Pierluca et al v. Quality Resources, Inc. et al
Filing
51
ORDER granting 45 Motion to Strike Demand for Trial by Jury. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 4/20/2017. (JG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MARIO PIERLUCA, on his own behalf and
on behalf of those similarly situated, and
MARCUS HOLMES, on his own behalf and
on behalf of those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CASE NO: 8:16-CV-1580-T-30AEP
QUALITY RESOURCES, INC.,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Strike Demand
for Trial by Jury (Dkt. 45) and Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition (Dkt. 49). The Court, upon
review of the motion, response, and being otherwise advised in the premises, concludes that
the motion should be granted because there is no right to a jury trial under the WARN Act.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs brought the instant case against Defendant Quality Resources, Inc. under the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §2101 et seq. (the “WARN
Act”). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant terminated them without giving sixty days’ advance
notice as required under the WARN Act. Plaintiffs’ complaint includes a jury trial demand.
Defendant now moves to strike the jury trial demand, arguing that remedies available under
the WARN Act are equitable in nature and did not exist at common law; as such, there is no
statutory or constitutional right to a trial by jury. The Court agrees.
The WARN Act does not specifically address the right to a jury trial, leaving it to the
courts to decide whether a jury trial is constitutionally required. The Eleventh Circuit has
not addressed this question. However, the weight of existing authority—including the Sixth
Circuit, the only circuit court to have squarely addressed the issue—holds that there is no
right to a jury trial because the WARN Act’s remedies are equitable in nature. See Bledsoe
v. Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc., 635 F.3d 836, 840-45 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Creech v.
Virginia Fuel Corp., 61 F. Supp. 3d 592, 594 (W.D. Va. 2014); Day v. Celadon Trucking
Servs., Inc., No. 4:09CV00031 SWW, 2014 WL 2718188, at *11 (E.D. Ark. June 16, 2014);
Nelson v. Formed Fiber Technologies, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-473-GZS, 2012 WL 118490, at *1*6 (D.Me. Jan. 13, 2012). After careful consideration, the Court agrees with the Sixth
Circuit.
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in “suits at common law”
filed in federal court, and the Supreme Court has established a two-prong test for determining
whether a party enforcing a statutory right is entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987). First, a court must
compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior
to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Id. Second, a court must examine the remedy
sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature, and this inquiry is more
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important than the first. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494
U.S. 558, 565 (1990).
With respect to the first prong, “[i]t is undisputed that no action for failing to give
advance notice of an employment loss was known to 18th-century England.” Bledsoe, 635
F.3d at 841. Plaintiffs argue, however, that a WARN Act claim is analogous to a common
law breach of contract claim. The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ analogy because a
WARN Act violation is purely a creature of statute—its remedies do not flow from an
agreement between the parties requiring advance notice of mass layoffs.
The second prong of the inquiry invokes the “more important question,” i.e., whether
the WARN Act remedies are legal or equitable in nature. The Sixth Circuit concluded that
the back pay remedy available under the WARN Act provides equitable restitutionary relief
for which there is no constitutional right to a jury trial. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the
exclusive WARN Act remedy is restitutionary and equitable in nature because it seeks to
restore the pay and benefits the employer should have provided aggrieved employees during
or in lieu of a sixty-day notice period. See Bledsoe, 635 F.3d at 843. The Sixth Circuit also
noted that the WARN Act grants a district court discretion to reduce the amount of the
liability or penalty, which reinforces the view that WARN Act remedies are equitable in
nature. See id. at 844(citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 443 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“To the extent, then, that the District Court retains substantial
discretion as to whether or not to award back pay notwithstanding a finding of unlawful
discrimination, the nature of the jurisdiction which the court exercises is equitable ....”)). The
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Court agrees with the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning and concludes that WARN Act damages are
restitutionary in nature and analogous to reimbursement of wrongfully withheld funds, as
opposed to compensation for damages flowing from wrongful termination.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that there is no right to a jury trial under the
WARN Act. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant’s
Motion to Strike Demand for Trial by Jury (Dkt. 45) is granted.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on April 20, 2017.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record
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