Jones v. Secretary, Department of Corrections et al
Filing
29
ORDER denying Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Sam Jones and directing the Clerk to enter judgment and close case in accord with the attached order. A certificate of appealability and in forma pauperis status are denied. Signed by Judge William F. Jung on 9/16/2019. (JWW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
SAM JONES,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 8:16-cv-3235-T-02AEP
SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
__________________________________/
ORDER
On November 14, 2016, Petitioner Sam Jones constructively filed his
Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for writ of habeas corpus by a person in state
custody. Dkt. 1. He seeks relief from a 1994 Florida state court conviction. Id. at 1.
Respondents have filed a response in opposition. Dkt. 9. Petitioner filed a reply.
Dkt. 21. The Court finds that no hearing is necessary and denies the petition.
Background
On December 8, 1994 a jury found Jones guilty of first-degree murder,
attempted robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Dkt. 12-1. He was
sentenced to life in prison with a mandatory twenty-five year term and three
concurrent terms of 14 years and 9 months imprisonment. Id. He then appealed,
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and his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the state appellate court. Dkt. 122; see also Jones v. State, 686 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). On January 16,
1997, the appellate court issued its mandate. Dkt. 12-3.
On December 8, 1998, Jones filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief. Dkt.
12-4. In October 2000, the state postconviction court summarily denied this
motion. Dkt. 12-5. Jones appealed this denial. Id. On July 3, 2002, the state
appellate court issued a per curiam decision affirming the denial of postconviction
relief without opinion. Dkt. 12-6. The court issued its mandate on August 27, 2002.
Dkt. 12-7.
In August 2003, Jones filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus in state
court, which were denied. Dkt. 12-8. Several years later in April 2008, Jones filed
a second motion for postconviction relief alleging the discovery of new evidence.
Dkt. 12-9. The state postconviction court denied this motion on February 28, 2014.
Dkt. 12-10. On May 18, 2016, the Second District issued a per curiam decision
affirming the denial without opinion. Dkt. 12-11. The court issued its mandate on
June 14, 2016. Dkt. 12-12.
On November 14, 2016, Jones filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
by placing it into the hands of correctional facility authorities to be mailed. Dkt. 1;
see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275–76 (1988).
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Standards of Review
This petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Wilcox v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210
(11th Cir. 1998). AEDPA “establishes a highly deferential standard for reviewing
state court judgments.” Parker v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 768 (11th
Cir. 2003). This type of review does not allow relief of a state court conviction on
a claim
that was adjudicated on the merits in the State court proceedings’ unless
the state court’s decision was ‘(1) . . . contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) . . . based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.’
Nejad v. Attorney Gen., State of Ga., 830 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2016)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
“Clearly established Federal law” means holdings of the U.S. Supreme
Court “as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. at 1288–89.
“Contrary to” requires a state court conclusion “opposite to that reached by [the
Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently
than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at
1289 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). The “unreasonable application”
clause applies only “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
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principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. (citation omitted) (alterations in
original).
However, a state court’s factual determination “is not unreasonable merely
because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the
first instance.” Id. (citation omitted). AEDPA “requires federal habeas courts to
presume the correctness of state courts factual findings unless applicants rebut this
presumption with ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Id. (citation omitted). This is a
“demanding but not insatiable standard, requiring proof that a claim is highly
probable.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Counsel is ineffective under the Sixth Amendment if “(1) counsel's
performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense such that petitioner was deprived of a fair trial.” Dill v. Allen, 488 F.3d
1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984)). But in the habeas context, “[t]he question is not whether a federal court
believes the state court’s determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect
but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher
threshold.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “If there is ‘any reasonable argument that counsel
satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,’ then a federal court may not disturb a
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state-court decision denying the claim.” Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210,
1248 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Discussion
A. Timeliness
Federal habeas petitions are subject to a one-year statute of limitation. 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2018). It begins running—as relevant here—on the latest of
either: “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review” or “the date on which
the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence.” Id. The clock stops running for the “time
during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction . . . judgment or
claim is pending.” Id. § 2244(d)(2).
Here, Jones’s conviction was affirmed by the state appellate court on
December 20, 1996, and the mandate was issued on January 16, 1997. Dkt. 12-2 &
12-3. It became final for the purposes of ADEPA when the ninety-day period for
petitioning the United States Supreme Court for review expired: on April 17, 1997.
See Nix v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 393 F.3d 1235, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, Mr. Jones had a year from April 18, 1997 to file a petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2254.
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Jones did not file any postconviction motions between April 18, 1997 and
April 18, 1998. Any motions after this time did nothing to toll the one-year
timeframe to file a habeas petition. Therefore, his time to file a habeas petition
expired on April 18, 1998—eighteen years before he filed this Petition. Dkt. 1. As
such, Jones’s Petition is untimely for Grounds I and II.
However, Ground III of the Petition is based on a claim of newly discovered
evidence. See Zack v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 917, 926 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that the
one-year statute of limitations applies claim-by claim rather than for the petition in
its entirety). The one-year limitation period begins to run on the latest of either:
“the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review” or “the date on which the
factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2018). Here, it is
unclear when Jones could have discovered the evidence forming the basis of
Ground III. However, Jones’s claim of newly discovered evidence, originally
brought in state court in April of 2008, were pending until the state appellate
court’s mandate was issued on June 14, 2016. Dkt. 12-12. During this time from,
2008 to 2016, the one-year clock for ADEPA purposes was paused. This Petition
was filed on November 14, 2016—exactly five months after the clock began to run
again. Dkt. 1. Thus, Ground III is timely if the first time Jones could have
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discovered the factual basis for the claims was less than seven months before April
2008. This is unclear from the record in front of the Court. In any event, Ground III
fails on the merits.
B. Merits
Ground III of the Petition raises two issues: the postconviction court made
an unreasonable interpretation of the law for a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963) violation and an unreasonable determination of the facts surrounding newly
discovered evidence. Dkt. 1 at 11–18. Neither of these issues are appropriate for
federal habeas relief.
As a preliminary matter, Respondent argues that the claims made in Ground
III are unexhausted and therefore cannot be reviewed in a federal habeas petition.
Dkt. 9 at 8–9. A petitioner must exhaust all available state court remedies before
challenging the state conviction in federal court. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (“[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full
opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of
the State's established appellate review process.”). Jones raised both issues
presented in Ground III in a state court postconviction motion and then
unsuccessfully appealed them to a state intermediate appellate court. Dkt. 12-9 at
1. So, the state claims have been exhausted and are ripe for federal habeas review.
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However, the claim in Ground III that the state postconviction court
improperly ruled that newly discovered evidence did not entitle Jones to relief is
inappropriate for federal habeas review. Arguments about the existence or weight
of newly discovered evidence potentially relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner—
as opposed to the constitutionality of incarceration—do not provide grounds for
federal habeas relief. Swindle v. Davis, 846 F.2d 706, 707 (11th Cir. 1988).
Therefore, the only potential claim properly presented in Ground III is that the
postconviction court made an unreasonable determination of the law for a Brady
violation.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the state postconviction court denied this
claim, stating in pertinent part:
In claim two, Defendant makes the same arguments regarding Mr.
Harris's and Mr. Floyd's statements, but frames them as a Brady
violation. He asserts he meets the requirements of a Brady violation
because 1) the State possessed evidence favorable to Defendant; 2)
Defendant did not possess the evidence and could not obtain it for
himself with reasonable diligence; 3) the State suppressed favorable
evidence; 4) had the evidence been disclosed, a reasonable probability
exists that the outcome would have been different. He alleges the
statements would have cast doubt on the State's assumption that a
robbery was planned, and this cast doubt on the State's felony murder
charge.
Assistant State Attorney Ada Carmona testified at the evidentiary
hearing that she did not speak to Mr. Floyd in a holding cell and that he
never told her he was changing his statements. (See Transcript, Jan. 16,
2014, p. 185, 211). Ms. Carmona testified that Mr. Harris entered his
guilty pleas on the morning of December 12, 1994, and later was
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transported to the Office of the State Attorney to give statements. (See
Transcript, Jan. 16, 2014, pp. 188-189). As noted above, Ms. Carmona
testified that Mr. Harris's statements did not exonerate Defendant and
explained that the difference between Mr. Harris's statements was that
he "expounded as to when it was that they talked about going to rob
Reginald." (See Transcript, Jan. 16, 2014, p. 192). She testified that Mr.
Harris did not recant his statements to law enforcements officers. (See
Transcript, Jan. 16, 2014, p. 193). Ms. Carmona testified that if Mr.
Harris has asserted there was no plan to rob the victim, she would have
considered such information to be Brady material and she would have
disclosed it (See Transcript, Jan. 16, 2014, p. 197).
Assistant State Attorney Douglas Covington also testified at the
evidentiary hearing. Mr. Covington testified that he did not have an
independent recollection of Mr. Harris's statements, but that under his
obligations as a prosecutor he would have turned over any Brady
material to the defense as soon as possible. (See Transcript Jan. 16,
2014, p. 225). Judge Ward testified that she had previously worked with
both Ms. Carmona and Mr. Covington, and she had personal knowledge
that both attorneys had ''the same philosophy about discovery as I did
when I was a prosecutor and that was to give up the file." (See
Transcript, Jan. 16, 2014, pp. 129-131).
The Court finds testimony of Ms. Carmona to be credible based on her
demeanor in court. And as noted in claim one, the Court finds Mr.
Harris's and Mr. Floyd's testimonies to be incredible. In particular as to
Mr. Floyd, the Court notes that on cross-examination and on redirect,
he did not testify that he refused to lie for the prosecutors but instead
testified that he told them he did not want anything to do with
Defendant's case. (See Transcript, Jan. 16, 2014, pp. 27-28). He
testified that he could not remember what the prosecutors were asking
him to say. (See Transcript, Jan. 16, 2014, p. 27). Based on the credible
testimony presented by Ms. Carmona, and further based upon the fact
that Defendant failed to present any credible evidence in support of his
claim that the State withheld exculpatory evidence, the Court finds that
Defendant has not met his burden of establishing a Brady violation.
Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to relief on claim two.
Dkt. 12-10 at 7–8 (emphasis in original).
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After a review of the record and the applicable law—while deferring to the
state appellate court’s decision in accordance with the standard for federal habeas
review1—the Court concludes that Jones is not entitled to relief based on this
claim. The state court’s adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly
established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts considering the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.
Nevertheless, even if the state appellate court’s adjudication of this claim is not
entitled to deference, relief on the claim in Ground Three must be denied.
Under clearly established Supreme Court precedent, in order to successfully
allege a Brady violation a defendant must prove: (1) the evidence is be favorable to
the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the
evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the
evidence is material. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004). Nondisclosed
evidence is material: “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
The state appellate court’s per curiam affirmance still warrants deference because “the
summary nature of a state court’s decision does not lessen the deference that it is due.” Wright v.
Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002).
1
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different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, (1985).
Jones alleges that two individuals were interviewed by the state, gave
exculpatory information about Jones to the state, and that information was never
provided to Jones. Dkt. 1 at 12–13. Even accepting that this series of events
happened—something the state court rejected after an evidentiary hearing on the
matter2—these statements do not create a reasonable probability that if they were
disclosed the result of the proceedings would have been different. Both
individuals’ credibility as witnesses would have been weak considering each had
multiple prior felonies. Dkt. 12-10 at 6–7. Additionally, each gave statements
directly contradicting the allegedly undisclosed information—another highly
impeachable action. Id. In fact, Jones’s trial counsel testified that even if she had
been given the information, she likely would not have called the two individuals as
witnesses at trial. Id. at 5–7. Accordingly, Ground III does not present a basis for
federal habeas relief.
Certificate of Appealability
“The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it
enters a final order adverse to the applicant,” and if a certificate is issued “the court
2
Dkt. 12-10 at 2–10.
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must state the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).” Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for
the United States District Courts. The decision to issue a certificate of
appealability requires “an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a
general assessment of their merits.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336
(2003). A certificate of appealability may be issued “only if the applicant has made
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). A plaintiff “satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of
reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional
claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (citation omitted).
The Court finds that Jones does not establish this requirement. The Court
declines to issue a certificate of appealability in the matter.
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Conclusion
The Court denies Jones’s Petition with prejudice. Dkt. 1. The Clerk is
directed to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions, and close
the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on September 16, 2019.
/s/ William F. Jung
WILLIAM F. JUNG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Counsel of Record
Petitioner, pro se
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