Vargas v. Michaels Stores, Inc.
Filing
63
ORDER: Defendant Michaels Stores, Inc.'s Omnibus Motion in Limine (Doc. # 56 ) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth herein. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 8/29/2017. (DMD)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JESUS VARGAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No.: 8:16-cv-1949-T-33JSS
MICHAELS STORES, INC.,
Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of
Defendant Michaels Stores, Inc.’s Omnibus Motion in Limine
(Doc. # 56), filed on August 2, 2017. Plaintiff Jesus Vargas
filed his response on August 16, 2017. (Doc. # 60). As set
forth herein, the Motion is granted in part and denied in
part.
I.
Legal Standard
“A
motion
in
limine
presents
a
pretrial
issue
of
admissibility of evidence that is likely to arise at trial,
and as such, the order, like any other interlocutory order,
remains subject to reconsideration by the court throughout
the trial.” In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 6:06–
md–1769–Orl–22DAB, 6:07–cv–15733–Orl–22DAB, 2009 WL 260989,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2009). “The real purpose of a motion
1
in limine is to give the trial judge notice of the movant’s
position so as to avoid the introduction of damaging evidence
which may irretrievably effect the fairness of the trial.”
Id. (internal quotation omitted). “A court has the power to
exclude evidence in limine only when evidence is clearly
inadmissible
on
all
potential
grounds.”
Id.
(internal
quotation omitted).
“A motion in limine is not the proper vehicle to resolve
substantive issues, to test issues of law, or to address or
narrow the issues to be tried.” LSQ Funding Grp. v. EDS Field
Servs., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2012)(citing
Royal Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 07–80172–
CIV, 2008 WL 2323900, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2008)). “Denial
of a motion in limine does not necessarily mean that all
evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted at
trial.” In re Seroquel, 2009 WL 260989, at *1 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Instead, denial of the motion
means the court cannot determine whether the evidence in
question should be excluded outside the trial context.” Id.
“The court will entertain objections on individual proffers
as they arise at trial, even though the proffer falls within
the scope of a denied motion in limine.” Id.
2
The district court has broad discretion to determine the
admissibility of evidence, and the appellate court will not
disturb
this
Court’s
judgment
absent
a
clear
abuse
of
discretion. United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th
Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273,
1285 (11th Cir. 2003)(“Inherent in this standard is the firm
recognition that there are difficult evidentiary rulings that
turn on matters uniquely within the purview of the district
court, which has first-hand access to documentary evidence
and is physically proximate to testifying witnesses and the
jury.”).
II.
Analysis
Rule 401, Federal Rules of Evidence, defines “relevant
evidence”
as
“evidence
existence
of
any
fact
having
that
any
is
tendency
of
to
make
the
to
the
consequence
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. All
relevant evidence is admissible unless “its probative value
is
substantially
outweighed
by
the
danger
of
unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid.
3
402, 403; United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1524 (11th
Cir. 1994). Use of Rule 403 to exclude relevant evidence is
an “extraordinary remedy” whose “major function . . . is
limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative probative
force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial
effect.” United States v. Grant, 256 F.3d 1146, 1155 (11th
Cir. 2001).
Michaels now seeks an order in limine barring Vargas
from presenting evidence on sixteen different topics, arguing
that these topics are irrelevant or unduly prejudicial. (Doc.
# 56). The Court will address each topic in turn.
1.
Any evidence, statement, or argument related to
settlement negotiations
Michaels
seeks
to
exclude
any
evidence
regarding
settlement negotiations pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence
401, 402, 403, and 408. (Id. at 2). Rule 408 makes settlement
negotiations and compromise offers inadmissible “either to
prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim
or
to
impeach
by
contradiction.”
a
Fed.
prior
R.
inconsistent
Evid.
408(a).
statement
But
Rule
or
a
408(b)
contains an exception: “The court may admit this evidence for
another
purpose,
such
as
proving
a
witness’s
bias
or
prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving
4
an
effort
to
obstruct
a
criminal
investigation
or
prosecution.” Fed. R. Evid. 408(b).
Therefore, Rule 408 does not justify a complete bar on
the admissibility of evidence of settlement negotiations. And
the
Court
discussion
cannot
of
determine
settlement
at
this
negotiations
juncture
whether
for
reasons
the
permitted under Rule 408(b) would be unfairly prejudicial or
confuse the jury. Accordingly, the Motion is denied to the
extent evidence of settlement negotiations is permitted for
the
purposes
enumerated
in
Rule
408(b).
More
specific
objections regarding relevance or undue prejudice under Rules
401, 402, and 403 may be addressed at trial.
2.
Any evidence, statement, or argument of insurance
Pursuant to Rules 403 and 411, Michaels moves to exclude
any
evidence,
statement,
or
argument
about
whether
it
possesses liability insurance. (Doc. # 56 at 2). Federal Rule
of Evidence 411 states: “Evidence that a person was or was
not insured against liability is not admissible to prove
whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.
But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose,
such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice or proving
agency, ownership, or control.” Fed. R. Evid. 411.
5
Thus, the rule explicitly contemplates situations in
which
evidence
of
insurance
would
be
admissible.
Vargas
requests “that this Court allow such evidence to be presented
to a jury” for the purposes permitted by Rule 411, if the
need arises. (Doc. # 60 at 1-2). The Court agrees that all
evidence of insurance should not be categorically excluded
under Rule 411. And the Court cannot determine at this time
whether
discussion
of
insurance
Michaels’s
for
the
permissible purposes under Rule 411 would be irrelevant or
unduly
prejudicial
under
Rule
403.
Therefore,
denies Michaels’s Motion without prejudice.
the
Court
Michaels may
raise more specific objections to evidence of insurance at
trial.
3.
Any evidence, statement, or argument regarding the
EEOC’s Notice of Right to Sue and determinations
therein
Michaels seeks to exclude the EEOC’s Notice of Right to
Sue letter that was issued to Vargas. Michaels argues the
letter is irrelevant because “it is undisputed that [Vargas]
exhausted his administrative remedies before bringing his
claims.” (Doc. # 56 at 2). Additionally, Michaels argues the
letter is unduly prejudicial under Rule 403 because “the jury
may
improperly
believe
its
findings
are
conclusive
or
indicative of fault” and “may give unjustifiable weight to a
6
federal agency’s determination.” (Id. at 2-3). Vargas argues
that the letter is neither irrelevant nor prejudicial. (Doc.
# 60 at 2).
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that district courts
must make determinations on a case by case basis whether to
admit EEOC documents in a discrimination case before a jury.
Barfield v. Orange Cty., 911 F.2d 644, 650 (11th Cir. 1990).
The relevant factors include whether the documents contain
legal conclusions in addition to factual content, whether
questions of trustworthiness are raised pursuant to Fed. R.
Evid. 803(8)(c), and whether the evidence presents prejudice
issues pursuant to Rule 403. And, although there may be
circumstances
in
which
the
probative
value
of
an
EEOC
determination is dwarfed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
the Eleventh Circuit has stated that such EEOC findings are
often “highly probative.” Id. at 649.
But
here,
determination
as
as
Michaels
to
notes,
whether
the
the
alleged
EEOC
made
no
discrimination
occurred. (Doc. # 56 at 3). Therefore, the danger Michaels
describes
—
that
the
jury
would
believe
the
EEOC
had
determined discrimination actually occurred — is low. The
Court cannot determine outside the trial context whether the
use of the Notice of Right to Sue letter would be unduly
7
prejudicial
and
outweigh
its
probative
value.
The
Court
denies Michaels’s Motion without prejudice.
4.
Any evidence, statement, or argument related to the
financial wealth of the parties
Michaels
seeks
to
exclude
evidence
regarding
the
financial wealth of the parties because “any reference to
[Vargas] or [Michaels’s] financial wealth is likely to cause
confusion to the jury and would prejudice the opposing party.”
(Doc. # 56 at 3). But Vargas argues introduction of evidence
of the parties’ wealth is harmless and that such evidence,
including profit and loss statements for the store at which
Vargas worked, is necessary to establish Vargas’s damages and
show that Vargas was performing well as store manager. (Doc.
# 60 at 3).
The Court shares Michaels’s concern that evidence of the
relative wealth of the parties could be used to confuse or
mislead the jury. But Vargas notes legitimate uses for some
financial information, such as Vargas’s salary and the profit
and loss statements for the store. Therefore, the Court
declines to categorically exclude all evidence that would
indicate the wealth of the parties. But the Court will
entertain
objections
as
they
8
arise
at
trial,
regarding
particular uses of this evidence. Michaels’s Motion is denied
without prejudice.
5.
Any reference to the Motion for Summary Judgment
and Dismissed Claims
Michaels argues that “any reference to the dismissed
claims, or facts supporting them, as well as any reference to
[Michaels’s] Motion for Summary Judgment, is irrelevant and
would
cause
confusion
to
the
jury
and
would
prejudice
[Michaels].” (Doc. # 56 at 3-4). But, as Vargas points out,
no counts of the Amended Complaint were dismissed by the
Court’s Order. (Doc. # 60 at 3-4). Rather, the Court held
that Vargas could not proceed on a single-motive theory of
discrimination, and could only proceed on a mixed-motives
theory for his claims. And Vargas relies on many of the same
facts for his mixed-motives theory as he did for his singlemotive theory. To prevent discussion of those facts would
severely limit Vargas’s ability to present his case and is
beyond the scope of a motion in limine. Therefore, the Court
denies Michaels’s Motion without prejudice.
6.
Any reference to Vargas’s religion, religious
preference, or participation in non-secular events
Michaels argues
that “[a]ny reference to [Vargas’s]
religion, religious preference, or participation in nonsecular activities would bear no relevance to the matters
9
being litigated and would serve only to garner sympathy from
those
members
of
the
jury
with
similar
religious
backgrounds.” (Doc. # 56 at 4). Vargas counters that his
master’s degree in Theology, as part of his educational
background, “is relevant evidence that must be presented to
the jury.” (Doc. # 60 at 4). He also maintains that his
counseling
by
priests
is
“imperative
to
his
claim
for
damages.” (Id.).
Rule 610 states “[e]vidence of a witness’s religious
beliefs or opinions is not admissible to attack or support
the
witness’s
credibility.”
Fed.
R.
Evid.
610.
And
the
Advisory Committee notes for the rule clarify that “an inquiry
for the purpose of showing interest or bias because of [the
witness’s religious beliefs] is not within the prohibition.”
Id.
The Court agrees with Vargas that his master’s degree in
theology is relevant to his background and employability. Nor
does reference to the theology degree create such a risk of
unfair prejudice that categorical exclusion is warranted.
And, regarding the counseling sessions, the Court finds that
they should not be categorically excluded either. To the
extent Vargas sought counseling because of emotional troubles
related
to
his
termination,
the
10
counseling
sessions
are
relevant to damages. Nor would discussion of these counseling
sessions
for
the
purpose
of
establishing
damages
be
an
inadmissible use of Vargas’s religious beliefs to bolster his
credibility.
The
Court
denies
Michaels’s
Motion
without
prejudice, but Michaels may raise specific objections at
trial.
7.
Any evidence, statement, or argument related to
Vargas’s conjecture concerning the discrimination
or termination of others
Pursuant to Rules 401, 402, and 403, Michaels argues
that Vargas should not be able to present evidence “that other
employees, in particular Marco Salazar and Daniel Narvaez,
were terminated because they were Hispanic.” (Doc. # 56 at
4). Michaels argues such allegations are “irrelevant and will
only serve to unfairly prejudice” Michaels. (Id.). Michaels
emphasizes that the Court in its summary judgment order noted
the only evidence of these other claims of discrimination
came from Vargas’s deposition testimony about phone calls he
had with Salazar and Narvaez. (Doc. # 52 at 45). And the Court
also noted that Salazar and Narvaez worked in Michaels stores
in New York and were not terminated by Vargas’s supervisor,
Zenn.
(Id.).
For
these
same
reasons,
Michaels
insists
“permit[ing] [Vargas] to testify as to his pure conjecture
that others may have been discriminated against because they
11
are Hispanic would only serve to mislead the jury, confuse
the issues, and cause undue prejudice to [Michaels].” (Doc.
# 56 at 5).
Vargas argues the “probative value of this evidence
outweighs
any
alleged
prejudice
claimed
by
[Michaels]”
because both Narvaez and Salazar were store managers, like
Vargas, and were placed on Performance Improvement Plans
right before determination of their bonus eligibility. (Doc.
# 60 at 4-5). Vargas emphasizes that he “has made allegations
that
[Michaels]
maintained
a
pattern
and
practice
of
discriminating against Hispanic Store Managers” and “should
be able to introduce this evidence to prove his claim.” (Id.
at 5).
The Court cannot determine at this time whether the
danger
of
undue
prejudice
caused
by
Vargas’s
testimony
regarding the other Hispanic store managers outweighs its
probative value. Although the Court denies Michaels’s Motion
without
prejudice
at
this
juncture,
Michaels
may
raise
specific objections regarding relevance and prejudice during
trial.
Additionally,
Michaels
may
raise
any
arguments
regarding the general prohibition on hearsay under Rule 802
at trial.
12
8.
Any layman’s use of certain terms
Michaels
seeks
“discrimination,”
to
exclude
“harassment,”
the
use
of
“retaliation,”
the
terms
“adverse
employment action,” and/or “tangible employment action” by
any lay witness. (Doc. # 56 at 5). Michaels argues use of
these terms, which bear upon ultimate issues of fact, by lay
witnesses
would
confusing
the
create
issues,
a
“risk
and
of
causing
misleading
undue
the
jury,
prejudice
[Michaels].”
(Id.).
Vargas
argues
Michaels’s
impractical
because
some
terms,
like
Motion
to
is
discrimination,
harassment, and retaliation, are “regularly defined and used
by lay witnesses” and other terms, like adverse employment
action, “are words that can be defined by this Court and which
will most likely be included in jury instructions.” (Doc. #
60 at 5).
While the Court
understands Michaels’s concern that
witnesses may misuse these terms during trial, the Court
cannot determine outside the trial context whether such use
will occur, or be inappropriate if it does. Indeed, some of
these terms are used in common parlance and the jury would
not necessarily be confused by their use by lay witnesses.
Therefore, Michaels’s Motion is denied without prejudice as
13
to these terms. Michaels may raise more specific objections
at trial.
9.
Any evidence, statement, or argument that Vargas
was involved in any alleged plan to open stores in
Puerto Rico
Michaels requests an order barring “[a]ny reference to
[Vargas’s] allegations that he was hired by Michaels to
eventually
open
stores
in
Puerto
because
Rico”
such
allegations “bear[] no relevance on the issues to be presented
to the jury and will only serve to confuse or mislead them.”
(Doc.
#
56
at
5).
Michaels
notes
that
Vargas
“has
not
proffered any evidence that the alleged discriminatory actors
were aware of these alleged plans for Puerto Rico.” (Id.).
Vargas
counters
transfer
of
directly
relevant
that
[Vargas’s]
to
the
“reasons
employment
[Vargas’s]
to
for
the
employment
[Michaels’s]
Tampa
area
history
is
with
[Michaels] and his claims.” (Doc. # 60 at 5). The Court agrees
the reasons for Vargas’s transfer to Florida are relevant to
his career here. Nor can the Court conclude at this juncture
that Vargas’s testimony as to his reasons for transfer would
be unduly prejudicial or misleading. Therefore, the Motion is
denied without prejudice and Michaels may raise specific
objections at trial.
14
10.
Any evidence, statement, or argument that Vargas
moved his child to a school closer to the store
Michaels seeks exclusion of Vargas’s allegation that
“after he received disciplinary action for the store’s failed
audit, he moved his child closer to [Michaels’s] Dale Mabry
location so that he could spend more time in the store and
address its deficiencies.” (Doc. # 56 at 6). Michaels argues
“[s]uch
testimony
is
not
only
irrelevant
as
to
whether
[Vargas] was subjected to discriminatory treatment, it is
designed to evoke sympathy for [Vargas] at the expense of
prejudicing [Michaels].” (Id.). But Vargas insists “[t]his
evidence is necessary to prove [his] case, i.e., how the
continued discriminatory treatment affected him.” (Doc. # 60
at 6). According to Vargas, “[i]f barred from presenting this
evidence to a jury, [his] case will be severely prejudiced as
he will not be able to present his entire case to the jury.”
(Id.).
Although the Court understands Michaels’s concerns, the
Court determines that a categorical bar on this evidence is
inappropriate, given its relevance to Vargas’s allegations
about his work performance. Accordingly, the Motion is denied
without prejudice but Michaels may raise specific objections
at trial.
15
11.
Any evidence, statement, or argument regarding
Michaels’s investigation of former Store Manager
Bill Dutka
Pursuant to Rules 401, 402, and 403, Michaels argues
that any mention of Bill Dutka, a former store manager at the
Michaels store in Spring Hill, Florida, and the investigation
into Dutka’s alleged impropriety with cash register logs
should be excluded. (Doc. # 56 at 6-7). Michaels argues Dutka
“is not a proper comparator to [Vargas] because the conduct
at issue was not sufficiently similar for proper comparison”
and “should not be introduced to the jury.” (Id.). But Vargas
insists Dutka is a proper comparator for Vargas, and that
discussion of the investigation of Dutka “is imperative to
[Vargas’s]
case
that
his
race
and
national
origin
substantially motivated [Michaels] to terminate him.” (Doc.
# 60 at 7).
A
motion
substantive
in
limine
issues,
such
should
as
not
whether
be
used
Dutka
is
to
decide
a
proper
comparator or whether Dutka violated company policies and
should have been disciplined. See LSQ Funding Grp., 879 F.
Supp. 2d at 1337 (“A motion in limine is not the proper
vehicle to resolve substantive issues, to test issues of law,
or to address or narrow the issues to be tried.”). Vargas’s
allegation — that Dutka was treated more favorably than Vargas
16
because
of
appropriately
his
race
and
addressed
by
national
origin
impeachment
—
testimony
is
more
than
a
categorical bar on the subject. Therefore, the Motion is
denied without prejudice.
12.
Any evidence, statement, or argument regarding
Zenn’s treatment of non-Hispanic managers at
locations other than the store at which Vargas
worked
Michaels argues Vargas “should not be permitted to argue
or offer evidence regarding Zenn’s alleged treatment of nonHispanic store managers at other locations” because Vargas
has not proffered sufficient evidence that discriminatory
treatment took place or that the treatment was based on
Vargas’s race or national origin. (Doc. # 56 at 7-8). But
Vargas notes “[e]vidence of how Mr. Zenn treated other, nonHispanic Store Managers is directly relevant and material to
his case and any decisions regarding those facts must be made
by the trier of fact — a jury.” (Doc. # 60 at 8).
The Court agrees with Vargas. It is true the Court in
its summary judgment order disagreed with Vargas over whether
the allegation that Zenn treated non-Hispanic store managers
more favorably supported that the stated reason for Vargas’s
termination was pretextual. (Doc. # 52 at 27-28). But the
Court did not rule that Vargas’s allegations could not be
17
presented to the jury in support of his mixed-motives theory
of discrimination. Zenn’s treatment of other store managers
he supervised is relevant to whether race or national origin
discrimination was one motive for Michaels’s termination of
Vargas.
Therefore,
Michaels’s
Motion
is
denied
without
prejudice.
13.
Any evidence, statement, or argument concerning the
state of Vargas’s marriage
Pursuant to Rules 401, 402, and 403, Michaels argues
that any evidence or testimony “regarding marital issues that
[Vargas] had to overcome, particularly during the latter part
of his employment with [Michaels] and shortly after his
termination” should be excluded as unduly prejudicial. (Doc.
# 56 at 8). In response, Vargas claims that “[t]he state of
[Vargas’s] marriage, specifically the toll the discriminatory
actions caused [him] and which resulted in his marriage almost
ending, is relevant to the compensatory and punitive damages
sought in this case.” (Doc. # 60 at 8).
The Court agrees with Vargas that the effect the alleged
discrimination had on Vargas’s personal life, including his
marriage,
is
relevant
to
damages.
And
the
Court
cannot
determine at this juncture whether any mention of these
marital difficulties would be unduly prejudicial to Michaels.
18
Accordingly,
the
Motion
is
denied
without
prejudice
and
Michaels may raise specific objections at trial.
14.
Any evidence, statement, or argument alleging that
Roberts,
McGrath,
and
Colbeth
are
proper
comparators
Michaels seeks to exclude any argument that Roberts,
McGrath, and Colbeth, who were all subordinate managers while
Vargas was store manager, are proper comparators to Vargas.
(Doc. # 56 at 8-9). Michaels emphasizes that these individuals
were subordinate to Vargas and that their alleged misconduct
was not similar to Vargas’s. (Id.).
But, again, “[a] motion in limine is not the proper
vehicle to resolve substantive issues, to test issues of law,
or to address or narrow the issues to be tried.” LSQ Funding
Grp., 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1337. Whether Roberts, McGrath, and
Colbeth are sufficiently similar to Vargas to serve as direct
comparators is a substantive question that should not be
resolved through a motion in limine. Accordingly, the Motion
is denied without prejudice.
15.
Any characterization of Vargas’s Performance
Improvement Plan as an “adverse employment action”
Michaels argues that “any characterization of [Vargas’s]
PIP as an adverse employment action will only serve to confuse
and mislead the jury” because the Court ruled in its summary
19
judgment order that the PIP was not an adverse employment
action. (Doc. # 56 at 10). Indeed, in that order, the Court
wrote “the PIP was not an adverse employment action” because
“Vargas has not shown that any material alteration of his
terms and conditions of employment as a result of the PIP
actually occurred.” (Doc. # 52 at 38-39).
Although Vargas disagrees with the Court’s determination
that the PIP was not an adverse employment action, the Court
agrees with Michaels that the PIP should not be presented to
the jury as an adverse employment action, given the Court’s
ruling that the PIP is not one. Therefore, the Motion is
granted and the PIP may not be described as an adverse
employment action. But, while it may not be characterized as
an adverse employment action, the PIP may be presented to the
jury as evidence probative of whether Vargas’s race and
national origin was a reason for the allegedly discriminatory
treatment and termination.
16.
Any evidence, statement, or argument that Vargas
was denied a bonus as a result of being placed on
a Performance Improvement Plan
Pursuant to Rules 401, 402, and 403, Michaels seeks to
prevent Vargas “from presenting any evidence, statement, or
argument that he was denied a bonus as a result of being
placed on the PIP.” (Doc. # 56 at 10). The Court noted in its
20
summary judgment order that bonus eligibility was determined
at the end of the fiscal year and Vargas was terminated before
the end of the fiscal year — so his termination, rather than
the PIP, prevented him from receiving a bonus. (Doc. # 52 at
14-15, 18, 38). Because allegations that Vargas was denied a
bonus because of the PIP, rather than his termination before
bonuses were awarded, would likely confuse or mislead the
jury, the Court agrees such statements should be excluded.
Nevertheless, Vargas insists that he “should be able to
present evidence to a jury that the PIP was intended to cause
material
changes
to
the
terms
and
conditions
of
his
employment, including denial of his bonus.” (Doc. # 60 at 910). While the PIP was not ultimately the reason for Vargas
failing to receive a bonus, Vargas may present evidence that
Zenn placed him on the PIP with the intent of discriminatorily
depriving him of a bonus. Therefore, the Motion is granted
but Vargas may present his theory that the PIP was issued
with the intent to discriminate against him and deprive him
of a bonus.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
21
Defendant Michaels Stores, Inc.’s
Omnibus
Motion
in
Limine (Doc. # 56) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as
set forth herein.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
29th day of August, 2017.
22
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