Bostick v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

Filing 71

ORDER: Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Expert Steven Koontz's Opinions and Testimony (Doc. # 54 ) is denied. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 6/28/2017. (KAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
LISA N. BOSTICK,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:16-cv-1400-T-33AAS

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This cause is before the Court pursuant to Defendant
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s Motion to
Strike

Plaintiff’s

Expert

Steven

Koontz’s

Opinions

and

Testimony (Doc. # 54), filed May 4, 2017. Plaintiff Lisa N.
Bostick filed a Response in Opposition to State Farm’s Motion
on June 5, 2017 (Doc. # 61), and State Farm filed a Reply on
June 19, 2017. (Doc. # 68). For the reasons that follow, the
Court denies the Motion.
I.

Background
Bostick filed her Complaint in state court against State

Farm seeking payment of underinsured motorist benefits as the
result of a car accident that occurred on November 14, 2013.

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(Doc. # 2).

State Farm removed the case on June 2, 2016,

based on complete diversity of citizenship. (Doc. # 1).
On June 29, 2016, the Court entered its Case Management
and Scheduling Order setting December 19, 2016, as Bostick’s
deadline to disclose expert reports. (Doc. # 13). Later,
Bostick filed an Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to
Complete

Discovery

which

the

Court

granted

by

extending

Bostick’s expert disclosure deadline to February 14, 2017.
(Doc. ## 34–35).
Bostick

has

retained

professional

engineer,

Steven

Koontz, P.E., to offer expert testimony at trial. (Doc. #
54). On February 13, 2017, Bostick provided Koontz’s “Traffic
Crash Investigation Report” to State Farm, which contains
Koontz’s analysis and conclusions regarding the physics of
the collision and forces that affected Bostick’s body. (Doc.
# 54-1).
At this juncture, State Farm seeks an Order striking
Koontz’s testimony and opinions on the grounds that (1) his
opinions are not based upon sufficient facts or data and (2)
will not help the trier of fact to understand or determine a
fact in issue. (Doc. # 54 at 2). State Farm also argues that
Koontz’s opinions should be stricken because they are either:
“not actually opinions, but simply a statement of undisputed

2 

facts; irrelevant; speculative; solely for the purpose of
bolstering; unfairly prejudicial; or a combination of these
reasons for inadmissibility.” (Doc. # 53 at 2–3).

The Court

will first evaluate whether Koontz’s testimony satisfies the
evidentiary

rules

Daubert analysis.

for

expert

testimony

by

conducting

a

The Court will then assess the relevance

and admissibility of his testimony.
II.

Daubert Analysis
Federal

Rule

of

Evidence

702,

which

governs

the

admissibility of expert testimony, states that:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge,
skill,
experience,
training,
or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise
if:
(a)
the
expert’s
scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is
based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied
the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
When

a

party

raises

an

objection

to

an

expert’s

testimony, the Court must perform its gatekeeping duty to
determine whether the expert testimony “is not only relevant,
but reliable.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579,
589 (1993). When deciding Daubert issues, the trial judge has
broad discretion in how the review is conducted. Kumho Tire

3 

Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). Usually, “the
rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than
the rule.” See Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 Amendment
to Rule 702.
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a three-part analysis
for determining whether expert testimony is admissible under
Daubert and Rule 702:
To fulfill their obligation under Daubert, district
courts must engage in a rigorous inquiry to
determine whether: (1) the expert is qualified to
testify competently regarding the matters he
intends to address; (2) the methodology by which
the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently
reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry
mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists
the trier of fact, through the application of
scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.
Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1291–92 (11th Cir.
2005) (internal citations omitted). The party offering the
expert has the burden of satisfying each of these elements by
a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1292; see also Allison
v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 1999).
A.

Koontz is Qualified

Koontz is a senior forensic engineer at Florida Forensic
Engineering. (Doc. # 54-2 at 2). He obtained a Bachelor’s
degree in mechanical engineering from Purdue University and

4 

is licensed as an engineer in Florida. (Id. at 3). Based on
these credentials, State Farm does not challenge that Koontz
is qualified as an expert in the fields of engineering and
physics.

Therefore,

the

Court

concludes

that

Koontz

is

qualified to testify competently regarding the Traffic Crash
Investigation Report and the first prong of the Daubert
analysis is satisfied.
B.

Koontz’s Methodology

Koontz determined the forces exerted upon Bostick during
the collision by reviewing supplied materials, photographs of
the accident, and a property damage estimate. (Doc. # 61 at
6). Koontz utilized these sources to conduct his calculations
and analysis. (Id.). The reconstruction approach used by
Koontz has been peer reviewed and is one of the accepted
engineering methodologies regularly used by experts in the
field. (Id.). But, State Farm seeks to exclude Koontz’s expert
testimony because it is based on speculation and “mere guess
work” instead of sufficient facts or data. (Doc. # 54 at 3–
4).
The majority of State Farm’s arguments rely upon the
assertion that Koontz erroneously assumed there was damage to
the bumper structure and used this fact in his calculations.
(Id. at 3–6). The Court is not convinced Koontz’s opinions

5 

and testimony should be stricken. In Taylor, Bean & Whitaker
Mortgage Corp. v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., No. 5:05-cv-260-OcGRJ, 2008 WL 3819752, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2008), the
court noted:
[T]hese arguments go more to the weight of the
evidence, than the admissibility of the evidence
under Daubert. The Court need not determine that
the expert [defendant] seeks to offer into evidence
is irrefutable or certainly correct. The certainty
and correctness of [the expert’s] opinion will be
tested through cross-examination and presentation
of contrary evidence and not by a Daubert
challenge. Indeed the Court’s role as gatekeeper
is not intended to supplant the adversary system or
the role of the jury.
Id.
The reasoning adopted in Taylor, Bean & Whitaker is
applicable here. Whether or not Koontz includes a certain
variable in his calculations does not establish that his
opinions are unsound. An argument against data or facts used
in calculations does not discredit the methodology. State
Farm should resolve their challenges to Koontz’s methodology
through the adversary system: “Vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on
the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means
of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Allison, 184
F.3d at 1311-12 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596).

6 

The

Court

concludes

that

Koontz’s

methodology

is

sufficiently reliable and satisfies the second factor of the
Daubert analysis.
C.

Koontz Will Assist the Trier of Fact

Expert testimony is helpful to the trier of fact “if it
concerns matters that are beyond the understanding of the
average lay person.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244,
1262 (11th Cir. 2004). In other words, “[p]roffered expert
testimony generally will not help the trier of fact when it
offers nothing more than what lawyers for the parties can
argue in closing arguments.” Id. at 1262–63.
Koontz

has

applied

engineering,

training

professional

experience

in
as

his

education

accident
an

in

mechanical

reconstruction,

engineer

to

develop

and
his

opinions regarding this case. (Doc. # 54-2 at 2–3). He will
testify about “the forces involved in the collision impact,”
not about any medical causation. (Doc. # 61 at 4). It is
unlikely that the average lay person possesses the education
and training necessary to understand the forces and physics
involved in a collision, and the jury will be able to use
Koontz’s opinions to evaluate the testimony of the medical
doctors. (Id.). Thus, the Court finds that Koontz’s testimony
will assist the trier of fact and denies the Motion to Strike

7 

Koontz’s opinions and testimony to the extent those arguments
are predicated upon Daubert and Rules 702, 703, and 705 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
III. Relevancy Discussion and Rule 403 Balancing Test
Koontz’s

expert

report

contains

“Conclusions”

reached

“within

a

the

reasonable

following
degree

of

Engineering certainty:”












The rear bumper of the Bostick vehicle was damaged by
the crash.
The front bumper and radiator support of the Alsup
vehicle were damaged by this crash.
Measurements of the exten[t] of these damages were not
made.
The calculations are based on the maximum impact that
would cause no structural damage to either vehicle, and
thus represent minimum values – the actual values may be
significantly higher.
The Bostick vehicle was at a stop at the time of the
crash.
The front of the Alsup vehicle struck the rear of the
Bostick vehicle.1
The impact speed was about 12.6 miles per hour.
The two vehicles attained a common velocity of about 7.1
miles per hour.
The Bostick vehicle was accelerated at about 5.4g.
Ms. Bostick indicated that she braced for impact,
serving to reduce the time over which forces were
transferred to her from the [seat] and thereby
increasing the magnitude of the peak of those forces and
accelerations; thus the forces calculated for her head
are again a minimum value and the actual values may be
significantly higher.

1

  It is undisputed that Blair Alsup, a non-party, caused
the car accident at issue.  

8 







Ms. Bostick underwent a transverse force of about 571
pounds and a vertical force of about 241 pounds at
impact.
Ms. Bostick’s head experienced a transverse force of
about 109 pounds and a transverse acceleration of about
13.1g at impact.
Ms. Bostick’s head experienced a vertical force of about
193 pounds and a vertical acceleration of about 23.1g at
impact.
The forces calculated relating to Ms. Bostick are those
applied externally by the seat during the crash.
Forces internal to Ms. Bostick’s body are not calculated
herein and are typically higher than those applied
externally.

(Doc. # 54-1 at 6).
State Farm attacks Koontz’s testimony as irrelevant,
citing Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402.
evidence

is

existence

“evidence

of

any

having

fact

that

any
is

tendency
of

to

consequence

Relevant
make

the

to

the

determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401.
As highlighted by Bostick, the parties disagree as to whether
this is a “minor impact” fender-bender case or “one of
sufficient force to inflict injuries upon Dr. Bostick.” (Doc.
# 61 at 8).

Koontz’s testimony describes the forces involved

in the accident.

For instance, Koontz theorizes that Bostick

“underwent a transverse force of about 571 pounds and a
vertical force of about 241 pounds at impact” with her head
experiencing

“a

vertical

acceleration

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of

about

23.1g

at

impact.” (Doc. # 54-1 at 6).
relevance

of

these

contends

that

the

State Farm questions the

calculations.
car

crash

was

However,
a

State

low-impact

Farm

collision

happening at such slow speeds that it was not possible that
Bostick

sustained

the

injuries

that

she

claims

to

have

suffered. Due to the dispute regarding the nature of the
crash, the strength of the forces involved, and causation for
Bostick’s alleged injuries and impairments, the Court finds
Koontz’s testimony is relevant.
State Farm also isolates some of Koontz’s opinions and
points

out

that

such

opinions

are

really

statements

of

undisputed fact – such as Koontz’s “conclusion” that “The
Bostick vehicle was at a stop at the time of the crash.”
(Id.).

However, the Court would not strike an expert’s

opinion

as

irrelevant

other

the

expert

foundational

has
facts

interwoven

undisputed

facts

testimony.

Koontz is an engineer and a crash reconstruction

expert.

and

because

into

his

He is not an attorney and has not neatly parceled

out each “fact” upon which he bases his conclusions.

That

Koontz’s opinions rest on a firm factual basis actually lends
support to testimony, rather than robbing it of relevance.
State

Farm

also

asserts

that

Koontz

has

provided

“inherently speculative” opinions regarding “something that

10 

‘may’ occur or . . . something that Koontz did not even
calculate.”

(Doc.

#

54

at

10).

But,

“[t]here

are

no

certainties in science.” Navelski v. Int’l Paper, No. 3:14cv-445, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44411, at *16 (N.D. Fla. Mar.
25, 2017)(citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590). The Court rejects
State

Farm’s

assertion

that

Koontz,

a

senior

forensic

engineer, has provided an “inherently speculative” opinion
regarding the forces at play in a car accident.

During the

course of the trial, State Farm is free to question Koontz
regarding his methods, but State Farm has not shown that
Koontz relies on mere speculation such that his opinion is
reduced to the point of irrelevance.
Nor has State Farm demonstrated that Koontz’s opinion
should be excluded under Rule 403.

Rule 403 allows a Court

to exclude relevant evidence when the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Here, State
Farm contends that the probative value of Koontz’s testimony
is outweighed by the confusing and misleading nature of his
opinions.

The Court will perform the Rule 403 balancing test

at the time of the trial, but at this preliminary juncture,

11 

the Court is not convinced that Koontz’s testimony should be
characterized as either misleading or confusing.
The

Court

also

rejects

State

Farm’s

assertion

that

Koontz’s opinions constitute improper “bolstering.” (Doc. #
54 at 9).

Bostick persuasively contends:

The forensic engineering analysis provides a
description of the forces at work during the
accident. The forces are relevant to show what the
body experienced during the accident. How the body
responds to the forces through symptoms and
development of medical conditions, along with the
extent and permanency of the body, brain and mind
impairments is a medical question. The doctors can
speak to body symptoms and conditions reasonably
likely medically connected to forces of the nature
described by Mr. Koontz.
(Doc.

#

61

at

9).

Rather

than

presenting

“dangling”

conclusions of “no consequence in determining this action,”
Koontz will use his engineering experience to supply an expert
opinion based on the laws of physics and other scientific
foundations. (Doc. # 54 at 7). His testimony regarding the
forces Bostick’s body encountered during the car crash is
relevant and the probative value of his testimony is not
substantially outweighed by the perils enumerated in Rule
403.

The Motion is thus denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

12 

Defendant

State

Farm

Mutual

Automobile

Insurance

Company’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Expert Steven Koontz’s
Opinions and Testimony (Doc. # 54) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
28th day of June, 2017.

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