtain responses to his
discovery requests.
Id. at 870 (internal citations omitted).
Horvath points out that he has not had a meaningful
opportunity to develop the facts through discovery. In the
Motion to Stay, Horvath identifies discovery that he seeks to
conduct, including taking the depositions of Ricky Shew and
other witnesses, in order to develop his defenses. (Doc. # 28
at 3; Doc. # 33 at 2, 7). The deposition of Ricky Shew was
scheduled for October 31, 2016, two weeks after the Shews
filed their reply and briefing on the Motion for Partial
Summary
Judgment
ended.
(Doc.
#
28
at
3;
Doc.
#
39).
Furthermore, the February 1, 2017, discovery deadline set by
5
the Court’s Case Management and Scheduling Order has yet to
expire. See (Doc. # 19).
Upon due consideration, the Court determines that the
Shews’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be denied
as premature. The court reached a similar result in Blumel,
919 F. Supp. at 423. There, the plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment “when discovery just began.” Id. at 429.
The court denied the motion for summary judgment as “blatantly
premature” after finding that “there has been inadequate time
for discovery.” Id. The court explained, “If the Court were
to rule on the merits of [the plaintiff’s] motion, such ruling
would
frustrate
the
[defendants’]
right
to
factually
investigate.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(providing
for
discovery
where
a
non-movant
cannot
present
facts
essential to justify its opposition to the summary judgment
motion); Royal Oak Enters., LLC v. Nature’s Grilling Prods.,
No. 1:10-cv-2494-JEC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133856, at *9
(N.D. Ga. Nov. 21, 2011)(“Depending on the evidence that is
developed during discovery, defendant may ultimately prevail
on its motion for summary judgment. However, at this stage in
the litigation, the motion is clearly premature.”).
The Court determines that the Shews’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment was prematurely filed. Therefore, in order
6
to allow the parties the opportunity to engage meaningfully
in discovery, the Court denies the Motion.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)
Defendant
William
Horvath’s
Motion
to
Stay,
or
Alternatively Deny as Premature, Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 28) is GRANTED to the
extent that the Court denies the Shews’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment as prematurely asserted.
(2)
Plaintiffs Ricky and Frances Shew’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Doc. # 26) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this
10th day of November, 2016.
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