Gonzalez v. Honeywell International, Inc.

Filing 10

ORDER denying 3 Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. The request made by Defendant in its Response 9 for an award of fees and costs is DENIED. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 1/17/2017. (LN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
IVONNE GONZALEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 8:16-cv-3359-T-30TGW

HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL,
INC.,
Defendant.

ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to State Court
(Dkt. 3) and Defendant’s Response in Opposition (Dkt. 9). Upon review and consideration,
the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion.
BACKGROUND
On November 7, 2016, Plaintiff Ivonne Gonzalez filed a complaint (Dkt. 2) against
Defendant Honeywell International, Inc., her former employer, in state court. She alleged
that Defendant violated the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) by discriminating against
her on the basis of her disability, denying her a reasonable accommodation for her
disability, and retaliating against her by terminating her employment. She requested relief
including (1) compensation for lost wages, benefits, and pension rights, (2) reinstatement
or front pay, (3) compensatory damages, including for emotional distress, (4) punitive
damages, and (5) attorney’s fees.

On December 7, 2016, Defendant filed a notice of removal (Dkt. 1) based on
diversity jurisdiction. Defendant alleged that the parties are diverse and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.
On December 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand to state court (Dkt. 3).
Plaintiff does not dispute that the parties are diverse. She argues that Defendant has not
established that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
DISCUSSION
Where the alleged basis for federal jurisdiction is diversity, the removing defendant
has the burden of demonstrating (1) complete diversity of citizenship and (2) an amount in
controversy greater than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see McNutt v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 179, 189 (1936) (holding that the party who seeks
federal jurisdiction must establish jurisdictional facts). The defendant must prove these
jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613
F.3d 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the
defendant must prove only that the amount in controversy “more likely than not” exceeds
the jurisdictional amount. Id. It need not prove the amount in controversy “beyond all doubt
or banish all uncertainty about it.” Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 754
(11th Cir. 2010).
In determining the amount in controversy, the court should look first to the
complaint. Id. If it is not facially apparent from the complaint that the amount in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount, then the court should look to the notice of
removal and other relevant evidence. Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th

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Cir. 2001). When a defendant seeks to remove the case to federal court within the first
thirty days of service, it is not limited in the types of evidence it can use to establish the
amount in controversy. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 767. The Defendant can provide an affidavit,
declaration, or other documentation, id. at 755; it can also satisfy its burden by submitting
evidence of damages from comparable cases, Schmidt v. Pantry, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-228SPM-GRJ, 2012 WL 1313490, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2012). Furthermore, district courts
are permitted to make “reasonable deductions, . . . inferences, [and] . . . extrapolations” and
need not “suspend reality or shelve common sense” in determining whether a party has
established the jurisdictional amount. Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061-62 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “[C]ourts may use their judicial experience and common sense
in determining whether the case . . . meets federal jurisdictional requirements.” Id. at 1062.
In the complaint (Dkt. 2), Plaintiff simply alleged that her damages exceed $15,000.
However, as discussed in Defendant’s notice of removal (Dkt. 1) and response to Plaintiff’s
motion to remand (Dkt. 9), the back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive
damages, and attorney’s fees claimed by Plaintiff more likely than not exceed $75,000.
i.

Back Pay

Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s potential back pay alone amounts to $72,972. In
support of this contention, Defendant submitted a declaration by a regional director of its
human resources department (Dkt. 1-3) and Plaintiff’s W-2s from 2014 and 2015 (Dkt. 14), which establish that Plaintiff’s annualized salary at the time of her termination was
approximately $36,486. Defendant calculates the $72,972 based on the fact that Plaintiff
was terminated approximately one year before the case was removed, Plaintiff has not

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obtained a new job that would mitigate her damages, and the trial in this matter is likely to
take place one year from the date of removal. 1 Plaintiff did not dispute these allegations,
other than to argue that the back pay accumulated by the time of removal is only about
$36,000 and estimating any additional damages is speculative.
Under the FCRA, a prevailing plaintiff is presumptively entitled to back pay. See,
e.g., Brown v. Cunningham Lindsey U.S., Inc., No. 305-CV-141-J32-HTS, 2005 WL
1126670, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 11, 2005). Courts in this Circuit have previously held that
back pay may be calculated through the estimated date of trial. E.g., Wineberger v.
Racetrac Petroleum, No. 5:14-CV-653-OC-30PRL, 2015 WL 225760, at *3 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 16, 2015); Hallmeyer v. Gateway Clippers LLC, No. 8:12-CV-2876-T-30TBM, 2013
WL 268643, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2013); Sheehan v. Westcare Found., Inc., No. 8:12CV-2544-T-33TBM, 2013 WL 247143, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2013). Combining
evidence (i.e., the rate of Plaintiff’s salary) with reasonable extrapolations (i.e., calculating
the amount of back pay by estimating a reasonable trial date) is not improper speculation.
See Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754. As noted in Pretka, “[t]he amount of controversy is . . . an
estimate of the amount that will be put at issue in the course of the litigation.” Id. at 751
(emphasis added) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the Court
accepts Defendant’s calculation that the amount of back pay at issue is $72,972.

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Defendant’s estimate of one year until the trial date is reasonable. This case has been
designated as a Track Two case (Dkt. 4). Therefore, pursuant to Local Rule 3.05(c)(2)(E), the
Court should hold a trial in this case within one to two years.

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ii.

Front Pay

Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s potential front pay adds at least another $36,486
to the amount in controversy. It cites to prior case law in which the plaintiff recovered a
year of front pay after prevailing on an employment discrimination claim under the FCRA.
Under the FCRA, a prevailing plaintiff is presumptively entitled to reinstatement or
front pay. See, e.g., Brown, 2005 WL 1126670, at *5. Courts in this Circuit have previously
held that it is reasonable to add one year of front pay to the amount in controversy in an
FCRA employment discrimination case. See, e.g., Wineberger, 2015 WL 225760, at *3
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2015); Penalver v. N. Elec., Inc., No. 12-80188-CIV, 2012 WL
1317621, at *2, *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2012); Brown, 2005 WL 1126670, at *5.
Accordingly, the Court accepts Defendant’s calculation that the value of the front pay
placed in controversy is $36,486. 2
iii.

Compensatory Damages, Punitive Damages, and Attorney’s Fees

Defendant has proven that the amount in controversy likely exceeds $75,000 based
on consideration of just the back pay and front pay at issue. However, Plaintiff also

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Although Plaintiff requested front pay or reinstatement, this does not discredit
Defendant’s amount in controversy calculation. Reinstatement is a form of equitable relief. For
purposes of calculating the amount in controversy, the value of this relief is the “monetary value
of the benefit that would flow to the plaintiff if the injunction were granted.” Morrison v. Allstate
Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Because the monetary value of reinstatement would likely equal or exceed that of a year’s worth
of front pay, valuing this relief at $36,486 is conservative.

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requested (1) compensatory damages, including for emotional distress, (2) punitive
damages, and (3) attorney’s fees.
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s potential compensatory damages, punitive
damages, and attorney’s fees add thousands more dollars to the amount in controversy.
First, Defendant cites to prior cases in which plaintiffs who alleged emotional distress
recovered $75,000 to $150,000 in compensatory damages after prevailing on their FCRA
claims. Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff could be awarded up to $100,000 in
punitive damages under the FCRA, and Plaintiff has not indicated that she is seeking
anything less than the maximum amount of damages. Third, Defendant estimates that
Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees through the time of trial will amount to at least $62,500, assuming
250 hours of work at an hourly rate of $250 per hour. Defendant cites to cases in this Circuit
in which courts have awarded prevailing plaintiffs’ attorneys with fees for 450 to 1050
hours spent litigating employment discrimination cases through trial, as well as cases in
which the courts found attorneys’ hourly rates of $200 to $350 to be reasonable.
Under the FCRA, a prevailing plaintiff can obtain compensatory damages, punitive
damages, and attorney’s fees. See Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5). The Court must consider each of
these in calculating the amount in controversy. Bell v. Preferred Life Assur. Soc. of
Montgomery, Ala., 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943) (“Where both actual and punitive damages
are recoverable under a complaint each must be considered to the extent claimed in
determining jurisdictional amount.”); Morrison, 228 F.3d at 1265 (“When a statute
authorizes the recovery of attorney’s fees, a reasonable amount of those fees is included in
the amount in controversy.”). The Court need not pinpoint the exact dollar figure of each

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of these forms of relief to recognize that their value adds thousands of dollars to the amount
in controversy.
Construing Plaintiff’s damages as a whole and applying its “judicial experience and
common sense,” the Court concludes that Defendant has established that Plaintiff’s
damages more likely than not exceed $75,000.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Dkt. 3) is DENIED.

2.

The request made by Defendant in its Response (Dkt. 9) for an award of fees
and costs is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on January 17th, 2017.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record

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