Jones-Morgan v. JP Morgan Chase Bank

Filing 61

ORDERED: 1. Plaintiff Jennifer Jones-Morgan's Motion to Lift the Stay and Reopen the Case 56 is DENIED. 2. Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank's Opposed Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and Response in Opposition to Plaintif f's Motion to Reopen Case 60 is GRANTED. 3. This case is DISMISSED for lack of prosecution pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 4. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case. Signed by Senior Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell on 2/27/2024. (AB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JENNIFER JONES-MORGAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 8:16-cv-1519-CEH-AEP

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK,
Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Jennifer Jones-Morgan’s Motion to Lift the Stay
and Reopen the Case (Doc. 56) and Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank’s Opposed
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Motion to Reopen Case (Doc. 60). Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. Upon review and consideration, the Court will
deny Plaintiff’s motion to lift the stay and reopen the case and grant Defendant’s
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
BACKGROUND
This is an employment discrimination lawsuit, initially filed on June 13, 2016,
and amended multiple times. Docs. 1, 9, 31, 47. The operative complaint at the time
this case was stayed on November 3, 2017 (Doc. 47) brings one count for disparate
treatment (sex-based and race-based) under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and Florida common
law, and one count for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). See id. Defendant

moved to dismiss the complaint for failing to cure certain pleading deficiencies set out
in the Court’s previous orders granting Motions to Dismiss. Doc. 50. The Court denied
Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to respond to that motion to dismiss, and
she ultimately failed to respond, leaving the motion to dismiss unrebutted. Docs. 51,
53.
Prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s response to the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant
moved to stay the case, to which Plaintiff responded, after being ordered to do so by
the Court. Docs. 46, 52. Defendant requested the stay after postponing Plaintiff’s
deposition due to her medical issues. The Court granted-in-part Defendant’s request
for a stay on November 3, 2017, noting that the action would be administratively
closed, that any party could lift or extend the stay for good cause, and that it intended
to lift the stay after the expiration of 90 days. Doc. 55. There was no subsequent
activity in this matter until Plaintiff filed a motion to reopen the case on April 15, 2023.
Doc. 56.
According to Defendant, however, in February 2020 (three years after the case
was stayed), Plaintiff’s counsel contacted Defendant’s counsel, noting that Plaintiff
intended to re-open the case because her long-term disability benefits were going to
terminate. Doc. 60-2 ¶ 7. Defendant’s counsel states that neither Plaintiff’s medical
condition nor her inability to participate in the litigation were mentioned at the time.
Id. After this exchange, Plaintiff’s counsel made no effort to reopen or otherwise
prosecute the case.

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Over three years later, on March 21, 2023, counsel for Defendant approached
Plaintiff’s counsel to ask whether he would agree to file a joint stipulation of dismissal
to close this matter. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff’s counsel declined and instead, three weeks later,
filed a motion to lift the stay and re-open the case. Doc. 56.
Plaintiff’s Disability Leave, Long-Term Disability Claims, and Participation in Other
Proceedings
During the five years that this case sat dormant, Plaintiff actively participated
in several other activities and proceedings related to her disability leave, long-term
disability claims, and other unrelated proceedings. This is explained and supported
with evidence by defense counsel. See Doc. 60 at 6–10.
First, following the approval of Plaintiff’s long-term disability benefits in
February 2018, Plaintiff periodically submitted updated medical information to her
benefits provider regarding her health and treatment. This included communication
via telephone for the purposes of disputing the temporary cessation of her benefits for
failure to provide certain information. See Doc. 60-3 ¶ 8 and Doc. 60-3 at 7–12; 25–34.
Specifically, Plaintiff spoke with Prudential regarding her claim on sixteen different
occasions in 2018 and 2019 and submitted documentation relating to her activities of
daily living. See Doc. 60 at 7 n.2. Plaintiff also communicated with Defendant’s human
resources team regarding her updated marital status and recent divorce decree, as well
as her long-term disability leave. Doc. 60-1 ¶ 9; Doc. 60-3 ¶ 9.
Further, Plaintiff actively participated in her appeal of Prudential’s termination
of long-term disability benefits, including by providing Prudential with documents and

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information. Doc. 60-3 at 1, 8–13, 50. Plaintiff has since continued to communicate
with Prudential and provide information about her medical status and activities of
daily living since her appeal was granted in October 2020. Doc. 60-3 at 8–13.
Additionally, Plaintiff participated in divorce proceedings in a Florida State Court in
2019, bought property in Montgomery, Alabama in August 2022, and appears to now
reside there. Doc. 60-2 at 5, 10.
Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank’s Re-Organization
Defendant provided a declaration in support of its argument that the lengthy
delay in this matter has caused it substantial prejudice. See Doc. 60-1. Specifically, as
declared by Defendant, JPMorgan Chase exited the corporate (private) prepaid card
business, in which Plaintiff was employed, between 2015 and 2018. Doc. 60 at 10;
Doc. 60-1 at 3. Therefore, at least eight individuals who worked with Morgan and had
knowledge of the allegations raised in her various complaints (based on Defendant’s
initial disclosures) are no longer employed by Defendant. Doc. 60 at 10–11.
The Instant Motions (Docs. 59, 60)
According to Plaintiff’s motion, she is “currently physically, mentally, and
emotionally able to assist her attorney in resuming litigation.” Doc. 56 ¶ 2. A sworn
and notarized affidavit is also attached. Doc. 56-1 1. Plaintiff indicates that she was

Plaintiff’s affidavit states that it provides her “personal assessment of [her] health” and
describes her current health treatment and the fact that she “will be able to sit for depositions
as well as other legal proceedings which require my attention.” Doc. 56-1. The affidavit does
not include any more specific information or evidence of her condition, treatment, or ability
to participate in litigation over the past five years.
1

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previously “incapable of providing any assistance on her case as a result of the effects
of cancer and treatments,” and has not worked since October 2017. Doc. 56 at 2.
Plaintiff argues that good cause exists to reopen the case considering her improved
condition and a lack of prejudice to Defendant. Id. ¶ 5. She also notes that neither party
moved the Court to lift or extend the stay after November 2017, and that Defendant
did not move to dismiss. Id. ¶ 6. Defendant responds in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion
and moves to dismiss the case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) based on Plaintiff’s
failure to prosecute. See Doc. 60.
DISCUSSION
Courts have broad discretion to manage their own dockets. Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 681, 706 (1997). Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that,
if a plaintiff “fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a
defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the order
states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision . . . operates as an adjudication on
the merits.” Middle District of Florida Local Rule 3.10 further provides that a
“plaintiff’s failure to prosecute diligently can result in dismissal if the plaintiff in
response to an order to show cause fails to demonstrate due diligence and just cause
for delay.” In addition, a district court may, sua sponte, “dismiss a complaint for failure
to prosecute even without affording notice of its intention to do so or providing an
adversary hearing before acting.” Link v. Wabash RR. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962)
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit and district courts within the Circuit have
upheld or exercised their discretion to dismiss cases for lack of prosecution where a
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plaintiff allowed a case to lie dormant. See, e.g., Taylor v. Augusta-Richmond Cty. Consol.
Comm’rs, 618 F. App’x 651, 651 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding dismissal for failure to
prosecute appropriate where plaintiff failed to comply with court order to respond to
a motion, despite the court granting a sua sponte extension of time to plaintiff); Gratton
v. Great Am. Commc’n, 178 F.3d 1373, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding no abuse of
discretion where Court dismissed Title VII case for Plaintiff’s flouting of discovery
rules and ignoring court orders); Morales v. Berryhill, 2021 WL 4295399, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 12, 2021) (recommending dismissal for failure to prosecute where plaintiff
took no action for more than three years), adopted by 2021 WL 4290901; Hayward v.
SSP Am., Inc., 2012 WL 2814160, at * 2–3 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 22, 2012) (recommending
dismissal where plaintiff stopped participating for eighteen months and failed to
cooperate in discovery), adopted by 2012 WL 28114135. 2
Here, the Court agrees that—although it is a severe sanction—dismissal
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) is appropriate. As Defendant notes,
a Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate “where there is a clear record of delay or willful
contempt and an implicit or explicit finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.”
Graham v. Prof’l Adjustment Corp., 2012 WL 13134585, *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2012). In
Graham, the court recommended dismissal where plaintiff failed to establish cause for
her complete lack of interest in participating in the prosecution of her claim or her

Defendant also cites to numerous other cases, most of which are out-of-circuit, where federal
courts have dismissed or affirmed dismissal for failure to prosecute based on a Plaintiff failing
to prosecute a case for five or fewer years. Doc. 60 at 13–14.
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failure to follow prior court directives, and the court was not satisfied that another
order directing plaintiff’s participation would result in advancement of the case. The
Court found that “[t]o recommend otherwise would unnecessarily waste court
resources, extend the undue delay, and inappropriately approve of Plaintiff’s
conduct.” Id.
Based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute for over five years, together with her
bare-bones motion to reopen and failure to provide a satisfactory explanation or
evidence related to the delay, dismissal of this case is appropriate here. First, the docket
is replete with examples of Plaintiff’s repeated delays and failure to follow orders. Most
importantly, there is the five-year-delay between the stay of this case and Plaintiff’s
motion to reopen it. In that time, Plaintiff failed to provide any status updates or file
anything else on the docket. Additionally, this was not the first delay in the case, as
the Court previously ordered Plaintiff to show cause for lack of prosecution (Doc. 19),
and Defendant was forced to seek a stay in this matter to avoid prejudice (because
Plaintiff could not sit for her deposition.) Doc. 46. Further, Plaintiff’s counsel failed to
respond to the motion for a stay until ordered to do so by this Court. Docs. 52, 54.
And pending that motion, Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant’s motion to dismiss
her Third Amended Complaint. 3 Then, once the case had been stayed, as Defendant
describes, “[Plaintiff] and her counsel simply failed to prosecute the case or advance it
toward resolution in any manner in over five years.” Doc. 60 at 16.

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Plaintiff also failed to respond to the instant motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution.

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Defendant’s thorough recap of Plaintiff’s participation in other legal and nonlegal matters over the past five years is not the only evidence that casts doubt on
Plaintiff’s explanation for the delay and her claimed inability to participate. As
reflected in the record before this Court, in February 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel suggested
to defense counsel that he would re-open the case. However, no mention was made at
this time that Plaintiff was medically unable to participate in the litigation or hindered
by her condition in any way. Doc. 60-2 at 4–5. And notwithstanding this interaction,
Plaintiff made no other efforts to prosecute this case in the next three years.
Finally, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s scant and unsupported
motion to reopen the case fails to show good cause or justify her inaction in the case
for over five years. Although Plaintiff says she was previously unable to assist in the
case, and that these circumstances have now changed (Docs. 56 at 2; 56-1), she
provides no evidence. Moreover, even her notarized statement, a short “personal
assessment” of her own health condition, lacks any substantive explanation of why
she was unable to participate in this litigation in any manner for the last five years.
This is despite the fact that, as Defendant points out, Plaintiff participated in divorce
proceedings in Florida state court in 2019, moved to Alabama and purchased property
there in 2022, and has been very active in pursuing her disability benefits.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s motion includes a conclusory statement that “Defendant
has not been prejudiced” by the lengthy delay. Doc. 56 ¶ 5. To the contrary, Defendant
has clearly established prejudice. Defendant’s submissions explain in depth (and cite
to evidence for) its argument for why it would be prejudiced by the reopening of this

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case, given not only the length of time that has passed, but also the fact that none of
the ten individuals identified as likely to have information relevant to its defenses still
works for Defendant. The Court agrees that this evidence establishes prejudice and
credits Defendant’s argument that prejudice commonly ensues after such a lengthy
delay due to the dimming of witnesses’ memories or the irretrievable loss of evidence.
Finally, Plaintiff’s contention that the case should not be dismissed because
“neither Plaintiff nor Defendant moved the Court to Lift the Stay or Extend the Stay
. . . [and] Defendant did not move to Dismiss this matter at any time” is unpersuasive.
Doc. 56 ¶ 3. Although it is true that Defendant did not move for dismissal after the
Court entered a stay, a Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint was pending
at that time, which Defendant had not responded to. This argument highlights
Plaintiff’s apparent (and incorrect) belief that it is the burden of a defendant to
prosecute a case, rather than a plaintiff. This position is not supported by any
authority.
In sum, even before the case was stayed in 2017, Plaintiff repeatedly failed to
prosecute or file pleadings in a timely manner. Once the case was stayed, nearly five
years passed without a single filing from Plaintiff or any update to the Court. Now,
providing only a conclusory statement that she was unable to participate in the
litigation, Plaintiff asks that this case be reopened. Plaintiff fails to provide any
evidence establishing that she truly could not have participated in the case over the last
five years. The Court has considered Plaintiff’s obviously serious health issues. While
they are unfortunate, they do not excuse Plaintiff from explaining her failure to

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prosecute the case for over five years. This is especially so given the dearth of
information Plaintiff provides, and the contradictory evidence submitted by Defendant
showing that Plaintiff was in fact able to participate in a variety of proceedings in the
past five years, including long-term disability benefits requests (and an appeal), a
divorce, and a move and purchase of property. Additionally, Defendant clearly
explains how it would be prejudiced if this case were reopened, including the fact that
none of its listed employee-witnesses remain with the company. For these reasons, the
Court finds that dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) based on Plaintiff’s failure
to prosecute is appropriate.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff Jennifer Jones-Morgan’s Motion to Lift the Stay and Reopen the
Case (Doc. 56) is DENIED.
2. Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank’s Opposed Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to Prosecute and Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen
Case (Doc. 60) is GRANTED.
3. This case is DISMISSED for lack of prosecution pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b).
4. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on February 27, 2024.

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Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record

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