Williams v. State Attorney Office

Filing 3

ORDER dismissing the civil rights complaint; directing the clerk to ENTER A JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL against Williams and to CLOSE the case. Signed by Judge Steven D. Merryday on 6/7/2017. (BK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

TIMMY WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 8:17-cv-367-T-23MAP

STATE ATTORNEY OFFICE,
Defendants.
/

ORDER
Williams’s complaint alleges that the State Attorney’s Office for the Sixth
Judicial Circuit of Florida violated his civil rights during a state post-conviction
proceeding under state Rule 3.850. Williams has neither moved for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis nor paid the required filing fee. Nevertheless, whether he proceeds
in forma pauperis or he pays the filing fee, the district court must dismiss an action if
the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (if proceeding in forma paupeis) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A (if the filing fee is paid). Although the complaint is entitled to a generous
interpretation, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam), this pro se complaint
lacks merit under this standard.

Habeas Corpus:
Williams discloses that he is a state prisoner in the custody of the Florida
Department of Corrections (“DOC”). The DOC’s website discloses that Williams
is imprisoned for life under a 1994 judgment for robbery with a gun or deadly
weapon.1 Williams specifically entitles his paper a “Complaint Civil Action” and
avoids seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Nevertheless, a federal court has an
“obligation to look behind the label of a [pleading] filed by a pro se inmate and
determine whether [it] is, in effect, cognizable under a different remedial statutory
framework.” Gooden v. United States, 627 F.3d 846, 847 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 990
(2006) (quoting Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006)), explains the differences
between a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a habeas action under
28 U.S.C. § 2254:
The line of demarcation between a § 1983 civil rights action and
a § 2254 habeas claim is based on the effect of the claim on the
inmate’s conviction and/or sentence. When an inmate
challenges the “circumstances of his confinement” but not the
validity of his conviction and/or sentence, then the claim is
properly raised in a civil rights action under § 1983. However,
when an inmate raises any challenge to the “lawfulness of
confinement or [the] particulars affecting its duration,” his
claim falls solely within “the province of habeas corpus” under
§ 2254. Simply put, if the relief sought by the inmate would
either invalidate his conviction or sentence or change the nature

1

The information is accessible by searching under the prisoner’s name at
“http://www.dc.state.fl.us/OffenderSearch/Search.aspx.”
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or duration of his sentence, the inmate’s claim must be raised in
a § 2254 habeas petition, not a § 1983 civil rights action.

Williams contends that his right to due process was violated because he was
allegedly not afforded a fair hearing in the post-conviction proceeding. Williams
gains no benefit by liberally construing the civil rights complaint to allege that he was
denied his constitutional rights during the state proceeding because the claim would
challenge the validity of the criminal conviction. Under Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S.
475, 500 (1973), if a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of confinement, a
writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy. Additionally, Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994), precludes Williams from challenging the
validity of either the conviction or the sentence (including a fine or penalty) by a civil
rights action instead of an application for the writ of habeas corpus.
We hold that, in order to recover damages for [an] allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,
28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state
prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if
it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff
can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already
been invalidated.

Heck requires dismissal of a civil rights complaint if a ruling in the plaintiff’s favor
questions the validity of the conviction or sentence. Williams has no Section 1983
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claim unless he prevails on habeas corpus. “[A] § 1983 cause of action for damages
attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the
conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 489–90.
Consequently, Williams fails to state a claim for relief that he can pursue in a
civil rights action because the complaint fails to allege that the conviction was
“reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . . .” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 487.
Civil Rights:
The only named defendant in the complaint is “Asst. State Attorney of record
for the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court.” (Doc. 1 at 2) The only factual allegations
involve the conduct of a Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction proceeding, which
motion was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Williams contends that the
denial of his post-conviction motion, which he represents was based on newly
discovered evidence that showed his actual innocence, deprived him of “life or liberty
[without] due process of law.” (Doc. 1 at 3) Williams further contends that the
prosecutor and the judge conspired to deny his requested relief.
Although not named as a defendant, Williams complains that the state court
judge mishandled the post-conviction proceeding. A state court judge is entitled to
absolute immunity from suit in a civil rights action for an act that is within the scope
of judicial authority. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 355 (1871); Supreme Court of
Virginia v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Jones v. Cannon,
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174 F.3d 1271, 1281-82 (11th Cir. 1999). “Like other forms of official immunity,
judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of
damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991). Judicial immunity is not defeated
by an allegation of bad faith or malice. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
Also, judicial immunity is not defeated because an action is filed under Section 1983.
Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 734–35. As a consequence, Williams cannot pursue a
claim for damages against the state court judge.
Williams’s allegations show that the state attorney acted in the capacity of a
prosecutor. Prosecutorial immunity precludesWilliams’s recovering compensatory
damages. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (“[I]n initiating a prosecution
and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for
damages under § 1983.”); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999)
(“[A]bsolute immunity extends to a prosecutor’s <acts undertaken . . . in preparing for
the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his
role as an advocate for the State . . . .’”) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,
273 (1993)). See also Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1294–96 (11th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 560 U.S. 953 (2010), for a thorough review of the breadth of prosecutorial
immunity. As a consequence, Williams cannot pursue a claim for damages against
the prosecutor.

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No Appellate Jurisdiction:
Williams complains that the state court failed to follow controlling law when it
denied his motion for post-conviction relief. A federal district court has no
supervisory or appellate jurisdiction over a state court, as Jones v. Crosby, 137 F.3d
1279, 1280 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1041 (1998), explains:
It is well settled that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to
review, reverse, or invalidate a final state court decision. See
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1923).
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the authority to review final
decisions from the highest court of the state is reserved to the
Supreme Court of the United States. Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d
624 (11th Cir. 1997). Jones cannot utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
recast his claim and thereby obtain collateral review in federal
court of the state court decision. Berman v. Florida Bd. of Bar
Examiners, 794 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1986).

A federal district court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate “cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection
of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005). See also Christophe v. Morris, 198 Fed. App’x 818, 825 (11th Cir. 2006)2
(construing part of a complaint as a challenge to a state court adjudication and
holding the claim barred under Rooker-Feldman).

2

“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as
persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. Rule 36-2.
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CONCLUSION
As determined above, Williams can pursue a claim for monetary damages
against neither the state court judge nor the prosecutor. Williams must pursue a
challenge to his conviction and sentence in an application for the writ of habeas
corpus. As a consequence, Williams fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted in the present action. Amendment of the action would prove futile because
Williams can state no valid Section 1983 claim for relief. See Bryant v. Dupree,
252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A district court need not, however, allow an
amendment (1) where there has been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; (2) where
allowing amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or
(3) where amendment would be futile.”).
Accordingly, the civil rights complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED. The clerk
must enter a judgment of dismissal against Williams and close this case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on June 7, 2017.

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