Jean-Baptiste v. Business Law Group, P.A. et al

Filing 32

ORDER: SLK's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 10 ) is DENIED. The Motions to Dismiss filed by Business Law Group (Doc. # 15 ) and LM Funding (Doc. # 20 ) are GRANTED IN PART only to the extent that Count V is dismissed as time-barred. The Motions to Dismiss (Doc. ## 15 , 20 ) are otherwise DENIED. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 8/4/2016. (KAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
SANTIANA JEAN-BAPTISTE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:16-cv-2027-T-33AEP

BUSINESS LAW GROUP, P.A.,
LM FUNDING, LLC, and SHUMAKER,
LOOP & KENDRICK, LLP,
Defendants.
____________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Motions
to Dismiss filed by Defendants Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP
(“SLK”)(Doc. # 10), Business Law Group, P.A. (Doc. # 15), and
LM Funding, LLC (Doc. # 20). Plaintiff Santiana Jean-Baptiste
has responded to the Motions. (Doc. ## 16, 17, 23). As
explained below, Count V of the Complaint, lodged against
Business Law Group and LM Funding, is dismissed as timebarred.
I.

The Motions to Dismiss are otherwise denied.

Background
The following factual allegations are taken as true for

the purposes of resolving this motion to dismiss. Stephens v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th
Cir. 1990). Jean-Baptiste is the owner of a condominium

located in Lakeland, Florida within the community known as
“Cobblestone Landing Townhomes Condominium Association, Inc.”
(Doc. # 1 at ¶ 4).  Defendants Business Law Group and SLK are
law firms engaged in debt collection activities. (Id. ¶ 5,
7). Jean-Baptiste claims that LM Funding “is a debt buyer
. . . that, itself and through its employees, representatives,
and

lawyers,

regularly

collects

debts

allegedly

owed

to

another throughout the state of Florida.” (Id. at ¶ 6).
Between December 11, 2014, and April 22, 2015, SLK and
Business Law Group sent Jean-Baptiste multiple communications
seeking to collect condominium association dues and fees.
(Id. at ¶¶ 16, 34). The first communication, an email, was
sent to Jean-Baptiste by SLK on December 11, 2014, requesting
the

payment

additional
indicating

of

$2,152.88.

communications
the

amount

asserting

conflicting

addition,

SLK

advised

due

(Id.

at

¶

16).

on

December

was

$2,786.62,

amounts.

(Id.

at

Jean-Baptiste,

SLK

22,

¶¶
“if

sent

2014,

and

the

19,
a

two
one

other

20).

In

settlement

agreement is prepared, there will be additional attorneys’
fees and costs associated with preparing the agreement and
filing the same with the court.” (Id. at ¶ 19). However, at
that time, no court action was pending against Jean-Baptiste.
(Id. at ¶¶ 19, 58).

2 

On February 25, 2015, Business Law Group sent JeanBaptiste “a debt collection letter stating that the total
balance then due for unpaid assessments was $4,396.69.” (Id.
at ¶ 23). The increase in the amount due from the previous
communications purportedly resulted from “various unexplained
finance charges, late fees, legal costs and fees, and a fee
for

‘underwriting.’”

“represents

to

(Id.).

Additionally,

[Jean-Baptiste]

that

the

Cobblestone

letter
is

its

client, the creditor, when in fact the creditor is a related
and commonly controlled managed entity, LM [Funding].” (Id.
at ¶ 28).

Jean-Baptiste alleges: “LM [Funding] is the client

and creditor who makes the debt collection decisions, settles
debts, and ultimately profits from the collection of the
debts, not Cobblestone, as represented in the debt collection
letter.” (Id. at ¶ 29).
On

March

10,

2015,

Jean-Baptiste

sent

a

letter

to

Business Law Group requesting a “detailed statement of her
account,”

which

was

not

provided.

(Id.

at

¶¶

30,

31).

Additionally, Jean-Baptiste made a payment of $2,786.62 on
March 10, 2015, to settle the debts sought by SLK in the
December 22, 2014, communications. (Id. at ¶ 30).
On April 22, 2015, Business Law Group sent Jean-Baptiste
a second collection letter seeking $2,224.95 in unpaid debt.

3 

(Id. at ¶ 34). This letter stated, “Cobblestone Landing
Townhomes has filed a lien against your Unit for delinquent
assessments, finance charges, late fees, attorneys’ fees, and
costs.” (Id. at ¶ 35).

However, Jean-Baptiste alleges that

no lien was recorded at the time the letter was sent. (Id. at
¶ 42). Rather, Cobblestone “recorded a claim of lien in the
amount of $2,224.95” on April 27, 2015, after the letter was
sent. (Id.). Additionally, Jean-Baptiste contends the Dispute
form contained in the letter “misrepresents Florida law with
respect to late fees” charged when a delinquent account
balance exists. (Id. at ¶ 41).
On

July

2,

2015,

Cobblestone,

through

Business

Law

Group, filed a foreclosure and collections action against
Jean-Baptiste in Polk County, Florida. (Id. at ¶ 43). On July
6, 2016, Business Law Group provided a “ledger” indicating
that the amount owing was $7,736.05, an amount Jean-Baptiste
claims is “unreasonable.” (Id. at ¶ 44).
Jean-Baptiste accordingly initiated this action on April
18, 2016, by filing a nine-count Complaint alleging that LM
Funding, Business Law Group, and SLK violated the Florida
Consumer

Collection

Practices

Act,

Fla.

Stat.

§

559.72

(“FCCPA”) and further alleging that LM Funding and Business
Law Group violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act,

4 

15 U.S.C. § 1692 (“FDCPA”). (Doc. # 1). Defendants have filed
Motions to Dismiss the Complaint, which are ripe for the
Court’s review.
II.

Legal Standard
At the Motion to Dismiss stage, this court accepts as

true all allegations in the complaint and construes them in
the

light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff.

Jackson

v.

Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004).
Further,

“the

facts

stated

in

[the]

complaint

and

all

reasonable inferences therefrom are taken as true.” Stephens,
901 F.2d at 1573. However, the Supreme Court explains:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations omitted). Additionally, courts are not “bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
III.

Analysis
a.

FDCPA Statute of Limitations

5 

Jean-Baptiste asserts Counts One, Two, and Nine pursuant
to the FCCPA, which has a two-year statute of limitations.
Coursen v. Shapiro & Fishman, GP, 588 Fed. Appx. 882, 885 at
n.3 (11th Cir. 2014).

Defendants do not assert any statute

of limitations arguments with respect to the FCCPA claims.
However, SLK, Business Law Group, and LM Funding contend the
claims brought under the FDCPA (Counts Three through Eight)
should be dismissed as barred by the FDCPA’s one-year statute
of limitations.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). 

Jean-Baptiste’s claims stem from five debt collection
communications. The first communication was sent on December
11, 2014, the second and third communications were sent on
December 22, 2014, the fourth communication was sent on
February 25, 2015, and the fifth communication was sent on
April 22, 2015. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 16, 19, 20, 23, 34). JeanBaptiste filed her Complaint on April 18, 2016. Therefore,
all FDCPA claims arising from the first four communications
are barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

Only the

April 22, 2015, communication is actionable under the FDCPA.
i.

Count III is not Time-Barred

Count Three alleges Business Law Group and LM Funding
violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) by misrepresenting “the
amount, legal status, or character of the debt.” (Doc. # 1 at

6 

¶ 91). Specifically, Jean-Baptiste argues “each of [Business
Law Group’s] collection attempts reference a baseless and
differing total amount owed by [Jean-Baptiste].” (Id. at ¶
94). As the last letter sent by Business Law Group that
allegedly misrepresents the amount or character of the debt
was sent within the statute of limitations period (on April
22, 2015), Count Three is not time-barred. (Id. at ¶ 34).
ii. Count IV is not Time-Barred
Count Four alleges Business Law Group and LM Funding
violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5), which forbids parties from
“[threatening] to take any action that cannot legally be taken
or that is not intended to be taken.” Jean-Baptiste alleges
Business Law Group and LM Funding violated this provision by
“[threatening] to enforce a lien which could not be legally
enforced” because no lien was filed at that time. (Id. at ¶
100). This threat was sent in a collection letter within the
statute of limitations period. (Id. at ¶ 34). Accordingly,
Count Four is not barred by the statute of limitations.
iii.

Count V is Time-Barred

Count Five asserts Business Law Group and LM Funding
violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10), which forbids “[t]he use of
any false representation or deceptive means to collect or
attempt to collect any debt or obtain information concerning

7 

a consumer.” Jean-Baptiste relies solely on provisions in the
first and second Business Law Group letters, sent December
22, 2014. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 108-112). As these letters were sent
outside the statute of limitations period, the FDCPA claims
arising from these letters are time-barred. Therefore, Count
Five against Business Law Group and LM Funding is dismissed.
iv.

Count VI is not Time-Barred

Count Six solely targets LM Funding, claiming that LM
Funding violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11), which is triggered
when a debt collector “fail[s] to disclose . . . that the
communication is from a debt collector.” Jean-Baptiste argues
LM Funding “failed to disclose that it is, at least in part,
a

creditor

to

the

Debt,

is

a

decision

maker

regarding

settlement and resolution of the Debt, and is partially owned
and/or operated by the same principles as [Business Law
Group].” (Id. at ¶ 127). As LM Funding allegedly failed to
disclose its status as a creditor in the April 22, 2015,
letter, the claim alleged in Count Six is not barred by the
statute of limitations.
v.

Count VII is not Time-Barred

Count Seven charges Business Law Group and LM Funding
with

violating

15

U.S.C.

§

1692f,

which

forbids

debt

collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means to

8 

collect

or

attempt

to

collect

any

debt.”

Jean-Baptiste

maintains Business Law Group and LM Funding violated the
statute by, in part, by “failing to disclose that [LM Funding]
was . . . the creditor with regard to the debt.” (Id. at ¶
131). As stated above, the debt collection letter sent April
22, 2015, fails to disclose LM Funding’s alleged status as a
creditor

to

the

debt.

This

letter

was

sent

within

the

applicable statute of limitations period. Therefore, Count
Seven is not time-barred.
vi.

Count VIII is not Time-Barred

In Count Eight, Jean-Baptiste alleges Business Law Group
and LM Funding violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692(g)(b). The statute
provides that if “the debt, or any portion thereof, is
disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address
of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease
collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until
the debt collector obtains verification of the debt.” Id.
On

March

10,

2015,

Jean-Baptiste

sent

a

letter

to

Business Law Group “disput[ing] the debt” owed. (Doc. # 1 at
¶ 30).

She contends Business Law Group and LM Funding’s

subsequent attempts to collect the debt, including the letter
sent on April 22, 2015, the filing of a lien on her property
on April 27, 2015, and filing a foreclosure action, all

9 

constitute attempts to collect the debt and thus violate the
statute. (Id. at ¶¶ 34, 42, 43). As these events occurred
within the statute of limitations period, Count Eight is not
time-barred.
b. SLK’s Motion to Dismiss
SLK contends this Court lacks original subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims brought against SLK because the
claims against it, asserted pursuant to the FCCPA, arise from
state

law.

supplemental

Furthermore,

SLK

argues

jurisdiction

because

the

this

Court

state

law

lacks
claims

against SLK do not arise from the same case or controversy as
the federal claims brought against LM Funding and Business
Law Group.
“When a plaintiff makes a plausible argument that a
federal statute creates his right to relief, the district
court has subject-matter jurisdiction over that complaint.”
Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 536 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11th Cir.
2008). SLK correctly states that Jean-Baptiste only brings
claims against it that arise under the FCCPA, which does not
confer

federal

jurisdiction.

See

Fla.

Stat.

§

559.77.

However, “[w]hen a district court has original jurisdiction
over a civil claim it may gain supplemental jurisdiction over
all related state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).”

10 

Kirby v. Prof’l Ass’n Mgmt., Inc., No. 3:12-cv-697-J20-MCR,
2012 WL 5497951, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2012). As JeanBaptiste alleges federal claims against Business Law Group
and

LM

Funding,

this

Court

may

exercise

supplemental

jurisdiction over the state law claims against SLK if the
claims “form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a); see also Clark v. Credit Prot. Ass’n, LP, No. 8:15cv-02926-EAK-TBM, 2016 WL 3580664, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 27,
2016).
The case or controversy standard “confers supplemental
jurisdiction over all state claims which arise out of a common
nucleus of operative fact with a substantial federal claim.”
Leblanc v. Advance Credit Corp., No. 8:06CV747T27EAJ, 2007 WL
141173,

at

*3

(M.D.

Fla.

Jan.

16,

2007).

Furthermore,

“[c]laims arising from a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’
necessarily involve ‘the same witnesses, presentation of the
same evidence, and determination of the same, or very similar,
facts.’” Id. (citing at Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph
Cty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1563-64 (11th Cir. 1994)).
SLK maintains the state law claims levied against it do
not arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts as the
federal claims brought against Business Law Group and LM
Funding. Specifically, SLK asserts the claims against it

11 

arise from two communications sent by SLK. The first was a
debt collection email sent on December 22, 2014, in which SLK
“misleadingly implied that Cobblestone was currently engaged
in a legal action against [Jean-Baptiste].” (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶
19, 58). The communication was sent on January 27, 2015, and
“made false and misleading statements to [Jean-Baptiste] . .
. the purpose of which was to abuse and harass her while
incurring more unauthorized charges at her expense.” (Id. at
¶¶ 27, 59). As Jean-Baptiste’s FDCPA claims against Business
Law Group arise out of separate communications beginning on
February 25, 2015, SLK asserts the only factual similarity is
the

underlying

debt,

which

is

insufficient

to

confer

supplemental jurisdiction. (Doc. # 10 at 4).
Jean-Baptiste counters that the state law claims against
SLK arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the
federal claims brought against Business Law Group and LM
Funding. (Id. at 3). The Court agrees.

The collection

activities targeted the same individual, the same debt, and
the same condominium. “[I]t is clear from section 1367 itself
that the parties to the federal and supplemental claims need
not be identical in order for supplemental jurisdiction to
lie.” Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians
of Fla., 177 F.3d 1212, 1224 (11th Cir. 1999); see also 28

12 

U.S.C.

§

1367(a)(“Such

supplemental

jurisdiction

shall

include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of
additional parties.”). Here, SLK’s email communications to
Jean-Baptiste that give rise to the FCCPA claims contain
similar

content

and

concern

the

same

debt

as

the

communications giving rise to the FDCPA claims. (Doc. # 1 at
¶¶ 19, 22, 23, 34). The Court accordingly finds that the FCCPA
claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts as
the federal claims. See Leblanc, 2007 WL 141173 at *4 (finding
supplemental

jurisdiction

over

FCCPA

claims

in

a

case

alleging violations of the FCCPA and FDCPA against multiple
defendants, where the letters were “substantially similar in
both form and content” and “[e]ach letter attempts to collect
the same debt from Plaintiff”).
Alternatively, SLK argues that, should this Court find
it may exercise supplemental jurisdiction, it should decline
to do so. District courts may refuse to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of
State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the
claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

13 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). “In the absence of any of these four
factors, the court must exercise supplemental jurisdiction.”
Mears v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 541 B.R. 899, 905 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2015)(citing Palmer, 22 F.3d at 1569).
SLK contends this Court should not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3)

because

Jean-Baptiste’s

“FDCPA

claims

against

[Business Law Group] and [LM Funding] are time-barred.” (Doc.
# 10 at 5). Alternatively, SLK maintains the FCCPA claims
should be dismissed because “exceptional circumstances” exist
that warrant declining jurisdiction. (Id. at 6).
As stated previously, the statute of limitations does
not bar all of the FDCPA claims Jean-Baptiste brings against
Business Law Group and LM Funding. Therefore, this Court may
not rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to dismiss the state law
claims.
Furthermore, exceptional circumstances do not exist in
this instance that merit dismissing the FCCPA claims. In
determining whether exceptional circumstances exist under 28
U.S.C.

§

1367(c)(4),

courts

consider

“judicial

economy,

convenience, fairness to the parties, and whether all claims

14 

would be expected to be tried together.” Parker v. Scrap Metal
Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 745 (11th Cir. 2006).
SLK states this Court should not “exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over [Jean-Baptiste’s] state law claims” because
“a trial date has not been set, and significant resources
have not yet been expended on this case.” (Doc. # 10 at 6).
SLK relies on Leblanc, in which the court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over FCCPA claims that arose out of
the same nucleus of operative facts as FDCPA claims. 2007 WL
141173 at *5. However, Leblanc is easily distinguished from
the matter at hand because all of Leblanc’s FDCPA claims were
found to be time-barred.

In contract, in this case, Jean-

Baptiste asserts parallel unfair collection claims that are
timely under both the FDCPA and FCCPA.

In addition, a

decision declining to exercise jurisdiction over the FCCPA
counts pertaining to SLK would result in a duplication of
judicial effort by requiring that the same issues be resolved
in both state and federal court. See Disser v. City of Tampa,
No. 8:13-cv-885-T-24-EAJ, 2013 WL 3975759, at *4 (M.D. Fla.
July

31,

2013)(exercising

supplemental

jurisdiction

over

state law claims and finding “the claims asserted in this
case can reasonably be expected to be resolved at one time
and in one court.”).

15 

Accordingly, and for the reasons stated above, the Court
denies SLK’s Motion to Dismiss.
c. Business Law Group’s Motion to Dismiss
In

addition

to

asserting

statute

of

limitations

arguments, which are addressed above, Business Law Group
argues Jean-Baptiste’s FDCPA claims should be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action under Rule 8(a). Business
Law Group highlights the allegations Jean-Baptiste makes “on
information and belief” and asserts that those allegations
are “conclusory statements and legal conclusions unsupported
by actual facts or law.” (Doc. # 15 at 3). As such, the
allegations based on “information and belief,” (Doc. # 1 at
¶¶ 34, 44, 95, 126, 128, 138, 139), “are not entitled to a
presumption of truth” and “fail to meet the Twombly standard.”
(Doc. # 15 at 2)(citing In re Superior Air Parts, Inc., 486
B.R. 728, 741 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2012)).
Twombly requires plaintiffs to plead “enough facts to
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. However, utilizing the phrase “on
information and belief” does not automatically preclude a
plaintiff from meeting Twombly’s standard. Rather:
Allegations pled on “information and belief” should
be reviewed in the same way as all factual
allegations in a complaint – that is, the court

16 

should review them under Twombly’s 12(b)(6)
formulation requiring sufficient facts pled to make
a claim plausible. The mere fact that allegations
begin with the statement “on information and
belief”
will
not
automatically
render
them
insufficient.
In re Superior Air Parts, 486 B.R. at 740 (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted).
The Court recognizes that it does not have to take as
true conclusory allegations made “on information and belief.”
See Smith v. City of Sumiton, 578 Fed. Appx. 933, 936 at n.4
(11th Cir. 2014)(“for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, we do not have to take as true allegations based
merely

‘upon

Baptiste’s

information

allegations

and

are

belief.’”).

not

due

to

However,

be

Jean-

automatically

discredited or otherwise disregarded based solely upon JeanBaptiste use of the phrase “on information and belief.”
Rather, under Twombly and its progeny, the Court separates
the conclusory allegations from the remaining well-pleaded
factual

allegations

and

determines

if

the

well-pleaded

allegations, when accepted as true, plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief. Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1251
(11th Cir. 2013).
Here,

the

Complaint

contains

detailed

allegations

regarding specific debt collection efforts and attaches the

17 

letters

and

emails

to

the

Complaint

as

exhibits.

The

Complaint sets forth precise allegations that, when accepted
as true under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., give rise to
relief under the relevant statutes.

As Business Law Group

offers no additional arguments that the allegations against
it

are

insufficient

under

Rule

8,

the

Court

finds

the

Complaint sufficient and denies Business Law Group’s Motion
to Dismiss.
d. LM Funding’s Motion to Dismiss
LM Funding seeks dismissal of the Complaint by arguing
that Jean-Baptiste failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule
8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.

Generally, LM Funding argues Jean-

Baptiste “completely fail[s] to allege any specific conduct
of LM [Funding], or establish liability of LM [Funding].”
(Doc. # 20 at 2). Additionally, LM Funding asserts Count Six
rests

solely

on

“conclusory

allegations

made

under

information or belief” and accordingly lacks sufficient facts
necessary to meet the Twombly standard. (Id.). (internal
citations omitted). LM Funding also argues Jean-Baptiste has
failed to allege a “discrete incident of violation of the
FDCPA that arises within the statute of limitations” and as
the claims under the FDCPA are the only federal claims brought
against LMF, dismissal of the FDCPA claims would consequently

18 

preclude “the remainder of the suit from continuing in federal
court.” (Id. at 3, 4).
i. Rule 8 is Satisfied
LM Funding contends Jean-Baptiste fails to state a cause
of action “with the particularity required under federal
law.” (Doc. # 20 at 6).

As an initial matter, the Court notes

that Jean-Baptiste’s pleadings are judged under Rule 8’s
notice pleading standards, and not Rule 9’s particularity
standards because fraud has not been alleged.
The Court will evaluate the questioned counts under Rule
8.

“To satisfy the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a), a complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the
plaintiff’s claims and the grounds upon which they rest.”
316, Inc. v. Md. Cas. Co., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1181 (N.D.
Fla.

2008).

“The

court

must

determine

only

whether

the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims,
not whether the plaintiff can ultimately prove the facts
alleged.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
This Court finds Jean-Baptiste has met her burden under
Rule 8(a). She makes numerous factual averments that LM
Funding

violated

the

FCCPA

and

FDCPA

throughout

the

Complaint. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 6, 25-29, 74, 91, 122, 126-129,
131, 137-139). After due consideration, the Court finds Jean-

19 

Baptiste has satisfied Rule 8(a) with respect to Counts One
through Five, Seven, and Eight.
ii. Count VI
With respect to the FDCPA violation alleged against it
in Count Six, LM Funding contends “[t]here are no factual
allegations to support any claims against LMF in Count Six,
and no basis for liability upon the allegations set forth.”
(Doc. # 20 at 2). Count Six alleges LM Funding violated 28
U.S.C. § 1692e(11), which prohibits debt collectors from
using “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or
means

in

connection

with

the

collection

of

any

debt.”

Specifically, the provision bans: “The failure to disclose in
the initial communication with the consumer . . . that the
communication

is

from

a

debt

collector.”

28

U.S.C.

§

1692e(11).
Jean-Baptiste argues LM Funding breached the statute by
“fail[ing] to disclose that it is, at least in part, a
creditor to the debt, is a decision maker regarding settlement
and resolution of the Debt, and is partially owned and/or
operated by the same principles as [Business Law Group].”
(Doc. # 1 at ¶ 127).

Jean-Baptiste also alleges that LM

Funding violated “15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) by indirectly and
covertly communicating with [Jean-Baptiste] in an attempt to

20 

collect

the

Debt

without

disclosing

that

it

is

a

debt

collector, that it was attempting to collect the Debt, and
that any information would be used for that purpose.” (Doc.
# 1 at ¶ 126).

Accepting the factual allegations of the

Complaint as true, Jean-Baptiste has alleged a violation of
28 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) as to LM Funding. Accordingly, LM
Funding’s Motion to Dismiss is denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)

SLK’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 10) is DENIED.

(2)

The Motions to Dismiss filed by Business Law Group (Doc.
# 15) and LM Funding (Doc. # 20) are GRANTED IN PART
only to the extent that Count V is dismissed as timebarred. The Motions to Dismiss (Doc. ## 15, 20) are
otherwise DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 4th

day of August, 2016.

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