United States of America v. Allen
Filing
9
DEFAULT FINAL JUDGMENT. Order granting 8 Motion for Default Judgment. (See Judgment for details.) The Clerk is directed to close this case and deny all pending motions as moot. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 11/28/2016. (LN)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
Case No.: 8:16-CV-2779-T-30AAS
v.
CHARLES M. ALLEN
Defendant.
DEFAULT FINAL JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Final
Judgment (Dkt. 8). The Court, having reviewed the motion, Plaintiff’s complaint, and the
relevant law, concludes that the motion should be granted.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff, the United States, filed this lawsuit to collect two (2) unpaid debts
Defendant allegedly owed, one each to Florida Federal Savings and Loan Association
Saint Petersburg, FL, and Florida Federal Savings and Loan Jacksonville, FL. According
to the complaint, both of these loans were guaranteed by the State of Florida, Department
of Education, and insured by the Department of Education. According to the certificates
of indebtedness attached to the complaint (Dkt. 1, p. 3 & 4), the state paid the debt as
guarantor upon Defendant’s default, after which the Department of Education reimbursed
the state. Thereafter, the United States demanded repayment, but Defendant has not
complied.
The complaint and summons were served on Defendant on or around October 11,
2016. Defendant had twenty-one (21) days to respond to the complaint, but Defendant
never filed an answer or a response. Plaintiff moved for entry of a clerk’s default, which
was entered on November 14, 2016.
Default Judgment
Plaintiff now seeks default final judgment. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
55(b)(2), a court may enter a default judgment against a party who has failed to plead in
response to a complaint. Such a judgment is appropriate “against a defendant who never
appears or answers a complaint, for in such circumstances, the case never has been placed
at issue.” Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Sys., 803 F.2d 1130, 1134 (11th
Cir. 1986). All well-pleaded allegations of fact against that defendant will be deemed
admitted. See Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Houston Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.
1975). 1
Mere conclusions of law, however, will not. Cotton v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005). A plaintiff must provide “a sufficient basis in
the pleadings for the judgment entered.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Foundation, 789 F.3d
1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). A “sufficient basis” means
satisfying the court that it has jurisdiction over the claims and that the complaint adequately
states a claim for which relief may be granted. See Nishimatsu Const. Co., 516 F.2d at 1206;
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh
Circuit adopted as binding precedent all the decisions of the former United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit decided prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
see also Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245 (concluding that, conceptually, a motion for default
judgment should be treated like a reverse motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
When evaluating the complaint, a court must determine “whether [it] contains
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d
868 (2009) (internal quotations omitted)). And this plausibility standard is met “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245 (internal
citations omitted).
Here, the Court has jurisdiction because the United States is the plaintiff, see 28
U.S.C. § 1345, and the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations establish
that Defendant defaulted on his federally insured loans. Specifically, the complaint makes
the following relevant allegations:
(1) that Defendant executed several promissory notes in 1984, 1985, and 1986 to
secure loans from the Florida Federal Savings and Loan Saint Petersburg;
Loans on these promissory notes—of $2,500.00, $2,500.00, and $2,500.00—
were disbursed in 1986 and 1987 at 8.00% interest per annum (Dkt. 8, Ex. B);
(2) that Defendant defaulted on this loan in 1989, after which the holder, Florida
Federal Saving and loan Saint Petersburg, filed a claim on the loan guarantee
(Dkt. 8, Ex. B);
(3) that Defendant executed a promissory note in 1988 to secure a loan of
$2,000.00 from Florida Federal Savings and Loan Jacksonville; the $2,000.00
loan on this note was disbursed for in 1988 at 8.00% interest per annum (Dkt. 8
Ex. C);
(4) that Defendant defaulted on this loan in 1989, after which the holder, Florida
Federal Saving and Loan Jacksonville, filed a claim on the loan guarantee (Dkt.
8 Ex. C);
(5) that Plaintiff has demanded repayment and that Defendant has failed to make
repayment;
(6) that the outstanding balance, with interest, is now $24,074.00.
Furthermore, these allegations were sworn to in a Certificates of Indebtedness issued by the
United States Department of Education.
Accepted as true, these allegations permit the Court to draw the reasonable inference
that Defendant is in default on his loan and indebted to the United States in the amount
specified in the complaint and in the Certificates of Indebtedness. See Surtain, 789 F.3d at
1245 (internal citations omitted). Default final judgment will be entered against Defendant.
Damages
The sworn Certificates of Indebtedness issued by the Department of Education and
provided by plaintiff details the amount Defendant owes. The first Certificate was dated
August 24, 2016, and according to it, the principal balance on the loan is $8,283.52 and the
interest as of that date was $11,083.74. The second Certificate was dated August 24, 2016,
and according to it, the principal balance on the loan is $1,980.49 and the interest as of that
date was $2,699.25, for a total debt of $24,047.00. Plaintiff also seeks $45.00 in costs for its
process-server fee, and Plaintiff provides an invoice of that fee as evidence to support the
award of that cost.
This sum of damages, the Court finds, is capable of being ascertained by way of
mathematical calculation. See Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism and the Klan,
777 F.2d 1538, 1543 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the sworn
certificate supplies the “essential evidence” that the Court would have used in a hearing to
determine damages. See S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2005). For these
reasons, a hearing on damages is not necessary. See id. (citing Adolph Coors, 77 F.2d at
1543).
It is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
1.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Final Judgment (Dkt. 8) is
GRANTED.
2.
Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff United States of America, and
against Defendant Charles M. Allen, for the following sums:
a.
Principal
(after application of all prior payments,
credits, and offsets),
b.
Interest through August 24, 2016
plus interest at the rate of 8.00% from August 24,
c.
Principal
(after application of all prior payments,
credits, and offsets),
d.
Interest through August 24, 2016
plus interest at the rate of 8.00% from August 24,
e.
Costs
TOTAL:
For all of which sums let execution issue.
$ 8,283.52
$ 11,083.74
$ 1,980.49
$ 2,699.25
$
45.00
$ 24,092.00,
3.
This judgment shall bear interest at the rate prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961
and shall be enforceable as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq., 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3307,
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a).
4.
The Clerk is directed to close this case and deny all pending motions as
moot.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 28th day of November, 2016.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record
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