United States of America v. Arnao
Filing
12
DEFAULT FINAL JUDGMENT: Order granting 11 Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Final Judgment. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff United States of America, and against Defendant Antonio Raymond Arnao. (See Order for details.) This judgment shall bear interest at the rate prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961 and shall be enforceable as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq., 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3307 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a). The Clerk is directed to close this case and deny all pending motions as moot. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 11/17/2016. (LN)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No.: 8:16-cv-2553-T-30JSS
ANTONIO RAYMOND ARNAO,
Defendant.
______________________________/
DEFAULT FINAL JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Final
Judgment (Dkt. 11). The Court, having reviewed the motion, Plaintiff’s complaint, and
the relevant law, concludes that the motion should be granted.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff, the United States, filed this lawsuit to collect unpaid debts Defendant
allegedly owed to Barnett Bank, loans that were guaranteed by the State of Florida and
insured by the Department of Education. According to a certificate of indebtedness
attached to the complaint (Dkt. 1, p. 3), the state paid the debt as guarantor upon
Defendant’s default, after which the Department of Education reimbursed the state.
Thereafter, the United States demanded repayment, but Defendant has not complied.
The complaint and summons were served on Defendant on or around September 8,
2016, after which Defendant moved the Court for an extension of time to file an answer
or otherwise respond to the complaint. The Court granted that motion on October 5,
2016, but Defendant never filed an answer or a response. Plaintiff moved for entry of a
clerk’s default, which was entered on November 1, 2016.
Default Judgment
Plaintiff now seeks default final judgment. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
55(b)(2), a court may enter a default judgment against a party who has failed to plead in
response to a complaint. Such a judgment is appropriate “against a defendant who never
appears or answers a complaint, for in such circumstances, the case never has been placed
at issue.” Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Sys., 803 F.2d 1130, 1134 (11th
Cir. 1986). Accordingly, all well-pleaded allegations of fact against that defendant will be
deemed admitted. See Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Houston Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206
(5th Cir. 1975). 1
Mere conclusions of law, however, will not. Cotton v. Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005). A plaintiff must provide “a sufficient
basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Foundation,
789 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). A “sufficient basis”
means satisfying the court that it has jurisdiction over the claims and that the complaint
adequately states a claim for which relief may be granted. See Nishimatsu Const. Co., 516
F.2d at 1206; see also Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245 (concluding that, conceptually, a motion
for default judgment should be treated like a reverse motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim).
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh
Circuit adopted as binding precedent all the decisions of the former United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
2
When evaluating the complaint, a court must determine “whether [it] contains
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173
L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotations omitted)). And this plausibility standard is met
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Surtain, 789 F.3d at
1245 (internal citations omitted).
Here, the Court has jurisdiction because the United States is the plaintiff, see 28
U.S.C. § 1345, and the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations establish
that Defendant defaulted on his federally insured loans. Specifically, the complaint makes
the following relevant allegations:
(1) that Defendant acquired a debt in 1994, a debt that Plaintiff insured, in the
amount of $32,067.00 at a 9.00% interest rate per year;
(2) that Defendant defaulted on that loan in 1996, after which the holder, Barnett
Bank, filed a claim on the loan guarantee;
(3) that the guarantor paid the loan and that the Plaintiff, as insurer of the loan,
paid the guarantor;
(4) that Plaintiff has demanded repayment and that Defendant has failed to make
repayment;
(5) that the total loan amount, with interest, is now $101,993.05.
Furthermore, these allegations were sworn to in a Certificate of Indebtedness issued by
the United States Department of Education.
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Accepted as true, these allegations permit the Court to draw the reasonable
inference that Defendant is in default on his loan and indebted to the United States in the
amount specified in the complaint and in the Certificate of Indebtedness. See Surtain, 789
F.3d at 1245 (internal citations omitted). Default final judgment will be entered against
Defendant.
Damages
The sworn Certificate of Indebtedness issued by the Department of Education and
provided by plaintiff details the amount Defendant owes. The certificate was dated May
17, 2016, and according to it, the principal balance on the loan is $36,932.14 and the
interest as of that date was $65,060.91, for a total debt of $101,993.05. Plaintiff also
seeks $45.00 in costs for its process-server fee, and Plaintiff provides an invoice of that
fee as evidence to support the award of that cost.
This sum of damages, the Court finds, is capable of being ascertained by way of
mathematical calculation. See Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism and the
Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1543 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the
sworn certificate supplies the “essential evidence” that the Court would have used in a
hearing to determine damages. See S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir.
2005). For these reasons, a hearing on damages is not necessary. See id. (citing Adolph
Coors, 77 F.2d at 1543).
It is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
1.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Final Judgment (Dkt. 11) is
GRANTED.
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2.
Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff United States of America, and
against Defendant Antonio Raymond Arnao for the following sums:
a.
Principal
(after application of all prior payments,
credits, and offsets),
b.
Interest through May 17, 2016
c.
Costs
TOTAL:
$ 36,932.14
$ 65,060.91
$
45.00
$102,038.05,
plus interest at the rate of 9.00% from May 17, 2016 to the date of this
judgment, for all of which sums let execution issue.
3.
This judgment shall bear interest at the rate prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961
and shall be enforceable as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq., 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001–
3307 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a).
4.
The Clerk is directed to close this case and deny all pending motions as
moot.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 17th day of November, 2016.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record
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