Graham v. Pyramid Healthcare Solutions, Inc.

Filing 58

ORDER: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 50 is denied. Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification 44 is granted. The Court certifies the following class: Background Check Class: All Pyramid Healthcare Solutions, Inc. employ ees and job applicants who applied for or worked in a position at Pyramid Healthcare Solutions, Inc. in the United States and who were the subject of a consumer report that was procured by Pyramid Healthcare Solutions, Inc. within two years of the fi ling of this complaint and as to whom Pyramid Healthcare Solutions, Inc. used the employment application and purported disclosure and authorization form substantially similar to Exhibit A. The Court approves Denise Graham as Class Representative and her counsel, Andrew Ross Frisch, C. Ryan Morgan, and Marc Reed Edelman, as Class Counsel. The parties are provided thirty (30) days from the date of this Order to confer regarding issues that may arise associated with the administration of the clas s, including the form and content of the notice, and the establishment of an opt-out period and procedure, and shall advise the Court on these efforts and whether there are issues that require the Court's resolution. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 6/28/2017. (LN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

DENISE GRAHAM, on her own behalf and
all similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO: 8:16-cv-1324-T-30AAS

PYRAMID HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS,
INC.,
Defendant.
____________________________________/

ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification
(Dkt. 44), Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 50) and the parties’ respective
responses thereto. The Court, having reviewed the motions, responses, record evidence, and
being otherwise advised in the premises, concludes that Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment should be denied and Plaintiff’s motion for class certification should be granted.
BACKGROUND
This is a putative class action brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).
According to the amended complaint, in October 2015, Plaintiff Denise Graham applied for
employment with Defendant Pyramid Healthcare Solutions, Inc. Defendant offered Plaintiff
employment, subject to Plaintiff’s successful completion of a background check. Thereafter,
Defendant obtained Plaintiff’s background check from a consumer reporting agency.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant rescinded its job offer based upon the results of the
background check.
Counts I and II of the amended complaint allege, in relevant part, that the disclosure
form Plaintiff and the other putative class members executed to authorize Defendant to obtain
a background report as part of the employment process failed to comply with 15 U.S.C. §
1681b(b)(2)(A)’s requirement of a stand-alone disclosure. Specifically, under the FCRA, an
employer must disclose to a job seeker that “a consumer report may be obtained for
employment purposes” and must obtain authorization from a consumer before procuring her
consumer report. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2). To ensure that prospective employees are
adequately informed about their rights concerning these consumer reports, the FCRA
requires that this information be provided “in a document that consists solely of the
disclosure.” Id. at § 1681b(b)(2)(A). This is commonly known as the “stand-alone
disclosure requirement.”
With respect to the violations of § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i), Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
provided Plaintiff and other putative class members a form titled Background Check
Disclosure and Authorization (“Disclosure Form”). Plaintiff alleges that the Disclosure Form
violated the FCRA by containing extraneous information. The Disclosure Form included
numerous items of information and authorizations that were unrelated to the disclosure,
including the business logo of the consumer reporting agency; blank lines for “Organization
Name” and “Account”; a reference to an unidentified “Organization”; the name and address
and phone number of the consumer reporting agency; a false statement that a copy of “A
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Summary of Your Rights Under the FCRA” was attached; various disclosures relating to
state law that were irrelevant and unrelated to the disclosure required under federal law; and
a broad authorization requiring Plaintiff and the putative class members to forego their legal
rights.
As a result of these violations, Plaintiff’s second class claim alleges that, in addition
to 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i), Defendant also violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) by
obtaining consumer reports on Plaintiff and other putative class members without proper
authorization.
Plaintiff requests, in relevant part, statutory damages under the FCRA based on
Defendant’s willful violations of the stand-alone disclosure requirement. With respect to the
injury suffered, Plaintiff alleges that she and the putative class suffered a concrete harm
because they were deprived of a disclosure that complied with the FCRA’s requirements.
Plaintiff also contends that Defendant’s failure to provide a stand-alone disclosure invaded
Plaintiff’s and the putative members’ privacy because Defendant obtained a consumer report
that it was not legally entitled to under the FCRA.
Defendant now moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims, arguing that
Plaintiff does not have standing and that, even if she did, Defendant’s actions were not
willful. Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion and separately moves for class certification

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under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because standing is a threshold issue,
the Court will address Defendant’s motion first.1
DISCUSSION
I.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
A.

Standard of Review

Motions for summary judgment should be granted only when the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). The existence of some factual disputes between the litigants will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported summary judgment motion; “the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986) (emphasis in original). The substantive law applicable to the claimed causes of action
will identify which facts are material. Id. Throughout this analysis, the court must examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences
in its favor. Id. at 255.

1

Although the Court begins with Defendant’s motion because it concerns threshold
issues, the Court acknowledges that Plaintiff filed her motion for class certification before
Defendant moved for summary judgment.
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B.

Plaintiff’s Standing

Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring this action because she
did not suffer a concrete injury. Defendant asserted this same argument in its motion to
dismiss, which the Court denied. (Dkts. 19, 32). Defendant does not point to anything that
would convince the Court to change its prior ruling. As the Court explained in its Order
denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 32), to establish standing a plaintiff “must have
(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
The record before the Court demonstrates that Plaintiff suffered a concrete and
particularized injury in fact: Plaintiff has statutorily-created rights under the FCRA to receive
a clear and conspicuous stand-alone disclosure. See Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654
Fed.Appx. 990, 994 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that not receiving information to which one
is statutorily entitled is a “concrete” injury); Nicklaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 839 F.3d 998,
1002 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting that a “plaintiff who alleges a violation of a statutory right to
receive information alleges a concrete injury”); Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, Inc. v. John
G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245, 1251 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting various decisions of
the Supreme Court for the following proposition: “Congress may create a statutory right or
entitlement[,] the alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even where the
plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute. In
other words, ‘[t]he actual or threatened injury required by Art[icle] III may exist solely by
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virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’”); see also
Moody v. Ascenda USA, Inc., Case No. 16-cv-60364-WPD, 2016 WL 5900216, at *3 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 5, 2016) (“Plaintiffs suffered a concrete informational injury because Defendant
failed to provide Plaintiffs with information to which they were entitled to by statute, namely
a stand-alone FCRA disclosure form. Through the FCRA, Congress has created a new
right—the right to receive the required disclosure as set out in the FCRA—and a new
injury—not receiving a stand-alone disclosure.”).
In sum, the Court does not depart from its prior ruling that Plaintiff’s standing “was
established when Plaintiff alleged Defendant procured a consumer report on her background
without following the FCRA’s disclosure and authorization requirements.” (Dkt. 32).
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is denied with respect to this issue. See Hargrett v.
Amazon.com DEDC LLC, No. 8:15-CV-2456-T-26EAJ, 2017 WL 416427, at *4-*5 (M.D.
Fla. Jan. 30, 2017) (denying a nearly identical standing argument because: “The invasion of
Plaintiffs’ right to receive a stand-alone disclosure document required by the FCRA is not
hypothetical or uncertain.”).
C.

Whether Defendant Willfully Violated the FCRA

Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a), “[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply with any
requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that
consumer . . .” See Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., 564 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir.
2009). Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on all of the
FCRA claims because it did not willfully violate the FCRA.
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An FCRA violation is “willful” if it is either intentional or committed in reckless
disregard of the defendant’s duties under the Act. See Safeco Ins. Co. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47,
57-58 (2007). Recklessness is measured by an objective standard; a defendant’s conduct is
reckless if it “entail[s] an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious
that it should be known.” Id. at 68. A defendant does not act in reckless disregard of the
FCRA “unless the action is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of the statute’s
terms, but shows that the company ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than
the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless.” Id. at 69.
“To take advantage of the ‘objectively reasonable interpretation’ safe harbor, Safeco
requires that the defendant [] ‘adopt[ed]’ and acted on an interpretation of the statute.”
Milbourne v. JRK Residential Am., LLC, 202 F. Supp. 3d 585, 591 (E.D. Va. 2016) (quoting
Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70 n.20). The “objectively reasonable” analysis of Safeco does not apply
absent evidence that Defendant acted in reliance on an interpretation of the relevant provision
of the FCRA or that Defendant’s conduct might be acceptable under the statute. See id.
Here, as Plaintiff points out, there is no evidence that Defendant researched the
FCRA, interpreted the FCRA, or adopted an interpretation of the FCRA. Rather, much like
the defendant in Milbourne, Defendant “simply used a form that had been provided to it by
a third-party background check vendor.” Milbourne, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 592 (“In sum, there
is nothing in the record from which the Court could infer that anyone at JRK made a decision
as to what the word “solely” in § 1681b(b)(2) requires or that anyone at JRK ever sought
advice on whether inclusion of the release in the form was permissible, either at the time that
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JRK adopted the Standard Disclosure Form or at any point thereafter. Therefore, the
“objective reasonableness” analysis called for by Safeco does not apply in this case.”).
Accordingly, the question of whether the alleged violations of § 1681b(b)(2) were knowing
or reckless must be left to the finder of fact and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
is denied with respect to this issue. See Hargrett, 2017 WL 416427, at *6 (“Willfulness is
typically a question of fact for the jury.”).
II.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Rule 23 Class Certification
Plaintiff seeks certification of the following class:
Background Check Class: All Pyramid Healthcare Solutions, Inc. employees
and job applicants who applied for or worked in a position at Pyramid
Healthcare Solutions, Inc. in the United States and who were the subject of a
consumer report that was procured by Pyramid Healthcare Solutions, Inc.
within two years of the filing of this complaint through the date of final
judgment and as to whom Pyramid Healthcare Solutions, Inc. used the
employment application and purported disclosure and authorization form
substantially similar to Exhibit A.2

As explained below, the Court concludes that class certification is appropriate under the facts
of this case.
A.

Standard of Review

A district court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether to certify a
class. See Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 959 F.2d 1566, 1569 (11th
Cir. 1992). However, a district court may certify a class action only if Plaintiff has met the

2

Exhibit A is the Background Check Disclosure and Authorization form that Defendant
provided to Plaintiff in order to obtain a consumer report for employment purposes.
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implicit and explicit requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52 (2011); Vega v. T-Mobile USA,
Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2009).
As a threshold issue, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the proposed class is “adequately
defined and clearly ascertainable.”3 Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2012). Assuming the class is ascertainable, Plaintiff must then prove that there are “in
fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, typicality of claims or
defenses, and adequacy of representation as required by Rule 23(a).” Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff must also satisfy
through evidentiary proof at least one of the provisions of Rule 23(b). See id. Only after a
“rigorous analysis” may a court determine that the movant has satisfied Rule 23’s
prerequisites and properly certify the class. See id.
B.

“Adequately Defined and Clearly Ascertainable”

The Eleventh Circuit instructs that “a class is not ascertainable unless the class
definition contains objective criteria that allow for class members to be identified in an
administratively feasible way.” Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 Fed.Appx. 945, 946 (11th
Cir. 2015) (citing Bussey v. Macon Cnty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 Fed.Appx. 782, 787
(11th Cir. 2014)). Identifying class members is administratively feasible when it is a

3

Standing is also a threshold issue: as explained in detail above, the Court has already
concluded that Plaintiff has adequate standing to assert the class claims. See Busby v. JRHBW
Realty, Inc., 513 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008).
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“manageable process that does not require much, if any, individual inquiry.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, this element is easily satisfied because the class members are limited to those
individuals who were provided the same Disclosure Form as Plaintiff and there is nothing
in the record to indicate that it would be unfeasible to identify the class members. Notably,
Defendant has already produced to Plaintiff documents indicating that approximately 250
individuals were provided with the subject Disclosure Form during the relevant time. And
Defendant does not contest this issue. Accordingly, identifying the class members should
be a manageable process.
C.

Requirements under Rule 23(a)

The four elements required for class certification under Rule 23(a) are: (1) numerosity,
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) commonality, there
are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) typicality, the claims or defenses of the
class are typical; and (4) adequacy, the class representative will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. Luna, 2009 WL 4366953, at *1 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)); Hines
v. Widnall, 334 F.3d 1253, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2003); Franze v. Equitable Assurance, 296
F.3d 1250, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002).
1.

Numerosity and impracticability of joinder

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.” Plaintiffs seeking class certification do not need to know the exact size of
the proposed class. See Agan v. Katzman & Korr, P.A., 222 F.R.D. 692, 696 (S.D. Fla.
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2004). While the size of the proposed class is relevant to a court’s determination, other
factors such as “the geographic diversity of the class members, the nature of the action, the
size of each plaintiff’s claim, judicial economy and the inconvenience of trying individual
lawsuits, and the ability of the individual class members to institute individual lawsuits”
should also be considered. Id. (quotations omitted).
Defendant does not challenge Plaintiff’s assertion that Rule 23(a)’s numerosity
requirement is met with a putative class of a minimum of 250 applicants. The Court
concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement.
2.

Common questions of law and fact

The commonality requirement typically “refers to the group of characteristics of the
class.” Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2000). To
satisfy the commonality requirement, “a class action must involve issues that are susceptible
to class wide proof.” Cooper v. Southern. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 714 (11th Cir. 2004), overruled
on other grounds, (quoting Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 811 (11th Cir. 2001)).
However, it is not necessary that all members of the class have identical claims. See PradoSteiman, 221 F.3d at 1279 n.14. Commonality, like typicality, focuses “on whether a
sufficient nexus exists between the legal claims of the named class representatives and those
of individual class members.” Id. at 1278.
The Court concludes that a sufficient nexus clearly exists here. Plaintiff asserts
common questions of fact among the class members, who are all applicants that were
provided the same Disclosure Form.

The common legal questions include whether
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Defendant willfully violated the FCRA when it provided the class members the Disclosure
Form. Plaintiff has satisfied Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement.
3.

Typicality

Typicality requires that a class representative “possess the same interest and suffer the
same injury as the class members.” Cooper, 390 F.3d at 713. Thus, “the typicality
requirement is satisfied if ‘the claims or defenses of the class and class representative arise
from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on the same theory.’” Agan, 222
F.R.D. at 698 (quoting Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332, 1337 (11th
Cir. 1984)). Even if the fact patterns are unique to each claim, the typicality requirement will
be satisfied if the class representative and class members experienced the same unlawful
conduct. See Agan, 222 F.R.D. at 698. However, like commonality, Rule 23 does not
require that all members of the class possess identical claims. See id. at 714.
Defendant does not contest this issue and the Court concludes that this factor is met
for the reasons already stated, i.e, Plaintiff and the class members’ claims arise from the same
conduct and essentially the same factual and legal bases. Therefore, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff has satisfied Rule 23(a)’s typicality requirement.
4.

Adequacy of protection of class interests

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.” There are two separate inquiries under this section: (1)
whether there are any substantial conflicts of interest between the named representatives of
the class and the class members; and (2) whether the representatives will adequately
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prosecute the action. See Busby, 513 F.3d at 1323 (citing Valley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at
1189). This requirement serves to uncover any conflict of interest that named parties may
have with the class they represent. See Amchem Products, Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
627 (1997). “If substantial conflicts of interest are determined to exist among a class, class
certification is inappropriate.” Id. Minor conflicts alone will not defeat class certification,
the conflict must be “fundamental” to the specific issues in the case. Id. Under this section,
the Court must also consider the competency and any conflicts that the class counsel may
have. See id. at 627 n.20.
Defendant does not contest this element. The Court’s independent review reveals that
there are no conflicts of interest between Plaintiff and the class members. Moreover, it
appears that Plaintiff will adequately prosecute this action. Plaintiff has satisfied Rule
23(a)’s adequacy requirement. The Court also concludes that Plaintiff’s counsel are adequate
as class counsel.
D.

Requirements under Rule 23(b)

As stated above, in order to have a class certified, the representative Plaintiff must not
only satisfy Rule 23(a), but must also show that she meets one of the alternative requirements
of Rule 23(b). Plaintiff’s motion indicates that the claims satisfy the requirements for
certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
For class certification to be appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3), common questions must
predominate over questions that affect only individual members and the class action must be
a superior method for a “fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Cooper, 390
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F.3d at 722 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3)). Thus, rule 23(b)(3) imposes two additional
requirements to Rule 23(a): predominance and increased efficiency (superiority). See id.
(citing Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1006 (11th Cir. 1997)).
1.

Predominance

The issues raised in the class action that are subject to generalized proof and that are
applicable to the class as a whole “must predominate over those issues that are subject only
to individualized proof.” Babineau, 576 F.3d at 1191 (quoting Kerr, 875 F.2d at 1558).
“Common issues will not predominate over individual questions if, ‘as a practical matter, the
resolution of [an] overarching common issue breaks down into an unmanageable variety of
individual legal and factual issues.’” Id. at 1191 (quoting Andrews v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
95 F.3d 1014,1023 (11th Cir. 1996)). A class should not be certified if it appears that most
of the plaintiff’s claims have highly case-specific factual issues. See id. The predominance
requirement is “far more demanding” than the commonality requirement. Jackson, 130 F.3d
at 1005.
The Court concludes that the class claims predominate over any individual legal and
factual issues. The central common issues in this case are whether Defendant’s FCRA forms
satisfy the notice and authorization requirements under the FCRA and, if not, whether
Defendant’s failure to comply with the FCRA was willful. These common issues can be
decided uniformly for all class members.
Defendant’s opposition on this point is unpersuasive because whether its disclosure
forms violated the FCRA does not require an individualized inquiry. Similarly, whether
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Defendant’s conduct was willful requires no inquiry from the class members; this legal issue
focuses solely on Defendant’s actions. Simply put, Plaintiff does not have to prove a variety
of individual circumstances to support the alleged FCRA violations because any violations
stemming from the same FCRA disclosure form were uniformly directed to all members of
the putative class.
2.

Superiority of Class Action

Rule 23(b)(3) requires a finding that “[the] class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” The Court looks to the four
non-exclusive factors listed in Rule 23(b)(3):
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
It is unlikely that the individual class members would have any interest in instituting
a lawsuit or in controlling their own individual actions and Plaintiff states that, to date, class
members have not filed individual FCRA lawsuits against Defendant. It is also desirable to
conduct the litigation in this forum and the process of bringing individual actions would be
more onerous than managing a class action. The alternative of having a plethora of
individual claims for damages arising out of the exact same conduct offers neither efficiency

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nor fairness to Defendant or the putative class. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff
has established the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
In sum, common legal questions and facts predominate over any individual issues in
this case. Class action is an appropriate vehicle for the fair and efficient adjudication of this
controversy. See, e.g., Speer v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., Case No.: 8:14-cv-3035-T26TBM (M.D. Fla. Sep. 16, 2015) (Dkt. 58) (FCRA class preliminarily certified by Judge
Lazzara based on identical FCRA claims for settlement purposes); Reardon v. ClosetMaid
Corp., Case No. 2:08-cv-01730, 2011 WL 1628041 (W.D. Pa. April 27, 2011) (FCRA class
certification granted based on similar claims). Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
1.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 50) is denied.

2.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification (Dkt. 44) is granted.

3.

The Court certifies the following class:
Background Check Class: All Pyramid Healthcare Solutions,
Inc. employees and job applicants who applied for or worked in
a position at Pyramid Healthcare Solutions, Inc. in the United
States and who were the subject of a consumer report that was
procured by Pyramid Healthcare Solutions, Inc. within two
years of the filing of this complaint and as to whom Pyramid
Healthcare Solutions, Inc. used the employment application and
purported disclosure and authorization form substantially similar
to Exhibit A.

4.

The Court approves Denise Graham as Class Representative and her counsel,
Andrew Ross Frisch, C. Ryan Morgan, and Marc Reed Edelman, as Class
Counsel.
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5.

The parties are provided thirty (30) days from the date of this Order to confer
regarding issues that may arise associated with the administration of the class,
including the form and content of the notice, and the establishment of an optout period and procedure, and shall advise the Court on these efforts and
whether there are issues that require the Court’s resolution.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on June 28, 2017.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record

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