King et al v. Board of County Commissioners, Polk County, Florida et al
Filing
58
ORDER: Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Doc. ## 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 ) are denied. Defendants' Motions to Strike Prayer for Punitive Damages (Doc. ## 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 ) are denied. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 3/23/2017. (DMD)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
NANCY KING, THE OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH CENTER, INC., and
WORK LOSS MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 8:16-cv-2651-T-33TBM
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
POLK COUNTY, FLORIDA, KANDIS
BAKER-BUFORD, individually,
LEA ANN THOMAS, individually,
and JIM FREEMAN, individually,
Defendants.
________________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendants
Board of County Commissioners, Polk County, Florida’s Motion
to Dismiss and Strike (Doc. # 48), Jim Freeman’s Motion to
Dismiss and Strike (Doc. # 49), Kandis Baker-Buford’s Motion
to Dismiss and Strike (Doc. # 50), and Lea Ann Thomas’s Motion
to Dismiss and Strike (Doc. # 51). Plaintiffs Dr. Nancy King,
the
Occupational
Health
Center,
Inc.,
and
Work
Loss
Management, Inc., filed responses on March 6, 2017. (Doc. ##
56-57). For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the
Motions.
1
I.
Background
King
is
the
owner
and
an
employee
of
both
the
Occupational Health Center (OHC), which contracts with Polk
County to provide medical services, and Work Loss Management,
Inc. (WLM), which contracts with the County to provide drug
screenings. (Doc. # 43 at ¶¶ 5-6, 11-12). Through OHC and
WLM, King worked as the occupational medicine medical director
for the County from October of 2000 until March of 2016. (Id.
at
¶¶
11-12,
51).
The
contract
was
renewed
for
three
consecutive five-year terms without the County using a bidding
process. (Id. at ¶ 11). King’s duties included “overs[eeing]
the administration of physicals, drug testing, and worker’s
compensation claims” and “performing all the fitness-for-duty
evaluations” for the County. (Id. at ¶ 13).
In December of 2013, one of King’s physician assistants
performed a fitness-for-duty examination on Mr. J.,1 who had
been recruited to be a firefighter by the County in its effort
to increase diversity. (Id. at ¶ 14). The physician assistant
determined that Mr. J was not qualified to be a firefighter.
(Id.). Yet, in November of 2014, King learned that Mr. J was
in the County’s firefighter training program. (Id. at ¶ 15).
For privacy reasons, the Second Amended Complaint uses a
pseudonym, as does the Court.
1
2
The County again asked King to review Mr. J’s medical records
and
make
a
fitness-for-duty
determination
based
on
the
records. (Id.). King stated that she would need to personally
examine Mr. J to make that determination. (Id.).
A
few
days
later,
the
County’s
director
of
risk
management, Michael Kushner, asked King to tell Baker-Buford,
the County’s human resources and diversity director, that
King would be examining Mr. J. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-17). Baker-Buford
told King that she could not re-examine Mr. J because Mr. J’s
personal physician had already cleared him for duty. (Id. at
¶ 18). King reported Baker-Buford’s refusal to Kushner, who
later requested in an email that King review Mr. J’s medical
records “to determine whether or not they contained falsified
medical information.” (Id. at ¶¶ 19-20).
When King requested Mr. J’s medical records that had
been provided to the employee health clinic, she discovered
that Baker-Buford had submitted some of Mr. J’s records,
although employees typically submit their own. (Id. at ¶ 20).
After
reviewing
the
records,
King
contacted
Kushner
and
suggested that Mr. J undergo an examination by a specialist
for a second opinion. (Id. at ¶ 21). Her conversation with
Kushner “reported, at the very least, a violation of [the
County’s] policies on medical clearance requirements for
3
firefighters working for [the County] and interference in the
medical clearance requirements for firefighters by [BakerBuford].” (Id.). According to King, this discussion qualified
as an “inquiry” because “Kushner asked [King] to obtain
information and report back to him thereafter.” (Id.).
An
appointment
with
a
specialist
was
scheduled
in
February of 2015, but the specialist received a phone call
cancelling the appointment from a woman purporting to be Mr.
J’s attorney. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-24). A public records request
revealed that the phone call had been made from an employee’s
phone
in
Baker-Buford’s
department.
(Id.
at
¶
24).
Subsequently, Kushner emailed Baker-Buford and emphasized to
her
that
King
“had
sole
discretion
in
making
medical
determinations on behalf of [the County],” but Baker-Buford
insisted that King should not have chosen the specialist to
examine Mr. J. (Id. at ¶ 25).
At that time, King tried but was unable to arrange a
meeting with either the county manager, Freeman, or the deputy
county
Thomas,
manager
to
for
discuss
support
her
services
concerns.
and
(Id.
human
at
¶¶
services,
8-9,
26).
Thereafter, King contacted Mr. J’s physician and asked him
whether he thought Mr. J met the specific physical guidelines
for firefighters. (Id. at ¶ 27). The doctor “admitted that he
4
had been unaware of the guidelines” and agreed that Mr. J was
not
medically
fit.
(Id.
at
¶
29).
After
Baker-Buford
discovered Mr. J had been found unfit, she emailed King,
“warning her that she needed to ‘treat all employees the
same.’” (Id. at ¶ 32).
King was then able to meet with Thomas, the deputy county
manager, to discuss her concerns “about [Mr.] J’s ability to
safely perform the essential functions of his job, the public
safety concerns that could be posed by [Mr.] J if he was a
firefighter, as well as the multiple actions by [Baker-Buford]
interfering with the medical clearance of [Mr.] J.” (Id. at
¶ 33). Soon thereafter, in April of 2015, Mr. J was dismissed
from firefighter training, but was still being considered for
an EMT position. (Id. at ¶¶ 35, 37). Then, King emailed Diane
Mulloney,
the
County’s
employee
health
services
clinic
director, and Kushner. (Id. at ¶ 36). King attached a chart
to the email, which disclosed the events surrounding King’s
determination that Mr. J was unfit to be a firefighter,
including her conversations with Baker-Buford and Thomas.
(Id.).
After a different physician concluded that more tests
were required to determine whether Mr. J was medically fit to
be an EMT, another deputy county manager informed King that
5
the County would not require Mr. J to take the tests. (Id. at
¶¶ 38-39). Nevertheless, King “issued her final determination
letter finding that [Mr.] J was medically unfit for the EMT
position” on June 25, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 40). But, the County
ignored King’s determination and “placed [Mr.] J in an EMT
position.” (Id.).
Eventually, in September of 2015, King met with the
county manager, Freeman. Freeman “is responsible for the
proper administration of all affairs of the [C]ounty . . . [,
w]ith the exception of the county attorney’s office, Freeman
appoints and manages all of the [C]ounty’s nearly 2,000
employees . . . and is responsible for proper administration
of the Board of County Commissioners’ adopted budget.” (Id.
at ¶ 8). During the meeting, King explained her concerns over
Mr. J’s fitness and Baker-Buford’s involvement, “which [King]
understood to constitute both violations of law, rule or
regulation”
and
“malfeasance,
misfeasance
or
gross
misconduct” by the County. (Id. at ¶ 40). King told Freeman
“that
her
priority
was
the
safety
of
[Mr.]
J,
of
his
coworkers, and of the public, and that there were public
safety concerns with [Mr.] J working as a firefighter or EMT.”
(Id.). When Freeman said “We just need your help on this, Dr.
King,” King responded that “her responsibility to [the County]
6
was to make sure that personnel were medically fit for duty,
and that she would not compromise her medical judgment for
anyone.” (Id.).
She
further
disclosed
the “multiple instances where
[Mr.] J, as an employee of [the] County, falsified medical
documents yet
[]
was permitted to remain on the County
payroll.” (Id. at ¶ 41). King also shared with Freeman “her
concerns
regarding
the
potential
reverse
discrimination
actions other medically unqualified fire fighters might take
who were never afforded the opportunity to work for the []
County once they were deemed to be medically unqualified.”
(Id.).
This
disclosure
of
her
public
safety
and
civil
liability concerns was not part of King’s ordinary job duties.
(Id.).
Allegedly
in
retaliation
for
King’s
disclosure
and
refusal to certify Mr. J, the County put the occupational
medicine medical director contract out for bidding. (Id. at
¶ 43). King submitted her proposal and attended an interview
with the selection committee, which included Thomas. (Id. at
¶¶ 44, 47). During the interview, Thomas asked whether King
would handle Mr. J’s certification differently if she were
able. (Id. at ¶ 47). Later, King was informed that the
committee could not agree to make a recommendation for either
7
King or the other candidate. (Id. at ¶ 49). On March 24, 2016,
the County’s “procurement director formally rejected all
proposals for the occupational health program.” (Id. at ¶
51). However, when King later spoke with two members of the
selection committee, they informed King that the committee
had voted to give her the contract. (Id. at ¶¶ 54-57).
The gravamen of King’s claims is that the
County used the [bidding] process to wrongfully
terminate [] King because she had refused to provide
medical clearance which would have permitted
[Baker-Buford] to continue to hire and have [the]
County employ a medically unqualified applicant,
because she discussed and reported safety concerns
with [the] County’s management, and because she
refused to medically qualify [Mr.] J, who is
African-American.
(Id. at ¶ 59).
On September 15, 2016, King and OHC filed their Complaint
against the Board of County Commissioners for Polk County, as
well as Freeman, Baker-Buford, and Thomas in their individual
capacities, alleging that they violated her First Amendment
rights and Florida’s Whistleblower Act for public employees,
Section 112.3187, Fla. Stat., by retaliating against her for
reporting her public safety concerns. (Doc. # 1). After
Defendants moved to dismiss, King and OHC filed an Amended
Complaint on November 4, 2016. The Amended Complaint contained
four counts: (I) Florida whistleblower retaliation claim
8
against
the
County
by
King;
(II)
Florida
whistleblower
retaliation claim against the County by OHC; (III) First
Amendment retaliation claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
against the individual Defendants by King; and (IV) a § 1983
First Amendment retaliation claim against the County by King.
(Doc. # 23). On December 22, 2016, the Court granted in part
and
denied
in
part
Defendants’
Motions
to
Dismiss
and
dismissed the two First Amendment retaliation claims without
prejudice, after finding that King spoke as an employee rather
than a citizen. (Doc. # 42).
Then, on January 23, 2017, King filed her Second Amended
Complaint, with the same four counts but with WLM added as a
plaintiff. (Doc. # 43). Defendants then filed another round
of motions to dismiss, (Doc. ## 48-51), which also embed
motions to strike King’s prayer for punitive damages against
the individual Defendants. King responded to the pending
Motions on March 6, 2017. (Doc. ## 56-57). The Motions are
ripe for review.
II.
Legal Standard
A.
Rule 12(b)(6)
On a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true all
the allegations in the complaint and construes them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth
9
Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further,
this Court favors the plaintiff with all reasonable inferences
from the allegations in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of
Health
&
Human
Servs.,
901
F.2d
1571,
1573
(11th
Cir.
1990)(“On a motion to dismiss, the facts stated in [the]
complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom are taken
as true.”). However,
[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal
citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Furthermore, “[t]he scope
of
review
must
be
limited
to
the
four
corners
of
the
complaint.” St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337
(11th Cir. 2002).
B.
Rule 12(f)
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
10
The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, or scandalous
matter. The court may act:
(1)
on its own; or
(2) on motion made by a party either before
responding to the pleading or, if a response is not
allowed, within 21 days after being served with the
pleading.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (emphasis added).
Motions
to
strike
are
considered
“drastic”
and
are
disfavored by the courts. Thompson v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs.
E.,
LLC,
211
F.
Supp.
2d
1345,
1348
(M.D.
Fla.
2002).
Generally, “a court will not exercise its discretion under
the rule to strike a pleading unless the matter sought to be
omitted has no possible relationship to the controversy, may
confuse the issues, or otherwise prejudice a party.” Reyher
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 574, 576 (M.D.
Fla. 1995).
III. Analysis
A.
Protected Speech
Both of King’s First Amendment claims, Counts III and
IV, are governed by a four-stage analysis to determine whether
King’s speech is protected. Moss v. City of Pembroke Pines,
782 F.3d 613, 617 (11th Cir. 2015)(citing Carter v. City of
Melbourne, Fla., 731 F.3d 1161, 1168 (11th Cir. 2013)). The
first step is for the Court to “consider whether [King’s]
11
speech was made as a citizen and whether it implicated ‘a
matter of public concern.’” Id. (quoting Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987)). These first two questions are
“questions of law that are decided by the Court.” Id. at 618
(citing Battle v. Bd. of Regents for Ga., 468 F.3d 755, 760
(11th Cir. 2006)). Only if this threshold requirement is met
will the Court “then weigh [King’s] First Amendment interests
against the City’s interest in regulating [her] speech to
promote ‘the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.’” Id. at 618 (quoting Rankin, 483 U.S.
at 384).
All Defendants argue that King did not speak as a citizen
on a matter of public concern. The determination of whether
an employee spoke as a citizen concerns whether the speech
“owes
its
existence
to
a
public
employee’s
professional
responsibilities.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 42122 (2006). However, the phrase “owes its existence to . . .
must be read narrowly to encompass speech that an employee
made in accordance with or in furtherance of the ordinary
responsibilities of her employment, not merely speech that
concerns the ordinary responsibilities of her employment.”
Alves v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 804 F.3d
1149, 1162 (11th Cir. 2015)(emphasis added).
12
Thus, “the mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns
information acquired by virtue of his public employment does
not transform that speech into employee — rather than citizen
— speech.” Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014).
Instead,
the
Court
considers
relevant
practical
factors
including “the employee’s job description, whether the speech
occurred at the workplace, and whether the speech concerned
the subject matter of the employee’s job.” Alves, 804 F.3d at
1161. However, these factors are not dispositive. Id. An
employee’s job duties are interpreted practically because
courts recognize that “[f]ormal job descriptions often bear
little resemblance to the duties an employee actually is
expected to perform.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25.
King argues that her conversation with Freeman was not
employee speech. (Doc. # 56 at ¶ 13). The Second Amended
Complaint
adds
some
new
allegations
regarding
that
conversation. Specifically, King now alleges that she told
Freeman
“her
discrimination
concerns
actions
regarding
other
the
medically
potential
reverse
unqualified
fire
fighters might take who were never afforded the opportunity
to work for the [] County once they were deemed to be medically
unqualified.” (Doc. # 43 at ¶ 41). According to King, the
possibility of reverse discrimination lawsuits “would have
13
been a matter of public concern to the citizens in Polk
County.” (Id.). King also adds that “She advised Freeman of
multiple instances where [Mr.] J, as an employee of [the
County], falsified medical documents yet [Mr.] J was permitted
to remain on the County payroll.” (Id.).
Although King alleges that she had concerns for the
public’s safety and the possibility of reverse discrimination
suits against the County, King made all of her disclosures to
her employer rather than the public. See Alves, 804 F.3d at
1161 (noting that whether speech occurred in the workplace is
relevant but not dispositive). As in the Amended Complaint,
King does not allege that she contacted the media, or spoke
out
about
the
implementation
of
firefighter
fitness
requirements at a city council meeting, or made her concerns
public in any other way. Cf. Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333
(11th Cir. 2007)(finding caseworkers spoke as employees and
noting that one employee’s “complaints, although more often
in a written format as a letter or memorandum to a supervisor,
were not sent to an outside entity”).
King’s
complaints
about
the
breach
of
procedures
concerning Mr. J, which the Court discussed in its Order
dismissing the Amended Complaint, were made so that she could
fulfill her duties as occupational medicine medical director
14
by correcting what King considered improper conduct by BakerBuford. Thus, those complaints were made in furtherance of
her ordinary job responsibilities. See Alves, 804 F.3d at
1164-65
(“Each
complaint
in
the
Memorandum
was
made
in
furtherance of [plaintiffs’] ability to fulfill their duties
with
the
goal
of
correcting
Dr.
Lee-Barber’s
alleged
mismanagement, which interfered with [plaintiffs’] ability to
perform.”); see also Winder v. Erste, 566 F.3d 209, 215 (D.C.
Cir. 2009)(“[Employee’s speech] was an attempt to ensure
proper
implementation
of
[his
duties]
and
was
therefore
offered pursuant to his job duties.”). Accordingly, the Court
again finds that “in reporting conduct that interfered with
[her] ordinary job duties, [King] spoke pursuant to those
duties.” Alves, 804 F.3d at 1165. The allegations that were
previously included in the Amended Complaint about BakerBuford’s interference with King’s medical determinations fail
to qualify as citizen speech. While King insists in her
response that Alves was wrongly decided, Alves is binding
precedent.
But, King now alleges that, in addition to her complaints
about the interference in her job duties, she informed Freeman
of her concern that the County would be exposed to liability
15
for reverse discrimination lawsuits because of its hiring of
Mr. J and that Mr. J had falsified his medical records.
The
Court
disagrees
with
Defendants
that
when
King
mentioned potential reverse discrimination lawsuits, she “was
simply
expressing
what
she
believed
to
be
a
potential
consequence of not letting King do her job.” (Doc. # 48 at
16). Rather, King plausibly alleges that she was concerned
that the County was violating employment discrimination laws,
and that taxpayer money could be lost in a lawsuit brought in
part because the County hired Mr. J despite his medical
unfitness. Furthermore, the filing of falsified records by a
County employee is serious misconduct that calls into question
that employee’s integrity and ability to serve the community
— important issues that plausibly fall outside the ordinary
duties of occupational medicine medical director.
Next,
the
specifically
possibility
Court
finds,
contest,
of
reverse
that
and
the
King’s
Defendants
speech
discrimination
did
not
regarding
the
lawsuits
and
the
falsification of records by Mr. J touched on a matter of
public concern. An employee’s speech involves a matter of
public concern if that speech can “be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern
to the community.” Cook v. Gwinnett Cty. Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d
16
1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2005)(quoting Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
King casts her communications as exposing misconduct by
various County employees, including Baker-Buford and Mr. J,
which could result in the County’s liability in Title VII
lawsuits brought by other medically unqualified firefighter
applicants.
“Exposing
governmental
inefficiency
and
misconduct is a matter of considerable significance,” and
here, King was concerned that the misconduct could lead to
additional liability for the County, thereby affecting its
citizens. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. At the motion to dismiss
stage, where the Court must accept the allegations of the
Second Amended Complaint as true, King has plausibly alleged
that her speech touched on a matter of public concern and was
motivated by such a concern.
The next step of the First Amendment analysis is the
Pickering balancing test. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of
Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
“The Pickering test seeks to arrive at a balance between the
employee’s interest in commenting on matters of public concern
and his employer’s interest in efficiently providing public
services.” Moss, 782 F.3d at 621 (citing Leslie v. Hancock
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 720 F.3d 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2013)).
17
“The ‘manner, time, and place’ of the challenged speech and
‘the context’ in which it arose are relevant to the Pickering
balance.” Id. (citation omitted).
King’s interest in her speech plausibly outweighs the
County’s interest in efficient administration. See Bryson v.
Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989)(“[A] core
concern of the [F]irst [A]mendment is the protection of the
‘whistle-blower’
attempting
to
expose
government
corruption.”); see also Smith v. Birmingham Water Works, No.
CV 12-J-3493-S, 2013 WL 246018, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 23,
2013)(“Rather
perform
employees
than
impeding
efficiently,
promotes
the
exposing
efficient
government’s
corruption
public
in
ability
to
government
service.”).
The
Defendants have not included any arguments regarding this
prong of the First Amendment analysis. At this stage of the
proceedings, King has plausibly alleged a violation of her
First Amendment rights.
B.
Causation
“If [her] speech is so protected, the third stage of the
analysis requires [King] to show that it was a substantial
motivating factor in [her] termination.” Moss, 782 F.3d at
618 (citation omitted). “If [King] is able to make this
showing, the burden shifts to the City to prove that it would
18
have terminated [King] even in the absence of [her] speech.”
Id. However, “[b]ecause these final two issues, which address
the causal link between [King’s] speech and [her] termination,
are questions of fact, a jury resolves them unless the
evidence is undisputed.” Id.
Here, the parties dispute the role that each individual
Defendant played in the decision to put the occupational
medicine
medical
director
contract
out
for
bidding,
and
subsequently to not select King for that contract — the
adverse employment action King allegedly suffered because of
her speech.
Still, the individual Defendants argue that King
has
to
failed
allege
sufficient
causation
between
each
Defendant’s actions and the adverse employment action.
For all three individual Defendants, King alleges that
her “protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor
in the adverse actions taken against her.” (Doc. # 43 at ¶
79).
“Each
participated
of
the
in
the
[i]ndividual
adverse
Defendants
actions
against
personally
[]
King
in
violation of her First Amendment rights.” (Id. at ¶ 82).
Furthermore, “[e]ach of the [i]ndividual Defendants were a
main participant, a policymaker, and/or made decisions to act
adversely to [] King in her relationship with Defendant County
after she engaged in protected First Amendment activity.”
19
(Id. at ¶ 83). According to King, the individual Defendants
“were acting under color of state law . . . when they made
the decisions and/or participated in the adverse actions
against [] King.” (Id. at ¶ 84).
King’s theory of causation is that the “County used the
[bidding] process to wrongfully terminate [] King . . .
because she discussed and reported safety concerns with [the]
County’s management.”(Id. at ¶ 59). King has alleged facts
plausibly
supporting
that
allegation:
Thomas
asked
King
during her interview for the contract renewal whether King
would change the way she behaved during Mr. J’s medical
qualification process, if she had the chance, and other
members of the selection committee told King that she had
been chosen by the committee, yet County officials informed
King that the committee had not selected anyone and King’s
contract would not be renewed. (Id. at ¶¶ 47, 54-57).
At the motion to dismiss stage, King has plausibly
alleged that her speech regarding the irregularities of Mr.
J’s medical fitness examination and medical records, as well
as the County’s potential liability King foresaw as a result,
caused the adverse employment action against her. Cf. Cruz v.
Puerto Rico Power Auth., 878 F. Supp. 2d 316, 327 n.4 (D.P.R.
2012)(denying motion to dismiss First Amendment retaliation
20
claim and stating “With the limited facts presently before
the Court, we find that Plaintiff’s speech was a substantial
or motivating factor in the actions against him.”).
C.
Qualified Immunity
Even
if
King’s
speech
is
protected
by
the
First
Amendment, the individual Defendants argue that they are
entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly
established that King’s speech was protected. “[D]efendants
assert the defense of qualified immunity in a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, and they are entitled to qualified immunity
at this stage in the proceedings if [the Second Amended
Complaint]
fails
to
allege
the
violation
of
a
clearly
established constitutional right.” Williams v. Ala. State
Univ.,
102
F.3d
1179,
1182
(11th
Cir.
1997)(citations
omitted). Qualified immunity protects government officials
performing discretionary functions from being sued in their
individual capacities unless their conduct violates a clearly
established statutory or constitutional right. Brannon v.
Finkelstein, 754 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2014).
In order to establish a defense of qualified immunity,
a government official must first demonstrate that he or she
was acting within his or her discretionary authority. See
Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 995 (11th Cir. 2003). King
21
does not contest that the individual Defendants were acting
within their discretionary authority. (Doc. # 57 at 4). And,
the
Court
has
already
determined
that
some
of
King’s
statements are protected under the First Amendment. Thus, the
Court’s qualified immunity analysis focuses on whether King’s
right was clearly established.
To determine if a right is clearly established, courts
in the Eleventh Circuit use “two methods to determine whether
a
reasonable
official
would
understand
that
his
conduct
violates a constitutional right.” Carollo v. Boria, 833 F.3d
1322, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016)(quoting Moore v. Pederson, 806
F.3d 1036, 1047 (11th Cir. 2015)). The first method asks
whether “binding opinions from the United States Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the highest
court in the state where the action is filed . . . gave [the
defendant] fair warning that his treatment of [the plaintiff]
was unconstitutional.” Merricks v. Adkisson, 785 F.3d 553,
559 (11th Cir. 2015). The second method examines whether a
public official’s “‘conduct lies so obviously at the very
core of what [federal law] prohibits that the unlawfulness of
the conduct was readily apparent to [the public official],
notwithstanding the lack of fact-specific case law’ on point.”
Moore, 806 F.3d at 1047 (quoting Fils v. City of Aventura,
22
647 F.3d 1272, 1291 (11th Cir. 2011)(internal quotation marks
omitted)). The first method is the relevant one for this
analysis because “it is not ‘so obvious’ that [Defendants]
violated the First Amendment in light of the close merits
question of whether” King spoke as an employee or as a
citizen. Carollo, 833 F.3d at 1333.
But, for King’s claims, “[t]he law is clearly established
that an employer may not demote or discharge a public employee
for engaging in protected speech.” Travers v. Jones, 323 F.3d
1294, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Akins v. Fulton Cty.,
Ga., 420 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005)(holding that a
defendant had “fair warning . . . that speech whose main
thrust
is
to
report
bidding
irregularities
to
a
public
official in a meeting requested for that purpose is protected
by the First Amendment” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
According to the Second Amended Complaint, King’s conflicts
with Baker-Buford began in November of 2014 and the County
officially rejected King’s bid for contract renewal in March
of 2016. Thus, the retaliatory actions taken by the Defendants
occurred after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Garcetti and
Lane. Both cases made clear that speech on a matter of public
concern made by an employee in their capacity as a citizen is
generally protected by the First Amendment, even if the
23
employee gained knowledge about the subject of her speech
through her employment. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 (“[T]he
mere
fact
that
a
citizen’s
speech
concerns
information
acquired by virtue of his public employment does not transform
that speech into employee — rather than citizen — speech. The
critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at
issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s
duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”).
Defendants cite to Eleventh Circuit case law stating
that “[b]ecause no bright-line standard puts the reasonable
public employer on notice of a constitutional violation, the
employer is entitled to immunity except in the extraordinary
case where Pickering balancing would lead to the inevitable
conclusion that the discharge of the employee was unlawful.”
Dartland v. Metro. Dade Cty., 866 F.2d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir.
1989)(reversing denial of summary judgment and finding county
manager entitled to qualified immunity for First Amendment
retaliation
claim).
True,
the
Eleventh
Circuit
has
acknowledged that “a defendant will only rarely be on notice
that his actions are unlawful because applying the Pickering
balancing involves legal determinations that are intensely
fact-specific and do not lend themselves to clear, brightline rules.” Brannon, 754 F.3d at 1278 (affirming grant of
24
qualified immunity at motion to dismiss stage but “on somewhat
different grounds because we now have the benefit of discovery
unavailable to the district court at the motion to dismiss
stage”)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
But, those cases involved the Pickering balancing aspect
of the analysis while Defendants argue primarily that King
spoke as an employee. See Carollo, 833 F.3d at 1334 (affirming
denial of qualified immunity at motion to dismiss stage and
stating “Our decisions applying Pickering’s balancing test
are
irrelevant,
however,
because
here
appellants
do
not
advance an argument that they had an adequate justification
for terminating Carollo, only that Carollo spoke pursuant to
his
official
Dartland
and
discovery,
job
responsibilities.”).
Brannon
rather
than
were
on
decided
the
Furthermore,
with
basis
of
both
the
benefit
of
the
complaints’
allegations alone.
The authority cited by Defendants may have led them to
believe at the time of their retaliatory conduct that they
might
be
entitled
to
qualified
immunity
in
a
potential
retaliation action. But, those opinions do not undermine the
fair warning provided by Garcetti, Lane, and Eleventh Circuit
precedent that terminating an employee in retaliation for
speaking on a matter of public concern outside the scope of
25
her
ordinary
job
responsibilities
violates
the
First
Amendment.
The Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that
the individual Defendants violated King’s clearly established
First Amendment rights when they refused to renew King’s
contract
in
retaliation
for
her
protected
speech.
See
Cunningham v. Sch. Bd. of Lake Cty., No. 5:15-cv-480-Oc-30PRL,
2016 WL 5106944, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2016)(denying
motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity because “the
Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit have recognized public
employees’ clearly established right to speak on matters of
public concern well before Cunningham’s demotion”). Thus,
Baker-Buford,
Thomas,
and
Freeman
are
not
entitled
to
qualified immunity at this stage. But, with the benefit of
discovery, they may
be able to establish
that they are
entitled to qualified immunity later in the proceedings.
B.
Municipal Liability
King did not respond to the County’s argument that King
has failed to sufficiently plead municipal liability for Count
IV. And, while King “incorporate[d] all arguments previously
made
in
opposition
to
dismissal
of
[Plaintiffs’]
Whistleblower Act claims contained” in the response to the
motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint, King has overlooked
26
incorporating her arguments on municipal liability for the
First Amendment retaliation claim against the County from her
previous response. (Doc. # 56 at 2). But, given the preference
for deciding cases on the merits, the Court does not grant
the County’s Motion as to this issue as unopposed. See In re
Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003)
(noting in the default context that “there is a strong policy
of determining cases on their merits”). Rather, the Court
finds
that
the
Second
Amended
Complaint’s
allegations
sufficiently state a claim for municipal liability.
The County’s Motion argues that King has not sufficiently
stated a claim under any of the theories for liability set
forth in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978). (Doc. # 48 at 17). A plaintiff seeking to impose
liability on a governmental entity under § 1983 must identify
a “municipal ‘policy or custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s
injury.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). A plaintiff may also establish
liability pursuant to a municipal policy when “a deliberate
choice to follow a course of action is made from among various
alternatives by the official or officials responsible for
establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter
27
in question.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
483 (1986).
King has sufficiently alleged that the decision not to
renew her contract in retaliation for her speech was made by
a County decision-maker with final policymaking authority.
King alleges: “One or more of the Individual Defendants had
final
policymaking
authority
for
[the]
County,
and
were
responsible for hiring, retaining, staffing, training, and
supervising
necessary
other
for
employees
of
investigating
the
[]
alleged
County
and,
wrongdoing
when
by
its
employees.” (Doc. # 43 at ¶ 99).
And, while the County contests that any of the individual
Defendants had final policymaking authority, the Court must
accept the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint as
true at this stage. See Booth v. Pasco Cty., Fla., No. 8:09cv-02621-T-30TBM, 2010 WL 2757209, at *12 (M.D. Fla. July 13,
2010)(“In
regards
to
whether
Director
Lopinto
and
BC
Ciccarello have final policymaking authority as Plaintiffs
allege, at this stage, the Court must assume that the facts
alleged
in
Plaintiff’s
Amended
Complaint
are
true.
Defendant’s argument to the contrary is more appropriate for
a
motion
for
Summary
Judgment.”).
The
Seconded
Amended
Complaint quotes the County’s website as saying that Freeman
28
“is responsible for the proper administration of all affairs
of the [C]ounty . . . [, w]ith the exception of the county
attorney’s office, Freeman appoints and manages all of the
[C]ounty’s nearly 2,000 employees . . . and is responsible
for
proper
administration
of
the
Board
of
County
Commissioners’ adopted budget.” (Doc. # 43 at ¶ 8). Such an
allegation
plausibly
supports
that
Freeman,
as
county
manager, had final policymaking authority with respect to
decisions to renew — or not — contracts like King’s.
Furthermore,
King has
alternatively
alleged that
at
least one of the individual Defendants was delegated final
authority regarding the decision not to renew King’s contract.
If the individual Defendants are not final policymakers, King
alleges that “one or more nonetheless functioned as the final
policymaker
for
[the]
County
in
connection
with
the
allegations herein, their decisions and actions having been
rubber-stamped at all higher levels of authority.” (Id.).
“Authority to make municipal policy may be granted directly
by a legislative enactment or may be delegated by an official
who
possesses
such
authority.”
City
of
St.
Louis
v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988)(quoting Pembaur, 475
U.S. at 483).
29
Here, King has alleged that final authority was delegated
to at least one of the individual Defendants, and has alleged
facts indicating that some of the individual Defendants played
major roles in the decision not to renew King’s contract. She
alleges that Thomas was on the selection committee and asked
King a question about the medical certification of Mr. J
during King’s interview. (Doc. # 43 at ¶ 47). King also
alleged that the selection committee had chosen to give her
the contract, yet someone in the County decided not to renew
her contract regardless — reasonably implying that the final
decision was made by a policymaker rather than the selection
committee. (Id. at ¶ 54-57).
It is plausible that the county manager, deputy county
manager for support services and human services, or the
County’s
human
resources
director
either
had
final
policymaking authority or had been delegated final authority
to
decide
whether
to
renew
employment
contracts
for
independent contractors like King. Thus, the First Amendment
retaliation claim against the County should not be dismissed.
C.
Whistleblower Retaliation
1.
New Allegations
Although the Court already held that Counts I and II of
the
Amended
Complaint
sufficiently
30
stated
claims
under
Florida’s Whistleblower Act, the County argues that Count I
and II of the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed
because the new allegations in these Counts undermine King’s
claims. (Doc. # 48 at 3). The Court disagrees. The Second
Amended
Complaint
still
states
claims
under
Florida’s
Whistleblower Act.
In order to state a claim under the Act, a plaintiff
must allege that (1) he or she engaged in a statutorily
protected
activity;
(2)
he
or
she
suffered
an
adverse
employment action; and (3) there existed a causal connection
between the two events. See Castro v. Sch. Bd. of Manatee
Cty., Fla., 903 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
A disclosure is protected if the information revealed
includes
“[a]ny
violation
or
suspected
violation
of
any
federal, state, or local law, rule, or regulation committed
by an employee or agent of an agency or independent contractor
which creates and presents a substantial and specific danger
to the public’s health, safety, or welfare” or “[a]ny act or
suspected
act
of
gross
mismanagement,
malfeasance,
[or]
misfeasance . . . committed by an employee or agent of an
agency or independent contractor.” Fla. Stat. § 112.3187(5).
For disclosures concerning a local governmental entity
like the County, “the information must be disclosed to a chief
31
executive officer” or “other appropriate local official.”
Fla. Stat. § 112.3187(6). Additionally, the disclosure of a
violation or suspected violation must be made in a signed
written
complaint,
if
disclosed
on
the
employee’s
own
initiative or to the employee’s “supervisory officials.” Fla.
Stat. § 112.3187(7). But if the disclosure is made pursuant
to a “request[] to participate in an investigation, hearing,
or
other
inquiry
conducted
by
any
agency
or
federal
governmental entity,” there is no writing requirement. Id.
The Court is mindful that “[t]he public whistleblower statute
is
remedial,
and
courts
should
construe
it
broadly.”
Competelli v. City of Belleair Bluffs, 113 So. 3d 92, 94 (Fla.
2d DCA 2013).
As the Court held regarding the Amended Complaint, the
Second
Amended
Complaint’s
allegations
that
Baker-Buford
submitted the suspected false medical records for Mr. J and
called to cancel Mr. J’s appointment with the specialist
physician while pretending to be Mr. J’s attorney plausibly
qualify as malfeasance, which is “the doing of an act which
a person ought not do at all,” or misfeasance, which is “the
improper doing of an act which a person might lawfully do.”
Burden v. City of Opa Locka, No. 11-22018-CIV, 2012 WL
4764592, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2012)(citations omitted).
32
The new allegation that Mr. J “falsified medical documents
yet [] was permitted to remain on the County payroll” would
also qualify as malfeasance. See (Doc. # 43 at ¶ 41).
Like the Amended Complaint, the Second Amended Complaint
alleges that Kushner requested King participate in an inquiry,
during
which
she
made
a
disclosure
about
Baker-Buford’s
conduct, and therefore a writing would not have been required.
King claims that Kushner asked her to review Mr. J’s medical
records
to
determine
whether
they
contained
“falsified
medical information.” (Doc. # 43 at ¶ 20). This allegation —
that the County’s director of risk management contacted King
to review records for signs of falsification — still suffices
to establish at this juncture that King was asked to assist
in an investigation of misconduct rather than asked to perform
her ordinary duty of providing medical fitness evaluations.
Thus, for this allegation, a writing would not be required.
Nevertheless, King alleges that she also sent an email,
with an attached chart, to Kushner and Mulloney that detailed
the
conflict
surrounding
Mr.
J’s
medical
fitness
qualifications. (Id. at ¶ 36); see also Scheirich v. Town of
Hillsboro Beach, No. 07-61630-CIV, 2008
WL 186621, at *14
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2008)(stating “[t]hese alleged complaints
in the form of a report, letter, and email messages meet the
33
writing requirement of § 112.3187(7)”). And, regarding the
County’s insistence that King has not pled that she reported
to an appropriate local official, the Court again finds that
King, OHC, and WLM have plausibly alleged that Kushner, as
director of risk management for the County, and Mulloney, as
employee health services clinic director for the County, were
appropriate
officials
who
had
authority
to
investigate
misconduct by County employees and to whom King could report
her concerns. See Saunders v. Hunter, 980 F. Supp. 1236, 1246
(M.D. Fla. 1997)(denying motion to dismiss because “plaintiff
allege[d] she reported the incidents not to a chief executive
officer but to her supervisors who are appropriate local
officials”).
The County emphasizes that King refers to Kushner and
Mulloney
as “‘local officials’
under [section] 112.3187”
rather than “appropriate local officials.” (Doc. # 48 at 4).
But, this allegation explicitly invokes the statutory section
discussing “appropriate local officials” and is combined with
King’s assertion that Kushner and Mulloney were in positions
“to correct the actions that [King] reported.” See (Doc. # 43
at ¶ 36); see also Igwe v. City of Miami, 208 So. 3d 150, 154
(Fla. 3rd DCA 2016)(“The phrase, ‘other appropriate local
official,’ has been interpreted to mean ‘an official or
34
official
entity
who
is
affiliated
with
the
violating
governmental entity and has the authority to investigate,
police, manage, or otherwise remedy the violation or act by
the
violating
governmental
entity.’”)(citation
omitted)
(emphasis added). Thus, at this stage, these allegations are
sufficient to plead that Kushner and Mulloney were appropriate
local officials.
The
Second
Complaint,
Amended
sufficiently
Complaint,
states
a
like
claim
the
under
Amended
Florida’s
Whistleblower Act.
2.
New Party and Relation Back
Next, the County argues that WLM should be dismissed as
a party to this action because King did not seek leave to add
a new party. However, the time to add parties and amend
pleadings,
as
set
by
the
Court’s
Case
Management
and
Scheduling Order, did not end until March 15, 2017. (Doc. #
28 at 1). Therefore, it was acceptable for the Second Amended
Complaint, which was filed on January 23, 2017, to add WLM as
a party.
The County also argues that, if WLM is not otherwise
dismissed, its whistleblower claim should be dismissed as
time-barred. (Doc. # 48 at 7-8). A claim under Florida’s
Whistleblower Act must be brought within 180 days of the
35
violation. Fla. Stat. § 112.3187(8). King alleges that the
adverse employment action — the nonrenewal of her contract —
took place on March 24, 2016, at the latest, when the County
formally rejected King’s proposal for the occupational health
program. (Doc. # 43 at ¶ 51). King and OHC filed the original
Complaint in this Court on September 15, 2016, which is 175
days after the alleged adverse employment action. (Doc. # 1).
But, WLM was only added as a party on January 23, 2017—over
300 days after the adverse employment action. (Doc. # 43).
But, King persuasively responds that WLM’s claim is not
time-barred because it relates back to King and OHC’s claims,
which are not time-barred on the face of the Second Amended
Complaint. (Doc. # 56 at 9-11). King insists that WLM’s claim
in the Second Amended Complaint satisfies the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C) and relates back
to the whistleblower claims by King and OHC in the original
Complaint.
“Though
[the
relation
back]
rule
technically
references amendments that change the parties against whom
claims are asserted, [the Eleventh Circuit has] previously
applied it to situations in which new plaintiffs were added.”
Makro Capital of Am., Inc. v. UBS AG, 543 F.3d 1254, 1259
(11th Cir. 2008)(citing Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc.,
363 F.3d 1113, 1131-33 (11th Cir. 2004)).
36
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) governs when an
amended complaint may ‘relate back’ to an earlier complaint,
and therefore be considered filed at the time of the initial
complaint.” Lindley v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 515 F. App’x
813, 815 (11th Cir. 2013). An amended complaint that adds a
party or changes the name of a party relates back where (1)
the claim “arose out of the same conduct, transaction or
occurrence set out — or attempted to be set out — in the
original pleading”; (2) the new party “received such notice
of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on
the merits”; (3) the party being added received such notice
within the time period of Rule 4(m), 90 days; and (4) the
party being added “knew or should have known [within the Rule
4(m) time period] that the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s
identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B), (C)(i-ii); see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(m).
Here, the allegations regarding King and OHC are the
same as those involving WLM. WLM is merely a different entity
through which King contracted with the County to provide
medical services. King alleges that she was “both an owner
and employee” of WLM, just as King has alleged that she is an
owner and employee of OHC since the original Complaint. (Doc.
37
# 43 at ¶ 12). Whereas King previously alleged that she
provided medical fitness examinations and drug screenings for
County employees through OHC, (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 11; Doc. # 23 at
¶¶ 11-12), King clarifies that she actually provided the drug
screenings through WLM. (Doc. # 43 at ¶ 6).
WLM, which is “wholly owned and operated” by King, was
certainly on notice of the possibility of its being a party
in this case when King and OHC filed the original Complaint.
(Doc. # 43 at ¶ 6). And, as King’s claims always involved
allegations that the County refused to renew its contract
with her and an entity through which she provided medical
services, the County was on notice that King’s claim would
involve
all
entities,
including
WLM,
through
which
King
contracted to provide various medical services. Therefore, at
this stage, the Court finds that WLM’s claim in the Second
Amended
Complaint
properly
relates
back
to
the
previous
complaints. As the Court previously found that King and OHC’s
claims were not time-barred on the
face of the Amended
Complaint, WLM’s claim is also not time-barred on the face of
the Second Amended Complaint and will not be dismissed on
that basis.
38
3.
Corporate Plaintiffs
Even if it was proper to add WLM, the County argues that
WLM and OHC should be dismissed because corporations are not
“persons” under the Florida Whistleblower Act. (Doc. # 48 at
7). Under the Act, “employee” is defined as “a person who
performs services for, and under the control and direction
of, or contracts with, an agency or independent contractor
for wages or other remuneration.” Fla. Stat. § 112.3187(3)(b).
Nothing in these definitions excludes a corporation from being
a “person,” and thus an “employee.”
Section 1.01, Fla. Stat., which provides the general
definitions for all Florida Statutes, states: “In construing
these statutes and each and every word, phrase, or part
hereof, where the context will permit: . . . (3) The word
‘person’ includes individuals, children, firms, associations,
joint adventures, partnerships, estates, trusts, business
trusts, syndicates, fiduciaries, corporations, and all other
groups or combinations.” Fla. Stat. § 1.01(3).
As the general definition of “person” under Florida law
includes corporate entities like OHC and WLM, and the County
has not presented any authority to suggest that the definition
of
“employee”
in
Florida’s
Whistleblower
39
Act
otherwise
excludes corporations, the Court will not dismiss OHC and
WLM’s claims.
D.
Punitive Damages
Each Defendant includes a “Motion to Strike Prayer for
Punitive Damages” at the end of his or her Motion to Dismiss,
requesting that the prayer for punitive damages against the
individual Defendants be stricken. However, Defendants do not
cite to any legal authority for the proposition that the
prayer for punitive damages should be dismissed. See Local
Rule 3.01(a), M.D. Fla. (“In a motion or other application
for an order, the movant shall include a concise statement of
the precise relief requested, a statement of the basis for
the request, and a memorandum of legal authority in support
of the request . . .” (emphasis added)). Instead, Defendants
argue that the “prayer for punitive damages should be stricken
as conclusory and unsupported by the facts alleged in the
[S]econd [A]mended [C]omplaint.” (Doc. # 49 at 19).
While the Local Rules for the Middle District of Florida
do not require defendants to confer with opposing counsel
before filing motions to dismiss, they are required to confer
before filing most other types of motions, including motions
to strike. See Local Rule 3.01(g), M.D. Fla. But, Defendants
have not included a certificate indicating that they have
40
conferred with King’s counsel regarding the relief requested
in the Motions to Strike embedded in their Motions to Dismiss.
Denial of the Motions to Strike for violating Local Rules
3.01(a) and (g) alone is warranted.
Regardless, King’s allegations that the County chose to
put her contract out to bid and then refused to renew her
contract despite the selection committee’s vote for King
create the plausible inference that the County acted with
callous
and
willful
disregard
for
King’s
constitutional
rights. Cf. Bailey v. Town of Lady Lake, Fla., No. 5:05-cv464-Oc-10GRJ, 2007 WL 677995, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5,
2007)(declining to strike prayer for punitive damages at
motion to dismiss stage because the complaint sufficiently
“put the Individual Defendants on notice that Bailey is
seeking punitive damages based on the Individual Defendants’
‘intentional and willful’ conduct”). Thus, the Court declines
to strike King’s prayer for punitive damages.
IV.
Conclusion
King has sufficiently pled claims for First Amendment
retaliation and violations of Florida’s Whistleblower Act.
Additionally,
punitive
King
damages
has
sufficiently
against
the
41
pled
her
individual
claim
for
Defendants.
Therefore, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and Strike are
denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
Defendants’
Motions
to
Dismiss
(Doc.
##
48-51)
are
DENIED. Defendants’ Motions to Strike Prayer for Punitive
Damages (Doc. ## 48-51) are DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
23rd day of March, 2017.
42
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