Vargas v. Michaels Stores, Inc.

Filing 54

ORDER: Defendant Michaels Stores, Inc.'s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. # 53 ) is DENIED. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 7/26/2017. (DMD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JESUS VARGAS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No.: 8:16-cv-1949-T-33JSS

MICHAELS STORES, INC.,
Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of
Defendant Michaels Stores, Inc.’s Motion for Reconsideration
(Doc. # 53), filed on July 21, 2017. For the reasons that
follow, the Motion is denied.
I.

Background
A detailed recitation of the facts of this case is

unnecessary at this juncture. Plaintiff Jesus Vargas brought
this action against his former employer, Michaels, for race
and

national

origin

discrimination

and

hostile

work

environment under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Florida
Civil Rights Act. (Doc. # 10). On May 15, 2017, Michaels moved
for summary judgment on all of Vargas’s claims under the
analytical framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). (Doc. # 34). In his response,

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Vargas asserted that his claims were brought under both the
single-motive theory of liability — to which the McDonnell
Douglas framework applies — and the mixed-motive theory — to
which the separate framework set by Quigg v. Thomas County
School District, 814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016), applies.
(Doc. # 47). Michaels replied, but still failed to analyze
Vargas’s claims under the Quigg framework and did not assert
that the mixed-motive theory of liability was inapplicable
based on the Amended Complaint’s allegations. (Doc. # 48).
On July 10, 2017, the Court granted in part and denied
in part the motion for summary judgment and granted summary
judgment on the various claims to the extent they were brought
under the single-motive theory of liability. (Doc. # 52).
But, because Michaels did not move for summary judgment under
the mixed-motive framework nor assert that framework was
inapplicable to Vargas’s claims, the Court denied the motion
to the extent Vargas’s claims were brought under the mixedmotive framework. (Id.).
Michaels now moves for reconsideration of the Court’s
Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and
seeks entry of summary judgment on Vargas’s claims to the
extent they are brought under the mixed-motive framework.
(Doc. # 53).
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II.

Legal Standard
“The only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are

newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.”
Anderson v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 567 Fed. Appx. 679,
680 (11th Cir. 2014)(quoting Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335,
1343 (11th Cir. 2007)(quotation marks omitted)). Granting
relief under Rule 59(e) is “an extraordinary remedy to be
employed

sparingly

in

the

interests

of

finality

and

conservation of scarce judicial resources.” United States v.
DeRochemont, No. 8:10-cr-287-T-24MAP, 2012 WL 13510, at *2
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2012)(citation omitted). Furthermore, “a
Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used] to relitigate old matters,
raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised
prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill.
of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
III. Analysis
Michaels acknowledges that its “summary judgment motion
did not address [Vargas’s] claims under the mixed-motive
framework but only under the McDonnell Douglas” framework.
(Doc. # 53 at 2). Michaels also admits that its reply “never
expressly

addressed

the

mixed-motive

theory.”

(Id.).

Nevertheless, Michaels seeks reconsideration of the denial of
its motion regarding the mixed-motive theory because “(1)
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Michaels

rebutted

each

argument

offered

in

support

of

[Vargas’s] mixed-motive claims in its reply” and “(2) the
Court’s ruling on [Vargas’s] single-motive claims effectively
eliminated any issue of fact as to [his] mixed-motive claims.”
(Id.).
“A party cannot readily complain about the entry of a
summary judgment order that did not consider an argument they
chose not to develop for the district court at the time of
the summary judgment motions.” Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d
1317, 1329 (11th Cir. 2009)(citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that Rule
59 motions “should not be used to raise arguments which could,
and should, have been made before the judgment was issued,”
and that denial of such a motion “is especially soundly
exercised when the party has failed to articulate any reason
for the failure to raise the issue at an earlier stage in the
litigation.” Id. (citation omitted).
While

Michaels

now

asserts

it

“had

no

notice

that

[Vargas] was pursuing” the mixed-motive theory, this is not
entirely correct. Michaels may not have expected Vargas to
invoke the mixed-motive theory when it drafted its motion for
summary judgment, but Michaels became aware of that theory at
the latest when Vargas filed his response to the motion.
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Although

district

courts

ordinarily

do

not

consider

new

arguments raised in reply briefs, such new arguments are
properly considered if they address unexpected issues raised
for the first time by the opposing party’s response. See Girl
Scouts of Middle Tenn., Inc. v. Girl Scouts of the U.S., Inc.,
No. 3:12-CV-00575, 2013 WL 1736643, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Apr.
19, 2013)(“[C]ourts necessarily may consider new arguments in
a movant’s reply where those arguments address issues raised
for the first time in the nonmovant’s response.”); see also
Brown v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1332–33
(S.D. Ala. 2011)(declining to consider a new argument about
statutory damages raised in a reply because “it was clear
from the plain language of the Complaint that [plaintiffs]
were predicating their [] claim on a theory of statutory
damages” and “[defendant] could not have been surprised or
caught unawares in that regard”).
Thus, Michaels could have asserted in its reply, as it
does now in the motion for reconsideration, that it lacked
notice the mixed-motive theory would be invoked and that
“[Vargas] should not be permitted to proceed to trial under
[the mixed-motive] theory given his firm position that it was
only his race and national origin that motivated the decision
to terminate him.” (Doc. # 53 at 2 n.1).
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The case law Michaels now cites for that argument was
available at the time Michaels filed its motion for summary
judgment. See Z.K. Marine Inc. v. M/V Archigetis, 808 F. Supp.
1561, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992)(“A motion for reconsideration
should not be used as a vehicle to present authorities
available at the time of the first decision.”). And one case
in which the district court granted summary judgment under
both the single and mixed-motive theories and upon which
Michaels particularly relies, Williams v. Florida Atlantic
University, No. 15-60621-CIV, 2017 WL 1881676 (S.D. Fla. May
9, 2017), is inapposite. Unlike Michaels, the defendant in
Williams also argued in its motion for summary judgment that
the mixed-motive theory of liability was inapplicable because
of how the plaintiff’s claims were pled in the complaint, and
that no record evidence supported that discrimination was a
motivating factor for the adverse action. To be sure, Vargas
could have cited Williams in its motion for summary judgment
or reply for the proposition that the mixed-motive theory is
inapplicable to Vargas’s claims. But Williams does not imply
that this Court should have granted summary judgment under
the mixed-motive framework even though Michaels failed to
address

that

framework

at

all

briefing.
6

in

its

summary

judgment

And the Court disagrees with Michaels that the case’s
result — i.e. a grant of summary judgment on Vargas’s claims
—

would

necessarily

be

the

same

under

the

mixed-motive

framework. In the July 10, 2017, Order, the Court determined
that Vargas failed to show a genuine issue of material fact
regarding pretext — meaning Vargas failed to show Michaels’
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his termination was
false and that the real reason was discrimination. (Doc. # 52
at 41-45). But the Court did not address whether there was a
genuine issue of material fact about whether race or national
origin was a motivating factor in Michaels’ decision to
terminate Vargas — the relevant question under the mixedmotive framework established by Quigg.
In

articulating

the

Quigg

framework,

the

Eleventh

Circuit emphasized that the McDonnell Douglas framework “is
fatally

inconsistent

with

the

mixed-motive

theory

of

discrimination because [it] is predicated on proof of a
single, ‘true reason’ for an adverse action,” which the
plaintiff must show is pretextual. Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1237.
“Thus, [under McDonnell Douglas,] if an employee cannot rebut
her employer’s proffered reasons for an adverse action but
offers evidence demonstrating that the employer also relied
on a forbidden consideration, she will not meet her burden”
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— even though “this is the exact type of employee that the
mixed-motive

theory

of

discrimination

is

designed

to

protect.” Id. at 1238. Because the Quigg framework was created
to rectify this problem, Vargas’s mixed-motive claims could
survive even if Michaels truly believed Vargas had retaliated
against employees (the stated reason for his termination), as
long as Vargas could show a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether his race or national origin also played a
motivating

role

in

Michaels’

decision.

Because

Michaels

failed to squarely address this question in its summary
judgment motion or reply, the Court did not address it either
and cannot say that no genuine issue of material fact exists
on that issue.
Michaels

also

argues

that,

while

it

never

directly

addressed the mixed-motive theory propounded by Vargas, its
reply

refuted

each

piece

of

evidence

on

which

Vargas’s

response relied to support his mixed-motive argument. (Doc.
# 53 at 3-4). Again, while Michaels thinks no genuine issue
of material fact exists regarding whether discrimination was
a motivating factor in its decision to terminate Vargas, this
argument was not explicitly presented to the Court at the
summary judgment stage. In its Order, the Court determined
Vargas had not shown that discrimination was the true reason
8

for his termination and Michaels’ stated reasons were false.
The Court did not determine that no reasonable factfinder
could conclude Vargas’s race or national origin was one
motivating factor in Michaels’ decision to terminate him. And
the Court declines to make such a determination now.
Michaels has not pointed out an intervening change in
controlling law, any new evidence, or a manifest error of law
or

fact.

Rather,

Michaels

takes

issue

with

the

Court’s

reasoning that summary judgment should not be granted under
a distinct analytical framework that was never mentioned by
Michaels during the summary judgment briefing. See Madura v.
BAC Home Loans Servicing L.P., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1296
(M.D. Fla. 2012)(“‘[A] motion for reconsideration is not the
proper forum for the party to vent dissatisfaction with the
Court’s reasoning.’” (quoting Ludwig v. Liberty Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., No. 8:03-cv-2378-T-17MAP, 2005 WL 1053691, at *4
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2005))). Accordingly, reconsideration
pursuant to Rule 59(e) is inappropriate.
Although the Court declines to reconsider its July 10,
2017, Order, Michaels may assert its arguments about the
mixed-motive theory on a Rule 50 motion at trial. See McGinnis
v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 817 F.3d 1241, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2016)(“[A] motion for [judgment as a matter of law] may
9

be brought under Rule 50(a) ‘at any time before the case is
submitted to the jury.’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2))).
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
Defendant

Michaels

Stores,

Inc.’s

Motion

for

Reconsideration (Doc. # 53) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
26th day of July, 2017.

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