Bolden v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER reversing the Commissioner's decision and remanding for further proceedings consistent with this Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Monte C. Richardson on 9/1/2017. (MEH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
NATHANIEL BOLDEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 8:16-cv-826-T-MCR
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal of an administrative
decision denying his applications for a period of disability, Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. Plaintiff filed his applications on
January 15, 2013, alleging disability as of January 5, 2012. (Tr. 14.) These
claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Id.) Plaintiff appeared at a
hearing held in front of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on January 7, 2015.
(Tr. 32-60.) The ALJ rendered a decision on March 5, 2015, finding Plaintiff not
disabled from January 5, 2012 through the date of the decision. (Tr. 14-26.)
Plaintiff has exhausted his available administrative remedies and the case is
properly before the Court. The Court has reviewed the record, the briefs, and the
applicable law. For the reasons stated herein, the Commissioner’s decision is
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The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate
Judge. (Docs. 19, 22.)
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
I.
Standard of Review
The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841
F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the Commissioner’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390
(1971). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir.
2004). Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence,
the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary
result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937
F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th
Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into
account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d
835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating the court must scrutinize the entire record to
determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s factual findings).
II.
Discussion
Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
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erred in evaluating the disability rating placed upon him by the Department of
Veterans Affairs (the “VA”). Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in
classifying his past relevant work as a “jailer.” Finally, Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ erred at step five in concluding that he had transferable skills with little to no
vocational adjustment in terms of tools, work processes and the industry, with
respect to other jobs he could perform in the national economy. The undersigned
agrees with Plaintiff with respect to his first contention and thus determines that
remand is warranted without addressing the second and third issues raised on
appeal.
A.
The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has severe impairments, including diabetes
mellitus, peripheral neuropathy, dermatitis or eczema, and stage three kidney
disease. (Tr. 17.) However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of one of the listed impairments 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P, Appendix
1. (Tr. 18.) The ALJ determined, in relevant part, that Plaintiff had the RFC to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds [sic] no
more than occasional climbing (ramps/stairs), crawling,
crouching or stooping, and no more than frequent balancing or
kneeling.
(Id.) The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff was able to perform his past relevant
work as a jailer or, alternatively, that there were jobs that existed in significant
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numbers in the national economy that he could perform. (Tr. 23-25.) As such,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant period. (Tr. 25.)
C.
B.
The ALJ Failed To Properly Consider The VA’s Decision
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly or adequately take into
account the VA’s decision and 60% disability rating with respect to his skin
condition. The undersigned agrees.
The findings of another agency, although not binding on the Commissioner,
are entitled to great weight. Falcon v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 827, 831 (11th Cir.
1984); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233. 1241 (11th Cir. 1983). According
to the Eleventh Circuit, this includes the decisions and disability ratings of the VA.
Hacia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 601 Fed. App’x 783, 785-86 (11th Cir. 2015).
While the Eleventh Circuit does not require the ALJ to quantify numerically the
exact weight given to a VA disability determination, the ALJ has a duty to
sufficiently explain “the weight accorded to each item of evidence” and the
reasons for those decisions to enable a reviewing court to determine whether the
ultimate decision is based on substantial evidence. Cowart v. Schweiker, 662
F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 2010).
Here, the ALJ stated that:
[He] is mindful that [Plaintiff] has a 60 percent disability rating
by the [VA] and he should be receiving disability payments
from that agency. However, the Social Security Administration
makes determinations of disability according to Social Security
law, therefore a determination of disability by another agency
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is not binding on this proceeding.
(Tr. 22 (internal citations omitted).) While the ALJ is correct that a VA disability
determination is not binding on the Commissioner, Eleventh Circuit case law
mandates that such determination be afforded “great weight” unless the
Commissioner articulates reasons supported by substantial evidence for
discounting such determination. See Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 921 (11th
Cir. 1984) (“Although the V.A.’s disability rating is not binding on the
[Commissioner], it is evidence that should be given great weight.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d 1233, 1241 (11th
Cir. 1983) (“The findings of disability by another agency, although not binding on
the [Commissioner], are entitled to great weight.”); Kemp v. Astrue, 308 F. App’x
423, 426 (11th Cir. 2009) (“‘A VA rating is certainly not binding on the Secretary,
but it is evidence that should be considered and is entitled to great weight.’”)
(quoting Rodriguez v. Schweiker, 640 F.2 682, 686 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also
Brown-Gaudet-Evans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 673 F. App’x 902, 904 (11th Cir.
2016) (“In making his own determination of whether Brown-Gaudet-Evans is
disabled, however, the ALJ must seriously consider and closely scrutinize the
VA’s disability determination and must give specific reasons if the ALJ discounts
that determination.”) (citing Rodriguez, 640 F.2d at 686). In concluding that the
Social Security Administration makes disability determinations based on different
criteria than the VA, the ALJ failed to sufficiently scrutinize the VA determination
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at issue and explain the reasons for discounting such determination. See, e.g.,
Brown-Gaudet-Evans, 673 F. App’x at 904 (“It is not disputed that the VA’s
‘disability’ determination relies on different criteria than the SSA’s determination.
But that does not mean that the ALJ can summarily ignore the VA’s determination
nor give it ‘little weight.’ Therefore, the ALJ erred.”); Hogard v. Sullivan, 733 F.
Supp. 1465, 1469 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (reversing the decision of the Commissioner
and remanding the case, in part, because “[t]he ALJ’s perfunctory rejection of the
VA disability rating as based on different criteria from Social Security disability
determinations does not indicate that he accorded it great weight as required by
the case law”); Cronin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:10-cv-1765-Orl-DAB, 2012
WL 3984703, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2012) (concluding that the ALJ erred in
discounting a VE disability rating “without providing a reasoned basis for
disregarding the weight normally given to a VE determination of 60% disability
from such disease”).
The Commissioner in her memorandum provided reasons why the VA
determination should be rejected by the ALJ. While reasons to reject the VA’s
disability determination may exist, the Court cannot affirm simply because some
rationale might have supported the ALJ’s conclusion. See Owens v. Heckler, 748
F. 2d 1511, 1516 (11 Cir. 1984) (“We decline . . . to affirm simply because some
rationale might have supported the ALJ’s conclusion.”). Therefore, this case will
be reversed and remanded with instructions to the ALJ to reconsider the VA’s
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disability determination, to explain what weight it is being accorded, and the
reasons therefor. If the ALJ rejects any portion of the VA disability determination,
he must clearly articulate and explain his reasons for doing so. In light of this
conclusion and the possible change in the RFC, the Court need not address
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments. See Jackson v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.2
(11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Freese v. Astrue, 2008 WL 1777722, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 18, 2008); see also Demenech v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 913 F.2d 882, 884 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1.
The Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED pursuant to sentence
four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and REMANDED with instructions to the ALJ to: (a)
reconsider the VA’s disability determination, and explain what weight it is being
accorded and the reasons therefor; and (b) conduct any further proceedings
deemed appropriate.
2.
In the event that benefits are awarded on remand, any § 406(b) or §
1383(d)(2) fee application shall be filed within the parameters set forth by the
Order entered in In re: Procedures for Applying for Attorney’s Fees Under 42
U.S.C. §§ 406(b) & 1383(d)(2), Case No.: 6:12-mc-124-Orl-22 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 13,
2012). This Order does not extend the time limits for filing a motion for attorney’s
fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
3.
The clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and
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close the file.
DONE AND ENTERED as Jacksonville, Florida, on September 1, 2017.
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
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