Rau v. Cuppa, Inc. et al

Filing 33

ORDER: The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Rau's state law claims asserted in Counts Two, Four, Five, and Six. Those counts are dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 3/2/2017. (KAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
KYMBERLEE RAU,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:16-cv-3230-T-33JSS

CUPPA, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. The Court
held a case management hearing on March 1, 2017, and heard
from the parties regarding the nature of the claims and
defenses asserted in this case.

As explained herein and at

the hearing, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over
Plaintiff Kimberlee Rau’s state law claims, finding that they
predominate over the federal claims asserted.

Rau may file

her state law claims in state court, as explained herein.
Discussion
On

November

18,

2016,

after

her

separation

from

employment, Rau filed her Complaint (Doc. # 1), containing the
following counts: FLSA overtime as to all Defendants (Count
One); breach of contract and entitlement to attorney’s fees
and costs under Fla. Stat. § 448.08 as to Defendant Cuppa
(Count Two); FLSA retaliation as to all Defendants (Count
Three); battery against Griswold and Cuppa (Count Four);

intentional

infliction

of

emotional

distress

as

to

all

Defendants (Count Five); and violation of Florida’s Private
Whistle Blower Act, Fla. Stat. § 448.102, against Cuppa (Count
Six).
The limited discovery conducted so far reveals that Rau
is seeking $195.75 in unpaid straight time wages, $88.50 in
overtime wages, and $88.50 in liquidated damages under the
FLSA. (Doc. # 22-1 at 3).

Her counsel “has expended 43.10

hours on this case at an hourly rate of $325.00 for a total of
$14,007.50 in attorney’s fees [and] costs incurred to date are
$540.00.” (Id.).
Recently, Defendants filed a submission recognizing that
Rau is seeking monetary relief under the FLSA but emphasizing:
“The additional causes of action in the Complaint are of a
more serious nature in that Plaintiff contends that there has
been a battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
as well as retaliatory conduct by the Defendants.

These

matters are what is at the heart of the dispute. Because of
the seriousness of these allegations, the case itself goes
beyond just the claims of failure to pay wages.” (Doc. # 25 at
2).
As suggested by Defendants, the Court finds that the
state law claims presented in Counts Two, Four, Five, and Six,
2

particularly

the

battery

and

intentional

infliction

of

emotional distress claims, substantially predominate over the
two federal claims asserted under the FLSA.
Federal

courts

are

courts

of

limited

jurisdiction.

Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994).
presumption,

in

fact,

jurisdiction

in

a

is

that

particular

a

federal

case

until

court
it

The

lacks

has

been

demonstrated that jurisdiction over the subject matter exists.
United States v. Rojas, 429 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005).
Nevertheless, the exercise of jurisdiction is proper over
claims to which the Court’s jurisdiction would ordinarily not
extend if they form part of the same case or controversy as
“any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Rau’s FLSA claims form the basis of this Court’s original
jurisdiction and the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over
the

related

state

law

claims.

However,

the

Court’s

supplemental jurisdiction analysis does not end there. As
codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), district courts may decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim
when such claim (1) raises a novel or complex issue of state
law or (2) would substantially predominate over the federal
claim forming the basis of the court’s original subject matter
3

jurisdiction.
The unique factual allegations presented convince the
Court that the state law claims asserted should be severed and
dismissed without prejudice.

In addition, the nature of the

claims is not such that “all claims would be expected to be
tried together.” Cruz v. Winter Garden Realty, LLC, No. 6:12cv-1098, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176734 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 27,
2012).

This Court has developed a “fast track” for the

resolution of FLSA claims that is highly effective and is
focused on speedy resolution of an employee’s demands for
unpaid wages.

Rau’s allegations regarding being physically

battered at her place of employment and being subjected to
intentional infliction of emotional distress, among other
claims, are in an entirely different realm than her demand for
unpaid wages. See, e.g., Patel v. Goldspot Stores, LLC, No.
6:15-cv-198, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67796, *5 (M.D. Fla. May 1,
2015)(declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
defendant employer’s misappropriation counterclaims, based on
FLSA plaintiffs’ alleged theft of lottery tickets at work,
explaining: “the only connection between an action for unpaid
wages and the alleged misappropriation is that Plaintiffs were
employed by Goldspot at the time.

This is not enough.”);

Bennett v. S. Marine Mgmt. Co., 531 F. Supp. 115, 117 (M.D.
4

Fla. 1982)(combining Title VII and state tort law and contract
claims would cause confusion and delay, which is at odds with
important federal policies underlying Title VII); Williams v.
Bennett,

689

F.2d

district

court’s

1370,

1380

exercise

(11th

of

Cir.

1982)(affirming

discretion

not

to

assert

supplemental jurisdiction over state law assault and battery
claims).
Considering judicial economy, fairness to the parties,
and prudential notions for comity, the Court declines to
exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. Those claims
are novel and complex and they “dominate the federal claims
and obscure their significance.” Mather v. Portfolio Recovery
Assocs., LLC, No. 16-cv-62640, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156670,
at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2016).1
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Rau’s
state law claims asserted in Counts Two, Four, Five, and Six.
Those counts are dismissed without prejudice.

1

The Court directs Rau to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), which
tolls the limitations period on claims asserted under §
1367(a) for thirty days, unless state law provides for a
longer tolling period, so that the state law claims may be refiled in state court if Rau so chooses.
5

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 2nd day of
March, 2017.

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