Merlin Petroleum Company, Inc. v. Sarabia et al

Filing 23

ORDER denying without prejudice as premature 18 Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Javier Sarabia. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 6/29/2016. (LN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MERLIN PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:16-cv-1000-T-30TBM

PEDRO JAVIER SARABIA and
CARLA CARLINA RAMIREZ EDWARDS,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/

ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment against Defendant Javier Sarabia (Dkt. 18) and Defendants’ Response in
Opposition (Dkt. 22). The Court, upon review of the filings, and being otherwise advised
in the premises, concludes that the motion for summary judgment should be denied without
prejudice as premature.
DISCUSSION
This is a breach of contract case related to a past debt that Defendants purportedly
owe to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff filed the instant motion for summary judgment before

Defendants answered the complaint and before the Court issued the case management and
scheduling order. In support of its motion, Plaintiff relies on one, conclusory affidavit, and
seeks judgment against Defendant Javier Sarabia in the amount of $1,568,407.41.

Sarabia’s response in opposition argues that Plaintiff’s motion is premature because
discovery has just commenced. Sarabia’s response also relies on his declaration, which
creates numerous material issues of fact. For example, Sarabia’s declaration creates an issue
of fact with respect to whether the purported contract lacked consideration. His declaration
also creates a genuine issue as to whether the contract was materially breached.
The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is premature because
Sarabia has been deprived of conducting adequate discovery at this early stage in the
litigation. As stated in Blumel v. Mylander, 919 F. Supp. 423, 428 (M.D. Fla. 1996), Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “implies [that] district courts should not grant
summary judgment until the non-movant has had an adequate opportunity for discovery.”
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit has decisively determined that “summary judgment may
only be decided upon an adequate record.” Snook v. Trust Co. of Ga. Bank, 859 F.2d 865,
870 (11th Cir. 1988). The Eleventh Circuit expounded:
[S]ummary judgment should not be granted until the party opposing the
motion has had an adequate opportunity for discovery. The party opposing a
motion for summary judgment has a right to challenge the affidavits and other
factual materials submitted in support of the motion by conducting sufficient
discovery so as to enable him to determine whether he can furnish opposing
affidavits. If the documents or other discovery sought would be relevant to the
issues presented by the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party
should be allowed the opportunity to utilize the discovery process to gain
access to the requested materials. Generally summary judgment is
inappropriate when the party opposing the motion has been unable to obtain
responses to his discovery requests.
Id. at 870 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the motion is denied as premature.

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Notably, even if the Court considered the merits of the motion, Sarabia’s declaration
presents material disputed facts that would prevent the entry of judgment in Plaintiff’s favor
on the breach of contract claim.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment against Defendant Javier Sarabia (Dkt. 18) is denied without prejudice
as premature.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on June 29, 2016.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record
S:\Even\2016\16-cv-1000.msj-premature-deny.wpd

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